AH Egypt prepares for IDF crossing

On October 9, 1973, while probing Egyptian lines, Sharon discovered a gap in the Egyptian deployment just north of the Great Bitter Lake. In this scenario, the Egyptians foresee this as the prelude to an IDF crossing attempt and prepare accordingly. They take the following steps to thwart the Israelis:
  • Cancel all further offensive operations and reinforcements for the east bank. No attacks on Zrakor, no October 13 or 14 attack.
  • Twenty first Armored Division deploys its 18th brigade in the greenbelt north of Deversoir. The idea is to contain the anticipated IDF bridgehead in easily defensible terrain, and prevent its northward expansion toward Ismailia. Farther west, in desert terrain the 1st brigade has its tanks in hull down ambush positions.
  • The 21st Armored's 14th brigade stays east of the canal, in the Chinese farm north of the Tirtur Lexicon junction. It too is defensively deployed. The Egyptians anticipate an Israeli attempt to widen their corridor to the canal by moving north into the Chinese farm. They plan to let the leading enemy armor pass the road junction ambush, and get hit by the 14th while the ambush shoots up the following elements.
  • To contain the IDF bridgehead to the south and west as well as north, the Egyptians withdraw their 15th and 25th brigades from Sinai and position them in the Om Habara and Jebel Geneifa areas respectively. The 23rd Mechanized reinforces the 15th in the Om Habara area. Elements of 6th Mechanized reinforce the 25th armored in the Geneifa hills. The Egyptians establish ambushes in these places.
  • Fourth Armored Division is held in reserve west of the Jebel Geneifa. Another unit, the 27th brigade, reinforces it.
  • To prevent possible use of the Fayid base to bring in supplies, the Egyptians tear up the runway there.
  • Egyptian artillery is trained on the Deversoir area and artillery spotters, in the 18th's area not far from it, retain a great view of potential targets.
  • Anticipating a threat to their SAM network following an IDF crossing, the Egyptians redeploy the missiles to new locations beyond their new defenses. As a result the IAF can't provide much CAS as it did in the OTL.

So how does it go? The IDF crosses the canal first with paratroops then Erez's brigade as in the OTL. But Reshef's brigade gets shot up even worse than in real life, to the point of being effectively destroyed. Since the 25th was moved back west of the canal, Adan can still cross without first having to deal with it. But Magen, who also crossed in the OTL, has to stay behind in the Chinese Farm area to guard the corridor.
West of the canal, Adan faces no opposition at the Tsach position, and immediately breaks out. One of his brigades heads toward Jebel um Katiff, or om habara and gets mauled. Another, racing south into the Geneifa hills, blunders into the 25th's ambush and is also mauled. Meanwhile, in his attempt to expand northward, Erez loses many tanks to the 18th and first brigades. By this time, October 19, the crossing point is being mercilessly pounded by Egyptian artillery. Much of the logistic tail of the IDF crossing force is blown to bits. Intact SAMs impede the IAF's attempts to help.
By the 20th, the Israelis realize they've blundered into a trap. Unable to breach Egyptian defenses and with too little supplies they decide to abandon the operation. But with little fuel getting through, and the crossing site under heavy attack they decide to evacuate by air leaving their equipment behind. Israeli copters and boats ferry the troops across the Great bitter lake. But the fiasco has cost the Israelis over half of the armor facing Egypt. Only Magen's division is intact, and it can't cover the whole front. By the 24th, the Egyptians, after suffering minimal losses, send the bulk of their armor to sinai and easily take the high ground near their lines. Essentially the Israelis pull back to the line of the passes. History's judgement is that Egypt has won the war.
 
Last edited:
So, no October 14 offensive by the Egyptians which makes it far harder for the IDF to break through to and the cross the canal You should by the way take a look at Crossing Suez by Amiram Ezov, In my timeline th 14 Octobr attack happens as in OTL. Sharon gets mor sidtrackd into attempts to capture Chinese Farm He is killed by Egyptian artillery fire short;;y before his HQ is overrun in a Eyptian counter attack. The destruction of 25 Armoured Brigade still happens. However,due t Sharon's blunder Adan has to tak over he crossing. Fighting on two fronts Adan also suffers heavy losses. Far more so than OTL.

Th IDF running into the Geneifa Hills ambush seems reminiscent of Jiradi Pass in 1967 but in 1973 the Egyptians will be using Saggers

The effects of all this are in some ways similar to OTL With heavy losses the IDF has to ma the front with weaker forces Shazli, in my time learns from the failure of 14 October and takes advantage with a better plan along the lines of Dupuy's analysis in Elusive Victory. As you know it requires an Israeli nuclear strike to stop the crossing of the canal by the three reserve divisions I have also been looking at the situation in Syria, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the international Superpower confrontation dynamics The OTL Cold War crisis is. in my TL, far more serious
 
So, no October 14 offensive by the Egyptians which makes it far harder for the IDF to break through to and the cross the canal

In my scenario the Egyptian plan is to let the IDF cross, to maul and trap it. The key difference between my scenario and the OTL is that the Egyptians are far better able to deal with a crossing.

In my timeline th 14 Octobr attack happens as in OTL. Sharon gets mor sidtrackd into attempts to capture Chinese Farm


In real life Sharon was almost indifferent to the situation in the Chinese Farm as he was eager to cross with as much force as possible ASAP.


He is killed by Egyptian artillery fire short;;y before his HQ is overrun in a Eyptian counter attack. The destruction of 25 Armoured Brigade still happens. However,due t Sharon's blunder Adan has to tak over he crossing. Fighting on two fronts Adan also suffers heavy losses. Far more so than OTL.

In the OTL Sharon's forces initially crossed and gained ground in the CF.

Th IDF running into the Geneifa Hills ambush seems reminiscent of Jiradi Pass in 1967 but in 1973 the Egyptians will be using Saggers

And RPGs, and the 115mm guns of maybe 75 T-62s. The 25th had been somewhat depleted by then but still had approx. that # of tanks.

The effects of all this are in some ways similar to OTL With heavy losses the IDF has to ma the front with weaker forces Shazli, in my time learns from the failure of 14 October and takes advantage with a better plan along the lines of Dupuy's analysis in Elusive Victory.

I read Dupuy too but have doubts about that scenario. IMO the Egyptians would've only won big time had they first severely worn down the IDF and this scenario here is probably the most realistic way to do it. IMO it's asking too much for Cairo to launch another major offensive in Sinai after loss of the 25th, and severe losses to the 21st armored and part of the 4rth. You consider it feasible if an IDF division were mauled. I suggest two, plus preservation of much more Egyptian armor, as described above.
 
Last edited:
Top