MarkA said:
There seems an inordinate emphasis on undividuals who, if in positions of power, could 'save the Republic'. In a democracy individuals only represent the movements that carry them to power and they only stay in power while those movements enjoy the support of the electorate.
Yes, but the Weimar Republic is a much more fragile democracy than some, and it is under a great deal of strain. What I would mostly say is not that it would take the 'right' individuals gaining power to save the Republic but rather keeping out the 'wrong' individuals from power to avoid the destruction of the Republic.
Curtailing some of the disasterous decisions of Hindenburg (who could rule by decree remember) is important.
I think also that avoiding the rise to power of 'obscure' politician von Papen would be good. Many of his actions and influence paved the way for the Nazis.
I can think of half a dozen PODs that would save the Republic in combination without invoking any one individual, but I've been trying to do it with only one initial POD. That usually requires basing it at first on an individual.
You can't have people like Adenauer just appearing as a saviour figure when his support base outside of Cologne was almost nil.
Well, how did he develop his base in OTL post-war? He had the ability to do so, and to do a lot to help a fallen Germany...he proved it in OTL. That means we know he has the skillset and the desire, which we can't say about a lot of possibilties. So then the question becomes, what POD leads to Adenauer becoming a Chancellor over a decade earlier? I imagine that this could happen, the question is how. Anyone have any ideas?
Note that von Papen did rise from obscurity to become Chancellor by just having someone in the right place at the right time suggesting him. Can't Adenauer have the same happen?
Jarres may have got 36% of the vote in the first round in 1925 (I do not know the exact number) but he did do well. That is precisely why the SPD and Democrats decided to throw their support behind Marx. If Jarres had remained a candidate then the communists would certainly have campagined against him and not produced a candidate of their own. A majority of the two million votes cast in OTL for their candidate would have gone to the Centre candidate Marx and he would have been elected. Marx alone would not 'save' the Republic but his election would show that those forces committed to the protection of the Republic were in the ascendency.
I think there are several possible PODs that could lead to a Marx victory in 1925, so that is a good place to start.
Stresemann would be emboldened to push his party further and faster towards acceptence of the inevitable than he managed in OTL. The ultranationalists would be further marginalised and would begin to shrink in numbers and effectiveness. Instead of this being the case in 1927/28, it would materialise two or three years earlier.
Okay, that makes a sort of sense. So Stresemann before he dies steers the party a little closer to the Center. That would help.
A coalition of Centre and SPD parties in power with a right united behind Stresemann acting as a loyal opposition would dissapate ultra nationalist appeal.
I'm not certain that Stresemann would be able to unite the whole right. Shift them a little more towards this position, yes.
The German people faced with stable government and an opposition commited to peaceful transfer of power and both commited to the strengthening of the Republican state, would do wonders for the legitimate claims of democracy as the preferable form of government for Germany.
True, but I would suggest these changes would be slight, not radical. A little better here, a little stronger there. Still, it might be enough.
Personalities don't matter that much. After all Hindenburg thought Muller, the SPD Chancellor in 1928 was an exceptional leader.
Yes, but he also didn't like the SPD as a party, and Schleicher encouraged that dislike once he gained Hindenburg's ear (much to his regret, I am sure, since when he was faced with having to be Chancellor he started to reach out to them, but by then it was von Papen telling Hindenburg to beware and undermining Schleicher).
The main problem was the army and the civil service. Both were deeply conservative and anti-Republican. Reforms in recruitment were urgently needed. If such reforms could have been introduced as a result of the strengthening of the commitment to the constitiution by the centre and the left with the reluctant support of the right in 1925/6,
This is probably true, but would it have been doable. Such changes could have also triggered a military coup attempt as well.
then there may have been enough time to reform these two institutions before the crucial period of 1933/4. Certainly there would have been enough time to introduce new people and to have them promoted through normal channels to positions of influence and power in the six or seven years before Hitler became a threat.
Maybe so, maybe so. Anyone else care to elaborate or comment on these suggestions?