AH Project: CP Victory Once and For All

Since the dawn of Alternate History, we have been wondering many things. However, we keep coming back to one thing in particular, a world where the Central Powers win the Great War.
Threads pop up every single time somebody has a new thought on the subject, and I am willing to bet that most of us are getting pretty damned tired of it. But wait! Are we truly done discussing it? Do we as a group know and agree on the most likely outcome of a world where the Entente succumbs to their bitter enemies?

This thread will solve that. This thread will solve this WI once and for all!


Topics we can begin with. And you are all welcome to add to this list.


In this world, Germany is victorious on the Marne. And I will stop there. There is no specific order to these questions.



  1. How long will it be before France falls?
  2. Will the UK declare an armistice with Germany soon after France?
  3. How long can the Russians withstand the full force of the CP (sans Ottomans, maybe)?
  4. What will the Germans annex of France/Belgium proper?
  5. Will German terms be so harsh on Russia in an earlier victory (IE, no Brest-Litovsk)?
  6. What would be the Ottoman annexations from Russia?
  7. Who would get Libya?
  8. How will the war look between the UK and Ottoman Empire should the two remain at war once the UK makes peace with Germany and AH. Will this even happen?
  9. What would Germany annex from French/Belgian Africa/Indochina?
  10. What would be made of German Pacific colonies?
  11. Would the British annex Katanga if they could?
  12. What would AH make of Venetia? Direct annexation or puppet or neither)?
  13. What would the Balkans look like after Bulgarian annexations and Austro-Hungarian domination?
  14. What would be the AH political situation be? Is a USAH likely? How long can they survive intact?
  15. Without Lenin, will Russia collapse into a civil war between the Pro-Communists and Anti-Communists?On what level will America be isolated?
  16. To what degree will America be isolationist/expansionist?
So these are just some of the many questiosn I hope this thread will answer.

I will start with our first draft of the map and over time we can watch it evolve. By the time this thread dies, we will have completed the map.


From
GodRaimundo.

Thank you in advance.


Zach
 
I assume you mean a victory in the first battle of the marne. But to answer your questions.
With your pod 7 and 12 are pretty stupid. Why should Italy join a war on the loosing side?
1. France can fight on even after the fall of paris. But I doubt it will, as long as German terms are seen as reasonable. A lot depends upon the government which will form after the defeats.
2. As long as German terms are reasonable they will probably accept a peace treaty without a valuable continental ally and German access to the Atlantic. This is more likely than in the case of France, because many Germans including the Kaiser were anglophile.
3. Withstanding the CPs alone is hopeless. They will try to get a peace treaty as favourable as possible. As the CPs will probably demand from them harsh terms without controlling much of Russias territory they might fight on for a while, but not more than a year.
4. Possible annexations are especially the ore region of Briey and Luxembourg (including the belgian part). Liege and Antwerp were also proposed but a lot depends on the extent of a German victory.
5. Brest-Litovsk is out of question, but poland and the baltics are going to Germany either directly or as puppets.
6 Don´t know
7. See above
8.Don´t know
9. There was of course the Mittelafrika plan: All of the kongo and Gabon additionally some wanted parts of the portugese colonies but they haven´t entered the war at this point
10 Probably is gone perhaps a face saving sale/ exchange
11 Katanga was a major colonial aim of the Germans therefore probably not.
12 See above
Have no more time will answer the rest later
 
If anything got solved once and for all, historians would be out of a job and amateur historians out of a hobby. Nonetheless, for what it's worth...

Hang on. Which Marne?
 
@ I Blame Communism: The first battle at the Marne of course.

@ Chelm: Without Dobruja, wich completly Romanian in 1914 and Romania is neutral.

1. Not long, they wont make it untill November.
2. Yes, othwerwise it would become and endless war. The UK and Germany both didnt want that.
3. Not long too, with or without the Ottomans, they will surrender after some kind of spring and summer offensives of the CP's
4. I think they will mostly follow the Meusse as new west border.
5. Only no Belarus, but Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic will be CP. Baltic will become a German settlement colony.
6. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as puppets.
7. Just Italy.
8. No war between UK and Ottomans (part of the General peace), but I think that the Ottoman empire will collapse in the late 20's. With great powers interventing.
9. Mittelafrika (+ Benin) and Indochina and the French sphere in Qing China, what will create a pro-German Qing versus a pro-UK Japan.
10. They will take some islands (mostly those millions of small island under Hawaii) but new Caledonia will stay French.
11. No, will be German.
12. Italy is not part of the war, but if it was Venice would become part of Austria
13. AH annexes north + west Serbia and Montenegro, south + east Serbia and Macedonia go to Bulgaria.
14. AH will become a Federation (Danubian federation, U.S. of Austria etc. like OTL presents day Austria and Germany) and reorganises itself (mainly merging serveral old Kronlands into new states, see map). With Hungary (a state) also having three states (Slovenia, Hungary and Banat (wich has a big variation of ethnicities))
15. With Germany victorious in 1915 I think Russia wont fall into a civil war (for now) because the Tsar got enough control but they will become communist (just as civil war again), fascist (Like TL Hitler did, with a very strong Tsar, like OTL fascist Italy) or republic/constitutional monarchy if the Tsar wins the civil war but sees that it is time for change.
16. America will stay isolationist for a while.

And a map with (roughly) my idea about a CP victory with a succesfull von Schlieffen plan.
cpvicschlieffen.png
 
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yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
1. Depends. I think France might fall if Paris falls, but then again... It depend on the shape of the French army after such a disaster. Is there still fight in them or not.

2. No, it will probably take a while. The UK rules at sea and the Germans rule at land.

3. Not too long, but they will probably get a less harsh peace than Bretsk- Litovsk.

4. Luxemburg, Liege. An independent Flandern as a German ally is possible.

5. No, Poland, Lithuania and Courland will be annexed (well partly annexed, partly turned into puppets). But Russia probably keep northern Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, the Ukraine and Finland.

6. The Ottoman Empire will probably reconquer the Kars area and Russian Armenia. A Azeri puppet is possible but not certain.

7. Italy would probably hold it. If France lose at Marne there's a (huge) chance Italy never join the war.

8. Good question, let's assume the Ottomanits join the war against Russia, Britain might declare war, but it's not certain. If they does I assume it in the end will mean a return to status quo (this might actually prevent Ottoman annexations in the Caucasus).

9. I doubt they'll get Indochina, but they'll certainly annex Belgian Congo and the French Central African colonies to create Mittelsafrika.

10. Return to Germany after the war I guess.

11. Perhaps, but I think the peace between Britain and German would involve a return to prewar borders.

12. Italy would probably never join the war, and even if they did I don't see the point for Austria in annexing more Italian speaking territory.

13. Austria- Hungary would annex Montenegro and the Sandjak of Novi Pazar. Bulgaria would annex Macedonia and Nis. A small rump Serbia will be left. Greece and Romania wouldn't join the war.

14. Austria- Hungary can't survive in it's current form. But any attempt to reform the empire will face opposition. Will the attempts be succesful or not? I don't know. The next European crisis could very well be the Empire crumbling.

15. Russia must reform or die (in a way like Austria). The civil war could well be between Reformists and Reactionaries. It probably wouldn't start right away, and could probably be avoided. But if Russia continues down the Reactionary Autocratic path, the Romanovs will just shoot themselves in the head, since that won't be tolerated forever.

16. America will stay isolated for now, but probably not forever.
 
I don't think there's any way the CP can win WWI unless alien space bats destroy the Royal Navy. But if we take "CP victory" to mean a draw...

1. It depends on why the battle ends in Germany's favour - whether the Entente forces have retreated and regrouped or been wiped out.

2 and 4. Britain doesn't want and cannot afford to let Germany dominate Europe. If Germany maintains its ambition to rule Belgium and the Netherlands and to subject France to reparations and an exclusionary customs union, then Britain will blockade the continent indefinitely and concentrate on supporting Russia to defeat Germany in the East. But I suspect Germany will agree to a return to the pre-war status quo in the West, in exchange for territorial gains in Eastern Europe and in Africa. So Germany withdraws from France, Belgium and the Netherlands, no reparations are paid by either side and everyone agrees not to mention the unpleasantness of the previous few months.

3 and 5. With France and Britain making peace, surely Russia will want to as well. But Germany is going to want a lot in return: The rest of Poland along with Estonia, Latvia, Belarus and the western Ukraine as a "buffer" zone under German rule ("for all time!!!1!"). If the military get their way, Poles and Jews will be driven out of Prussia into these new vassal states. I presume Bessarabia and Romania also come under German or maybe Austro-Hungarian rule as vassal states. I think the Ottomans will actually declare war on Russia if France and the UK have abandoned the Entente and made peace with Germany, and will invade the Caucasus.

6 and 8. If the war ends in September 1914, the British and Ottoman Empires won't be at war. The Ottomans will want the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbijan - and Germany might let them have it), and possibly all the territory up to and including the Crimea (Germany surely won't let them have that). The Ottoman Empire stays where it is but Germany gradually comes to dominate it.

7 and 12. If the war ends in 1914, and Italy has remained neutral, it keeps Libya while Austria never enters Venetia.

9 and 10. All of Germany's colonial gains are in Africa, and it will probably give up Pacific and Asian colonies in return. Germany wants a "German India in Africa", a jewel in the Kaiserkrone - as ever, the Kaiser will trip over himself in giving things away in exchange for a big African colony.

11. Probably not - Britain is more interested in coastline than land at this point, and is already moving toward consolidation. Before the war it had been negotiating with Germany for supporting each other in taking Portugal's colonies in South Africa, and Britain had indicated a willingness to cede British East Africa in return for keeping Zanzibar and gaining German South-West Africa (basically, Britain was preparing to ditch the North-South axis idea in line with German and French conceptions of East-West axes).

13 and 14. I presume, as with Prussianisation in Eastern Europe, there will be a concerted effort to Austro-Hungarise the Balkans. Austro-Hungary itself is going to come increasingly under German domination.

15. It depends on how Russia extricates itself from the war, but almost certainly not. Either the Tsar will remain in power but be forced to accept more piecemeal constitutional reforms, or will abdicate with power transferring decisively to an elected government, with Kerensky (yay!) dominant for the first few years.

16. America has missed its first chance to be a superpower. With the entrenchment of a third European imperial power, and the empires lasting a lot longer than they did in OTL, it will probably want to concentrate on South America. But I think the biggest effect might be on immigration. One of Germany's stated goals was to redirect migration from Germany and the rest of central Europe, to German colonies rather than to America. I don't know how significant German migration to America was - German conservatives certainly resented it, but I suspect they might have exaggerated the problem (and the potential damage they gleefully imagined an end to German immigration would do to America). But if the flow of migrants from Europe after WWI was responsible for America tightening its immigration laws (and I have an inkling that it was), and a victorious Germany and Austro-Hungary prevent the movement of people from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe to America, then this would surely have an effect on that legislation.

I did a map of what I think Africa would end up looking like, after a thread some weeks ago.

6VUKw.png
 
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1. If the Germans win that the first Marne, the war is probably over by the close of 1915 at the latest, but possibly much sooner.

2. Yes. The British may not like it too much, but they won't have much of a choice. THe peace terms will be favorable though to Britain, largely.

3. Not long. Yes, without the Ottomans, they have more forces available, but the same fundamental flaws will exist.

4. Belgian Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Briey-Longwy, Belfort, possibly Belgian Limburg, and some colonies.

5. Probably not. "Independent" Poland and Baltic states, but beyond that is hard to say.

6. OTL Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, with perhaps the first as a puppet state. However, under these circumstances, Ottoman entry is far from certain.

7. Depends on what happens with Italy. Abiding by the Triple Alliance might seem like the better choice in this timeline for Italy. Savoy, Nice, and Tunisia could well go to Italy under such circumstances as might French (and British) Somaliland.

8. Unlikely to happen I suspect.

9. Most/all of French Equatorial Africa and possibly parts of French West Africa. Also, part or all of Belgian Congo is realistic too, but expect some accomodation with Britain either in Congo or in East Africa.

10. Ceded to Britain and/or Japan, with possibly one or two minor exceptions.

11. See number 9.

12. Neither. Italian intervention on Entente side under these circumstances is boerline ASB.

13. Fewer countries in the near term. Long term, who knows. Also, if Italy backs the Central Powers, it may get Albania.

14. I suspect it collapses, to the benefit of Germany and its Polish puppet.

15. Civil war? Maybe. Communists? no.

16. Bot really expansionist. Isolationist, perhaps on a relative basis, but expect a naval expansion.
 
1. Good question. It depends on the outcome of the Marne battle. If the French get defeated, but not totally, they still have quite some fighting spirit in them. But if it is a decisive, smashing victory like the one the Germans were hoping for... Paris will be lost in a few weeks, and after that, France has no more defensive lines to stop the German advance. They will sue for peace around early October.

2. Another good question. If they can get a fair peace, they might as well do it. German might has just smashed France in the quick victorious war that everyone expected, so it looks like the Germans have already won. Britain would probably agree to a peace if they get a status quo ante bellum and if Germany does not cut up Belgium (which was Britain's casus belli after all) and retreats from it. They'll probably insist on a say in the peace with France, too, to moderate German demands. Most likely a compromise will be reached after a few months of negotiations.

3. Not very long. The Germans will probably conquer Poland first, to ease the pressure on Austria-Hungary, and then march for St. Petersburg (because they all remember how much good it did for Napoleon to march on Moscow). When Germany has conquered the Baltics, it will likely be late 1915. I suppose that by the time St. Petersburg is under siege and victory does not appear to come soon, Russia will sue for peace. Early 1916, I would think.

4. Of France, border regions such as Briey-Longwy and Belfort - it was a quick victory after all, so the treaty is unlikely to be very harsh. Perhaps a little bit more to straighten out the front line. From Belgium, Germany would either take nothing, or perhaps some minor border regions (Arlon in Belgian Luxemburg would be an idea). They don't want to unneccessarily anger Britain after all.

5. No, probably not. The OTL situation was only created due to specific circumstances after all. They will probably take what they've occupied: Poland and the Baltics.

6. At least the regions lost in 1878. Whether they go any further depends on Ottoman stability and the amount of success they had on the battlefield. If they take any more, it would probably be oil-rich Azerbaijan.

7. Italy, of course. They own the place after all.

8. Given the fact that the Ottomans weren't even in the war jet at the time of your POD, I would highly doubt that such a situation would emerge. Also, I can't imagine that Britain would not make peace with the Ottomans if they did have war. Britain would not be far onto Ottoman soil yet, and they were no agressor wishing to conquer the Ottoman Empire anyway. Also, Germany has no interest in letting one of the few allies it has get smashed. In case of a 1916 peace, the Ottomans would probably have to concede Libyan independence, but that would be all.

9. The basics: Belgian and French Congo, Benin, Gabon, probably the present-day Central African Republic. They might take Chad and Morocco as well. Indochina is also an interesting possibility, and I could see Germany being interested in it. If they go far, Germany could take Senegal and Ivory Coast as well, or even Algeria. I can't see Germany seizing French West Africa or Madagascar (relatively worthless), Djibouti and Tunisia (no use to them and it would only anger the Italians, they would go to the Ottomans if they changed hands at all).

10. Probably some negotiations about giving them back, but in the end, Germany might be okay with selling them to the conquerors (Australia, Japan).

11. If they could, maybe. But it's Belgian territory that is transferred to Germany, so Britain has little to do with it. De jure, Britain lost the war anyway.

12. Venice is Italian, as far as I know. Austria-Hungary has nothing to do with it. If Italy is going to join the war, it is going to be on the side of the Central Powers, but given the quick French collapse and the Anglo-German peace as I detailed earlier, they might not have time for that (joining the war against Britain when Germany is already negotiating with them about peace might not be a good idea). Italy is likely to remain neutral and resent itself for not honouring the Triple Alliance when they still could.

13. Greater Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia, rump Serbia and Montenegro as puppet states of Austria-Hungary. Romania probably has Bessarabia since in this situation, they would most likely join the Central Powers against Russia.

14. It all depends. On one hand, Austria-Hungary has suffered a lot less devastation than IOTL, to it might survive. On the other hand, Franz Ferdinand is gone and though Karl might have a lot of the same ideas, it still depends whether he manages to implement them. Austria-Hungary's fate is probably either (1) a federation with every major minority in the empire being granted equal rights or (2) a Quadruple Monarchy with the Austrians, Czechs, Hungarians and Croats in charge, creating a comfortable majority (with a bit of luck, just the addition of the Czechs might be enough) or (3) partition, with Germany gaining Austria and Bohemia, Italy taking her claims in Trento, Trieste, Istria, Fiume and Dalmatia, German puppet Poland taking Galicia, with a rump Hungary remaining. Romania and Serbia might acquire some of their objectives too, probably Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern Vojvodina for Serbia and southern Transsylvania for Romania.

15. Civil war or at least a major uprising is certainly a possibility. With a bit of luck, the uprising will be squashed and the Tsar will enact reforms. However, once revanchism sets in, I'm not sure how much of those reforms will stay...

16. Isolationist, probably to a great degree. Expansionist, perhaps concerning northern Mexico and the Caribbean, but not on a large scale.
 
I really am rather mystified as to which Marne we can mean: the references to Italy suggest the second, the references to the Ottomans possibly not being in the first. Well, I suppose I'd better cover all my bases and answer the questions in both cases. Separate answers where appropriate:

1) I don't know enough about the military circumstances to comment with any certainty.

2) Yes. There's nothing much else we can do.

3) In the first case, the Russians will sue for peace as soon as they can. Germany might prolong the war - they were interested in Poland before they ever occupied Warsaw and anyway finishing with Russians in Galicia would be embarrassing - but war is an uncertain business, the Russians have fight, and so Warsaw is the furthest they'd go before negotiating, I'd say.

In the second case, Russia's out of it already.

4) German aims towards Belgium and France were fairly constant. Belgium was to be controlled by Germany, its economy an appendage of the German and its fortresses (especially Antwerp, the annexation of which was contemplated) to be German garrisons; whether it would be officially annexed is uncertain. The idea was raised as early as the September Programme but that document broadly came down on the side of vassalisation "to avoid domestic complications". But after 1916 and Ludendorff, Germany is going to be less and less concerned by what a lot of blasted Catholics and Socialists think, so I think annexation becomes more likely. Germany was at war with Britain, after all, and not inclined to do what we wanted all the time; Belgium was actually one of their main war aims, a demand articulated in full from 1914 onwards and a repeated sticking point in attempts at compromise.

Either way, Liege was to become Prussian and "part of the border" to be attached to Luxemburg, which was of course to become a German state. Whether this means the whole of Belgian Luxemburg or the area where Germanic dialects were spoken or what I do not know.

As for France, they were to lose parts of Lorraine and the remnant of Alsace. Brie was the main goal; others were Belfort and a more defensible border somewhere between the western foot of the Vosges and the Meuse. There was also talk about grabbing the ironworks at Longwy for German Luxemburg, and about German-controlled Belgium taking French Flanders and even the coast between Dunkirk and Boulogne; this last one I consider likely to be poo-pooed by Britain, at least in an early-victory scenario.

5) Brest-Litovsk wasn't even the first offer the Germans made after Russia's army started to unwind: frankly, they'd never displayed any interest in Ukraine. Any peace before the revolution would be vastly less drastic, though Poland was a long-standing goal.

So, first Marne (or any time before the Great Retreat): between status quo ante and the cession of Poland. Maybe Lithuania and Courland at a stretch. After the Great Retreat: Poland at least, and probably Lithuania and Courland (so, the frontline, just about). By Second Marne, of course, B-L had already happened.

6) First Marne? Well, they aren't in, though I suppose they might join in in time to grab Kars and Batum, which were their main goals and the only bone Germany was likely to throw (they were all that was officially signed over at B-L, although at that point the Bolsheviks didn't actually control the Caucasus so it made no difference) . But of course after Russia's collapse they adventured in the Caucasus and the annexations of nowadays Armenia and Azerbaijan was briefly on the cards.

7) Italy, probably. It could conceivably end up as some sort of native-run Ottoman protectorate but in any scenario where Italy's society doesn't collapse I find this unlikely.

8) I don't see why it should. The war, even when Britain was making a fine mess of it, was always on Ottoman soil. If the Germans are negotiating from a position of strength, of course they will want to secure peace for their beleaguered ally as well.

9) Belgian Congo was of course to be annexed - that rather went with controlling Belgium - and the requisite bits of French Central Africa to make a nice continuous grey blob. Given British disapproval I don't see any terribly obvious way to acquire more in spite of the grandiloquent aims of the place-in-the-sun lot, in Africa or Asia - although as an aside they might persuade us to dig up that partition of the Portuguese colonies we'd plotted with them before the war.

10) Status-quo ante in an early victory; in a later one, they might have been a sop to Britain and Japan, but if Germany has won a really smashing victory then perhaps not. Skeptical I may be of their ability to actually annex Indochina, but you won't find my denying that there was interest in Asian imperialism.

11) If we were offered I don't see why we'd refuse, but I don't think it too likely a scenario if we're talking about a convincing German success. It was the juiciest bit of the Congo, and the Congo was their foremost goal in Africa, to the point that even a proposed compromise suggested it being handed over under the pretext of a sale.

12) Austria has quite enough on its plate. The most you'd see for Italy, territory-wise, is some sort of small revision of the mountain borders to give Austria the passes ala Romania.

13) First Marne: Serbia squished, with Vardar Macedonia at least probably going to Bulgaria and the rest, if not annexed by Austria, then as much under Austrian overlordship as Belgian under German. Montenegro would share the fate of its big brother (although there's an outside chance it might become a vassal even if Serbia is annexed, since Nikola was anxious to make peace when things turned bad for his armies). Albania would become an Austrian client, but Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece would remain pretty independent actors (and bitter rivals in the case of the last two).

Second Marne: as above, but Bulgaria and defeated Romania would be more-or-less in the German orbit, and Bulgaria would also help itself to a chunk of Greece's Macedonian possessions and at least as much of Dobruja as it had before the Balkan Wars; from Serbia, at least everything it got by San Stefano and possibly also Nish. I don't think the Germans could really impose their will on Greece, though.

14) First Marne: the sort of profound reform implied by the "USAH" has never struck me as likely but you might see a triumphant officer class and miscellanious pro-Hapsburg nationalist types urge confrontation with the Hungarians at the next Ausgleich. I reckon you see a more confident Austria-Hungary with a government keen to centralise and a bit more authoritarian than it had been accustomed to, its great issues being what to do about the Hungarians and whether socialism is friend or threat. I don't know how long it would live: that depends.

Second Marne: Austria by this point is Germany's creature and I'd be surprised if it staggered past 1927 as a state meaningfully united or independent. It might break up or not, as Germany wills, but either way it will be an economic, military, and political extension of German power.

15) First Marne: Russia is due political turbulence, although the Bolsheviks will likely be much less in the spot-light. Besides the forces of proletarian revolutionism and peasant discontent mobilising on the left, there's threats to the tsarist regime as it stands from the right also. Some sort of civil war at some point in the near future is not certain but nor is out of the question.

Second Marne: well, obviously the civil war is already beginning.

16) Expansionism is not the opposite of isolationism, but onyway:

First Marne: without the bloody nose of the war and the betrayed hopes of Versailles - and confronted by a power-bloc in Europe that can rival Japan for threatening ambitions - I think America would only be more willing to punch at its weight in international diplomacy. I don't think she was ever really that isolationist anyway, if isolation means anything beyond "unwilling to become involved in wars between other great powers". Many Americans were isolationist, but America continued to be involved especially in the Pacific throughout the interbellum.

Second Marne: everything still goes except for the absence of bloody noses.
 
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But Germany is going to want a lot in return: The rest of Poland along with Estonia, Latvia, Belarus and the western Ukraine as a "buffer" zone under German rule ("for all time!!!1!"). If the military get their way,

I have never heard of this scheme and given that it all sounds rather outlandish (whatever do the Germans want with Belarus?) I think you are probably confused about one I have heard of often enough, which is the "buffer zone" idea. That was that the Poles and Jews living in a border strip of Russian Poland would be expelled further into it and, if possible, replaced by Germans. The idea was actually to insulate the Poles in Germany from the wicked influence of the Poles in Russia (again we see the contradiction between the strategic imperative to wrest Poland from Russia and the total lack of firm ideas about what to do with it) and so keep them passive and speed up their Germanisation, which makes no sense if they're to be expelled.

German Jews and Russian Empire Jews were whole different kettles of fish. Victims of widespread and often institutional anti-semitism though they were, the German Jews were mostly very national - and frequently rather sniffy about Yiddish-speaking and ostensibly bomb-throwing eastern Jews
 
I have never heard of this scheme and given that it all sounds rather outlandish (whatever do the Germans want with Belarus?) I think you are probably confused about one I have heard of often enough, which is the "buffer zone" idea. That was that the Poles and Jews living in a border strip of Russian Poland would be expelled further into it and, if possible, replaced by Germans.

I'll admit to some confusion - the "buffer zone" was part of the September Programme, but it doesn't pin down what would actually form that zone.

From what I understand, from secondary sources on the Riezler diaries etc, the discussions seem to have started with getting the Poles out of Prussian Poland, but then branched out into the ethnic-German colonisation of Russian Poland as well. So I'm assuming the buffer zone would take the form of a series of independent countries (under German domination) beyond that - the Baltic states, Belarus and Western Ukraine.

The idea was actually to insulate the Poles in Germany from the wicked influence of the Poles in Russia (again we see the contradiction between the strategic imperative to wrest Poland from Russia and the total lack of firm ideas about what to do with it) and so keep them passive and speed up their Germanisation, which makes no sense if they're to be expelled.

I think that represents some talking-at-cross-purposes between those who were pro-Prussian (and want to Prussianise the Poles in Germany) and those who were anti-Slav (and want to get rid of them).

German Jews and Russian Empire Jews were whole different kettles of fish. Victims of widespread and often institutional anti-semitism though they were, the German Jews were mostly very national - and frequently rather sniffy about Yiddish-speaking and ostensibly bomb-throwing eastern Jews

None of which stopped them being the victims of institutionalised racism, and by the end of 1914 the upper class was already starting to believe that England declared war and ruined everything because of Jewish influence (a cui bono fallacy).
 

I'm a little confused as to how a draw means Germany gets a lot of useful British territory. Since the RN is still Britain's trump card after WWI, they're not going to let Germany get British East Africa, for example, because it's one of their more useful bases in the Indian Ocean if I'm not mistaken. Plus, most of Germany's colonies might be occupied early on in the conflict (being poorly armed, except, I think, Tanganyika), and will be indefinite bargaining chips for Britain (they could bargain the territorial integrity of Belgium, for example, so to them it doesn't feel like a loss or a draw at all).

Edit: I see the note you made about it, but nothing in the Pacific needs to be returned to Germany at all. General consensus has always been that the HSF could never project enough power in the Pacific to retake their colonial possessions from the Commonwealth or Japan (despite the IJN's apparent inferiority, but that also depends on when this war ends). So basically Germany isn't going to trade off their Pacific colonies in exchange for African ones because Britain isn't stupid enough to agree.
 
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The only african colony of Germany falling early was Togoland, which hadn´t even armed forces. Südwest (Namibia) capitulated in july 1915, Kamerun in February 1916 and East Africa fought till the end of the war.
And With German access to the Atlantic the British are in the weaker position. They are in no position to blockade all of Europe like hundred years before nor can they do anything for their remaining continental allies (which at this point will be only the russians) Sure they can´t be conquered but they will suffer a lot more in a drawn out war than the CPs. Therefore a peace favourable for Germany is not out of question, if the british loose no colonies, although an exchange is possible.
 
I'll admit to some confusion - the "buffer zone" was part of the September Programme, but it doesn't pin down what would actually form that zone.

From what I understand, from secondary sources on the Riezler diaries etc, the discussions seem to have started with getting the Poles out of Prussian Poland, but then branched out into the ethnic-German colonisation of Russian Poland as well. So I'm assuming the buffer zone would take the form of a series of independent countries (under German domination) beyond that - the Baltic states, Belarus and Western Ukraine.

Nobody on the CP side (except the Galicians, of course, and they didn't run the show) had any real interest in Ukraine until they stumbled into the place. Galicia, by the way, is the most populous, national, and economically important part of western Ukraine and obviously it's already in Austria; the rest is pretty fertile but contains little industry at this point beyond the processing of its own agricultural produce and is in general nothing to write home about, besides being owned by Poles and chock full of Yiddish Jews. Belarus is all like that.

The carving out of a whole series of states between Germany and Russia was never contemplated much until, by circumstances which hardly anybody expected, it happened. It's not the same as a reasonably well-documented scheme concerning Poland, the conquest of which was always on the agenda.

I think that represents some talking-at-cross-purposes between those who were pro-Prussian (and want to Prussianise the Poles in Germany) and those who were anti-Slav (and want to get rid of them).

That different plans were being chucked out by different officials with different agendas and all being trumped by the shifting needs of war-fighting is of course the first thing to bear in mind here. That said, I'm not sure what you mean by "Prussianising" and whether it is any different from Germanising.

None of which stopped them being the victims of institutionalised racism, and by the end of 1914 the upper class was already starting to believe that England declared war and ruined everything because of Jewish influence (a cui bono fallacy).

"The upper class" is a big nebulous entity that can be accused of practically anything and this is true of all countries. One can certainly find plenty of anti-semitic people in Britain's upper class(es).

Obviously anti-semitism in Britain was not nearly such an institution as in Germany - though I would note, as an apendum to your specific point, that there was a distinctly anti-semitic colouring to a lot of the window-smashing and public humiliation directed at 'Germans' (eastern Europe immigrants with Teutonic-sounding names) in Great Britain in 1914. What a world, what a world...

Anyway, I did say that there was institutional anti-semitism in Germany. It seems to me that this question is one which a lot of people, though I don't mean to accuse you, approach one way or the other way. Either Germany discriminated against the Jews ('cos we don't like Germany); or the German Jews were great patriots ('cos we do). The possibility of both being true at the same time puts us on the path down which lurks the demon Complicated History.
 
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I'm a little confused as to how a draw means Germany gets a lot of useful British territory. Since the RN is still Britain's trump card after WWI, they're not going to let Germany get British East Africa, for example, because it's one of their more useful bases in the Indian Ocean if I'm not mistaken.

It's not useful territory, not until the 1930s. Mombasa is little more than a big jetty at this point, and it's the best port in BEA. It services some of the anti-slaving patrols but that's about it. The only other reason the port has had any traffic in the 20 years preceding the war is that Britain has been building a railway in-land. There's no passenger service until after WWI, and even for trade it's only a stop-over on the way to Zanzibar.

Britain never really wanted BEA and only has it because the Kaiser is an idiot. During the negotiations over Heligoland, Britain's only interest was in securing Zanzibar against Germany's claims. It had no real interest in what became BEA until Salisbury got intelligence that the Kaiser was desperate to get Heligoland in time for a summer ceremony and was willing to give up that land. After the collapse of the British East Africa Company in 1896, Britain has only kept the territory going in order to save face. It's throwing money at it but nothing productive is coming out. It's of no strategic value and Britain would still have to bribe settlers to go and live there well into the 1920s.

Most crucially, Britain was contemplating ceding it before the war. The most important thing is Zanzibar - that's the key strategic port for the Royal Navy and also the best trading port, that's what Britain wants to keep, the African Hong Kong. The Germans still felt they'd been cheated in 1890 over Heligoland and were still muttering about their old claim to Zanzibar - giving them BEA back gets them to think honour has been restored. In addition, British companies are doing a booming trade in Portugese East Africa, and those are some ports Britain wants. And on top of that, if Germany cedes German SW Africa, Britain secures Walvis Bay and ensures safety around the Cape.

Plus, most of Germany's colonies might be occupied early on in the conflict (being poorly armed, except, I think, Tanganyika), and will be indefinite bargaining chips for Britain (they could bargain the territorial integrity of Belgium, for example, so to them it doesn't feel like a loss or a draw at all).

But Germany knows, from pre-war negotiations, what Britain is willing to give up and what it wants in return. Germany is an expanding colonial power, it wants more land in Africa - and Britain was relatively happy for them to have it before the war, and would surely be just as happy for them to have it in exchange for Germany withdrawing from France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
 
Nobody on the CP side (except the Galicians, of course, and they didn't run the show) had any real interest in Ukraine until they stumbled into the place. [...] The carving out of a whole series of states between Germany and Russia was never contemplated much until, by circumstances which hardly anybody expected, it happened.

I'm not saying they have any interest in Ukraine, but rather that similar circumstances will emerge. When the dust settles, it and the others mentioned will sit there as attractive client states to form the sought-after buffer zone.

It's not the same as a reasonably well-documented scheme concerning Poland, the conquest of which was always on the agenda.

Granted. But I see Poland as becoming a part of Germany, while the buffer zone is a set of supposedly neutral states under Germany's thumb.

That said, I'm not sure what you mean by "Prussianising" and whether it is any different from Germanising.

It sounds better. And I might have a tendency similar to the one that leads people to say "England" when they mean "the United Kingdom". But Germany before 1945 was dominated by Prussia - culturally, economically and politically.

In general, I mean making German into the dominant language and Prussian culture at least dominant, if not total, over other cultures in Poland. And there are certain things that are totemically Prussian - the education system, the voting system.

"The upper class" is a big nebulous entity that can be accused of practically anything and this is true of all countries. One can certainly find plenty of anti-semitic people in Britain's upper class(es).

Absolutely, but there was a very specific conspiracy theory developing in the Junker circle around the Kaiser, that Jews had perverted Britain against Germany - particularly the British newspapers, which the Kaiser had repeatedly railed against as the "lying Jewish press". One of the people grafting that conspiracy, perhaps the most significant, was of course British: Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the Kaiser's favourite philosopher and pen-pal.

Anyway, I did say that there was institutional anti-semitism in Germany. It seems to me that this question is one which a lot of people, though I don't mean to accuse you, approach one way or the other way. Either Germany discriminated against the Jews ('cos we don't like Germany); or the German Jews were great patriots ('cos we do). The possibility of both being true at the same time puts us on the path down which lurks the demon Complicated History.

Yes, sorry, that's what I was trying to get at - Germany's Jews were great patriots, but that did very little to combat the institutional anti-Semitism. You can say the same about the German socialists - most of them were great patriots but that didn't stop the High Command plotting for the elimination of socialism after the war. (Indeed, in 1912 the German government was saying in private that what they needed was a nice big war, to galvinise Germany behind nationalism and undermine the socialists and liberals.)

I think, if it happened, the purging of Jews would be something along the lines of the Doctor's Plot in the Soviet Union - the rabid anti-Semites would concoct a supposed Jewish plot to assassinate the Kaiser in revenge for victory against the Entente, in the hopes of escalating the lower-level anti-Semitism and precipitating the relocation of Jews to the East. I don't know how successful they'd be, but I wouldn't bank on them not succeeding - a victorious Second Reich is not going to be nice, internally or externally.
 
I reckon you see a more confident Austria-Hungary with a government keen to centralise and a bit more authoritarian than it had been accustomed to, its great issues being what to do about the Hungarians and whether socialism is friend or threat. I don't know how long it would live: that depends.

Well they tried the idea of using socialism as a friend in OTL, no? IIRC it ended up with some dismay at the formation of socialist parties for every people...

I do wonder if you could see a socialist, pan-not-hungarian movement arising in Austria-Hungary postwar. Without the Bolshevik Revolution, the socialist movement would be a bit more united than OTL, and as industrialization continues....

I agree on American isolationism being greatly overrated, at all times.
 
It's not useful territory, not until the 1930s. Mombasa is little more than a big jetty at this point, and it's the best port in BEA. It services some of the anti-slaving patrols but that's about it. The only other reason the port has had any traffic in the 20 years preceding the war is that Britain has been building a railway in-land. There's no passenger service until after WWI, and even for trade it's only a stop-over on the way to Zanzibar.

Britain never really wanted BEA and only has it because the Kaiser is an idiot. During the negotiations over Heligoland, Britain's only interest was in securing Zanzibar against Germany's claims. It had no real interest in what became BEA until Salisbury got intelligence that the Kaiser was desperate to get Heligoland in time for a summer ceremony and was willing to give up that land. After the collapse of the British East Africa Company in 1896, Britain has only kept the territory going in order to save face. It's throwing money at it but nothing productive is coming out. It's of no strategic value and Britain would still have to bribe settlers to go and live there well into the 1920s.

Most crucially, Britain was contemplating ceding it before the war. The most important thing is Zanzibar - that's the key strategic port for the Royal Navy and also the best trading port, that's what Britain wants to keep, the African Hong Kong. The Germans still felt they'd been cheated in 1890 over Heligoland and were still muttering about their old claim to Zanzibar - giving them BEA back gets them to think honour has been restored. In addition, British companies are doing a booming trade in Portugese East Africa, and those are some ports Britain wants. And on top of that, if Germany cedes German SW Africa, Britain secures Walvis Bay and ensures safety around the Cape.

Britain has a claim to their East African colony long before the Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty. They had treaties with the Sultan in Zanzibar allowing Missionaries to travel insland from Mombasa. In the Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty, they only acquired a very small sultanate on the Kenyan coast, not the whole of East Africa. Where is your source that Britain was going to cede it before the war?

I think it's important to note that Britain claimed its sphere of influence over East Africa in the Berlin Conference. So in saying that they didn't want it, you're wrong - they didn't get it because the Kaiser is an idiot, they had it before then and had begun settling it as early as the 1840s.

But Germany knows, from pre-war negotiations, what Britain is willing to give up and what it wants in return. Germany is an expanding colonial power, it wants more land in Africa - and Britain was relatively happy for them to have it before the war, and would surely be just as happy for them to have it in exchange for Germany withdrawing from France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
If by 'relatively happy for them to have it before the war' you mean their secret deals to partition the Portuguese Empire (which will definitely not happen now that Britain has lost a war with Germany, especially if Portugal enters this ATL WWI as well). They might return Germany's original colonies in exchange for them withdrawing from the Low Countries, and Germany may offer sales or trade-offs later, but I think you over-estimate Britain's willingness to give up parts of their empire (even in exchange for new parts). Britain will have occupied Togoland, Kamerun and Sudwest Afrika (and will be struggling away in Tanganyika, as per OTL), and can basically say to Germany - have Kamerun and Togoland back, and withdraw from Belgium and Holland, or we're keeping your blasted empire.

Germany may be willing to do that. Britain could even sweeten the deal and let them carve up France's empire however they please. How strong is the Entente Cordiale anyway? Would they try and preserve France as an ally after this? What would be the point - apart from some major bloodshed and an economic drain (possibly lessened by a shorter war than OTL) Britain is still the strongest ocean-faring country in the world. Edit: Not to mention that they sort of entered the war on Belgium's behalf (sort of - I'm well aware that the German naval build up was key to the reasoning as well).

The Belgian Congo also begs some new questions. If Britain can't defeat Germany all-out, they might jump on the idea that they were defending the Belgian Guarantee. As such, will they let the massive resources (percieved massive resources) of the Belgian Congo (or at least Katanga) into German hands? The hands of an 'enemy'? If they do, they will require compensation for this too. Perhaps they force Germany to preserve Belgium's territorial integrity on the continent, or even ask for Katanga and East Africa. A Cape to Cairo link was of relative importance I believe. If they allow Germany to retain Kamerun and annex French and Belgium Congo, and perhaps Chad (or part of Chad, the non-desert southern part), Germany still gets their 'African Raj' (Mittleafrika).
 
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