AHC: A Military Revolution in Southeast Asia

For general background, from Strange Parallels by Victor Lieberman (who studies Myanmar), volume one:

In mainland Southeast Asia military technology and strategy were more conservative than in Sengoku Japan or early modern Europe, and perhaps early modern South Asia. With broad, inhospitable marches separating some of the chief potential antagonists, fewer opportunities arose for extended conflict. Whereas in Europe printing, mercenaries, and a common cultural subtext sped the latest techniques from the English Channel to the Urals, and whereas in Japan a relatively unified culture also encouraged a rapid sharing of military advances, in mainland Southeast Asia poor east–west communications and the Indic-Sinic divide prevented a comparable fluidity.Moreover, compared to Japan, Europe, or South Asia, populations were smaller and commercial economies more sluggish, which was critical insofar as: a) Southeast Asia lacked the financial and credit mechanisms to maintain large standing armies and b) the absence of large-scale indigenous gun manufacture reduced the pressure for changes in weapons production, training, and finance.
 
Interesting. Southeast Asia is really under-represented in our timelines.

Another major factor that doesn't get mentioned here I'd say is the dependence on southeast asian states on hydraulic agriculture. It seems like it brought them to a certain level of sophistication but there was no real pressure to innovate after that point.

Wasn't the population of Southeast Asia rather large though? It seems to me that relative isolation from major threats played a bigger role than anything else.
 
It seems like it brought them to a certain level of sophistication but there was no real pressure to innovate after that point.
Is there any particular reason you think this? The kingdom of Bangkok in 1824 was far more centralized (and larger) than the kingdom of Ayutthaya in 1524, which in turn was far more centralized than even the Khmer empire, for example. This applies to Burma as well (the Konbaung dynasty was far more centralized than the Taungoo dynasty, which was in turn far, far more developed than Pagan).

Wasn't the population of Southeast Asia rather large though?
A lot of this is only in modern times. In the early 19th century both Burma and Thailand had less people than Spain (without its colonies). As one king of Thailand put it, "the ruler of Bengal rules over people; I rule over swamps and mosquitoes," which isn't unjustified since India had a population density 6 times greater than Southeast Asia as a whole.
 
Seems difficult, because Southeast Asian states could be massively successful in terms of conquest without any need to truly innovate. Taungoo is a pretty obvious example, and there's quite a few others. And once you get big enough, you run into the difficult terrain which prevents an empire there from getting too much bigger, which no manner of extra guns and cannons will solve. The situation seems too abstract to be an easily solvable one for the mindset of a Southeast Asian ruler (or really any contemporary nation).
 
You need a big threat for the ancient SEA states to step up the war game. Something like the Mongols, perhaps.
 
You need a big threat for the ancient SEA states to step up the war game. Something like the Mongols, perhaps.
Oh I certainly don't mean the Classic states, I mean the Early Modern ones. Most obviously Taungoo Burma in the west, Ayutthaya Thailand in the center and Trinh/Nguyen Vietnam in the east.
 
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