AH Challenge: Confederates Avoid Losing Atlanta Campaign

Probably, Hood's only competence was in backstabbing.

He was a fairly good brigade and division commander, in battle. Horrible off the field, though. Reading on the condition of his division after Antietam (in the ways a good division commander would be fixing) is shocking.
 
He was a fairly good brigade and division commander, in battle. Horrible off the field, though. Reading on the condition of his division after Antietam (in the ways a good division commander would be fixing) is shocking.

I admit I have alway despised Hood and so might be somewhat biased. What he did in Franklin was shockingly bad and his stupidity with Nashville was almost as bad.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Much as I would enjoy indulging in a Hood hatefest, let's try to get the thread back on track. In my mind, I see three potential opportunities for the Confederates to win the Atlanta Campaign.

1. A successful attack at Cassville.
2. A successful attack at Peachtree Creek.
3. Breaking the Union supply line before the evacuation of Atlanta.

Any other possibilities?
 
Much as I would enjoy indulging in a Hood hatefest, let's try to get the thread back on track. In my mind, I see three potential opportunities for the Confederates to win the Atlanta Campaign.

1. A successful attack at Cassville.
2. A successful attack at Peachtree Creek.
3. Breaking the Union supply line before the evacuation of Atlanta.

Any other possibilities?

There is another river crossing opportunity between Cassville and Peachtree Creek, I think - but I can't recall the name at the moment.

I'd say this on 3: Breaking it and keeping it broken long enough to make a difference. If Sherman can just retreat back to the broken part, summon the USMRR guys, and fix it, it won't help much. Even to delay him.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
There is another river crossing opportunity between Cassville and Peachtree Creek, I think - but I can't recall the name at the moment.

Are you thinking of the Chattahoochee?

I say this on 3: Breaking it and keeping it broken long enough to make a difference. If Sherman can just retreat back to the broken part, summon the USMRR guys, and fix it, it won't help much. Even to delay him.

If the railroad were broken near Dalton by the time Sherman's army was outside Atlanta, it obviously wouldn't make sense for him to retreat all the way back there. Basically, he'd have to hunker down and limit operations until the break was repaired.
 
Are you thinking of the Chattahoochee?

That sounds right.

If the railroad were broken near Dalton by the time Sherman's army was outside Atlanta, it obviously wouldn't make sense for him to retreat all the way back there. Basically, he'd have to hunker down and limit operations until the break was repaired.

Yeah. But by the point Sherman is outside Atlanta, the point of breaking the railroad to delay his advance has been lost.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
But by the point Sherman is outside Atlanta, the point of breaking the railroad to delay his advance has been lost.

Even a temporary break in Sherman's supply line would disrupt the flow of food and ammunition to his forces, and Sherman would not have been able to fight a battle near Atlanta without such a continuous flow. It also would have precluded the stockpiling of supplies that was necessary IOTL for the movement south of the city to severe the railroad at Jonesboro.
 
Even a temporary break in Sherman's supply line would disrupt the flow of food and ammunition to his forces, and Sherman would not have been able to fight a battle near Atlanta without such a continuous flow. It also would have precluded the stockpiling of supplies that was necessary IOTL for the movement south of the city to severe the railroad at Jonesboro.


Not that much. The South had a real hard time cutting the Union supply lines for any long stretch of time. There were reasons for the joking about Sherman's "spare tunnels". US Army trains carried railroad ties with them so they could lay down new tracks whenever they were broken. Sherman hunkers down a few days conducting no offensive operations until the rails are repaired. It might slow him down a few days, that's all.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The South had a real hard time cutting the Union supply lines for any long stretch of time.

True, but there were some examples of success. In late 1862, it was mostly due to Van Dorn's attacks on Grant's supply lines in northern Mississippi, and not any battlefield defeat, which forced Grant to abandon the first major effort to capture Vicksburg.
 
True, but there were some examples of success. In late 1862, it was mostly due to Van Dorn's attacks on Grant's supply lines in northern Mississippi, and not any battlefield defeat, which forced Grant to abandon the first major effort to capture Vicksburg.

That was 1862 which was before the Union Army adapted to it and when the CSA was stronger and the Union Army weaker. Hardly the same thing.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Here's another question: can the Confederates send any additional reinforcements to Georgia than they did IOTL? IOTL, Grant seems to have expected Early's troops (which he estimated at 20,000 or 25,000) to be sent to Georgia after they had withdrawn back to Virginia following the raid on Washington. At least, he thought it was a strong enough possibility to send Sherman a telegram warning him to expect considerable Rebel reinforcements in mid-to-late July.

Assuming the Confederates felt reasonably secure in the Eastern Theater for the time being, could they have sent, say, two divisions of troops to help Johnston in mid-to-late July, as Grant feared? They had been able to do so the year before, but the situation was obviously different in 1864.
 
Here's another question: can the Confederates send any additional reinforcements to Georgia than they did IOTL? IOTL, Grant seems to have expected Early's troops (which he estimated at 20,000 or 25,000) to be sent to Georgia after they had withdrawn back to Virginia following the raid on Washington. At least, he thought it was a strong enough possibility to send Sherman a telegram warning him to expect considerable Rebel reinforcements in mid-to-late July.

Assuming the Confederates felt reasonably secure in the Eastern Theater for the time being, could they have sent, say, two divisions of troops to help Johnston in mid-to-late July, as Grant feared? They had been able to do so the year before, but the situation was obviously different in 1864.


The railroads are in far worse shape. So much so I dread the idea of planning such a movement.

From Railroads of the Confederacy, by Robert C. Black III:

"In September, 1863, they had taken Benning's Brigade 775 miles from Richmond to Atlanta in about four days, but in May, 1864, it required six days for Colquitt's command to cover the 433 miles from Charleston to Petersburg. The Nottoway-Stony Creek gap served, of course, to delay matters, but the comparison was frightening...In Richmond it was reported that the Virginia Central possessed sufficient rolling stock for 5,400 infantry only, without heavy baggage or horses."

I'm ignoring the military situation since you did say "If the Confederates felt reasonably secure".
 
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