AH Cliches: Crisis Driven Innovation

[kernals12]

One thing that I've encountered on this forum is the mantra that we need crises to bring about new technology. Things that are cited are improvements in alternative energy resulting from the energy crisis and WW2 aircraft technology. It's just not true. Let's start with the two examples above:
Work was already being done on renewable energy. Bell Labs patented the Photovoltaic cell in 1954 and there were many futuristic predictions about "sun power". Car companies tried hard to get better batteries for electric cars, as well as other alternative powertrains such as fuel cells, turbines, and even steam. Just watch this 1969 General Motors Promotional Video

As for WW2 aircraft technology, jet aircraft were already being looked at in the 1930s. Frank Whittle patented the first jet design in 1932 and the first jet aircraft, the Heinkel He 178 flew on August 27, 1939, 4 days before World War 2 started.

Here's the reason: our demand for doing things better is just as strong during peacetime as during war. In the 1930s, we were not satisfied with our noisy and slow propeller aircraft, we wanted to be able to fly faster and with greater comfort, the jet engine was the answer. In the 1960s, we wanted a car that ran on cheap electricity, had few moving parts, was quiet, and emitted no smog, so work was done on battery powered cars. We never rest on our laurels. We are never satisfied. We always want more and scientists will try and quench our thirst. We don't need any wars to do that.

 

[Sam R.]

Crisis economics allows legitimate and legitimised major interventions by state agents and large market agents that would be difficult to insurmountable in political or market terms outside of perceived crises.

"There is no alternative" monetisation and movement in state investment from labour and state enterprise to private enterprise would be untenable in the U.K. of 1962.

Latent capacities, crisis implementation.

Yours,
Sam R.

 

[kernals12]

Crisis economics allows legitimate and legitimised major interventions by state agents and large market agents that would be difficult to insurmountable in political or market terms outside of perceived crises.

"There is no alternative" monetisation and movement in state investment from labour and state enterprise to private enterprise would be untenable in the U.K. of 1962.

Latent capacities, crisis implementation.

Yours,
Sam R.

Examples?

 

[kernals12]

The claim that electric cars were undesirable when gas was cheap is especially bizarre. The internal combustion engine is heavy, bulky, noisy, inefficient, expensive to build, and requires lots of maintenance. Any automotive executive in the 50s and 60s would've given a kidney to get an electric car on the road. It's batteries that have been the problem.

Also, people tend to forget the government sponsored research programs that didn't produce anything useful. Lots of effort was put into artificial intelligence in the 60s. No progress was made, resulting in funding being eliminated in 1974. And of course we see the big failure to meet expectations of nuclear power.

 

[Sam R.]

Thatcherism; The Boys from Chicago; Rogernomics; The recession we had to have: latent neomonetarist theory

Dekulakisation: proletarianisation and tractorisation of soviet agriculture

4-in-5 Soviet Heavy industry: heavy industry growth, fordism, Taylorism, reproletarianisation

Napoleon panic: Fiscalisation of U.K. state debt

King Ludds march: steam manufacture and new interpretation of master/servant; poor laws

Bash the Jap: us female reproletarianisation

Black Death: master & servant and poor laws

Sputnik / Missile gap: state investment in STEM training

Kindermoord: cycleways

Yours,
Sam R.

 

[kernals12]

Anyone?

 

[Dorknought]

I think you also need to consider if technology has matured or reached a plateau that will require some other breakthrough that may not be related to the particular technology. Often it's the military mind that will be decades behind rather than technology development.

An interesting comparison is the German U43 class designed pre-war and under construction in 1914 with the later Type VII refined during the 1920's and 30's:
Type U43 - 725 tons surfaced 940t submerged
Type VII - 769 tons surfaced 871t submerged
Type U43 - 65m long, 6.2m beam
Type VII - 67m long, 6.2m beam,
Type U43 - 2,400 hp 17.1 knots, 1200 hp - 9.1 knots submerged
Type VII - 2,800 hp 17.7 knots, 750 hp - 7.6 knots submerged
Type U43 - Range 9,400miles at 8knots, 55miles at 5knts submerged
Type VII - Range 8,500 miles at 10knots, 80 miles submerged at 4 knots
Type U43 - 4TT 2bow/2stern, 88mm deck gun
Type VII - 5TT 4bow/1stern, 88mm deck gun
Type U43 - Crew 36
Type VII - Crew 44
Type U43 - 164ft depth
Type VII - 750ft depth

Without war, the classic 'u-boat' was fully developed and matured by 1914. As you can see, 20 years of development went into structural improvements following war experience to increase diving depth from 164ft to 750ft. Why? Because concealment as a defense wasn't enough, great depth was required too. The second war showed that great speed at depth was also required and thus the Elektro Boot was required. However, the high speed submarine had been developed in WW1 by the RN - the R class submarine from completely different requirements ie. to ambush submarines.

The military mind can also work things out for itself without war. The RN is an example, most of the ships required over the 1920's and 1930's had been scoped or prototyped prior to WW1, suggesting that they didn't need war experience to develop. The Lightfoot class leader of 1913-14 was seen as the right size for all future destroyers because it had the required endurance to stay with the fleet for 3-4 day sorties and sea-keeping. It's the same tonnage and dimensions as the later Scott class leader that provided the prototype of most Destroyers built in the 1920s and 30's in many navies.

 

[kernals12]

I think you also need to consider if technology has matured or reached a plateau that will require some other breakthrough that may not be related to the particular technology. Often it's the military mind that will be decades behind rather than technology development.

An interesting comparison is the German U43 class designed pre-war and under construction in 1914 with the later Type VII refined during the 1920's and 30's:
Type U43 - 725 tons surfaced 940t submerged
Type VII - 769 tons surfaced 871t submerged
Type U43 - 65m long, 6.2m beam
Type VII - 67m long, 6.2m beam,
Type U43 - 2,400 hp 17.1 knots, 1200 hp - 9.1 knots submerged
Type VII - 2,800 hp 17.7 knots, 750 hp - 7.6 knots submerged
Type U43 - Range 9,400miles at 8knots, 55miles at 5knts submerged
Type VII - Range 8,500 miles at 10knots, 80 miles submerged at 4 knots
Type U43 - 4TT 2bow/2stern, 88mm deck gun
Type VII - 5TT 4bow/1stern, 88mm deck gun
Type U43 - Crew 36
Type VII - Crew 44
Type U43 - 164ft depth
Type VII - 750ft depth

Without war, the classic 'u-boat' was fully developed and matured by 1914. As you can see, 20 years of development went into structural improvements following war experience to increase diving depth from 164ft to 750ft. Why? Because concealment as a defense wasn't enough, great depth was required too. The second war showed that great speed at depth was also required and thus the Elektro Boot was required. However, the high speed submarine had been developed in WW1 by the RN - the R class submarine from completely different requirements ie. to ambush submarines.

The military mind can also work things out for itself without war. The RN is an example, most of the ships required over the 1920's and 1930's had been scoped or prototyped prior to WW1, suggesting that they didn't need war experience to develop. The Lightfoot class leader of 1913-14 was seen as the right size for all future destroyers because it had the required endurance to stay with the fleet for 3-4 day sorties and sea-keeping. It's the same tonnage and dimensions as the later Scott class leader that provided the prototype of most Destroyers built in the 1920s and 30's in many navies.

Bad example: Better submarines didn't offer benefits for civilians.

 

[Augenis]

One thing that I've encountered on this forum is the mantra that we need crises to bring about new technology. Things that are cited are improvements in alternative energy resulting from the energy crisis and WW2 aircraft technology. It's just not true. Let's start with the two examples above:
Work was already being done on renewable energy. Bell Labs patented the Photovoltaic cell in 1954 and there were many futuristic predictions about "sun power". Car companies tried hard to get better batteries for electric cars, as well as other alternative powertrains such as fuel cells, turbines, and even steam. Just watch this 1969 General Motors Promotional Video

As for WW2 aircraft technology, jet aircraft were already being looked at in the 1930s. Frank Whittle patented the first jet design in 1932 and the first jet aircraft, the Heinkel He 178 flew on August 27, 1939, 4 days before World War 2 started.

Here's the reason: our demand for doing things better is just as strong during peacetime as during war. In the 1930s, we were not satisfied with our noisy and slow propeller aircraft, we wanted to be able to fly faster and with greater comfort, the jet engine was the answer. In the 1960s, we wanted a car that ran on cheap electricity, had few moving parts, was quiet, and emitted no smog, so work was done on battery powered cars. We never rest on our laurels. We are never satisfied. We always want more and scientists will try and quench our thirst. We don't need any wars to do that.

Nobody here ever says that we need crises like wars or economic collapses to drive innovations, just that they are a drive for innovation. There is never a single drive for innovation and technological development, after all. You make it sound almost like people here say that technology can only develop during wars, which simply isn't the case.

I'm not even going to talk about the renewable energy thing because I'm not an expert on that, but regarding jet engines - before WW2, jets were fully experimental and were limited to a few early designs which could barely take off the ground, while during the six years of the war, they were turned into practical mass-produced equipment which would become a stable of aircraft mere years after the war was over. Under natural peacetime development, it would have certainly not advanced as quickly - and that's what wars and crises usually do. Not necessarily create new technology, but bring it out of obscurity and into mass popularity.

Only taking WW2 inventions as an example, here are some other inventions we owe to it:
* practical nuclear power, obviously
* early computing technology (without the necessity to boost cryptography, it's unlikely computers would have taken such a leap in computing power in a few years)
* superglue
* freeze dried coffee
* modern radar technology
* ballpoint pens (1938 invention popularized by the RAF)
* Jerrycans
* pressurized cabins
* medical penicillin (discovered by Fleming in 1928, but only first entered popularity during WW2)
* synthetic rubber
* so on and so forth...'

Of course, they all cost like 50 million people, so it's up to the observer to ask whether it was worth it

 

[Dorknought]

Bad example: Better submarines didn't offer benefits for civilians.

They drove investment in diesels for trains and ships and investment in improved battery capacity.

Your original premise is wrong by ignoring government as the customer. Customers purchase things because they see value in it. Something is only worth what someone else wants to pay for it.

Business exists to create a customer. To do this it needs to market and innovate, all other activities are just costs. Government is often a better customer than private industry or consumers. Why? Defense spending is insurance, as spending on insurance goes up then so does innovation. In peace, you insure against war. If in a war then you insure against losing.