VI ― Air Force Programme and Requirements.
(For details, see Schedule III.)
80. As indicated in paragraph 34 above, the proposals of the Air Council comprise—
(i) The completion of the expansion programme as at present approved, so as to increase our metropolitan first-line air strength to a total of 123 squadrons (1,512 aircraft) by April 1937.
It should be understood, however, that increases in the strength of Germany and France above 1,500 first-line aircraft would involve corresponding increases in our own first-line strength.
(ii) The provision of Army Co-operation squadrons to accompany the field forces on the following scale:
(a) First contingent (regular), 7 squadrons (each of 12 aircraft);
(b) One squadron for communication purposes to accompany the first contingent;
(c) Second contingent (territorial) (after 4 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;
(d) Third contingent (territorial) (after 6 months), 4 or 5 squadrons;
(e) Fourth contingent (territorial) (after 8 months), to be raised on mobilisation.
Present arrangements allow for 5 Army Co-operation Squadrons of the Royal Air Force to accompany the first contingent of the Field Force, each squadron having 18 aircraft. The War Office have represented that from the point of view of Army organisation, it would be preferable if there were 7 squadrons each of 12 aircraft. This arrangement would provide a squadron for co-operation with each of the two Corps headquarters and five Divisions constituting the first contingent of the Field Force
(vide paragraph 65). In a war of movement it is desirable that Divisional Commanders should be able to control the air reconnaissance on their own immediate fronts. If a total of only 5 squadrons is available, such an arrangement would clearly not be possible. A further argument in favour of the new proposal is that a squadron of 12 aircraft is a more mobile and compact unit for a war of movement than one of 18, owing to the reduction in quantity of transport, stores, &c. On the other hand, the 7-squadron organisation will be rather more expensive in personnel and accommodation.
A squadron is required to accompany the first contingent for intercommunication by air, especially to assist Commanders and Staff Officers to maintain touch between formations and units when roads are congested and other communications are bad. Details of equipment and strength will require discussion between the Air Ministry and War Office, and for this item no financial provision is at present included.
The 8 squadrons required as the complement of the 8 territorial divisions of the second and third contingents would be auxiliary air force squadrons.
As, however, there are practical limits to the number of auxiliary squadrons which can be effectively raised, the Air Council propose to meet these requirements in part by an increase of 4 additional auxiliary squadrons (over and above the 16 at present included in the scheme for home defence), and in part by converting—from bombers to Army Co-operation—four of the auxiliary squadrons at present earmarked as part of the Air Force expansion scheme. To replace these units four new regular bomber squadrons would be raised. The adoption of this plan would enable squadrons to be raised in localities where they could co-operate with the territorial divisions to which they are allotted.
It may later be necessary to raise two more squadrons, in order to bring the complement for Territorial Divisions up to 10.
In addition to the above, additional spotter flights will eventually be required for co-operation with Coast defences at Home, probably three flights in all. No financial provision for this is at present included.
(iii) The provision of a first-line strength of 504 aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm, in accordance with the Admiralty's programme, and the consequent provision of further shore accommodation at home and abroad.
(iv) The provision of additional aircraft at various overseas stations, amounting to 13 squadrons and 2 or more Spotter Flights, particulars of which are as under :-—'
(a) Singapore.
An extra land-plane reconnaissance squadron, making the total number of squadrons permanently based at Singapore up to 6. Provision is also needed for two additional operational landing grounds to facilitate the operation of squadrons permanently allocated to Singapore and of those earmarked to proceed there as reinforcements.
(b) Penang, Ceylon and Aden.
One land-plane reconnaissance squadron at each of the above.
These squadrons are required to co-operate with the Navy in the protection of the sea communications to the Far East, to assist in the defence of British territory and commerce in the Southern Pacific and Indian Oceans until the arrival of the Fleet at Singapore, and to secure bases which will be required by the Fleet on its passage from European waters. As the plan for the defence of Singapore involves immediate air reinforcement in an emergency by 4 squadrons from India and Iraq, no further squadrons are likely to be available in those Commands for rapid despatch to the ports in question. Moreover, the type of squadron best suited for the purpose is one trained and equipped for long flights over the sea, and no such squadrons are available outside the United Kingdom for strategic reinforcement purposes. Provision of appropriate squadrons permanently based at Penang, Ceylon and Aden is therefore essential. As and when it becomes necessary, spotter flights for co-operation with the Coast Defences and the requirements of the Army for the training of anti-aircraft units will have to be provided.
(c) Hong Kong.
Approval has already been given in principle to the establishment at Hong Kong of a force of 4 squadrons and 1 spotter flight, together with a repair unit and an additional aerodrome.
(d) Middle East.
To give effect to the principle of a strategic air reserve enabling reinforcement along the imperial air routes, it is recommended that an additional squadron should be located in the Middle East Command for this purpose. Provision, therefore, is included for 1 General Purpose squadron in order to strengthen our defensive position overseas.
(e) Malta.
It is recommended that the force at Malta should ultimately comprise 2 squadrons and 1 spotter flight. This provision is subject to further consideration to which reference is made in paragraph 29.
(f) West Africa.
The air requirements for West Africa were stated by the Joint Oversea and Home Defence Committee in the following terms :—
"It is considered that the scale of attack on Freetown could be effectively reduced by the provision in Sierra Leone in peace time of a total of 2 bomber squadrons and 1 fighter bomber squadron."
It is considered that until the international situation is more clarified the provision of these units is not of urgent moment, but the matter should be kept under constant review. In the meanwhile, provision is made for the establishment of an aerodrome and for 1 General Purpose squadron.
(g) East A frica.
For more than a year a proposal has been under consideration for the establishment of a squadron in East Africa for local defence purposes. The principal difficulty has been that the British Territories in East Africa cannot afford to pay the capital cost of the squadron, and cannot maintain it except by reducing three battalions of the local forces; and the General Staff hold strongly that, this reduction could not be made without detriment to security—an opinion which has been confirmed by recent events. Without prejudice to the question of whether or when the East African Territories will be in a position to maintain the squadron in whole or in part, we recommend that one General Purpose squadron should be provided as a further contribution to the strategic air reserve. It would, of course, also be invaluable for local defence.
(h) West Indies.
1 reconnaissance (flying-boat or land-plane) squadron should be established.
(i) Gibraltar.
Provision has been taken for the establishment of a landing ground with flying-boat facilities.
Up to the present the '" all British " route from the United Kingdom to the Middle East has been impracticable for aircraft owing to the limitations of flying range and to the lack of suitably spaced landing grounds in British territory. The first of the difficulties has now practically disappeared, and within a few years a large proportion of Royal Air Force squadrons in the United Kingdom will be equipped with aircraft capable of flying direct to Gibraltar (the longest stage in the route), and thence to Malta and the Middle East. The provision of an adequate intermediate air base at Gibraltar is therefore the key to the whole strategic conception of Imperial air defence, and on it will depend our ability to carry out large-scale reinforcement flights from England to other parts of the Empire, and
vice versa, for many years to come. An air base at Gibraltar is also essential for the local operation of landplanes and seaplanes engaged in trade protection and air defence. There are many difficulties, political, geographical, meteorological and social, in the way of providing the required facilities, but preliminary investigation of the problem suggests that they are not insuperable. Accurate estimates of the total costs involved cannot be given until further enquiries have been made and plans have been drawn up.
Sea Reconnaissance.
81. The Air Council's proposals under paragraph 80 (iv) above are designed to enable the fullest use to be made of mobility and to permit reinforcement of the threatened locality as required. The Air Staff, in conjunction with the Naval Staff, are giving full consideration to the needs of the Navy in reconnaissance aircraft to assist in the protection of trade routes and naval bases. Pending these explorations, we are not in a position to include a definite figure for this purpose. It is, however, a commitment which must be borne in mind.
Provision dependent upon International Situation.
82. Certain of the requirements shown above must be regarded as provisional, since they are dependent on the outcome of the existing international situation. For Malta, the Middle East and East Africa, for instance, requirements are framed without regard to the deterioration in the political relations between this country and Italy, or to the strength of the forces which Italy may ultimately keep in her African colonies. These are matters which, like the strategical situation in the Mediterranean, will require careful examination when the present Italo-Abyssinian question is cleared up. In the interim, as will be seen above, we have recommended an immediate provision of one composite squadron and one flight for Malta, one general purpose squadron for the Middle East, and one general purpose squadron for East Africa.
Similarly, the general purpose squadron proposed for West Africa must be regarded as provisional for reasons given in paragraph 80 (iv) (f).
War Reserves.
(i) Material.
83. The main item of expenditure in the Air Council's relates to the provision of war reserves. It is clear that recommendations in air warfare, particularly in Europe, the clash will be immediate, intensive and sustained. Losses in personnel and material will be heavy. The expenditure of armament stores and fuel supplies will be continuous and on a large scale. Unless this wastage is continually replaced our air forces will be rapidly reduced in strength, and in a very short time will become, impotent either to defend this country against air attack, or to undertake offensive operations against the enemy. War reserves to be adequate must be such as will bridge the gap between the outbreak of war and the time at which the aircraft industry can meet the demand. As yet it has only been possible to carry out a preliminary investigation of the potentialities of the aircraft industry in war. Based upon this investigation and upon the anticipated rate of wastage, it is calculated that it will be necessary to maintain in time of peace a reserve of aircraft amounting to 200 per cent, of the first-line strength. Of this 200 per cent., however, it is expected that 50 per cent, could be obtained from the working reserves provided for peace-time maintenance, and in consequence the net figure for war reserves of aircraft will be 150 per cent., with a rather lower scale for the Fleet Air Arm.
84. The anticipated rate of wastage in pilots in war is also very high, and in consequence it is- necessary to hold in reserve in time of peace sufficient aircraft and engines to permit the establishment of additional flying training schools immediately on the outbreak of war to maintain the supply of pilots. It is considered that four months' supply in both airframes and engines is necessary for this specific purpose.
85. Other items of aircraft equipment, airframe and engine spares and general supplies have been calculated on the same basis,
i.e., to cover the interval before the output from the industry on a war basis could meet the demand, which is at present assumed to be six months. In the case of bombs, small arms ammunition and pyrotechnics, it is calculated that six months' supply would be necessary to be held in reserve.
86. For motor transport, provision is made only for initial requirements and for reserves of technical vehicles which cannot be readily obtained from civil sources. It is hoped to procure the remaining requirements by requisitioning on the outbreak of war.
87. A further item of expenditure in the Air Council's proposals to which the Committee wish to draw attention is the provision of storage for reserves, and the provision of jigs and tools for the manufacture of aircraft. It is hoped that it may be possible to combine the provision of reserve storage with the provision of adequate erecting space for the aircraft industry to meet the big demands which will be made upon it on mobilisation. It may, therefore, be possible for a part of the expenditure required for the provision of storage for reserve aircraft to be borne by the aircraft industry. The provision of jigs and tools, &c, for the manufacture of aircraft is a heavy item.
One aspect of the provision of aircraft reserves to which we wish to draw attention is the rapid rate at which aircraft become obsolescent through the introduction of improved designs. Under peace-time conditions the aircraft which must be held in reserve to meet war wastage will, of course, be only partially used up. In consequence, heavy recurring expenditure will be required for periodical replacements of obsolete aircraft in the Reserve by newer types.
(ii) Personnel.
88. The problem of war reserves is not only one of equipment. A substantial enlargement of the reserve of pilots will also be required. As during the next four years the number of first-line units is being largely increased it will not be possible to accelerate the flow of Short Service Officers to the Reserve, and the only practicable solution of the problem is a larger entry than at present of persons who could be trained in flying
ab initio for Reserve Service only. The Air Ministry estimate that a further entry to the Royal Air Force Reserve of 600 pilots a year for the next three years will be required additional to the rate of entry of 200 a year to which they are now working.
END OF SECTION VI.