AHC: A Franco-German-Italian war in 1881 over Tunis?

raharris1973

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Can Germany (under Bismarck or under anybody else if he is not available for some reason) encourage Italy to actively oppose France in Tunisia rather than just take advantage of Italian bitterness over Tunisia after the fact*? Would combined German-Italian warnings deter France or egg France on? Would the German-Italian coalition win in Europe and North Africa if France persisted in the face of their opposition?

Why is Germany doing this? Just work with me here, the Germans are seeking to create a rupture as permanent and irreparable as the one between France and Germany between France and Italy also. Italy gaining territory in Africa or Europe (possibly Nice) from France would divide French revanchist feeling between Germany and Italy and cement Italy to the German orbit.




*In OTL Germany used Italian bitterness against France over Tunis to bring Italy into the Triple Alliance in the 1880s
 
I daresay any indication that the Germans would go to war with France to help the Italians take Tunisia would rapidly force the French to back down. Of course, it might alarm others in Europe and make diplomacy a lot more complicated, too.
 
Britain was opposed to Italy annexing Tunisia. They feared Italy could (theoretically at least) cut off access through the Med if it seized Tunisia. If Germany encouraged and supported Italy being more assertive against France, it might have meant Britain would get involved. Bismarck wasn't as stupid as a future German leader a few decades later in wanting to start a general European war over an area of little interest to Berlin that Germany might lose.
 
The Italians only barely had Libya, which they controlled a few coastal cities of until after WWI. I think they would love to get the city of Tunis and the ruins of Carthage, but they would not get the Germans on their side for that.
 
This would go against Bismarck's policy of encouraging the French to channel their energy into expanding the Empire rather than revanchism.
Bismarck didn't want a permanent rupture with France. He knew that Germany's position wouldn't be stable if France was always preparing for the next fight. He would much rather that the French have Tunis- and appreciate that the Germans weren't enemies in every sphere- than block a major victory for the faction of French policy makers whose interests aligned with his own.
 
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