AH Challenge: The United States loses the Mexican War

You do realize you lost the War of 1812 because British troops were superior, right? I mean cling to New Orleans if you want, but you lost the war.

In all of WWI the Canadian Army accomplished more than the US Army. However the US Army was there at the right time to stiffen morale and act as a large force-in-being, which (along with American monetary and material support) was enough to help win the war.

Normally, a return to the status quo ante bellum is not considered a loss. The USA did pretty well in 1812-15 considering how unprepared they were for war at the beginning. In terms of relative national militaries, it would be kind of like Iran fighting the USA to a draw today. Even if the US was distracted by fighting elsewhere, it would be rightly considered a significant accomplishment.

The US Army was only involved in heavy fighting in the last few months of WWI, but it was definitely more than a force in being by the last months of the war.

Please, people, don't avoid the "USA is better than anyone else" trap only to fall into the "USA is pathetic and only ever won because of good luck" trap.
 
Oddly enough, that trap is right next to the British Empire Wanking Club. :rolleyes:

Heh. To be fair, there's plenty of wankery (is that a word?) on both sides. That's why those USA vs. Britain scenarios during the US Civil War are so entertaining if you look at them from the right perspective. The US wankers will argue that the US could conquer Canada in about 2 weeks without worrying about the Confederates, and that a British blockade would be no problem at all, and that 5 US ironclads could sink a good part of the British fleet, and that the people in Quebec would rise up and welcome the US as liberators even though they had notably failed to do this in previous wars, and that all US soldiers were skilled marksmen who could kill British officers at 2000 yards, and so on. The Brit wankers will then explain how the British could move 150,000 reinforcements to Canada in 10 days, and that the Royal Navy could turn every US city within 30 miles of the coastline into rubble within a week while suffering zero casualties, and that the Monitor could be sunk by simply having the crew of the Warrior give it dirty looks, and how only 20,000 US troops were armed with rifles, while the rest of the US army consisted of 12 year olds with slingshots, and that the ones with rifles had not been trained to point the open end toward the enemy instead of at their own heads, and in any case the US only had enough gunpowder for 2 rounds per soldier, and so on. :rolleyes::D
 

CalBear

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You do realize you lost the War of 1812 because British troops were superior, right? I mean cling to New Orleans if you want, but you lost the war.

In all of WWI the Canadian Army accomplished more than the US Army. However the US Army was there at the right time to stiffen morale and act as a large force-in-being, which (along with American monetary and material support) was enough to help win the war.

In all of WWII the Russian Army accomplished more than the entire Western Armies, and man-for-man, unit-for-unit the Germans maintained advantage over the Western armies from the beginning to the end. Although quality was rather lower than the Germans, it doesn't really matter when you outnumber them and can spend hundreds of times the amount of material they can. (Oh, and Hitler is no expert. Please. I'm sure the Axis military leadership was concerned about the Americans.)


Nowadays, sure, the American Army is a professional force that is probably the best or second best army in the world (Israelis have a certain motivating factor :), and by far the one with the most support to draw upon (naval, air, and the army's own equipment). Historically though? Not quite the picture you tried to paint.


As to the actual topic? Reforming Mexico is the best way to have them win, I suppose, but I don't have a clue as to how we get a reformed Mexico.

Gee, the War of 1812 always struck me as a draw. The U.S. lost no territory, got impressment stopped on American Flag vessels, and Britain maintained an excellent market for its goods and source for raw materials.

That is why I specifically brought up New Orleans.

The U.S got into the war late, so it is far from surprising that the Canadians, who were both in it from the first AND as far as I can tell were the best trained and led force in the war had a more significant war-long impact.

Actually a surprising percentage of the German General Staff & the Imperial Japanese Staff DID believe that the U.S. wasn't up to any sort of real fight. Stupid yes, but still true.

My point was simply this: European experts have consistantly underestimated the American military and lessons that could have been learned from American forces. Had the military observers at Fredricksberg, during the third day at Gettyburg, and in several of the assault attempts on Richmond actually tried to LEARN anything from the fighting beyond how their exported weapons performed their countries could have avoided the casualies suffered in the first two years of WW I since all the lessons were there to see.
 
The effect of military reforms are difficult to predict before war is declared.
For some reason there is a general incapability for people to imagine change or progress.

Had the military observers at Fredricksberg, during the third day at Gettyburg, and in several of the assault attempts on Richmond actually tried to LEARN anything from the fighting beyond how their exported weapons performed their countries could have avoided the casualies suffered in the first two years of WW I since all the lessons were there to see.

I suspect more than a few people could see the potential cost of the war however they were faced with the problem of having no real alternatives.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Gee, the War of 1812 always struck me as a draw. The U.S. lost no territory, got impressment stopped on American Flag vessels, and Britain maintained an excellent market for its goods and source for raw materials.

The RN continued to pull deserters from US Shipping (what was left of it, except for New Englands merchant marine which operated supporting the British, the rest of the US merchant marine was swept from the seas and usually ended up as British prizes), and defended themselves against every attack the US made. The US OTOH starts to solidify as an actual nation rather than collection of ex-English colonials due to their experiences


My point was simply this: European experts have consistantly underestimated the American military and lessons that could have been learned from American forces. Had the military observers at Fredricksberg, during the third day at Gettyburg, and in several of the assault attempts on Richmond actually tried to LEARN anything from the fighting beyond how their exported weapons performed their countries could have avoided the casualies suffered in the first two years of WW I since all the lessons were there to see.
Observers were at virtually every major engagement of the war, and they reported back that both sides were tactically and operationally backwards for most of the war. Most "innovations" the ACW threw up had been applied to war in Europe in the previous decades, and there wasn't much to learn. Certainly nothing compared to the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War, which really did throw up some genuinely new ideas and had everyone clamouring for universal service and set in motion the wheels that created the war machines that fought in 1914.

It's hard to see how the ACW presarged the nature of WW1 at all. No wire, no machine guns, very few trenches (no field army ever dug in before Spotsylvania Court House, field defences in all previous battles involved building up wooden obstacles, and it was fought in what Europeans thought was ridiculously close order (literally shoulder to shoulder with a foot per man, for comparison, at the Alma in 1854 the assaulting British had a 6 foot interval, this interval was maintained until the Great Boer War, where battalions opened their intervals again).

In fact, the French and British armies maintained much looser intervals and had much better marksmanship during the FPW, and into WW1.

A quote from Mil Hist 68(1) 73-104

"These tactics proved costly in 1870 against the French, who usually chose defensive positions fronted by wide, open fields of fire and possessed deadly breechloading chassepot rifles, mitrailleuse gatling guns, and rifled artillery. While often these plains possessed almost imperceptible cover that could hide a few skirmishers, they exposed to French firepower units in close-controlled formations (close-order columns, lines, or dense skirmish lines-skirmish lines with two-pace or less intervals between the men). Prussians could not silence this fire with their needle-guns because the chassepot had triple the range. While the Prussians overcame these problems in the early battles with ad hoc tactics, concentrated close range rifle fire, artillery support, and French lack of ammunition, losses in battles such as St. Privat, ioerth, and Vionville were appalling. Stunned to tears by the results, King Wilhelm I ordered his officers to respect enemy weapons and disperse their men, which they did with great success.19"
 
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Observers were at virtually every major engagement of the war, and they reported back that both sides were tactically and operationally backwards for most of the war. Most "innovations" the ACW threw up had been applied to war in Europe in the previous decades, and there wasn't much to learn. Certainly nothing compared to the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War, which really did throw up some genuinely new ideas and had everyone clamouring for universal service and set in motion the wheels that created the war machines that fought in 1914.

It's hard to see how the ACW presarged the nature of WW1 at all. No wire, no machine guns, very few trenches (no field army ever dug in before Spotsylvania Court House, field defences in all previous battles involved building up wooden obstacles, and it was fought in what Europeans thought was ridiculously close order (literally shoulder to shoulder with a foot per man, for comparison, at the Alma in 1854 the assaulting British had a 6 foot interval, this interval was maintained until the Great Boer War, where battalions opened their intervals again).

In fact, the French and British armies maintained much looser intervals and had much better marksmanship during the FPW, and into WW1.

Did either side during the Franco-Prussian war make significant use of repeat-action rifles like the US army did in the last year of the US Civil War? Had any European war made as much use of railroads to move and supply troops as the American Civil War?

If you think that there was not much trench warfare during the ACW, you've obviously never read anything about Richmond and Petersburg in 1864-65, where the largest armies on both sides were locked in a trench stalemate.

Did the British really fight in a loose order during the Crimean War? The few accounts I've read said that tactics had changed very little between the Napoleonic Wars and Crimea. By your own account, the Prussians were still using very close infantry formations during the Franco-Prussian war - it seems very unlikely that they would still be doing this if other European armies had adopted loose formations 15 years earlier.

I also was not aware that the British army fought in the Franco-Prussian war, as you seem to imply. :p
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Did either side during the Franco-Prussian war make significant use of repeat-action rifles like the US army did in the last year of the US Civil War?

Did the US make significant use of repeaters? Are repeaters a significant increase in combat power? The answer to both is not really. The number of repeaters issued (and privately purchased, the Henry was not an issue weapon, and Ordnance did not supply ammunition for it) to the Union Army was 12,472 Spencers (you can find figures of 48,000 and 90,000 on various websites, these being the number ordered during the war (the latter including the Burnside-Spencer), but Spencers were only being built at about 3-400 per month), less than 10,000 Henry's were built (at about 250 a month once they got going) by wars end, and only a portion of those (maybe 5,000) found their way into military service (the Henry was never designed as a military arm, and it was sold on the open market. It fired a pistol round...), and the last repeater, the Colt, was supplied to the Army early war (ca 4,200 of them), but was quickly withdrawn from service.

So, at best (assuming no losses etc.) by wars end maybe 15,000 repeaters are in Union use. Accounting for losses, and a fair number that were never issued (a few thousand Spencers languished in the Washington Arsenal) this figure is probably closer to 5-8,000. These are almost entirely confined to Cavalry and Mounted Brigades, and the majority of that arms weapons are breechloaders, not repeaters. Of course, they get a lot more press than their actual numbers and effect would be due.

As to combat effectiveness, over a sustained firefight a repeater of the period is actually slower firing (once reloading is taken into account) than a breechloader.

Had any European war made as much use of railroads to move and supply troops as the American Civil War?

A lot more actually. The US railroads suffered in that they were not integrated into the Telegraph system as happened in Europe, and simply operated on a timetable. By comparison, European Army commanders could control rail movements directly by Telegraph, enabling large scale flanking movements by rail for example, of the kind that never really happened in America.

If you think that there was not much trench warfare during the ACW, you've obviously never read anything about Richmond and Petersburg in 1864-65, where the largest armies on both sides were locked in a trench stalemate.

I think both of those are after Spotsylvania Court House ;-)

In fact, this kind of warfare occurred earlier (Vicksburg, even the Richmond Defences in 1862), but trench system is really a misnomer. Rather than a dug in trench system a la the western front, the field fortifications (in line with European fortifications) consisted of built up (rather than dug in) ramparts, typically with a trench dug in front of the position (as a dry moat), and a field of fire cleared out to about 100 yards, with wooden obstacles placed in the way to delay the attacker.

Did the British really fight in a loose order during the Crimean War? The few accounts I've read said that tactics had changed very little between the Napoleonic Wars and Crimea.

The open order of the Crimea was the same interval as the Napoleonic wars (the three main orders being open, close, and doubled (4 ranks, used where there was an extreme cavalry threat, such as at Waterloo)), which one they'd use depended on the threat, and the ability of the British unit in question. Close order is inherently easier to maintain than open order, which is why volunteer units tended to use it (not must the Union, Canadian Militia had extreme difficulty in fighting in open order for example, and the inexperienced battalions at New Orleans also came on in close order). By 1854, with increased firepower (particularly shell firing artillery) it was normal to fight in open order.

By your own account, the Prussians were still using very close infantry formations during the Franco-Prussian war - it seems very unlikely that they would still be doing this if other European armies had adopted loose formations 15 years earlier.

Because Prussia was highly conservative and stressed command and control over all else. Perhaps this is a natural consequence of the fairly inexperienced nature of the average Prussian conscript. Line troops were forbidden to lie down, or even kneel, in the presence of the enemy, and the French (who like the British had trained the entire infantry in light tactics, the French called them "Algerian Tactics" (from their 1830's campaigns in North Africa), the British used to call them "American Tactics" (dating back to the SYW), they entered the German lexicon in ca 1900 as "Boer Tactics" (from observations of the Great Boer War).

A normal early FPW Prussian attack consisted of the Prussians advancing in Battalion columns, with the front rank firing from the hip as they advanced. Not surprisingly, well trained French infantry with Chassepots slaughtered them.

The tactic that developed in the Union Army was a copy of Napoleonic British practice. A Regiment would normally be formed with 8 of their 10 coys in close order, with a coy (sometimes two) pushed about 150 yds forward as a skirmish screen (what we'd recognise as the light coy), and another coy in reserve about 100 yds back (what we'd recognise as the Grenadier coy, although their main use was to stop the main body straggling)
 
Sheesh, how did this topic go from the Mexican war to the ACW and WW1? Getting back to the original topic (anyone remember that one?), I'd say that to get Mexico to defeat the US in the war, you'd need two things: better organization and better supplies. The Mexican army suffered from the 'too many chiefs, not enough Indians' syndrome, in that the officer corps was far too topheavy, and few of them earned their high ranks by merit. Second, the Mexican supply situation was riddled with graft and corruption, as cronies of Santa Anna basically cheated the government time and again, with poor food and gunpowder that was thinned out with too much charcoal. Fix these two problems, and you're well on the path to victory for them.

As for the ACW... as someone pointed out on another thread, fighting in the American east was a lot different than in Europe because it was a lot less built up, more heavily forested, and generally less open. The type of warfare that developed in the ACW was suited for America, but probably wouldn't have been so for Europe. The American commanders weren't stupid, and if there would have been a significant advantage in open order/close order, longer volley ranges, etc, they'd have done it (war is a singularly harsh evolutionary environment). They weren't stupid... but there was a level of inexperience in the US army that was far higher than anything in the major powers of Europe. Between the Mexican war and the ACW, the US didn't engage in any major wars with another industrial power... thus, although the majority of the commanders in the ACW had served in the Mexican war, they hadn't had much opportunity to hone their skills in between (wars against Native Americans are scarcely comparable, as they were fought in small actions and with completely different tactics... more of guerrilla warfare than open war). Thus, they tended to operate under the old system that had developed under smoothbore muskets, etc.... it took a while for most of them to adapt....
 
In OTL, General Winfield Scott and his staff joined Commodore David Conner on a ship to observe Vera Cruz. As one of those staff officers, George Meade, recorded, they drew fire from the Mexican Fort of San Juan de Ulua. Had those shot hit, Scott and Conner, leaders of the Army and Navy forces present would probably died. So would all of Scott’s general officers and several members of Scott’s staff – Meade, Robert E Lee, Joseph Johnston, and PGT Beauregard. With this decapitation of US forces, at the very least the Vera Cruz landings could have been delayed and they might not have made it out of the lowlands before fever season crippled the army. Even if they had, without Scott’s abilities as leader and Lee’s abilities scouting, the US forces could very well have lost the campaign.
 
In OTL, General Winfield Scott and his staff joined Commodore David Conner on a ship to observe Vera Cruz. As one of those staff officers, George Meade, recorded, they drew fire from the Mexican Fort of San Juan de Ulua. Had those shot hit, Scott and Conner, leaders of the Army and Navy forces present would probably died. So would all of Scott’s general officers and several members of Scott’s staff – Meade, Robert E Lee, Joseph Johnston, and PGT Beauregard. With this decapitation of US forces, at the very least the Vera Cruz landings could have been delayed and they might not have made it out of the lowlands before fever season crippled the army. Even if they had, without Scott’s abilities as leader and Lee’s abilities scouting, the US forces could very well have lost the campaign.
Plus, Even if they Do Win ...

That's The OTL Confederacy's ENTIRE Brain-Trust ...

Thus If there's Any Kind of ALT Civil War, The South is Going to have to Start it without its Early Commanders!

:eek:
 
Plus, Even if they Do Win ...

That's The OTL Confederacy's ENTIRE Brain-Trust ...

Thus If there's Any Kind of ALT Civil War, The South is Going to have to Start it without its Early Commanders!

While the Union loses the man who created the plans that won the Mexican-American and Civil Wars. Robert Anderson, the US commander at Ft Sumpter was also on Scott’s staff, as was Joseph Hooker, though I’m not sure if they were on the boat that day.

There's even more butterfly potential. If the Vera Cruz landings were delayed or abandoned, more pressure might be put on Zachary Taylor's force, resulting in the loss of him and/or subordinates Braxton Bragg, Albert Sidney Johnston, George Thomas, and Jefferson Davis.

If the Vera Cruz landings do go ahead, inferior command and scouting to OTL could result in the loss of men that survived in OTL. Over two dozen men who served under Scott in OTL became Confederate Generals. In addition to Beauregard, Joe Johnston, and Lee, that includes Generals Lewis Armistead, Simon Bolivar Buckner, Richard Ewell, William Hardee, A. P. Hill, Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson, James Longstreet, George Pickett, Gideon Pillow, and David Twiggs

Nearly twice as many men who served under Scott in the Mexican-American War became Union Generals. In addition to Hooker and Meade, they incuded Generals Don Carlos Buell, Edward Canby, Ulysses S Grant, Winfield Scott Hancock, Phil Kearny, George McClellan, John Sedgwick, as well as future President Franklin Pierce. (Ambrose Burnside arrived too late to see action.)
 
What , however , do you think will be the result of a defeated America in the Mexican war? What will America lose and how will this affect American social and national psyche?
 
I think the US would knuckle down and rebuild a bigger and better army (one result of a lost war would be to put to rest the idea that untrained militia called up for war is acceptable) and invade again.... the US really wanted those western territories, and the Mexicans just couldn't make good use of them, failing miserably to get anyone to settle there in large enough numbers to hold the place...
 
I think the US would knuckle down and rebuild a bigger and better army (one result of a lost war would be to put to rest the idea that untrained militia called up for war is acceptable) and invade again.... the US really wanted those western territories, and the Mexicans just couldn't make good use of them, failing miserably to get anyone to settle there in large enough numbers to hold the place...

Unlikely I should think... depends on the peace that is finally established with Mexico.


Do they regain Tejas? or simply the Disputed terr. therein? Do they recognise US Annexation of a smaller Texas. If they retain the Mexican Cession territories, the Aggression( from their viewpoint ) will signal the need to hasten its settlement of the region to guard against any future attempts along these lines. ( the OTL Mex- American War did just that, there is no reason to think it would not if the Americans are defeated, it really will depend though on how they are defeated. They are also likely to seek out allies to help in containing such future machinations in this direction.

No..I think the most probable outcome is that US expansion Westward comes to an abrupt end and the concept of Manifest Destiny is entirely discredited.
 
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