AH Challenge: Results of a more rapid Allied victory in WWII:

For the POD here I'm going to go with the Battle of Moscow, specifically that the poor state of Soviet communications in December 1941 delays Stalin's demands for a general offensive sufficiently to the point that Army Group Center is completely destroyed by March of 1942. The attempt to repair the logistical and manpower losses weakens Germany across the whole of the front, and North Africa remains their primary theater to do well. The USSR tries general offensives and fails in 1942, but the Germans in restoring a stable front line weaken themselves further. The general offensive fails due to losses from the Battle of Moscow and due to German overall tactical, strategic, and firepower exceeding that available to the USSR, but there are losses of territory all along the front and the Germans to restore the line require both Herculean efforts and tremendous casualties in the summer of 1942, executing a fall offensive in the south that sees large initial gains but is contained and encircled by the USSR in its first successful battle of that sort.

In 1943 the Germans launch a larger offensive, their troops in North Africa have surrendered, the ones in Russia, meeting a more confident, more skilled, and more mobile Red Army fail to make significant gains in any individual sector though Soviet troops take heavier losses in the counterattack, then start their own offensives that clear Soviet territory by the fall, pushing through the Balkans and Baltic, knocking Finland out of the war and potentially re-absorbing it. The USSR by 1944 controls increasingly large parts of Europe, the Allies for logistical reasons identical to OTL are seeing major Soviet gains and the limited logistical abilities of the democracies at this point handicapping them. By 1944 the USSR is on German soil, by the fall of 1944 Berlin has fallen and the USSR is pretty much pushing to meet up with the democracies in Italy.

By 1944 the war in Europe ends with it being almost all USSR, the main democratic contributions being fighting in Italy and potentially the Aegean Sea. Then there's two questions: if the war in Europe has ended in 1944, what happens in this scenario in the Pacific, and what would the consequences be of this particular scenario for the ATL version of the Cold War, the Holocaust, and both US and Soviet history? Would this more rapid victory be as financially calamitous to the UK?
 
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You have not made clear what happens on the Eastern Front. I have thought of scenarios where the British and Americans beat the Soviets to Eastern Europe. Does this happen here? I think this is the big question. Who controls what parts of Europe?
 
You have not made clear what happens on the Eastern Front. I have thought of scenarios where the British and Americans beat the Soviets to Eastern Europe. Does this happen here? I think this is the big question. Who controls what parts of Europe?

My idea is that post this Battle of Moscow the USSR makes in the Spring and Summer of 1942 a general offensive that runs into logistical overstretch, but the Germans take tremendous casualties and further overstretch themselves just to restore a thinner defensive line much further west along the Axis-Soviet Front. The Germans attempt a few local offensives but by then Lend-Lease is improving Soviet mobility and their confidence, growing from victory leads to more rapid defeats of these offensives and further Soviet counteroffensives that result by 1944 in the USSR controlling most of the Balkans and pushing into Germany itself.

The Germans lose North Africa as per OTL at the same timeframe as OTL, and by the time the democracies have launched Husky Soviet territory in the main is clear of Nazi occupation, by the time the democracies are in a position for the sequence of defensive battles near Rome the USSR has been throwing the Germans into the Balkans, though their greater overall inexperience in both defensive and offensive operations means different kinds of casualties to OTL.

By the time Rome falls the USSR has taken Berlin, by September of 1944 the Germans are surrendered unconditionally.
 
If Army Group Centre was destroyed, the war would be over by 1943.

I don't think it would be quite that early. The USSR doesn't have the ability even with that to launch a general offensive and after that kind of victory that will be the first thought on Stalin's mind. The Germans will be pushed rather further to the west in the USSR across the front but will still be able to stabilize it once Soviet logistical power in this phase runs out. The Allied war effort on the whole receives a massive boost, and unfortunately for the USSR this might lead Stalin to conclude another general offensive will be the proper answer to the USSR's needs in a tactical-strategic sense, which the USSR again cannot win by.

By the time all those trucks and jeeps have come in via Lend-Lease, however, the USSR has a much better starting point to use them in and a much weaker German enemy to use them against, the European war will be ending before 1945. The Pacific War is unlikely to see that much significant change from OTL at this point.
 
I think the Soviet conquest of Europe scenarios are a little fantastical if the Germany collapse takes longer than a year. The Western Allies will be able to take advantage if it takes longer than that.

For example in your scenario, the Germans are in trouble on the Eastern Front by early 1942. So:

1. I would expect Operation Torch to be a quick success and the Allies to conquer Tunis by the end of the year.

2. If the Allies go to Italy, the Allies should get farther north (Po?) before Germany bottles up that front in early 1943.

3. The Allies may be able to get launch their version of Overlord in 1943.

The US would be much more inexperienced without the stalemates in North Africa and Italy, but Germany would be relatively weaker. The logistical weaknesses the Western Allies had before 1944 would also be alleviated by the weaker Germany they are facing.
 
1) Why? The same inexperience will handicap US troops regardless, and logistically North Africa is a trap for both sides.

2) Again, why? Italy didn't exactly see sterling examples of US and UK generalship IOTL, it doesn't take military genius to use mountains and rivers to obstruct Allied advances for quite some time there.

3) How? With what transports? Sledgehammer will still fail if the Battle of Moscow is a greater success because the Allies at this phase still lack the ability to logistically support such an invasion, as OTL in Italy showed. The Italian landings succeeded but showed defects strongly improved by 1944, that learning period doesn't exist in 1943.

My scenario doesn't handwave the Soviet failings in general offensives all along the Front, and that same logistical limit applies to the democracies as per OTL.
 
I don't think it would be quite that early. The USSR doesn't have the ability even with that to launch a general offensive and after that kind of victory that will be the first thought on Stalin's mind.

I'm sure it will be but Stalin will realise that this offensive has pushed the Red Army to it's limit and that time for consolidation will be needed, if he goes any further he knows that he might fall into the same trap he just set for the Germans. Plus he's just regained a huge industrial and resource base, several armies worth of new conscripts and hundreds of thousands of potential slave labourers, he knows that time is on his side and that he can launch the knock out blow when he's taken advantage of these gains.

The Germans will be pushed rather further to the west in the USSR across the front but will still be able to stabilize it once Soviet logistical power in this phase runs out.

Even once the Soviets reach their logistical limit the Germans will still need to withdraw to prevent further catastrophe, probably out of the majority of the USSR considering the mega salient which the Soviets have created. The front will be stabilised but it will have surrendered the majority of Germany's 1941 gains.

The Allied war effort on the whole receives a massive boost, and unfortunately for the USSR this might lead Stalin to conclude another general offensive will be the proper answer to the USSR's needs in a tactical-strategic sense, which the USSR again cannot win by.

I'm not so sure. By the time this offensive is launched, say in the late spring of 1942, the Soviet numerical advantage will be huge, both in terms of men and armour. They will probably be superior in quality as well considering the huge number of troops the Germans will have to replace with green conscripts. The ghettos still contain a large amount of secretly preparing Jews as well, who will help anyone who is killing their enemy. The strategic bombing campaigns will also be more successful in all likelihood.

The Pacific War is unlikely to see that much significant change from OTL at this point.

Well once the Germans are finished Japan can expect an August Storm analogue.
 
1) Why? The same inexperience will handicap US troops regardless, and logistically North Africa is a trap for both sides.

2) Again, why? Italy didn't exactly see sterling examples of US and UK generalship IOTL, it doesn't take military genius to use mountains and rivers to obstruct Allied advances for quite some time there.

3) How? With what transports? Sledgehammer will still fail if the Battle of Moscow is a greater success because the Allies at this phase still lack the ability to logistically support such an invasion, as OTL in Italy showed. The Italian landings succeeded but showed defects strongly improved by 1944, that learning period doesn't exist in 1943.

My scenario doesn't handwave the Soviet failings in general offensives all along the Front, and that same logistical limit applies to the democracies as per OTL.

1. Because Germany isn't able to flood unused divisions into Tunisia. In OTL, despite their lethargy the Allies almost took Tunisia in Nov-Dec 1942. They should be able to do so with less opposition.

2. Butterflies. Sicily should go similarly. With less divisions opposing the Allies, the attritional warfare should go faster than in OTL.

3. Butterflies. The weakness of Germany on the Eastern Front causes the transfer of more divisions from France. Even with the reduced logistical tail limiting the landing force, the Allies gain a foothold by mid-1943.
 
I'm sure it will be but Stalin will realise that this offensive has pushed the Red Army to it's limit and that time for consolidation will be needed, if he goes any further he knows that he might fall into the same trap he just set for the Germans. Plus he's just regained a huge industrial and resource base, several armies worth of new conscripts and hundreds of thousands of potential slave labourers, he knows that time is on his side and that he can launch the knock out blow when he's taken advantage of these gains.

Perhaps. Stalin, however, had the same problem as Hitler of being extremely impatient and prone to order disastrous ideas. The scale of the Battle of Moscow ITTL is a key factor here, there is the possibility that the Soviets themselves take enough losses in the initial fighting that Stalin allows a tactical pause and is more willing to listen to the Stavka.

Even once the Soviets reach their logistical limit the Germans will still need to withdraw to prevent further catastrophe, probably out of the majority of the USSR considering the mega salient which the Soviets have created. The front will be stabilised but it will have surrendered the majority of Germany's 1941 gains.

This, however, leaves quite a few Germans alive who died in the OTL 1942 battles if such an order were to be given. What this would do to the Holocaust is another interesting question. Hitler had already authorized death squads by that point, whether or not the death camps would happen or not.....

I'm not so sure. By the time this offensive is launched, say in the late spring of 1942, the Soviet numerical advantage will be huge, both in terms of men and armour. They will probably be superior in quality as well considering the huge number of troops the Germans will have to replace with green conscripts. The ghettos still contain a large amount of secretly preparing Jews as well, who will help anyone who is killing their enemy. The strategic bombing campaigns will also be more successful in all likelihood.

I'm not so sure about strategic bombing, and I'm also not so sure that the 1942 USSR would have enough communications/logistical equipment to effectively co-ordinate the new armored forces in attacks, while those forces will still be more rigid than their German counterparts. The Moscow victory arguably moves the "Axis still have dim possibility of victory" part of the war out the window in 1942, albeit.

Well once the Germans are finished Japan can expect an August Storm analogue.

With the potential that by 1945 the USSR is invading mainland Japan in a joint offensive with the United States, as the A-Bomb is months away by that point.
 
1. Because Germany isn't able to flood unused divisions into Tunisia. In OTL, despite their lethargy the Allies almost took Tunisia in Nov-Dec 1942. They should be able to do so with less opposition.

2. Butterflies. Sicily should go similarly. With less divisions opposing the Allies, the attritional warfare should go faster than in OTL.

3. Butterflies. The weakness of Germany on the Eastern Front causes the transfer of more divisions from France. Even with the reduced logistical tail limiting the landing force, the Allies gain a foothold by mid-1943.

1) Point. I concede that one and #2.

3) France in that phase of the war IOTL was a giant rest stop for divisions burned out in the Eastern war. The absence of landing craft of the sort that made Overlord a success is still going to be a limiting factor, however.
 
3) France in that phase of the war IOTL was a giant rest stop for divisions burned out in the Eastern war. The absence of landing craft of the sort that made Overlord a success is still going to be a limiting factor, however.

It's going to limit, but I don't think it will prevent a 1943 Overlord in this scenario. So we'll just disagree.

I don't think the USSR will be able to meet the Allies at the Rhine, but I think that if Stalin desires it then they will get larger chunks of Germany and Austria will be permanently divided.
 
Perhaps. Stalin, however, had the same problem as Hitler of being extremely impatient and prone to order disastrous ideas. The scale of the Battle of Moscow ITTL is a key factor here, there is the possibility that the Soviets themselves take enough losses in the initial fighting that Stalin allows a tactical pause and is more willing to listen to the Stavka.

He did, however he has enough intelligence to realise that he can launch the finishing blow whenever he wants and that he will have a greater advantage in a few months. The effort it took to destroy Army Group Centre will likely make any large offensive undoable any way.

This, however, leaves quite a few Germans alive who died in the OTL 1942 battles if such an order were to be given. What this would do to the Holocaust is another interesting question. Hitler had already authorized death squads by that point, whether or not the death camps would happen or not.....

Those losses won't make up for the destruction of Army Group centre though, and the Soviets took higher casualties in many of the small offensives anyway, so it probably plays to their advantage. I don't think the Germans would have the freedom of mobility to establish something like the Final Solution, it'll probably be filed away.

I'm not so sure about strategic bombing, and I'm also not so sure that the 1942 USSR would have enough communications/logistical equipment to effectively co-ordinate the new armored forces in attacks, while those forces will still be more rigid than their German counterparts. The Moscow victory arguably moves the "Axis still have dim possibility of victory" part of the war out the window in 1942, albeit. .

My theory with strategic bombing is that with the need to make for much more lost aircraft, those used to defend the Reich are going to need to take on for the team, or the Soviets could gain air supremacy, if they haven't already. I suppose the Soviets could focus those regained industries on trucks and jeeps etc, but I see your point. I still reckon they could pull it off. The Germans would have little hope of victory, Hitler might even see this.


With the potential that by 1945 the USSR is invading mainland Japan in a joint offensive with the United States, as the A-Bomb is months away by that point.

Well the Japanese would lose all their East Asian gains within a few months and probably their southern ones soon after. Then it would only be a matter of time before their Navy is crushed and they face the prospect of Soviet invasion. At that point I'm guessing they'd unconditionally surrender to the western Allies but the Soviets would probably demand an occupation zone, and get it.
 
It's going to limit, but I don't think it will prevent a 1943 Overlord in this scenario. So we'll just disagree.

I don't think the USSR will be able to meet the Allies at the Rhine, but I think that if Stalin desires it then they will get larger chunks of Germany and Austria will be permanently divided.

For one thing, what exactly can the Allies argue if their logistics do limit them to a larger-scale Dieppe and Italy against the USSR which will rightly see itself as the key to victory in Europe moreso than IOTL?

He did, however he has enough intelligence to realise that he can launch the finishing blow whenever he wants and that he will have a greater advantage in a few months. The effort it took to destroy Army Group Centre will likely make any large offensive undoable any way.

*We* see it thus. Would Stalin necessarily? He wasn't as irrational as Hitler but he did make some big mistakes.

Those losses won't make up for the destruction of Army Group centre though, and the Soviets took higher casualties in many of the small offensives anyway, so it probably plays to their advantage. I don't think the Germans would have the freedom of mobility to establish something like the Final Solution, it'll probably be filed away.

So what does the historiography of that look like?


My theory with strategic bombing is that with the need to make for much more lost aircraft, those used to defend the Reich are going to need to take on for the team, or the Soviets could gain air supremacy, if they haven't already. I suppose the Soviets could focus those regained industries on trucks and jeeps etc, but I see your point. I still reckon they could pull it off. The Germans would have little hope of victory, Hitler might even see this.

Well, the USSR's not going to have Lend-Lease in significant numbers for a while so the absence of trucks into 1943 is going to handicap their ability to sustain offensives on the operational level. They could quite easily produce a larger string of tactical victories that add up to strategic gains, however.


Well the Japanese would lose all their East Asian gains within a few months and probably their southern ones soon after. Then it would only be a matter of time before their Navy is crushed and they face the prospect of Soviet invasion. At that point I'm guessing they'd unconditionally surrender to the western Allies but the Soviets would probably demand an occupation zone, and get it.

A point, though here the USA could more easily turn the USSR's potential arguments WRT Europe against it "You won Europe single-handedly, maybe, but we won Asia single-handedly so there."
 
*We* see it thus. Would Stalin necessarily? He wasn't as irrational as Hitler but he did make some big mistakes.

He did, however he regained much more of his cool post Moscow, whether or not the fact that he's won the war single handedly in one swipe when staring calamity in the face will change this for the better of worse is debatable but I would presume it would make him more rational, people generally are when things are going their way.

So what does the historiography of that look like?

Look at the Battles of Rhzev, huge casualties on both sides but much worse for the Soviets. Avoidance of these battles will benefit both sides but especially the Soviets.


Well, the USSR's not going to have Lend-Lease in significant numbers for a while so the absence of trucks into 1943 is going to handicap their ability to sustain offensives on the operational level. They could quite easily produce a larger string of tactical victories that add up to strategic gains, however.

The Soviets here have much greater access to resources, manpower and industry than they did in OTL. Considering their infantry (quality and quantity), armour and possible air superiority over the at this point they would have the comfort of being able to produce their own trucks. They could pull off a large scale offensive which could the Germans out of Poland and large parts of eastern Europe by the end of 1942.


A point, though here the USA could more easily turn the USSR's potential arguments WRT Europe against it "You won Europe single-handedly, maybe, but we won Asia single-handedly so there."

It depends on how the Pacific War is going and at what point Germany is defeated. Presuming Germany finally surrenders in 1943 and the Pacific War has been going more or less the same as OTL (butterflies could very easily turn Midway etc but I digress) then the European-American powers will have been making very sluggish progress and is in fact retreating in some parts of Asia. If the Soviets repeat the stunning victories of 1945 by kicking the Japanese out of Manchuria, Korea and China within the process of the few months, possibly also removing the Japanese from the Asian mainland altogether, and by doing so force the IJN and IJA to redirect it's forces to hold off the Soviets then they have a strong case for arguing that they played a greater part in the struggle against Japan, but least that they were equal partners in the struggle.
 
He did, however he regained much more of his cool post Moscow, whether or not the fact that he's won the war single handedly in one swipe when staring calamity in the face will change this for the better of worse is debatable but I would presume it would make him more rational, people generally are when things are going their way.

Point.

Look at the Battles of Rhzev, huge casualties on both sides but much worse for the Soviets. Avoidance of these battles will benefit both sides but especially the Soviets.

True, and they have a chance to develop more rapidly both armored formations and the doctrine to use them properly at less cost, which can only benefit the Allies as a whole.

The Soviets here have much greater access to resources, manpower and industry than they did in OTL. Considering their infantry (quality and quantity), armour and possible air superiority over the at this point they would have the comfort of being able to produce their own trucks. They could pull off a large scale offensive which could the Germans out of Poland and large parts of eastern Europe by the end of 1942.

They have to clear Leningrad first, as well as cross several major rivers in heavily wooded terrain in Ukraine. They have more lives to spend but they've still got to do all that they did IOTL.

It depends on how the Pacific War is going and at what point Germany is defeated. Presuming Germany finally surrenders in 1943 and the Pacific War has been going more or less the same as OTL (butterflies could very easily turn Midway etc but I digress) then the European-American powers will have been making very sluggish progress and is in fact retreating in some parts of Asia. If the Soviets repeat the stunning victories of 1945 by kicking the Japanese out of Manchuria, Korea and China within the process of the few months, possibly also removing the Japanese from the Asian mainland altogether, and by doing so force the IJN and IJA to redirect it's forces to hold off the Soviets then they have a strong case for arguing that they played a greater part in the struggle against Japan, but least that they were equal partners in the struggle.

I think since the Pacific Theater was on a shoestring and the Europe First mentality was pretty consolidated that the OTL course up to 1943 is quite plausible, after that is when things get interesting.
 
They have to clear Leningrad first, as well as cross several major rivers in heavily wooded terrain in Ukraine. They have more lives to spend but they've still got to do all that they did IOTL.

I'm pretty sure the Germans will need to retreat from the siege and from most of the Ukraine to stabilise the front due to the massive whole that Army Group Centre has just left.

I think since the Pacific Theater was on a shoestring and the Europe First mentality was pretty consolidated that the OTL course up to 1943 is quite plausible, after that is when things get interesting.

If anything it might suffer seeing as the Allies might focus landing craft on Europe in an attempt to get a foothold Sledgehammer style.
 
If the Germans don't try to counteract Allied North African landings, then that's a quarter of a million axis soldiers not taken prisoner at Tunis. Also include here all of the equipment, tanks etc. that were lost.

The problems that plagued the US military are not exposed and Fredendall keeps his position.


Under these circumstances, we might even see a failed invasion of Sicily.
 
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