AH Challenge: USA in the Old World

The biggest problem here is the Monroe doctrine. While it focused the US on Americas, it was accepted by European powers also because it meant USA have no word to say on European policies.
You need a MAJOR change in US politics to have interests in Europe.
OTL it took two world wars..

But note that despite the dissents from anti-imperialists, the majority of Americans apparently didn't think acquiring the Philippines violated the Monroe Doctrine. So the question is why the Atlantic was considered differently from the Pacific...
 
But note that despite the dissents from anti-imperialists, the majority of Americans apparently didn't think acquiring the Philippines violated the Monroe Doctrine. So the question is why the Atlantic was considered differently from the Pacific...

The Atlantic would be considered different from the Pacific because there are great powers on the Atlantic, but not on the Pacific at the time.
 
The Atlantic would be considered different from the Pacific because there are great powers on the Atlantic, but not on the Pacific at the time.

Great Britain is in Australia, and Japan had recently defeated China and is on the verge of acquiring great power status. Russia obviously is on the Pacific, already has Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and Germany and France owned islands in the Pacific.
 
Great Britain is in Australia, and Japan had recently defeated China and is on the verge of acquiring great power status. Russia obviously is on the Pacific, already has Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and Germany and France owned islands in the Pacific.

The Great Powers had colonies in the Pacific, as did the USA. The Atlantic borders the homeland of the Great Powers. (Russian's Pacific isn't threatened by any American colonies.) Japan--well, the racism of the time means that they wouldn't be considered in the same category as Europeans.

I'm beginning to think that an American presence in Europe or the Mediterranean isn't plausible...but a lot of great thoughts here :D
 
how much land exactly?

assume that Morocco ends up involved in the 2nd Barbary Pirate War of 1816, and is defeated as well. The US, wanting a permanent port in the Mediterranean Sea (jut in case the Barbary Pirates become a problem again), insist on Tangiers being a free port with a portion of it under US jurisdiction (think of it as a version of the International Settlement in Shanghai). Eventually as the Europeans move on other parts of Morocco as well as Algeria and Tunisia the Sultan of Morocco decides that having the Americans permanently around has advantages and the Tangiers enclave gets bigger.

Thus over the course of the 19th Century Tangiers remains a US port and indeed a valuable one as it is a US commercial enclave at the entry way of the Mediterranean Sea.

A lot more back story would be needed of course but a US base at Morocco has all kinds of consequences in the 20th Century and beyond
 
Again, the major problem is that this won't occur until after the majority of the American West is settled and the healing from the Civil War has progressed enough that US citizens are looking overseas. This gives you a relatively late window. The US has no desire to be acquiring easily lost lands overseas when they have vast expanses to the west. And, given the choice between annexing Ireland or Canada, the US would always take Canada. This gives you a rather narrow window. In order to minimize the damage done on the US by the Civil War, you need to have it be ended much more quickly. (note that the US did practically nothing major in foreign policy from 1865 to 1898. That is a period of 33 years, after all). If the war occurs earlier and the Union wins (or if it occurs a bit later and has less support from the Upper South/Texas), then the US could potentially be acting overseas by the 1870s. That would put it square in the timeline for the scramble for Africa. (Note that the US was invited to the Congress of Berlin, but did not attend).

Also take into account that the American Colonization Society's founding of Liberia was a private enterprise, not one sponsored by the government. That is historically what occurred with US overseas endeavors, for the most part. See the American claim in North Borneo/the Colony of Ellena/the Kingdom of Ambong and Maroodoo, or the US claim on the Washington/Marquesas Islands. None were ever sponsored.

Another problem is that, historically, Morocco was the first nation to recognize the US OTL; to this date, it is the only overseas country to have a US historic site within it. Morocco also, historically, looked fondly on the US and acknowledged the US's claims during the Barbary Wars, giving safe haven to US citizens and sailors. That will not change at all without a PoD prior to the revolution.

Sicily is something that did occur OTL; if I recall, there was a plebiscite that gained 40,000 signatures or such declaring that Sicily should secede from Italy and join the US. That is a tiny minority, and it would take either a longer war (and a longer period of time away from Italy) for Sicily to make such a play, or for another rather large PoD).

Albania joining is something that I've discussed in a thread before; those stories seem largely apocryphal. I found two separate newspapers talking about word on the street, but I never heard of a resolution calling for it. The attempts were rather recent, in the 1990s, and there definitely was talk of it. There simply wasn't any official action on record I could locate. This has slightly more basis than jokes/talk about Denmark or Poland joining the US because of relative fondness for the nations, which is hearsay at best.

Just to clarify, the US offered Denmark over a billion dollars in WW2 for Greenland; the Danish refused to sell. This will not go through unless Denmark is in far worse shape (longer occupation combined with US higher offers), or if WW2 goes into a stalemate as in AANW, and Greenland becomes de facto annexed.

Now, the situation would have to be engendered: you must have the US desire some territory on that rim in some fashion. How, though? (I mean, Jan Mayan could count as a Greenland territory, or perhaps Svalbard...) but, realistically, it must be part of some other interference in Europe within the time frame of 1870 to 1920.

First, we establish that the US has two primary backyards (outside of the continental US): 1. The Caribbean. 2. The Pacific. Any issues in the Pacific are superseded by issues in the Caribbean, which are only superseded by issues in the North American continent. This will not alter; the US will not trade territory in either of these for territory in Europe.

My proposed idea that gets you close within the timeline:

The US defeats the South handily after some slave states refuse to secede (say North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, leaving Virginia isolated). The war does not result in the gross death total that it did OTL (I think... 2% of the US population at the time? That's WW1 levels, and is a big part of the reason the US did not want to get involved in WW1 in the first place; they had fought a war on a similar scale, and wanted little of it). Slavery is not repealed during the war, but an amendment is passed soon after the war and slavery is ended, with the various southern states being forced to ratify the amendment to reenter (at least, they are until enough pass it that it becomes part of the Constitution). This spurs debate over what to do with the former slaves. As per OTL, talk of annexing Santo Domingo occurs, but fails as well. However, due to the US not being spent by the Civil War, the debate over making a black-majority state/territory continues, and the US turns to Liberia in the 1870s.

This occurs just as the scramble for Africa heats up. Liberia accepts US help, desiring more former slaves as citizens to strength the party rule in the nation, and it slowly become a protectorate. During the scramble, in exchange for the US pressing Liberian claims, they end up becoming a US territory. (the distance from North America means that autonomy is the order of the day, and is easily helped out by the ongoing immigration program the US is encouraging, along with investment). So, we have the US active in Africa with a slightly larger Liberia, perhaps. For the purposes, we are going to avoid the US taking any other purpose of the division of Africa.

This status quo remains until the US and Spain end up in a Spanish-American war in the 1880s/early 1890s (or 1898; I'm just spitballing right here). The US, in better shape than OTL, maintains a larger navy that has at least a few modern ships (this is also helped by the need to grant some protection to Liberia). This means the navy does not rot to the degree it did OTL. Whatever the circumstances might be, the US proceeds about the same in Cuba and the Pacific. However, the presence of the US in Africa means that they manage to also launch strikes into Spanish Equatorial Guinea and, later, towards the Canary Islands. A successful assault in those islands finally drives Spain to the peace table.

In these terms, the US seeks the same terms from Spain as it would OTL (I'm not going into the whole flip a coin aspect over Luzon vs all of the Philippines; that was a dream that decided it.) plus a few other concessions: Spanish Equatorial Africa and, in exchange for the return of the Canaries, Spanish Sahara and Ifni (if you want to throw in Micronesia somewhere, that is fine. Those are finer timeline details that would have to be shown). While Equatorial Guinea will be viewed as a second Liberia, the Western Sahara will be viewed as a headache by the US (see the US reaction the the American-Philippine War) and, instead of setting up an independent government as in the Philippines, would likely be ceded to Morocco (perennially friendly to the US) in exchange for recognition of its annexation of Ifni as a naval base and, perhaps, the establishment of an indefinite lease.

Here, the US seeks the lease so as to, essentially, make Morocco a protectorate, but reality would show that it would be a relatively minor port that would merely protect the approaches to Liberia/Equatorial Guinea while at the same time warding off European interests in Morocco. This would really start to alter things, then, as with the US reaching out both to the east and the west at the same time. This might be accepted by the European powers, mostly because Morocco was a point of contention and the US making it a protectorate keeps the French, Spanish, or Germans from doing so.

Ifni is the closes I think you can get, unless you finagle some way to get Tangiers to join Ifni (US protectorship endorsed by Morocco as being the only way to truly make Tangiers neutral to European affairs. You basically take the Swiss Approach: The French want it, the Germans want it, the Spanish want it, the American don't really care, so the answer is obvious!) Wilsonian Armenia is just a bridge too far for me; Wilson was alone on his various points, and the US had no desires to involve themselves in European affairs until much later (especially that far away from Europe and close to a disintegrating Russia). A strong Russia would have outright annexed Armenia and the Straits if it survived the war, and Britain and Italy were picking over the pieces.

I'm sure there are plenty of holes in my logic, but that gives you a general idea.


...I feel like I go over this quite subject a lot (US States that almost were/might have been). I am tempted to make a Beedok-style Worlda that can show all of the historical opportunities. Been a while since I've made one.

Of course, a really bad WW2 could lead to all/some of USS Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and Cyprus coming into existence in the American Fleet, but that is, again, outside the scope of the OP's desired answer. Another one could be direct US enforcement of a neutral city, but that seems pushing it by quite a bit unless you have AANW-style US. Granted, Trieste was an original member of NATO...
 
I recall some discussion of a possible US mandate in Constantinople following the end of WWI. Given very fortunate turns of events, this could have become something very interesting.
 
The Atlantic would be considered different from the Pacific because there are great powers on the Atlantic, but not on the Pacific at the time.

Well, the simple answer is that there are 4 major powers that actually border the Pacific: Russia, China, Japan, and the US. Of those four, three have significant portions of population on the Pacific Coast (China, Japan, and the US). Those are the three that considered the Pacific more vital to their interests

But note that despite the dissents from anti-imperialists, the majority of Americans apparently didn't think acquiring the Philippines violated the Monroe Doctrine. So the question is why the Atlantic was considered differently from the Pacific...

The Monroe Doctrine relates to the opposition of the US to the expansion of European Empires in the Americas, and only that. It was enforced by both the US and (majorly, early on) the UK. The US did not wish its continental borders threatened by bordering (another) European power, while Britain took advantage of the monopoly it had with several former Spanish colonies. Particularly, this did not mean that the Europeans could not attempt to combat insurrections in their colonies, nor did it technically forestall the efforts at forcing Mexico to repay debt. In that case, it was the French remaining and attempting to install a puppet monarch that violated the Monroe Doctrine, as it constituted as expanding the French Empire by force. (The failure of the French to achieve any headway, combined with the US finishing its Civil War, eventually did prompt the French to leave).

Anything outside of the Americas was fair game, in that sense. The Philippines are not in the Americas and, for one, the Monroe doctrine never proscribed against American powers acting imperialistically towards others. (Be it the US or someone else).

The reason the Atlantic is different is because of the smaller distances and that the islands there had established claims and settlements dating back centuries. The Pacific was mostly uncharted until the 19th century, and the US claimed many islands with the Guano islands act, seeing as they viewed the islands as uncivilized instead of being controlled by a major civilized power. However, it only occupied a few of those islands it claimed (the Line Islands in total were claimed in the 1850s; Britain only annexed them in the 1890s).

We must consider OTL and point out that the first time the US sought offensive war against a European power outside of the Americas was the Spanish-American war, in 1898. This was against one of the ailing members of Europe, not against one of its preeminent powers. And, again, the goals sought by the US were limited: removal of the Spanish from the Caribbean (the primary point of contention, as that threatens the largest portion of the US metropole) and the annexation of a few key island bases throughout the Pacific so as to maintain a string of naval bases through the Pacific. This only occurred because of Dewey's success; if Dewey had failed, the US was prepared to shrug and move on, as that was a bonus.

The original US negotiating position was solely for Luzon so they could obtain Subic Bay. It was only a manic dream by President McKinley that lead to the acquisition of the entire chain.

So, for the most part, in order to establish the US in Europe, you must have a chain of events or actions that result in the US logically entering Europe. In the time span sought (1794-1920, but realistically 1870-1920 for the reasons I list above), the US has no direct interest in Europe, only the metropole, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Establishing a fourth area of interest in a region that historically held American interests (Liberia) is the logical first step in shifting American interests to the east and, over time, giving them an actual reason to expand northward. Hence, how Ifni would be the best bet, or Tangiers (for the reasons listed above in an earlier post).

For perspective: Ifni would likely have the same status as Guam, being of similar population, role, and area. Tangiers, if possible (it becoming an international zone under US administration due to Morocco determining them to be the only neutral observer of European affairs), might have a plebiscite years later; if that goes to it joining the US instead of Morocco, that could cause some headaches, but by that point in time in the 1950s, the US might actually be interested in European affairs. Tangiers, and Ifni with it, could likely become a state (Tangier's population currently is high enough to be one, easily).

This is really pushing things, however.

I recall some discussion of a possible US mandate in Constantinople following the end of WWI. Given very fortunate turns of events, this could have become something very interesting.

I recall that thread. I think the basis of that was an interventionist US that would have been the type to intervene in Armenia supported the international mandate of the straits zone, and as the UK/France/Italy/etc are so exhausted by war that they eventually cease their support, leaving the US as the only backer with no good other option to hand it off to. I think that's really stretching chances, but in the event the US really does join the League of Nations and accepts the Armenian mandate (a long shot there), then the possibility of that strait zone might occur... it would require a few other circumstances to really come about.
 
The Philippines are not in the Americas and, for one, the Monroe doctrine never proscribed against American powers acting imperialistically towards others. (Be it the US or someone else).

The point is, though, that many Americans *did* interpret the Monroe Doctrine as implying a doctrine of "two spheres"--one in which Old World powers would not intervene against independent states in the New World, and in return the US would not intervene in the affairs of the Old World. Now the latter part was a very dubious interpretation, but nevertheless came to be widely held. One of the arguments constantly used against US involvement in Europe was that it would be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine--"if we can intervene in Europe, European powers can intervene in Latin America." The question is why this logic (which I will acknowledge was historically dubious but nevertheless was widely held) was found to be less convincing for Asia than for Europe. It's not that nobody argued it--on the contrary, one of the leading anti-imperialist arguments was that acquisition of the Philippines was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. E.g., George F. Hoar: " The Monroe doctrine is gone. Every European nation, every European alliance, has the right to acquire dominion in this hemisphere when we acquire it in the other..." https://books.google.com/books?id=lTk-B-lwmnUC&pg=PA178
 
The point is, though, that many Americans *did* interpret the Monroe Doctrine as implying a doctrine of "two spheres"--one in which Old World powers would not intervene against independent states in the New World, and in return the US would not intervene in the affairs of the Old World. Now the latter part was a very dubious interpretation, but nevertheless came to be widely held. One of the arguments constantly used against US involvement in Europe was that it would be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine--"if we can intervene in Europe, European powers can intervene in Latin America." The question is why this logic (which I will acknowledge was historically dubious but nevertheless was widely held) was found to be less convincing for Asia than for Europe. It's not that nobody argued it--on the contrary, one of the leading anti-imperialist arguments was that acquisition of the Philippines was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. E.g., George F. Hoar: " The Monroe doctrine is gone. Every European nation, every European alliance, has the right to acquire dominion in this hemisphere when we acquire it in the other..." https://books.google.com/books?id=lTk-B-lwmnUC&pg=PA178

It may have been interpreted as such, but the Monroe Doctrine never lays out such an arrangement. To whit, the relevant text of the Doctrine in regards to Europe...

The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different.

Emphasis mine. That is the most I can find in that text that relates to the matters of Europe instead of making implications otherwise about the nations in the new world having established and maintained their independence and the neutrality of the US in such matters. At most, that means that the US will not interfere with the metropole of the European nations, just the same as they would not interfere in the affairs of the independent nations of the New World. As such, I do not believe that I have conflated matters. The Philippines had not, at that point, established themselves a government and maintained it as legitimate.

The text of the Monroe Doctrine does emphasize that a large portion of its arguments were based on the remoteness of the Americas from Europe, and how that, when so far away, that the system of alliances entangling Europe and their interests should not be exported to the New World. East Asia, at least, is far more remote to Europe than any part of the Americas are; the same as Oceania.

Furthermore, the US did allow European nations to meddle in the Americas as well, seeing the Venezuelan crisis and the border dispute between Britain and Venezuela. Exceptions were not common, but they did exist.

If one takes a literalist approach, then Liberia and Ifni, among others, are in the Western Hemisphere. Same as with Samoa (of which Germany disputed and claimed).

I don't disagree that your argument wouldn't exist; it probably would. That's why I tried to establish the US with having an interest in Liberia (which it traditionally did, if not to any large degree) and extrapolating it along the African coast (which was indeed unclaimed). The European Powers, OTL, believed that the US deserved a seat at the table in the division of Africa (see the US's invitation to the Congress of Berlin) which would show that Europeans did not believe that Africa was solely an internal concern.

It's also why I insisted on Ifni as being the best you could get; the other Spanish Places of Sovereignty were part of the Spanish Metropole and, as such, part of their internal affairs, which the Monroe doctrine affiliated with. In any regards, the place of Morocco under the protection of the US would, in this case, be a result of them adapting them into the Monroe Doctrine in the literalist sense, with they being a nation located within the Western hemisphere having established and maintained their sovereignty. There would definitely be a pushback, as there was against the Philippines, but a US that had been invested in Africa directly for twenty years prior may be able to twist it such far; nearly a generation of changes, along with a healthier nation that wasn't nearly as isolationist due to the effects of the Civil War, might be willing to go that far.
 
It may have been interpreted as such, but the Monroe Doctrine never lays out such an arrangement. To whit, the relevant text of the Doctrine in regards to Europe...

However, the "Monroe Doctrine" as understood by policy makers and the public in varying forms in different eras was not necessarily synonymous with Monroe's original message. For example, the "no transfer" principle was eventually read into the Doctrine, though it was not in Monroe's message, as I note at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/-ZEiZ3ZLWL8/PYTAsp-4Bn4J
 
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