AHC A different WWII Greek Airforce

I downloaded a Cabinet Paper called Defence Expenditure in Future Years (date December 1937) from the National Archives website some time ago. In the appendices was TABLE III. COST OF CONSTRUCTION OF VARIOUS CLASSES OF SHIPS. It compared the cost of World War One warships with the ships being built at the time. Here are some figures that I think might be relevant.

Capital Ships
£8,000,000 King George V (including aircraft £75,000)
£7,600,000 Rodney
£7,500,000 Nelson​
Cruisers
£2,400,000 Norfolk
£2,200,000 Liverpool (including aircraft £55,700)
£2,175,000 Glasgow (including aircraft £55,700)
£1,650,000 Dido
£1,400,000 Penelope (including aircraft £22,000)
£1,400,000 Aurora (including aircraft £22,000)​
Destroyers
£595,000 Tribal class
£575,000 "K" class
£380,000 "I" class
£335,000 "A" class​

The above are approximate total costs.
 
I'd like to briefly drag us back to aircraft for a bit. Prior to the Spanish Civil War, Douhet's Theory was still well considered. After Guernica, the possibility of terror bombing a city is something militaries and governments must keep in mind. Having at least a token bomber force, of twin engine bombers, is therefore still a desirable weapon, just having it would be viewed as a deterrent to keep an enemy from indiscriminately bombing your cities to rubble. Twin engine, medium bombers are more expensive, so there would be a limited quantity of this type of aircraft. Germany offers the excellent Do17 and the He111. French bombers are at this time, capable of carrying large bomb loads but at slow speeds. Additionally there is the question of how long it would take for an aircraft order to be completed. The UK has the Handley Page Hampden, and the excellent Vickers Wellington. The UK seems to have more industrial capacity and ability to deliver than France too. The other factor to be weighed in considering aircraft orders from European manufacturers in this time frame is the seemingly increasing threat of war, with attendant disruption or outright cancellation of orders. Which brings us to the American possibility, the Martin B10, or its export derivative, the Martin Model 139.

What about OTL's choice, the PZL.37? An order of 12 had been placed by 1939 and work had begun towards domestic production.
 
Following on from Post 81..

Table VI in the document was PARTICULARS RELATIVE TO AIRCRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES FROM 1924 ONWARDS. These are the aircraft from 1937 onwards.

Fighters
£5,300 Gladiator 1937
£3,850 Demon 1937
£8,000 Spitfire 1939
£10,500 Defiant 1939​
Light Bombers - NOTE: From 1937 onwards Light Bombers are being replaced by Medium Bombers (S.E.)
£4,150 Hind 1937​
Medium Bombers (Single Engine)
£11,750 Wellesley 1937
£11,250 Battle 1937
£11,250 Battle 1939​
Medium Bombers (Twin Engine)
£13,500 Blenheim 1937
£20,000 Hampden 1939
£18,500 Wellington 1939​
Heavy Bombers
£24,000 Harrow 1937
£30,000 Whitley 1937
£30,000 Roe P13/36 1939
£42,000 Handley Page P13/36 1939​
Army Co-operation
£6,000 Hector 1937
£7,750 Lysander 1939​
Flying Boats
£31,500 London 1937
£31,500 Stranraer 1937
£46,500 Sunderland 1939
£38,000 Saunders Roe R1/36 1939​

The costs are Cost Complete. That is the figures of cost (which, for the latter types, are estimated only) shown includes airframe, engine(s), aircraft equipment (instruments, &c) and armament, other than bombs and ammunition.
 
What about OTL's choice, the PZL.37? An order of 12 had been placed by 1939 and work had begun towards domestic production.

Recently the minutes of the meetings of the Greek superior war council have been published (link for book in Greek here http://www.doureios.com/Books/Hellenic_Armamentsdet.html)

The minutes have an explicit decision to buy 12 LeO-451, with PZL P.37 the second choice. Interest in P.37 resurfaced due to problems with the delivery of LeO-451 on time but no definite order had taken place before the war. Or at least isn't present in the published minutes.

If we move the bomber selection a year ahead P.37 is turned to the obvious choice on the other hand as the French plane is even more unready.
 
What about OTL's choice, the PZL.37? An order of 12 had been placed by 1939 and work had begun towards domestic production.

...
If we move the bomber selection a year ahead P.37 is turned to the obvious choice on the other hand as the French plane is even more unready.

The PZL.37 looks every bit as capable bomber as the best 1930s He 111, and price would've probably been close to much less capable Blenheim or Do 17. Excellent choice, indeed and earlier order is needed.
 
I'm interested in the Greeks buying the Fokker G.I as a heavy fighter and as a light bomber. According to the Wikipeadia entry the Mercury powered version could carry 300kg (660lb) of bombs and the Twin Wasp Junior version 400kg (880lb). Does anybody know if the bombs were carried internally or externally? Also if more powerful versions of the Mercury and Twin Wasp could have been fitted would that produced more speed or payload?

The performance figures quoted in the reference books are presumably with 87 octane fuel. Would the British would have supplied the Greeks with 100 octane fuel and would that have improved the aircraft's performance with either of its OTL engine combinations?
 
The PZL.37 looks every bit as capable bomber as the best 1930s He 111, and price would've probably been close to much less capable Blenheim or Do 17. Excellent choice, indeed and earlier order is needed.
Only problem is Pzl was not able to manufacture enough for Polish AF. Or even if they did they may end up pressed into PAF.
 
That makes me wonder, can we make Greece stronger than they where on OTL where they manged to hold of the Italians until the Germans intervened.

With the POD we are currently using (Venizelos winning the 1933 election/successful republican coup in March 1935, preferably the first) yοu are looking at the Greek army officer corps not purged of about 1500 republican officers and actually the higher command. Couple this with 1-2 years earlier rearmament and it means you are dealing with an army of about 70 infantry regiments in 1940 (as per the 1934 mobilization plan) as opposed to the 56 mobilized in OTL that at at least a bit better armed as far as AT guns etc go. Does it matter? I doubt it stops Mussolini, the final decision to attack Greece was clearly underestimating the Greeks on political/ideological grounds (as well as Prasca wanting to retain command thus claiming he could start the war with limited force). This is hardly affected by how strong the Greeks actually are...
 
With the POD we are currently using (Venizelos winning the 1933 election/successful republican coup in March 1935, preferably the first) yοu are looking at the Greek army officer corps not purged of about 1500 republican officers and actually the higher command. Couple this with 1-2 years earlier rearmament and it means you are dealing with an army of about 70 infantry regiments in 1940 (as per the 1934 mobilization plan) as opposed to the 56 mobilized in OTL that at at least a bit better armed as far as AT guns etc go. Does it matter? I doubt it stops Mussolini, the final decision to attack Greece was clearly underestimating the Greeks on political/ideological grounds (as well as Prasca wanting to retain command thus claiming he could start the war with limited force). This is hardly affected by how strong the Greeks actually are...
With 25% more infantry regiments and presumably an equal or greater increase in artillery, engineers and services could the Greek Army have driven the Italians into the sea?
 
With 25% more infantry regiments and presumably an equal or greater increase in artillery, engineers and services could the Greek Army have driven the Italians into the sea?

That's contingent on many things, not least the ability to keep in supply 5 more divisions in Albania over what amounted to mountain tracks. This being said though you still can put the peak 14 infantry divisions on the front from November, more easily replace casualties, rotate divisions on the front and so on. Plus you've replaced Papagos who was solid but not exactly the brightest mind in the Greek general staff with... someone (Katheniotis and Othonaios probably). This may well be more important than the additional divisions if for example they exploit the fall of Korytza to the full in November.
 
That's contingent on many things, not least the ability to keep in supply 5 more divisions in Albania over what amounted to mountain tracks. This being said though you still can put the peak 14 infantry divisions on the front from November, more easily replace casualties, rotate divisions on the front and so on. Plus you've replaced Papagos who was solid but not exactly the brightest mind in the Greek general staff with... someone (Katheniotis and Othonaios probably). This may well be more important than the additional divisions if for example they exploit the fall of Korytza to the full in November.

Certainly the Greeks stand to make significant gains in Albania with improved armed forces. However unless the POD addresses infrastructure both in Greece and Albania and the issue of Italian and German reinforcements coupled with the reality of interior lines of communication I don't see the Greeks driving the Italians into the sea. Taking Vlore and Berat are certainly possible though.
 
Only problem is Pzl was not able to manufacture enough for Polish AF. Or even if they did they may end up pressed into PAF.

Which was the basis of my reluctance to opt for the Polish aircraft. Had the Poles been able to build more, sooner, they would have been a very good choice. Would a Greek order cause an increase in production and earlier delivery?
US Aircraft are good, but expensive, and that cuts them out of consideration. The reason for mentioning the B10/Martin 139 is that it was in production, and in numbers to have been available to fill orders, even if expensive.
 
Following on from Post 81..

Table VI in the document was PARTICULARS RELATIVE TO AIRCRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES FROM 1924 ONWARDS. These are the aircraft from 1937 onwards.
...
The costs are Cost Complete. That is the figures of cost (which, for the latter types, are estimated only) shown includes airframe, engine(s), aircraft equipment (instruments, &c) and armament, other than bombs and ammunition.

Thank you! Do you have the link for original document and did it also have prices for Army equipment, such as AA-guns etc. too?
 
I'm interested in the Greeks buying the Fokker G.I as a heavy fighter and as a light bomber. According to the Wikipeadia entry the Mercury powered version could carry 300kg (660lb) of bombs and the Twin Wasp Junior version 400kg (880lb). Does anybody know if the bombs were carried internally or externally? Also if more powerful versions of the Mercury and Twin Wasp could have been fitted would that produced more speed or payload?

The performance figures quoted in the reference books are presumably with 87 octane fuel. Would the British would have supplied the Greeks with 100 octane fuel and would that have improved the aircraft's performance with either of its OTL engine combinations?

Whether the 'real' Twin Wasp can be installed is anyone's guess, IMO it should have been possible. As for Mercury, the Mk.XV is pre-war option that is rated for 950++ HP at 8000-9000 ft when operating on 100 oct.
The wing is certainly big enough to carry bigger bomb load, question is whether the structure is laid out that way to allow bigger bomb load. Again, my guess is that with greater engine power it would've been possible to carry more.
 
Certainly the Greeks stand to make significant gains in Albania with improved armed forces. However unless the POD addresses infrastructure both in Greece and Albania and the issue of Italian and German reinforcements coupled with the reality of interior lines of communication I don't see the Greeks driving the Italians into the sea. Taking Vlore and Berat are certainly possible though.

Taking Valona drastically affects the Italian supply situation in Albania. At the time Valona had a capacity of about 1200t a day, Durrazo 800t a day and St John Di Medua (Shengjin) about 200t. If Valona falls you have taken out over half of the Italian supply capacity. The Italians can still maintain around 200-250000 men from the other two ports (they were supplying 550,000 by April 1941 with all three ports at full capacity) but this puts them at a distinct disadvantage, as the Greeks can supply about 300-350,000 men in Albania by comparison. And if the Greeks are forced to stop their own offensive due to the winter and their own extending supply lines, which looks plausible, they can still pull back several divisions from the new front to cover an Olympus -Vermion line against the Germans. (No Papagos also means a sane deployment against the Germans come 1941, as that was largely the latter's doing )
 
Taking Valona drastically affects the Italian supply situation in Albania. At the time Valona had a capacity of about 1200t a day, Durrazo 800t a day and St John Di Medua (Shengjin) about 200t. If Valona falls you have taken out over half of the Italian supply capacity. The Italians can still maintain around 200-250000 men from the other two ports (they were supplying 550,000 by April 1941 with all three ports at full capacity) but this puts them at a distinct disadvantage, as the Greeks can supply about 300-350,000 men in Albania by comparison. And if the Greeks are forced to stop their own offensive due to the winter and their own extending supply lines, which looks plausible, they can still pull back several divisions from the new front to cover an Olympus -Vermion line against the Germans. (No Papagos also means a sane deployment against the Germans come 1941, as that was largely the latter's doing )

Ok, this is taking things way off the rails into the weeds, but you've piqued my curiousity with the comment about Papagos's deployment against the Germans. I've only a couple books covering the German invasion, so I admit there is much I simply don't know. Please tell me how you feel he failed, and if you know of a book in English covering more of this, as it is an area of interest to me.
Thanks, Bill
 
Ok, this is taking things way off the rails into the weeds, but you've piqued my curiousity with the comment about Papagos's deployment against the Germans. I've only a couple books covering the German invasion, so I admit there is much I simply don't know. Please tell me how you feel he failed, and if you know of a book in English covering more of this, as it is an area of interest to me.
Thanks, Bill

Not much to say really. Allied forces deployed in two entirely separate positions with 4 divisions on the Bulgarian border, in a position that was known that it could be flanked in the west from Doiran and another 4 on the Aliakmon, 200km apart from the first (an also with a potentially exposed flank at Monastir). At the same time he kept refusing to pull back forces from Albania to the potentially far more defensible Olympus-Venetikos line not just before the invasion as proposed to him by his corps commanders but all the way to April 13th was time had effectively run out.

The actual deployments and the proposed Olympus line can be seen here:

http://tothosewhoserved.org/aus/army/ausarm02/img/img004.jpg
 
Thank you! Do you have the link for original document and did it also have prices for Army equipment, such as AA-guns etc. too?
There isn't a link as such. You have to go onto the National Archives website, sign up as a member and then do a search for it among the on-line Cabinet Papers. Then you have to buy it, but the price is nil and then the website sends a PDF by email or you can download it.

Or the easy way is send me a PM with your email address and I'll send you a copy of my copy. But it doesn't include army equipment.
 
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