AH Quick Vignette: Armored Icebreakers of Finland - or the Battle on Ice

Procurement of weapons in a democratic country is always matter of politics - sometimes less, sometimes more.

In Finland the need for new naval ships took an unexpected direction in 1920's when the need for new icebreakers capable of helping the nation's commerce during long winters was also highlighted. In the end, an unexpected and clearly political compromise was made: The new coastal battleships of the Navy "Väinämöinen" and "Ilmarinen" would also be constructed as icebreakers, the logic being that they could exercise by summer and break through ice during winter. The compromise was derided in European naval circles, but in reality had some merit, as Germans, for example, used their old BB Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein as icebreakers.

Nevertheless, in the end the Navy was happy with their new ships. Featuring 2x2 254mm guns supplemented by 4x2 105mm DP guns and 4x Vickers 40mm guns the ships were heavily armed for their size. Due to compromises of their role their seakeeping qualities were not good and their speed was low.

In 1939 Soviet Union attacked and after initial troubles got it's act together and by end of February the Soviet troops were advancing towards Gulf of Viipuri. While the Western shore had some coastal fortifications no one was prepared for the coldest winter in decades, which meant that ice was thick enough for tanks to drive over. Furthermore Finland had no more reserves to spare for defense of Gulf of Viipuri other than various hodge podge outfits of quickly trained replacement soldiers in their civilian clothes. The improvised outfits would be expected to die gloriously, but that would not help with issue of national defense.

Now, this was the Greatest Hour of Finnish Navy. In mid-February the Naval staff decided to prepare Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen for an Battle on Ice. The tremendous firepower of these armored ships was supplemented by further armament, as on ice one would not have to care about seakeeping qualities the topweight issues could be effectively abandoned. By beginning of March both ships were bristling with additional weapons. The regular armament was supplemented by 10 Madsen 20mm guns, four 57mm Nordenfelt guns and total of 10 quad Maxim AAMG's fresh from Raate road. These new installations were protected only by jury-rigged armor composed of mild steel and sandbags.

On 4 March 1940 the Armored Squadron started it's heavy plod towards Gulf of Viipuri. This was it, the decisive moment for the nation. The Soviets were heavily surprised by the appearance of the two armored behemoths. For a casual observer an icebreaker quickly plodding through ice might seem an easy target to eliminate, but it wasn't. Soviet aircraft lacked the skill in bombing, even so against a slowly moving target. Soviet anti-tank guns and tank guns lacked the penetration against heavily armored ships, although they did take a heavy toll on relatively unprotected personnel on deck weapons. Soviet field artillery could not hit a moving target and in direct fire the HE shells lacked penetration.

105mm shells simply tore apart Soviet tanks while a 254mm shell could take out an entire company. 57mm Nordenfelt guns could easily penetrate Soviet tanks while water-cooled quad Maxims fielded a spray of lead on ice and the rocky, unprotected islands.

The total length of this death ride was some 20 nautical miles at one direction and it took some nine hours from 20 pm to 5 am. Finns took the risk of Soviets not reacting quickly, and they were right. In the end both Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were full of wounded, their superstructure on fire and filled with small holes, but could continue towards Kotka. What was important too, that by breaking a lead through ice the icebreakers created a barried which did not permit vehicles to pass over until end of the War.

A few days later, on 9 March 1940 the war was over. While Finland lost the Winter War it has been questioned whether without the Navy it would have had to surrender. The casualties of the Winter War were exceedingly harsh, some 20000 dead and missing (OTL 27000).

The Death Ride was filmed and spread worldwide. When George Lucas filmed his "Empire Strikes Back" it was clear where he took his impressions from.

4 March is still the anniversary of the Finnish Navy and no-one questions the role of the Navy in national defense. The critics say, that the legendary Battle on Ice has resulted in Finnish Navy investing on too large ships instead of smaller ships like Sweden. Of course, alternate history is always speculation, but what we know is that the Finnish Navy, with it's six frigates featuring VLS with ASTER and SCALP missiles is no force to be laughed at.

(OTL icebreaker Jääkarhu was purchased from the Netherlands in 1926. Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen did not have sufficient icebreaking qualities to participate in Battle of Gulf of Viipuri. Finnish icebreaker Sisu was constructed as dual military-civilian ship, as a depot ship for submarines during summer and icebreaker during winter. In Finnish military history armchair society the coastal battleships are widely derided as follies because they did not have a role during the Winter War. In general, Navy is the most unappreciated branch of the Finnish Armed Forces.)

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Väinämöinen preparing for the Death Ride.

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Väinämöinen before installation of additional armament.

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A map on the final phases of the Winter War. "Viipurinlahti" with blue letters is Gulf of Viipuri in English.
 
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The critics say, that the legendary Battle on Ice has resulted in Finnish Navy investing on too large ships instead of smaller ships like Sweden.

Before the war, Sweden had the much larger Sverige class at 7 200 tons (3 900 for the Finnish Väinamöinen class) with 2x2x28cm and 4x1x15,2cm and 1x2x15,2cm. Post-war the Swedish navy used both light cruisers - the Tre Kronor class at 9 200 tons and large destroyers - the Visby class at 1 320 tons, the Öland class at 2 250 tons and the Småland class at 3 340 tons. Sweden did not retire its large destroyers and light cruisers designed to be able to meet any enemy at sea until 1985 and 1970, respectively.

Even if Finland is building larger ships than OTL, they won't be building ships larger than the Swedish navy did OTL, unless they build AEGIS cruisers or some kind of mobile coastal batteries/missile platforms/modern coastal battleships post-war.
 
This is an interesting and cool (pun intended) scenario, but I'd say that it would be hard to build armored icebreakers armed with 10 inch guns with 1930s technology that would not end up just being both poor warships and poor icebreakers. From the top of my head I'd say that these two ships would have a bigger displacement than the OTL armored ships (consider, for example, the Swedish Ymer from 1933 as an example of the most modern big icebreaker of the era). The additional weight of the armor, the weapons (the two main guns alone add over 500 tons of weight) and various required systems would mean that the ship would be very heavy for its size and would need to be a monster in terms of engine power. We can well predict that the ships would be under-powered as icebreakers, with the weight of the weapons and additional systems making them ungainly for icebreaking duty.

On the other side, as warships, these ships would have the same (or bigger) cost than the OTL coastal ships, but would only have half the armament. Given that IOTL the idea was (I believe) that the two ships with their eight modern 10 inch guns with a similar range, better theoretical rate of fire and more advanced fire control than the older Russian 12 inch naval guns could arguably take on a single Gangut class ship in ideal circumstances, especially if supported by a 12 inch coastal battery or two. ITTL, even this illusionary "parity" with a Gangut would be lost.

Without going into the specifics I'd place this idea in the same frame of reference as (Jouko Pirhonen's) "heavy assault sleds" I envisioned in an old vignette: cool but unrealistic.
 
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Before the war, Sweden had the much larger Sverige class at 7 200 tons (3 900 for the Finnish Väinamöinen class) with 2x2x28cm and 4x1x15,2cm and 1x2x15,2cm. Post-war the Swedish navy used both light cruisers - the Tre Kronor class at 9 200 tons and large destroyers - the Visby class at 1 320 tons, the Öland class at 2 250 tons and the Småland class at 3 340 tons. Sweden did not retire its large destroyers and light cruisers designed to be able to meet any enemy at sea until 1985 and 1970, respectively.

Even if Finland is building larger ships than OTL, they won't be building ships larger than the Swedish navy did OTL, unless they build AEGIS cruisers or some kind of mobile coastal batteries/missile platforms/modern coastal battleships post-war.

Actually, right now Finnish Navy is in process of acquiring frigates, while largest Swedish warships are corvettes.

Icebreaking coastal battleships would have to be larger than OTL Väinämöinen, let's say 5000-6000 tons, roughly sized post-war Voima, or even 10000 tons, roughly Yermak size.(Voima, The Force, how cool name is that? How do we break the ice to reach Helsinki? Use The Force...). But let's make a very quick and dirty, tongue in cheek, alternate naval history of this big-ship adhering Finnish Navy which

a) Gets larger share of defense spending than OTL
b) Tasks of icebreaking and major combatant are combined in largest ships - despite disadvantages.
c) The basic politica development is that of OTL

Post-war, assuming both V and I survived the war, they won't be sold to Soviet Union as they're economically crucial. And let's cross fingers Soviet's don't demand them as war reparations.

Both Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were old and tired ships by early 1950's and they were basically relegated to training duties in addition to their wintertime task of icebreaking. But, as money for defense was low, they were still kept as warships.

By late 1950's a new class of icebreakers was clearly needed for an expanding economy, and again, tasks of icebreaking and national defense was combined. Thus four-ship Hämeenmaa-class was ordered and completed between 1955-1960. (OTL Karhu-class icebreakers)

At 9000 tons their main armament was 2x2 Bofors Model 1942/1958 152mm guns capable of firing on both surface and aerial targets. For air defense 4x 2x 57mm/60 Model 1950 Bofors guns were installed. Their armor was at DD level.

The ships were derided as anachronistics, but they brought significant surface and anti-air capabilities for the Finnish Navy.

Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were delegated strictly to icebreaking duties with their turrets used for coastal defense. They received six 40mm L/70 guns for rudimentary air defense and mine rails on their after deck for auxiliary minelaying tasks.

In 1970's it was time for most powerful icebreakers in the world. Due to export interests, this time the Urho-class was designed with just naval auxiliary tasks in mind. However, the ship sported four 40mm L/70 guns. Altogether six were made for Finland and Sweden, and one modified to Argentina. (roughly as OTL) 10000 tons. Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen were retired and scrapped.

By 1970's it was clear that the concept of coastal battleship / icebreaker was clearly anachronistic, and at the same time the economy demanded larger icebreakers. The navy's true striking power were four Osa-class missile boats purchased from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the missile boat concept was problematic as well, as they could not act during winter, could not act in all weather conditions, could not support fighting on land and could not mount modern air defense weapons.

Thus in 1980's the new four ship Helsinki-class was ordered. At 10000 tons the ship sported OTO-Melara 127mm/54 Compact DP gun, 6x2 SAAB RBS-15 SSM's, 2x 1 Bofors 57/70 Mark II DP guns and 1x 8 Crotale missile launcher, and a helipad in aft deck. The four ships were extraordinary large, although deisgned for dual military-civilian use. The critics derided them as targets, the supporters as mobile AAW/ASUW/ASW nests which would not be easy to deal with.

In 2010 the first replacement ship of the six ship Väinämöinen class entered service. The ship continues the unique Finnish tradition, but with a new twist. The Navy is tasked with the deep strike capabilities of Finnish Defence forces, thus each ship carries, with it's Sylver VLS, SCALP Navale cruise missiles. With OTO-Melara 127mm/54 Compact DP gun, Oerlikon Millennium CIWS, 8 RBS-15 SSM's (to be replaced by Gabriel-missiles), 64 cell SYLVER VLS the ships are also capable of performing air defense for much of the Southern Finland.
 
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We can well predict that the ships would be under-powered as icebreakers, with the weight of the weapons and additional systems making them ungainly for icebreaking duty.
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Without going into the specifics I'd place this idea in the same frame of reference as (Jouko Pirhonen's) "heavy assauld sleds" I envisioned in an old vignette: cool but unrealistic.

Yes, they would be poor warships and poor icebreakers and larger too, but even much lighter armor or lighter armament would be enough for this specific task. I want warships destroying tanks at point blank range, damn it! ;) In the end they would also cost more than historical ships and Jääkarhu and Sisu combined.

As for DE machinery, it's easily scalable and the machinery of the historical ships was not exceedingly large.
 
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the German built Estonian icebreaker Suur Tõll was captured by the Finns and used by them prior to her restoration to Estonia by treaty. An armoured version of her could be a possible way to go.
 
the German built Estonian icebreaker Suur Tõll was captured by the Finns and used by them prior to her restoration to Estonia by treaty. An armoured version of her could be a possible way to go.

Finland planned to use an icebreaker for ground troop support operations in later days of Winter War but the project got nowhere.

To be frank, Finnish naval leadership before Winter War was quite unimaginative when it came to using ships in winter conditions. There were numerous technical glitches when using MTB's and submarines when Gulf of Finland had not yet been covered by ice. Both MTB's and submarines were used in tactically inept way, simply revealing how training in prewar times had not been at high level enough. This could be compared to Army and Air Force which operated comparatively far better.

And as of winter, simply no one seemed to have thought about the fact that Gulf of Finland is covered by ice for months during an ordinary winter.

Thus so simple things such as proper arming scheme for icebreakers or for their tactical use had not been thought out.
 
Finland planned to use an icebreaker for ground troop support operations in later days of Winter War but the project got nowhere.

To be frank, Finnish naval leadership before Winter War was quite unimaginative when it came to using ships in winter conditions. There were numerous technical glitches when using MTB's and submarines when Gulf of Finland had not yet been covered by ice. Both MTB's and submarines were used in tactically inept way, simply revealing how training in prewar times had not been at high level enough. This could be compared to Army and Air Force which operated comparatively far better.

And as of winter, simply no one seemed to have thought about the fact that Gulf of Finland is covered by ice for months during an ordinary winter.

Thus so simple things such as proper arming scheme for icebreakers or for their tactical use had not been thought out.

We can also say that the plans to use icebreakers for ground troop support at the end of the war were a measure of desperation (like the fact that ad hoc infantry units were put together out of navy personnel in the last weeks of the war in a last ditch effort to boost coastal defence in the Bay of Viipuri) that might well not occur to naval planners in peace time. For winter conditions during war, the obvious use for icebreakers is keeping open the sea lanes for freighters, transports, etc, and otherwise protecting these ships, to ensure the continuation of vital maritime trade. These ships already had a job. And this is what the Icebreaker Flotilla was predominately used for in 1939-40.

It was not as if the Finnish state had icebreakers to spare, either: most of the five bigger ships available would need to be committed to securing the trade routes. There was only one really stronger ship, the Jääkarhu (4800 tons, 9200 hp), the rest were smaller and weaker (under 2300 tons, under 4500 hp). Only one was truly modern (diesel-electric) and it had been specifically designed with military duty in mind, the Sisu, as a support vessel/tender for submarines. Due to the limited power and ability of pre-WWII icebreakers, you would sometimes need two icebreakers to service one single major shipping lane during the worst winter months. Using these ships as warships in easy reach of Soviet air forces and in waters that the Soviets could have mined would also present considerable risks, and as it is nearly all of the bigger Finnish icebreakers suffered significant damage from aerial bombings during the war. The Sampo also had to be counted out entirely at the beginning of the war as it ran aground outside Pori and nearly sank, to be only raised after the war. Losing even two or three of the five bigger icebreakers in the war would something Finland could ill afford, and then it is understandable that the national leadership would want to keep these expensive and highly specialized vessels out of harm's way when ever possible.

The general expectation in the interwar for the worst ice conditions was that there would be very little if no naval warfare in February and March. The same could be said for most warfare: the coldest part of the winter was as far away from the best campaign season as possible. While the Finnish military planners were prepared for war in the winter, I believe most leading officers did not expect that Finland's fate would be worst threatened at the time of the year when the attacker would face worst adversity for its actions due to the forces of nature alone. Planning for using icebreakers as artillery vessels to support battles on the land front in the winter is sort of outside of the box in terms of conventional pre-war thinking. If and when potential armament is considered, they would be most likely planned to be armed to protect themselves and merchant ships under their protection, with comparably little thought given for fire support missions on the land front.

In short, hindsight is 20/20. I think we would be too hard on the Finnish 20s and 30s defence planners if we expected them to build a military that is specifically designed with the OTL Winter War in mind, when the war was fought in very particular conditions and presented very particular challenges for the different branches of the Finnish armed forces.
 
We can also say that the plans to use icebreakers for ground troop support at the end of the war were a measure of desperation (like the fact that ad hoc infantry units were put together out of navy personnel in the last weeks of the war in a last ditch effort to boost coastal defence in the Bay of Viipuri) that might well not occur to naval planners in peace time. For winter conditions during war, the obvious use for icebreakers is keeping open the sea lanes for freighters, transports, etc, and otherwise protecting these ships, to ensure the continuation of vital maritime trade. These ships already had a job. And this is what the Icebreaker Flotilla was predominately used for in 1939-40.

While I know and understand the reasoning perfectly, I think one must ask one ultimate question: what use is foreign trade for if the country is lost? Defences for Gulf of Viipuri had been prepared and played in wargames from 1920's. An offensive during winter had succeeded in conquering Finland in 1808. Army had wargamed winter offensives too.

In short, hindsight is 20/20. I think we would be too hard on the Finnish 20s and 30s defence planners if we expected them to build a military that is specifically designed with the OTL Winter War in mind, when the war was fought in very particular conditions and presented very particular challenges for the different branches of the Finnish armed forces.

Army was best in the world in fighting during the winter and Air Force had quite adequate preparations as well. Navy did not, not even for the phase when ice had not yet covered Gulf of Finland. Staff work had been lazy. This is also illustrated by the fact that a lot of coastal guns and crews sat unemployed while fighting raged in Karelian isthmus. No preparation for their secondary use in wintertime had been made, not even for light pieces which would have been relatively easy to transport for land positions.
 
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While I know and understand the reasoning perfectly, I think one must ask one ultimate question: what use is foreign trade for if the country is lost? Defences for Gulf of Viipuri had been prepared and played in wargames from 1920's. An offensive during winter had succeeded in conquering Finland in 1808. Army had wargamed winter offensives too.

For the bolded, the obvious counter is "if Finland is successfully blockaded, how long can the field army last?" Like I said, the icebreakers had a job, and that job would not end while there is sea ice - during that winter, or during the next. Beating back one Soviet attack with the cost of two to four icebreakers sunk is all well and good if it ensures Finland keeps its independence, but what of the next attack, and the one after that? The USSR had reserves to spare, but Finland would not be able to replenish a depleted fleet of icebreakers during the Winter War, or even within the next two years. The risks of committing the icebreakers into battle then outweighed the benefits, and this would have been a basis for pre-war planning. There were units that were better suited to defend the Karelian Isthmus. Desperate last ditch measures are a separate issue, they are not usually planned several years in advance.


Army was best in the world in fighting during the winter and Air Force had quite adequate preparations as well. Navy did not, not even for the phase when ice had not yet covered Gulf of Finland. Staff work had been lazy. This is also illustrated by the fact that a lot of coastal guns and crews sat unemployed while fighting raged in Karelian isthmus. No preparation for their secondary use in wintertime had been made, not even for light pieces which would have been relatively easy to transport for land positions.

What exactly would you have had the navy do in the Winter War, with its OTL fleet? It would be a different thing if they really got the destroyers to support the coastal ships, and any number of additional vessels present in late 30s plans besides, but IOTL they had very limited options for any active operations against a clearly superior enemy. The general plans had to be based on defending the coast (and Åland) from enemy landings, and protecting the ports, the sea lanes and the merchant ships. The small submarine flotilla was the only unit that could be practically used further out, and even it had to be in readiness for repelling a potential enemy amphibious landing on any part of the coastal area. There was very little leeway there for active Finnish naval operations.

As for the coastal guns: they can only be redeployed to the land front if you think that there is not going to be an enemy attack against the coastal areas they are protecting. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that a lot of six inch Canets, for example, could have been moved to the Karelian Isthmus during the war, and it would have probably saved a lot of sweat and lives for the troops fighting there. But then the pre-war and early wartime military did not have the information we have as to how passive the Soviet fleet would be during the war. Certainly, though, it would have helped if they had pre-made plans for it and could have then moved a number of coastal guns to the front in, say, January 1940, after deciding that there would be no real threat of significant Soviet naval action in the next two to three months. As it was, J.L. Rikama had plans for a line of Canet guns to be placed in the Karelian isthmus already in 1932, in mobile (railway) artillery batteries, but did not have the clout yet at that time to ram through the system when his higher-ups were against the plan.
 
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For the bolded, the obvious counter is "if Finland is successfully blockaded, how long can the field army last?" Like I said, the icebreakers had a job, and that job would not end while there is sea ice - during that winter, or during the next. Beating back one Soviet attack with the cõost of two to four icebreakers sunk is all well and good if it ensures Finland keeps its independence, but what of the next attack, and the one after that? The USSR had reserves to spare, but Finland would not be able to replenish a depleted fleet of icebreakers during the Winter War, or even within the next two years. The risks of committing the icebreakers into battle then outweighed the benefits, and this would have been a basis for pre-war planning. There were units that were better suited to defend the Karelian Isthmus. Desperate last ditch measures are a separate issue, they are not usually planned several years in advance.

Finland was an inch away from total loss with close to 1000 men KIA each day and the Fleet (I don't say the Navy, because Coastal Artillery was fighting efficiently) was capable of just providing limited AA-support for Turku. Even last ditch efforts would have been well justified, and might have been even worth the cost.

With even limited pre-war staff planning there would have been options, such as using coastal battleships for artillery support with icebreaker support, with more extensive planning just perhaps possibility of using icebreaker or two for artillery support with shipborne artillery. Icebreakers could have provided very good flank support, as they did break the ice thus impending the movement of enemy forces.

What exactly would you have had the navy do in the Winter War, with its OTL fleet? It would be a different thing if they really got the destroyers to support the coastal ships, and any number of additional vessels present in late 30s plans besides, but IOTL they had very limited options for any active operations against a clearly superior enemy. The general plans had to be based on defending the coast (and Åland) from enemy landings, and protecting the ports, the sea lanes and the merchant ships. The small submarine flotilla was the only unit that could be practically used further out, and even it had to be in readiness for repelling a potential enemy amphibious landing on any part of the coastal area. There was very little leeway there for active Finnish naval operations.

The MTB's and submarines had numerous technical glitches due to cold conditions which should have been rectified in more rigorous prewar training. If there should have been an ampihibous landing in early December 1939, both subs and MTB's would have been very likely unable to take part in repelling it. Soviet naval passivity was a blessing.

Submarines were used in singular, ineffective intercept patrols against singular merchant ships in OTL. These operations might be characterized as "high risk, low reward", while more mundane tasks of protecting the trade with ASW operations was at hand. Granted, Finnish subs did just that in 1942, killing three subs with no losses which is a pretty good echange ratio.

As for the coastal guns: they can only be redeployed to the land front if you think that there is not going to be an enemy attack against the coastal areas they are protecting. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that a lot of six inch Canets, for example, could have been moved to the Karelian Isthmus during the war, and it would have probably saved a lot of sweat and lives for the troops fighting there. But then the pre-war and early wartime military did not have the information we have as to how passive the Soviet fleet would be during the war.

Ice conditions are an annual event with average of 106 ice days in Helsinki and 133 in Hamina, 1/3 a year. The almost total lack of planning what to do with fleet and coastal artillery after sea is frozen is a clear miss by Finnish naval staff. Especially as the Army's lack of artillery was well known since 1918. Finnish Navy clearly failed.

Canets could have been deployed only with more foresight to fixed positions behind Mannerheim line, but that would have demanded foresight before the war. However, the lighter guns, such as 57mm Nordenfelt, could have been redeployed fairly easily when it became clear that they were not demanded at sea. They would have been, if not perfect, good enough for various direct support and even anti-tank duties.

As you mentioned, a "killer app" for Finnish Navy would have been a scheme for rail-mobile 6" guns I would guess. Perhaps some kind of universal platform for flatcars and naval fortifications, semi-mobile also with motor transportation? Rikama would have been able to think something like that...

I certainly won't blame naval staff of 1918-1939 for not inventing what to do with the Fleet and Coastal Artillery after the sea was frozen. One might as well blame the General Staff for simply not noticing. However, the lack of thought to winter period is still curious. I think it might be a holdover on one hand from the Czarist Navy and from other navies which don't have to think about ice. Indigenous thought did not have time to mature on how to create advantage due to fact that coasts are frozen annually But still, it's curious that only now the Finnish Navy is emerging from it's summer predisposition with the new "Monitoimialus 2020" frigate program. Is it because virtually no one else has to think about it? Not even Russia / Soviet Union after acquiring the Kaliningrad base? Of course, the climate change may take this away from us, but who knows...
 
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I wonder what would work better, a dedicated Ice breaker fitted for but not with a cruiser scale armament, rather like a liner having strengthened decks to make conversion to an AMC easier. Or build a dedicated warship but make here ice capable. If the armour is structural then it can protect the waterline from Ice damage. Like wise a TPS system can include fuel stowagr and ballast tanks that can be used to artificial roll the ship to help free her from ice. Any thoughts?
 
I wonder what would work better, a dedicated Ice breaker fitted for but not with a cruiser scale armament, rather like a liner having strengthened decks to make conversion to an AMC easier. Or build a dedicated warship but make here ice capable. If the armour is structural then it can protect the waterline from Ice damage. Like wise a TPS system can include fuel stowagr and ballast tanks that can be used to artificial roll the ship to help free her from ice. Any thoughts?

Technologically that was possible and icebreakers were designed with possible inclusion of armament. Although icebreakers of the era were rather small, largest was the Russian Yermak of some 9000 tons, 7500hp, built already in 1898.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yermak_(1898_icebreaker)

And, as mentioned, the diesel-electric icebreaker Sisu, 1700 tons, 4500hp, was a dual use vessel with armament of 2x 4" and 2x 40mm guns initially.

https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jäänmurtaja_Sisu_(1939)

In fact, building modern icebreakers to open country for foreign trade would have been extremely sensible keynesiaism during 1930's, but that's a different story. Even the larger civilian icebreakers were very cheap, as they were civilian ships, compared to warships, Jääkarhu of 4900 tons, 9200hp, 4x 4", 2x 40mm guns cost 26 million marks against 200 million marks of a single coastal battleships.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jääkarhu

An 8 minute wartime news film about icebreakers among other things

http://www.elonet.fi/fi/elokuva/604805

Finnish icebreakers even of post-war era were built with possible light AA weapon emplacement in mind.

But, as DrakonFin mentioned, icebreakers were naturally fully employed in their maritime duties and thus the possibility and thinking about using them as warships in ice conditions did not surface. The Navy just did not think adequately about what to do in wintertime.

With more prewar thinking I think it just might be possible to purchase an "escort icebreaker" for Coastal Battleships instead of Sisu.

Enough funding would have been available and the contract could have been fulfilled domestically. For an "escort icebreaker" AA armament to be fitted in wartime might be a quite natural choice, as it would break the ice for coastal battleships it would not need strong armament for herself. Maybe a couple of 3" DP Bofors guns, 4x 40mm Vickers AA and rudimentary armor protection against shrapnels?
 
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Finland was an inch away from total loss with close to 1000 men KIA each day and the Fleet (I don't say the Navy, because Coastal Artillery was fighting efficiently) was capable of just providing limited AA-support for Turku. Even last ditch efforts would have been well justified, and might have been even worth the cost.

With even limited pre-war staff planning there would have been options, such as using coastal battleships for artillery support with icebreaker support, with more extensive planning just perhaps possibility of using icebreaker or two for artillery support with shipborne artillery. Icebreakers could have provided very good flank support, as they did break the ice thus impending the movement of enemy forces.

The AA support the coastal ships provided for Turku was perhaps limited, but then at the middle part of the war, the ships' AA weapons provided the bulk of Turku's entire AA defence, which without them would have been very poor. The ships' fire control was also better than what the few ground based units had. I have been recently reading up on wartime events in Turku, and when the town and port were bombed in December, there was at first very little AA in the area. To give an illustrative example, on December 25th 1939 the war diary of the II Section, 53rd Heavy AA Battery reports that at circa noon, seven SB bombers flew over the town in the height of 3500 meters and dropped bombs. Several buildings and ships in port area were damaged. The section could not open fire at all as its fire control apparatus was frozen in temperatures of -26 degrees Celsius. In the early part of the war, the two 76 mm guns of this unit were the only heavy AA protecting what by then was the main trade port of Finland. The eight 105 mm AA guns on the coastal ships that were protecting Turku since January made the situation from abysmal to barely tolerable. During the war, the coastal ships themselves were attacked by enemy bombers 35 times, with 218 SB bombers and 111 fighters taking part in these attacks (cumulatively). Had this considerable effort been directed against the functioning ports and freighters, without even what little AA the coastal ships and other armed vessels could provide, and the situation would have been much more precarious for Finnish trade.

Besides what the coastal ships were doing, the fleet was tasked with securing and directing maritime trade. Over 350 ships (the total of inbound and outbound) were during the war escorted across to and from the Swedish waters by the icebreakers and the armed ships under navy control and manned with navy personnel. This amounts to over 100 000 (net) tons of export and c. 80 000 (net) tons of import during the war. Especially in import, this included a lot of crucial war materials and weapons without which the situation on the front might have well looked a lot worse come late February.

Even while the waters were open, the use of smaller navy ships (like the gunboats) as escorts meant that there were practically no support vessels for the coastal ships to sortie out without taking unacceptable risks. Here we can see one of the major problems of the fleet: that they did not have the "destroyer-escorts" 1930s plans had called for. After the war, it was estimated that the navy would have necessarily needed at least five destroyer- or corvette-sized ships for escorting the coastal ships and trade vessels, in terms of both AA and ASW warfare. As it was, these escort duties were IOTL performed by armed state vessels with dubious military value when there was no other choice available. From the navy ships that were docked in January due to the ice, especially the wooden-hulled vessels and the submarines, as many artillery guns as possible were removed to other use, like the deck guns of the Vetehinens to outfit a three-gun 76 mm AA section to Turku, or AA guns to the escort vessels and even the Oihonna.

As you are mainly referring to the last two months of the war, we need not go into the Winter War minelaying efforts of the navy, as those happened when the water was still mostly open.

The navy did have plans for using the coastal ships as floating support artillery along the Karelian Isthmus in late February, but in the end General Valve decided against sending either of the ships east. The decision was based on one hand on the risks and difficulty of the effort: supporting a coastal ship or both would take the Jääkarhu (the only icebreaker that had the size needed) to open a lane for it/them through the ice and assist it/them in turning. In these conditions it was expected that should the ships be noticed by the enemy and come under determined air attacks out of the nearby Leningrad area, they would soon run out of AA shells. It is easy to see that should the Jääkarhu then hit an unlucky mine or be bombed by a lucky Soviet bomber and be disabled, the coastal ships following it would soon be sitting ducks for the Soviet bombers - maybe even before they could reach close enough to the front. When IOTL the Tarmo was sent east to assist the front in the last days of the war, it had to turn back early in big part due to enemy air attacks. On balance, then, the coastal ships would have been noticed by the Soviets going east and bombed heavily.

On the other hand, Kijanen in Suomen Laivasto 1918-1968, Vol. I argues that in January and February there were persistent rumours about the enemy planning an operation against Hanko over the ice in the near future. This led to the creation of ad hoc units to protect the nearby sealanes. The threat of an enemy attack here, one that could also lead to the severing of Finland's trade connections, weighed in the decision not to send the coastal ships east as well. We now of course know there was no such invasion planned (and even Kijanen thinks the rumours might have been a successful Soviet maskirovka operation) but you can't avoid a certain amount of the fog of war in these things.

The issue with potential armed icebreakers (that is dedicated warship icebreakers), IMHO, boils down to a couple of things. One, icebreakers were thought as a special asset for winter conditions, with a special role - opening a lane through the ice for merchant ships. Their arming schemes were based on self-defence, to make them able to keep fulfilling this role. Artillery vessels were also considered a specific type of a vessel to be used in a certain way. The demands for a pure icebreaker and a pure artillery ship are quite different, starting from the hull shape (in terms of hydrodynamics and seakeeping, etc), power-to-weight ratio, required systems, crew training, etc. Thinking about a ship that would be both at the same time may have been a lot less obvious for the 1930s soldiers than it could be to 2000's armchair alt-historians.

Two, after the realization of the 1927 Navy Law the Finnish navy just didn't have the money for new ship projects in the 30s. The next major pure navy project were the Ruotsinsalmi class minelayers in 1939. The Sisu is in fact a good example of the situation: it was specifically designed as both an icebreaker and as a support ship for the submarines because the navy was sorely needing one ( the Klas Horn and the M1/Louhi were poor substitutes for a ship that was actually technically designed for the role) and as the two uses did not hurt each other (submarines not being used when an icebreaker is absolutely needed), the navy could get its wishes through in a civilian state ship. The fact that it could also support submarines did not weaken the Sisu's design specifics as an icebreaker - too much. The design compromises did somewhat hamper its ability to break stronger ice on the open sea, though. Otherwise, there was no money available for new major navy vessels in the early-to-mid 30s since the coastal ships were completed, not even for the destroyers the navy would have most wanted. The state also mostly had the icebreakers it needed, for the time being. In these conditions, it is hard to see money being allocated in an ATL for a ship or ships of a wholly new concept not only nationally but also internationally, even if Rahola or one of his bright young officers got the idea about artillery icebreakers one fine day. There would be a lot more design compromises to be made than with the Sisu, as well, if ever someone planned such a ship.

(As it is, Aaro Sahari from Helsinki University has been in the last few years writing a doctor's thesis about Finnish shipbuilding and the state's role in it during independence, and the completed thesis will be published in a few weeks from now. Keep your eyes peeled for that, as I predict this work will provide a very good source for future arguments on Finnish shipbuilding WIs for us to draw on.:))


The MTB's and submarines had numerous technical glitches due to cold conditions which should have been rectified in more rigorous prewar training. If there should have been an ampihibous landing in early December 1939, both subs and MTB's would have been very likely unable to take part in repelling it. Soviet naval passivity was a blessing.

Submarines were used in singular, ineffective intercept patrols against singular merchant ships in OTL. These operations might be characterized as "high risk, low reward", while more mundane tasks of protecting the trade with ASW operations was at hand. Granted, Finnish subs did just that in 1942, killing three subs with no losses which is a pretty good echange ratio.

We can well posit a TL where there would have been more and better training for submarines and MTBs in the 30s than IOTL. As it is, in the above book Kijanen, himself a submarine commander, admits that the submarine crews did not have enough cold water/ice training and that caused issues in the Winter War, when with better preparation submarine use could have continued longer into January. But then we need to accept that money and resources were limited, and so was the number of vessels and men, even for prewar training. The navy was not given money for new acquisitions at all prior to 1925, and its MTB fleet for example was much more modest than any 1920s and 30s plans envisioned. In the event in the Winter War, the Navy faced a materially overpowered enemy. In the Continuation War things were different as the Soviet fleet was practically bottled up in Kronstadt: there was no even theoretical threat of amphibious attacks against Hanko or Åland. The submarines could then be sent out to the waters around Åland to hunt enemy subs - which in itself was done because, again, the Finns lacked the ASW capable destroyer-escorts. The Finnish Navy was alone in arming subs with depth charges for ASW duty, after all.

But let's say there was better preparation in the interwar for the submarines and MTBs. Practically, then, that could mean that we have a handful of more Soviet freighters sunk in concerted attacks, and maybe they could have bagged a bigger ship like the icebreaker Yermak, or a Soviet destroyer or, a miracle of miracles, a Gangut class ship. It would have been good for the Finnish morale, surely, but such naval victories would not have changed the situation at the front in Karelia. During the Winter War in an OTL form, the Finnish Navy could only practically be a nuisance to the Soviet fleet in terms of its ability to affect the outcome of the war by attacking the enemy. As we have discussed, its main duties were elsewhere.


Ice conditions are an annual event with average of 106 ice days in Helsinki and 133 in Hamina, 1/3 a year. The almost total lack of planning what to do with fleet and coastal artillery after sea is frozen is a clear miss by Finnish naval staff. Especially as the Army's lack of artillery was well known since 1918. Finnish Navy clearly failed.

Canets could have been deployed only with more foresight to fixed positions behind Mannerheim line, but that would have demanded foresight before the war. However, the lighter guns, such as 57mm Nordenfelt, could have been redeployed fairly easily when it became clear that they were not demanded at sea. They would have been, if not perfect, good enough for various direct support and even anti-tank duties.

As you mentioned, a "killer app" for Finnish Navy would have been a scheme for rail-mobile 6" guns I would guess. Perhaps some kind of universal platform for flatcars and naval fortifications, semi-mobile also with motor transportation? Rikama would have been able to think something like that...

I certainly won't blame naval staff of 1918-1939 for not inventing what to do with the Fleet and Coastal Artillery after the sea was frozen. One might as well blame the General Staff for simply not noticing. However, the lack of thought to winter period is still curious. I think it might be a holdover on one hand from the Czarist Navy and from other navies which don't have to think about ice. Indigenous thought did not have time to mature on how to create advantage due to fact that coasts are frozen annually But still, it's curious that only now the Finnish Navy is emerging from it's summer predisposition with the new "Monitoimialus 2020" frigate program. Is it because virtually no one else has to think about it? Not even Russia / Soviet Union after acquiring the Kaliningrad base? Of course, the climate change may take this away from us, but who knows...

There is ice every year, yes, though the 1930s winters were warmer than the winter of 1939-40 which was, as you know, unusually severe. I guess there could have been better planning for winter time among the navy brass, but then again we are talking about an entire military branch being set up in two decades, from very modest beginnings. There were many issues for the defence planners to tackle in the interwar. Not all theoretical benefits Finland had in terms of geography and nature were noticed and acted upon. It even took the events of the war to wake up to the full implications of the need to use dedicated coastal infantry, trained specifically as "marine" troops - in the thirties, it was very much the early days for this, and with actual coastal jaeger troops available in the Bay of Viipuri in the last weeks of the Winter War, a lot of lives could have been saved.

In terms of the navy providing artillery weapons to the army there are several points of friction. One thing is the normal, to-be-expected turf war between the different branches, with, in conditions of limited funds, the navy holding on to its assets with tooth and nail, not wanting to be seen as just an auxiliary branch in support of the army but an equal in status terms.

The second thing is actual logistics. A lot of the coastal artillery's guns would be in winter time found on the coastal forts in islands and otherwise remote parts of the coast. Getting guns from the forts to the front in a short order would not be all that easy, and would practically require transport ships and, again, icebreakers (that have other things to do) to practically make these transport operations possible. Thus just a part of the navy's theoretically formidable numbers of tubes, mainly the ones on mainland, would be available to be moved easily or quickly in the middle of the winter even with good planning.

Now, it is hard to say what kinds of comparative numbers we could talk of, but let's take the 57 mm Nordenfelt as an example. According to Enqvist's book on the guns of the Finnish coastal artillery, in 1939 there were 60 Nordenfelts in stock in total, with 20 held by the army and 40 by the navy. As the gun was a coastal artillery mainstay, we could expect that most functional weapons were emplaced in various forts along the coast, or held in local warehouses if not in place. How many of the 40 would then be movable in a short order? I'd be cautious and say that even with planning in advance, no more than 20 guns could be moved to the land front within a reasonably short timeframe. If the navy expects enemy action against Hanko or other parts of the coast, they do not want to have a empty cupboard at the local forts either, or at the armories where they could quickly draw upon to get replacement weapons.

20 guns, then, might have been practically moved to the front, to make up as much as five four-gun batteries, say. A help, surely, that could assist in holding back the Soviets for a time, and might help save hundreds of lives. But then, in terms of the Red Army's massive edge, in the end a comparative drop in the bucket. Other light and medium guns held by the navy were not, AFAIK, as numerous as the 57 mm Nordenfelt was, and a lot of weapons would still be needed to arm the forts, ships and AA batteries even in the winter, just in case, and so while with decent advance planning the navy could send some tens of tubes to the front, I don't think the realistic numbers would have been massive in any case.

Like you said, an innovative system of rail-transportable guns (and batteries) could have been a good bet in the 30s, but then again for the coastal artillery it would only work in terms of the land-based forts with a realistic access to railway lines.

EDIT: As for post-war thinking: I just took a look at the conclusions in Jouko Pirhonen's "Laivastotoiminta saaristotaisteluissa Suomen olosuhteissa" ("Naval action in archipelago battles in the Finnish conditions") from 1948, a classic study of indigenous tactics by a man who took part in the war in many roles and who was very keen on measures that are particularly suited for the Finnish conditions. The only mention of icebreakers in the conclusions refers to their important use for opening sea lanes in the coastal areas for actual military vessels. Earlier, he emphasizes arming icebreakers so that they can defend themselves (especially with AA weapons), and designing actual warships in a way that they can function in winter time (with icebreaker support), as late into the fall and as early in the spring as possible. He also points out that as icebreakers are vital for the fleet's operations in the winter, they should be kept as far away from harm's way in times of ice-free sea as possible to avoid losing them unnecessarily.

So, one could go through the war in the first lines of naval battles in the Gulf of Finland and not come up with the idea of icebreaker-warships as a major future development. If Pirhonen didn't think of it by 1948, it is no wonder others didn't pick up the idea, either, and before the war at that.
 
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