AHC: a better British Army co-op 'airforce'

Was it just a simple cash payment. I ask because modern airlines and plane makers go through some very convoluted finance deals and some of the sales of Boeing and Airbus seem to defy economic sense.

On July 8, 1935, Smith sent a telegram to Douglas ordering ten transports costing $795,000. The actual specifications for Smith’s proposed airplane arrived at Douglas Aircraft on November 14, 1935 (long after construction had begun). Before the first flight of the DC-3, American doubled their initial order to include eight DSTs and 12 DC-3s. By the time the actual contract was signed on April 8, 1936, American Airlines and Donald Douglas both had a heavy financial commitment.3 In today’s business environment the contract always precedes work, but in 1935, American Airlines had such faith in Douglas’ dependability and integrity that the order came first and the contract after delivery


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In deciding to manufacture the DC-2, Douglas took another calculated risk. The DC 1 had cost the company more than $350,000. TWA agreed to pay $65,000 for each DC 2 (sans engines) and Douglas was betting the DC 2 would catch on so he could recoup his research and development costs. When the 76th DC 2 rolled off the line, it put Douglas in the black, clearing the research, development, and losses on the DC 1, and the first 25 DC-2s.
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Bumping. You'll see why in a few minutes
Some background information

This is from National Archives File AIR 9/50 Mobilisation and Expansion for War 1925-36
1931 Composition of Contingent "A" of the Regular Expeditionary Force
HQ, RAF in the Field
HQ, No. 1 (Bomber) Group
HQ, No. 1 (Army Co-operation) Wing

Nos. 2, 4 and 13 (Army Co-operation) Squadrons
Nos. 35 and 207 (Bomber) Squadrons
No. 41 (Fighter) Squadron

No. 1 Air Stores Park
No. 1 Aircraft Depot
No. 1 Port Detachment

Base Personnel Office
Base Accommodation Office​

The file gave no details of the later contingents. However, the file did have a few pages going back to 1925 discussing the size of the Air Component of the British Expeditionary Force. There was no formula of squadrons per division.

For example
16 squadrons for 5 divisions
58 squadrons for 20 divisions​

These were squadrons that "might" accompany such forces. The notes I'm writing this post from didn't give any breakdown of the force.

Air Force required for a war with Japan dated 30th June 1926

FAA 241 aircraft in aircraft carriers and 105 in battleships - to double within one year

BEF estimates as above

Coastal Reconnaissance initially 5 flights and expand to 25 flights

Other RAF The Initial 52 squadrons of the 1923 Scheme part of which to the BEF

Overseas Initial Strength as present

Training to suit total requirements​

From National Archives File AIR41/39 Bomber Command 1917-39
Air Component of the Field Force at 31st March 1933
Contingent "A"
2 bombers squadrons
1 fighter squadron
3 army co-operation squadrons​
Contingent "B"
2 bomber squadrons
2 fighter squadrons​
Total
4 bomber squadrons
3 fighter squadrons
3 army co-operation squadrons
Appendix 3
The 52 Squadron Scheme (598 aircraft) to be Formed by 31st March 1928
204 fighters in 17 squadrons of 12 (all regular)
264 day bombers in 22 squadrons of 12 (14 regular, 3 special reserve and 5 auxiliary)
130 night bombers in 13 squadrons of 10 (8 regular, 4 special reserve and one auxiliary)

Later changed to 20 day bomber and 15 night bomber (26 regular and 13 special reserve/auxiliary)
Squadrons Outside The Scheme
Inland Area
2 "reserve" day bomber squadrons (Nos. 39 and 207) later "emergency squadrons"
2 army co-operation squadrons​
Coastal Area
Naval Co-operation squadrons
Revision of 3rd December 1925 - Completion Postponed to 31st March 1935
39 squadrons actually existed in the 1926-27 Financial Year​
Revision of 11th December 1926 - Completion Postponed to 31st March 1938
39 squadrons actually existed in the 1930-31 Financial Year including the 13 SR and Auxiliary squadrons
Nos. 35 and 207 Squadrons were now counted in the 52 squadrons.​

Actual Situation 31st March 1934

Air Defence of Great Britain - 41 Squadrons
13 fighter squadrons (9 Bulldog, 3 Fury and one Daemon)
16 day bomber squadrons (one Gordon, 8 Hart, one Horsley, one Sidestrand, one Wallace and 4 Wapiti)
2 day bomber squadrons at the A&AEE (part of No. 21 Group, RAF Inland Area) organised on a skeleton basis
2 Emergency Squadrons (2 Gordon)
8 night bomber squadrons (6 Virginia, one Hinaidi and one Heyford)​
No. 22 (Army Co-operation) Group, RAF Inland Area
5 Army Co-operation squadrons (4 Audax and one Atlas) Numbers 2, 4, 13, 16 and 26 - That is one for each of the 5 regular infantry divisions based in the UK
The School of Army Co-operation​
 
Following on from Post 82.

This is an extract from National Archives Document CAB.024.259 (0026) which is 141 pages long.

The title of the document is Programmes for the Defence Services 1936. It is dated 12th February 1936.

The first 26 pages are the report itself. Page 27 onwards is the Third Report (date 21st November 1935) of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Defence Policy and Requirements, also known as the Defence Requirements Committee or for short the D.R.C.

The first extract is Section VI of the main report. It is the recommended programme for the RAF.
VI. ― AIR FORCE PROGRAMME AND REQUIREMENTS.

30. The first recommendation of the Defence Requirements Committee in the Air Force Programme [and the 13th Recommendation overall] is for the completion of our metropolitan first-line strength to a total of 123 squadrons (1,512 aircraft) by April 1937 for which authority has already been given. It should be noted, however, that under our present policy of numerical parity with Germany it may be necessary to reconsider this figure, for there is, unfortunately, increasing evidence that Germany is not likely to be content with a figure of less than 2,000 first-line aircraft. This is a subject which, at the proper time, may require thorough reconsideration.

Apart from that consideration, however, we agreed to recommend:—

(a) Completion of the expansion programme of the Royal Air Force already authorised; and

(b) That the Air Ministry should have latitude to vary the Royal Air Force programme so as to improve its offensive power and constitute the most effective deterrent against German aggression. It should be appreciated that this will involve some increase in numbers in addition to the substitution of larger and more efficient machines for those envisaged in the latter part of the present programme.

Army Co-operation Squadrons [14th and 15th Recommendations].
31. For the Regular Contingent.-We recommend the provision of 7 squadrons (each of 12 aircraft) and' 1 squadron for communication purposes to accompany the Regular Contingent. (5 squadrons are already in existence.) [14th Recommendation]

For the Territorial Army.—In view of our proposal to reserve the decision as to whether, or when, the proposals for reconditioning the Territorial Army can be implemented we feel justified in suggesting a reduction in the number of squadrons of army co-operation aircraft intended to accompany territorial divisions. For a number of reasons it is inadvisable to make no provision at all under this head, and whilst reserving approval to the full proposals for providing' the Territorial Army with army co-operation squadrons until the detailed proposals for the role of the Territorial Army in. war is brought up for further consideration, we recommend : -

That authority should be given to make a beginning with the equipment and provision of Army Co-operation squadrons for the Territorial Army by the provision of 4 additional auxiliary squadrons. [15th Recommendation]

It may be noted that this provision will still further increase the strength of our first-line aircraft above the figure of 1,512.

Fleet Air Arm. [16th Recommendation]
32. As noted in paragraph 10 we recommend provision by 1942 of a first-line strength of 504 aircraft, and the consequent provision of further shore accommodation at home and abroad.

[Transcriber's note: The first-line strength of 504 aircraft (42 squadrons of 12) includes amphibians and seaplanes aboard capital ships and cruisers as well as machines aboard aircraft carriers.]

Overseas Squadrons. [17th Recommendation]
33. We recommend approval for the following proposals contained in the Report to be adopted as circumstances permit:—

Singapore.—An additional land-plane reconnaissance squadron and two additional operational landing grounds.

Penang, Ceylon, Aden.—One land-plane reconnaissance squadron at each of these places.

Hong Kong.—The provision of a total of 4 squadrons and one spotter flight, together with a repair unit and an additional aerodrome.

Middle East.—An additional squadron to increase the strategic reserve in the Middle East Command.

East Africa.—One general purpose squadron.

Malta.-The provision of one composite squadron (4 flights) for Malta has been put forward as an urgent requirement, and we agree. An increase to 2 squadrons and 1 spotter flight may later become necessary, but authority for this should, we consider, be reserved.

West Africa and West Indies.—The Report recommends the establishment of an aerodrome and one general purpose squadron at Sierra Leone and a reconnaissance squadron in the West Indies, but we understand that this is held to be in a lower order of priority to other overseas requirements, and we consider that approval should be reserved for the present.

Gibraltar.—Investigations are taking place as to the feasibility of constructing an aerodrome at Gibraltar. This forms an essential, and at present missing, link in our air communications, and we have accepted, in principle, the desirability of an air base at that place.​

War Reserves. [18th Recommendation]
34. The main item of expenditure in the Defence Requirements Committee's recommendations is for the provision of war reserves. It should not be necessary to emphasise that the provision of air forces will not avail in war if they are not given the means to fight, and to continue fighting. This applies to aircraft, personnel, ammunition and material of all kinds and the proposals put forward have been worked out as accurately as circumstances will permit.

The vast problem of industrial production affects, of course, all three Services and is dealt with in the next Section of the Report; but in connection with Air Force needs we have agreed :—

(a) In principle, that the Air Ministry should include in their programme provision of war reserves on the basis of the proposal of the Defence Requirements Committee. The detailed steps to carry out this programme will, of course, be discussed with the Treasury.

(b) That the Air Ministry should continue to work out plans for the employment of the shadow aircraft industry to the extent to which it might be necessary to utilise this industry to fulfil their expansion programme, and should proceed with the necessary arrangements to give effect to these plans, taking care that in doing so they act in conformity with the allocation of firms under the general plan for the shadow industry referred to below.

(c) That the Air Ministry, in making plans for increasing industrial output to meet their programme, should make allowance for future orders likely to be received from foreign countries for military aircraft, so far as these could be estimated.

END OF SECTION VI.
 
The following is the section on the RAF from the Third Report (date 21st November 1935) of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Defence Policy and shows the recommendations in Post 83 in more detail - Especially the requirements for Army Co-operation squadrons to support the British Expeditionary Force.

VI ― Air Force Programme and Requirements.
(For details, see Schedule III.)


80. As indicated in paragraph 34 above, the proposals of the Air Council comprise—
(i) The completion of the expansion programme as at present approved, so as to increase our metropolitan first-line air strength to a total of 123 squadrons (1,512 aircraft) by April 1937.

It should be understood, however, that increases in the strength of Germany and France above 1,500 first-line aircraft would involve corresponding increases in our own first-line strength.

(ii) The provision of Army Co-operation squadrons to accompany the field forces on the following scale:
(a) First contingent (regular), 7 squadrons (each of 12 aircraft);
(b) One squadron for communication purposes to accompany the first contingent;
(c) Second contingent (territorial) (after 4 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;
(d) Third contingent (territorial) (after 6 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;
(e) Fourth contingent (territorial) (after 8 months), to be raised on mobilisation.​

Present arrangements allow for 5 Army Co-operation Squadrons of the Royal Air Force to accompany the first contingent of the Field Force, each squadron having 18 aircraft. The War Office have represented that from the point of view of Army organisation, it would be preferable if there were 7 squadrons each of 12 aircraft. This arrangement would provide a squadron for co-operation with each of the two Corps headquarters and five Divisions constituting the first contingent of the Field Force (vide paragraph 65). In a war of movement it is desirable that Divisional Commanders should be able to control the air reconnaissance on their own immediate fronts. If a total of only 5 squadrons is available, such an arrangement would clearly not be possible. A further argument in favour of the new proposal is that a squadron of 12 aircraft is a more mobile and compact unit for a war of movement than one of 18, owing to the reduction in quantity of transport, stores, &c. On the other hand, the 7-squadron organisation will be rather more expensive in personnel and accommodation.

A squadron is required to accompany the first contingent for intercommunication by air, especially to assist Commanders and Staff Officers to maintain touch between formations and units when roads are congested and other communications are bad. Details of equipment and strength will require discussion between the Air Ministry and War Office, and for this item no financial provision is at present included.

The 8 squadrons required as the complement of the 8 territorial divisions of the second and third contingents would be auxiliary air force squadrons.

As, however, there are practical limits to the number of auxiliary squadrons which can be effectively raised, the Air Council propose to meet these requirements in part by an increase of 4 additional auxiliary squadrons (over and above the 16 at present included in the scheme for home defence), and in part by converting—from bombers to Army Co-operation—four of the auxiliary squadrons at present earmarked as part of the Air Force expansion scheme. To replace these units four new regular bomber squadrons would be raised. The adoption of this plan would enable squadrons to be raised in localities where they could co-operate with the territorial divisions to which they are allotted.

It may later be necessary to raise two more squadrons, in order to bring the complement for Territorial Divisions up to 10.

In addition to the above, additional spotter flights will eventually be required for co-operation with Coast defences at Home, probably three flights in all. No financial provision for this is at present included.

(iii) The provision of a first-line strength of 504 aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm, in accordance with the Admiralty's programme, and the consequent provision of further shore accommodation at home and abroad.

(iv) The provision of additional aircraft at various overseas stations, amounting to 13 squadrons and 2 or more Spotter Flights, particulars of which are as under :-—'
(a) Singapore.

An extra land-plane reconnaissance squadron, making the total number of squadrons permanently based at Singapore up to 6. Provision is also needed for two additional operational landing grounds to facilitate the operation of squadrons permanently allocated to Singapore and of those earmarked to proceed there as reinforcements.

(b) Penang, Ceylon and Aden.

One land-plane reconnaissance squadron at each of the above.

These squadrons are required to co-operate with the Navy in the protection of the sea communications to the Far East, to assist in the defence of British territory and commerce in the Southern Pacific and Indian Oceans until the arrival of the Fleet at Singapore, and to secure bases which will be required by the Fleet on its passage from European waters. As the plan for the defence of Singapore involves immediate air reinforcement in an emergency by 4 squadrons from India and Iraq, no further squadrons are likely to be available in those Commands for rapid despatch to the ports in question. Moreover, the type of squadron best suited for the purpose is one trained and equipped for long flights over the sea, and no such squadrons are available outside the United Kingdom for strategic reinforcement purposes. Provision of appropriate squadrons permanently based at Penang, Ceylon and Aden is therefore essential. As and when it becomes necessary, spotter flights for co-operation with the Coast Defences and the requirements of the Army for the training of anti-aircraft units will have to be provided.

(c) Hong Kong.

Approval has already been given in principle to the establishment at Hong Kong of a force of 4 squadrons and 1 spotter flight, together with a repair unit and an additional aerodrome.

(d) Middle East.

To give effect to the principle of a strategic air reserve enabling reinforcement along the imperial air routes, it is recommended that an additional squadron should be located in the Middle East Command for this purpose. Provision, therefore, is included for 1 General Purpose squadron in order to strengthen our defensive position overseas.

(e) Malta.

It is recommended that the force at Malta should ultimately comprise 2 squadrons and 1 spotter flight. This provision is subject to further consideration to which reference is made in paragraph 29.

(f) West Africa.

The air requirements for West Africa were stated by the Joint Oversea and Home Defence Committee in the following terms :—

"It is considered that the scale of attack on Freetown could be effectively reduced by the provision in Sierra Leone in peace time of a total of 2 bomber squadrons and 1 fighter bomber squadron."

It is considered that until the international situation is more clarified the provision of these units is not of urgent moment, but the matter should be kept under constant review. In the meanwhile, provision is made for the establishment of an aerodrome and for 1 General Purpose squadron.

(g) East A frica.

For more than a year a proposal has been under consideration for the establishment of a squadron in East Africa for local defence purposes. The principal difficulty has been that the British Territories in East Africa cannot afford to pay the capital cost of the squadron, and cannot maintain it except by reducing three battalions of the local forces; and the General Staff hold strongly that, this reduction could not be made without detriment to security—an opinion which has been confirmed by recent events. Without prejudice to the question of whether or when the East African Territories will be in a position to maintain the squadron in whole or in part, we recommend that one General Purpose squadron should be provided as a further contribution to the strategic air reserve. It would, of course, also be invaluable for local defence.

(h) West Indies.

1 reconnaissance (flying-boat or land-plane) squadron should be established.

(i) Gibraltar.

Provision has been taken for the establishment of a landing ground with flying-boat facilities.​


Up to the present the '" all British " route from the United Kingdom to the Middle East has been impracticable for aircraft owing to the limitations of flying range and to the lack of suitably spaced landing grounds in British territory. The first of the difficulties has now practically disappeared, and within a few years a large proportion of Royal Air Force squadrons in the United Kingdom will be equipped with aircraft capable of flying direct to Gibraltar (the longest stage in the route), and thence to Malta and the Middle East. The provision of an adequate intermediate air base at Gibraltar is therefore the key to the whole strategic conception of Imperial air defence, and on it will depend our ability to carry out large-scale reinforcement flights from England to other parts of the Empire, and vice versa, for many years to come. An air base at Gibraltar is also essential for the local operation of landplanes and seaplanes engaged in trade protection and air defence. There are many difficulties, political, geographical, meteorological and social, in the way of providing the required facilities, but preliminary investigation of the problem suggests that they are not insuperable. Accurate estimates of the total costs involved cannot be given until further enquiries have been made and plans have been drawn up.

Sea Reconnaissance.
81. The Air Council's proposals under paragraph 80 (iv) above are designed to enable the fullest use to be made of mobility and to permit reinforcement of the threatened locality as required. The Air Staff, in conjunction with the Naval Staff, are giving full consideration to the needs of the Navy in reconnaissance aircraft to assist in the protection of trade routes and naval bases. Pending these explorations, we are not in a position to include a definite figure for this purpose. It is, however, a commitment which must be borne in mind.

Provision dependent upon International Situation.
82. Certain of the requirements shown above must be regarded as provisional, since they are dependent on the outcome of the existing international situation. For Malta, the Middle East and East Africa, for instance, requirements are framed without regard to the deterioration in the political relations between this country and Italy, or to the strength of the forces which Italy may ultimately keep in her African colonies. These are matters which, like the strategical situation in the Mediterranean, will require careful examination when the present Italo-Abyssinian question is cleared up. In the interim, as will be seen above, we have recommended an immediate provision of one composite squadron and one flight for Malta, one general purpose squadron for the Middle East, and one general purpose squadron for East Africa.

Similarly, the general purpose squadron proposed for West Africa must be regarded as provisional for reasons given in paragraph 80 (iv) (f).

War Reserves.

(i) Material.
83. The main item of expenditure in the Air Council's relates to the provision of war reserves. It is clear that recommendations in air warfare, particularly in Europe, the clash will be immediate, intensive and sustained. Losses in personnel and material will be heavy. The expenditure of armament stores and fuel supplies will be continuous and on a large scale. Unless this wastage is continually replaced our air forces will be rapidly reduced in strength, and in a very short time will become, impotent either to defend this country against air attack, or to undertake offensive operations against the enemy. War reserves to be adequate must be such as will bridge the gap between the outbreak of war and the time at which the aircraft industry can meet the demand. As yet it has only been possible to carry out a preliminary investigation of the potentialities of the aircraft industry in war. Based upon this investigation and upon the anticipated rate of wastage, it is calculated that it will be necessary to maintain in time of peace a reserve of aircraft amounting to 200 per cent, of the first-line strength. Of this 200 per cent., however, it is expected that 50 per cent, could be obtained from the working reserves provided for peace-time maintenance, and in consequence the net figure for war reserves of aircraft will be 150 per cent., with a rather lower scale for the Fleet Air Arm.

84. The anticipated rate of wastage in pilots in war is also very high, and in consequence it is- necessary to hold in reserve in time of peace sufficient aircraft and engines to permit the establishment of additional flying training schools immediately on the outbreak of war to maintain the supply of pilots. It is considered that four months' supply in both airframes and engines is necessary for this specific purpose.

85. Other items of aircraft equipment, airframe and engine spares and general supplies have been calculated on the same basis, i.e., to cover the interval before the output from the industry on a war basis could meet the demand, which is at present assumed to be six months. In the case of bombs, small arms ammunition and pyrotechnics, it is calculated that six months' supply would be necessary to be held in reserve.

86. For motor transport, provision is made only for initial requirements and for reserves of technical vehicles which cannot be readily obtained from civil sources. It is hoped to procure the remaining requirements by requisitioning on the outbreak of war.

87. A further item of expenditure in the Air Council's proposals to which the Committee wish to draw attention is the provision of storage for reserves, and the provision of jigs and tools for the manufacture of aircraft. It is hoped that it may be possible to combine the provision of reserve storage with the provision of adequate erecting space for the aircraft industry to meet the big demands which will be made upon it on mobilisation. It may, therefore, be possible for a part of the expenditure required for the provision of storage for reserve aircraft to be borne by the aircraft industry. The provision of jigs and tools, &c, for the manufacture of aircraft is a heavy item.

One aspect of the provision of aircraft reserves to which we wish to draw attention is the rapid rate at which aircraft become obsolescent through the introduction of improved designs. Under peace-time conditions the aircraft which must be held in reserve to meet war wastage will, of course, be only partially used up. In consequence, heavy recurring expenditure will be required for periodical replacements of obsolete aircraft in the Reserve by newer types.

(ii) Personnel.
88. The problem of war reserves is not only one of equipment. A substantial enlargement of the reserve of pilots will also be required. As during the next four years the number of first-line units is being largely increased it will not be possible to accelerate the flow of Short Service Officers to the Reserve, and the only practicable solution of the problem is a larger entry than at present of persons who could be trained in flying ab initio for Reserve Service only. The Air Ministry estimate that a further entry to the Royal Air Force Reserve of 600 pilots a year for the next three years will be required additional to the rate of entry of 200 a year to which they are now working.

END OF SECTION VI.
 

Actual Situation 31st March 1934

Air Defence of Great Britain - 41 Squadrons
13 fighter squadrons (9 Bulldog, 3 Fury and one Daemon)
16 day bomber squadrons (one Gordon, 8 Hart, one Horsley, one Sidestrand, one Wallace and 4 Wapiti)
2 day bomber squadrons at the A&AEE (part of No. 21 Group, RAF Inland Area) organised on a skeleton basis
2 Emergency Squadrons (2 Gordon)
8 night bomber squadrons (6 Virginia, one Hinaidi and one Heyford)​
No. 22 (Army Co-operation) Group, RAF Inland Area
5 Army Co-operation squadrons (4 Audax and one Atlas) Numbers 2, 4, 13, 16 and 26 - That is one for each of the 5 regular infantry divisions based in the UK
The School of Army Co-operation
The expansion scheme in force at the end of March 1934 was still the scheme was still the "Fifty Two Squadron Scheme" of 1923. The balance of 4 fighter squadrons and 7 night bomber squadrons was to be formed in stages between April 1934 and March 1938.

The First Report of the D.R.C. produced in March 1934 actually recommended that priority be given to building up the RAF in the Far East over the Metropolitan Air Force and IIRC the army co-operation force wasn't even mentioned. Expansion Scheme A which was approved by the Cabinet in July 1934 reversed that recommendation. However, it provided more fighter, bomber and naval co-operation squadrons to be formed by April 1939 but no extra army co-operation squadrons. However, of the 336 fighter squadrons in 28 squadrons, 300 in 25 squadrons were for the Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) and 36 in 3 squadrons were for the Air Component of the British Expeditionary Force (ACBEF).

Scheme C was the next expansion programme to be approved by the Cabinet (in May 1935) for completion by April 1937. The number of army co-operation squadrons was still 5, but they now had 18 aircraft each instead of 12 for a total of 90 aircraft instead of 60. Furthermore the number of fighters was increased to 420 in 35 squadrons of which 300 in 25 squadrons were for ADGB but there were now 120 fighters in 10 squadrons for ADGB.

Scheme F was approved by the Cabinet in approved in February 1936 and its projected completion date was 31st March 1939. It approved the reorganisation of the 90 existing army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons into 132 aircraft in 11 squadrons (7 regular and 4 auxiliary) to provide the army co-operation squadrons required by the First and Second Echelons of the British Expeditionary Force. There were still 420 fighters, but now in 30 squadrons of 14 instead of 35 squadrons of 12. That was made up of 294 in 21 squadrons for ADGB and 126 in 9 squadrons for ACBEF. So although ACBEF had one fighter squadron fewer it actually had 6 fighters more.

Schemes G, H, J, K and L all provided 132 army co-operation squadrons in 11 squadrons (7 regular and 4 auxiliary). All of these schemes also provided 10 fighter squadrons for the ACBEF. However, the number of fighters per squadron increased from 14 in Schemes G, H, J and K for a total of 140 fighters to 16 in Scheme L for a total of 160.

Scheme M approved in November 1938 reduced the number of army co-operation aircraft from 132 aircraft in 11 squadrons (7 regular and 4 auxiliary) to 108 in 9 squadrons (7 regular and 2 auxiliary). The total number of fighters was increased from 608 in 38 squadrons in Scheme L to 800 in 50 squadrons. However, while the number of squadrons in ADGB was increased considerably from 448 in 28 squadrons to 736 in 46 squadrons the number of fighters for ACBEF was cut sharply from 160 in 10 squadrons to 64 in 4 squadrons. The 50 squadrons in Scheme M were short of the 57 required by the 1939 version of the Ideal Plan because it did not provide the 4 squadrons required for the defence of East Coast Shipping, 2 squadrons for Scapa Flow and on squadron for Northern Ireland.

No. 22 (Army Co-operation) Group (which was now part of RAF Fighter Command) had a grand total of 13 squadrons.
4 Hurricane fighters squadrons (Nos. 1, 73, 85 and 87)
5 Lysander army co-operation squadrons (Nos. 2, 4, 13, 16 and 26) the squadrons that existed in March 1934
2 Blenheim army co-operation squadrons (Nos. 53 and 59) - They both reformed on 28th June 1937 and were the 6th and 7th regular squadrons required by Scheme F.
2 Hind army co-operation squadrons (Nos. 613 and 614) or one had Hinds and the other Hectors according to my other RAF September 1939 spreadsheet​

The ADGB element of Fighter Command had 36 squadrons comprising 35 fighter squadron and No. 24 (Communications) Squadron.

Bomber Command had 55 squadrons. However, 20 of them were about to be reduced to second-line units (14 Group Pool and 6 Reserve Squadrons). So the RAF was effectively reduced to the 35 bomber squadrons that it should have had in March 1928 - although there were more and better aircraft in the squadrons. 2 of the 35 squadrons were Nos. 18 and 57 equipped with the Blenheim Mk I were the Emergency Squadrons and became part of the Air Component British Expeditionary Force.
 
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