AH Challenge: Better US torpedoes in 1941

Bearcat

Banned
Preferably with a POD not earlier than the mid-1930s, can the US get into service by 12/7/1941:

1. A better version of the Mark 14 and Mark 15 type, with either a working influence exploder, or with the influence exploder removed.

2. A first-generation passive homing acoustic torpedo. I'm thinking for surface use only, against escorts, oilers and transports. Maybe 25ish knots speed and several thousand yards theoretical range (though of course a sub will never launch at over a thousand yards or so). I'm not looking for a total ASB Mark 48, I'm thinking of something like the wartime German G7es / GNAT.

I see three categories of issues here.

1. Technical. Can the US build a GNAT-type torpedo by, say, 1939? -ie, in time for it to reach the fleet in reasonable numbers.

2. Political / Motivational. How does the Mark 14 get sorted out? How does the money get freed up for live fire testing during the depression? Something with getting FDR involved?

How do you get the Newport Torpedo Station to admit any flaws and fix them? FDR again? Remember the station has powerful patrons in Congress who protected it IOTL. Horse trading or a scandal?

3. Production. Pre-war, funding is scarce. The USN entered the war with alarmingly few torpedoes on hand, and little ability to build more quickly. Newport would not 'allow' a second source facility to be built. How do you get around that?
 
Preferably with a POD not earlier than the mid-1930s, can the US get into service by 12/7/1941:

1. A better version of the Mark 14 and Mark 15 type, with either a working influence exploder, or with the influence exploder removed.

2. A first-generation passive homing acoustic torpedo. I'm thinking for surface use only, against escorts, oilers and transports. Maybe 25ish knots speed and several thousand yards theoretical range (though of course a sub will never launch at over a thousand yards or so). I'm not looking for a total ASB Mark 48, I'm thinking of something like the wartime German G7es / GNAT.

I see three categories of issues here.

1. Technical. Can the US build a GNAT-type torpedo by, say, 1939? -ie, in time for it to reach the fleet in reasonable numbers.

2. Political / Motivational. How does the Mark 14 get sorted out? How does the money get freed up for live fire testing during the depression? Something with getting FDR involved?

How do you get the Newport Torpedo Station to admit any flaws and fix them? FDR again? Remember the station has powerful patrons in Congress who protected it IOTL. Horse trading or a scandal?

3. Production. Pre-war, funding is scarce. The USN entered the war with alarmingly few torpedoes on hand, and little ability to build more quickly. Newport would not 'allow' a second source facility to be built. How do you get around that?

The easiest solution to the duff torpedoes would be to buy British..:D:D
Hmm, maybe some sort of deal before L-L kicks in? Technically easy, but the politics....!!!!

Acoustic homers were probably possible quite a bit earlier than the GNAT, I dont know of any tech issues holding them up, just the perceived need and desire. However I'm not sure how good they would be against warships, as once they've missed I dont think the current torpedoes have teh speed and endurance to go around again - they'd have to be fairly on target at least. Would the US actually see a need for attacks on merchant ships at this point in time? I thought they were still fixated on warships like the IJN...:confused:
 
IIRC, the USN saw merchantmen as a target, but a fairly low priority one, with warships being high-priority targets.
 

Markus

Banned
The key is realizing the Mk.14 and 15 have flaws. All it takes are some math and test shots without live warheads.

The tip of the fishes was the same design as the one of the older, slower ones. Now kinetic engery increases to the square of the speed, thus it shuld have been obvious that increasing the speed from 34 to 46 knots and the weight by 1,000lb would require a stronger torp tip. Add some test shots without warheads into nets and there you got a torp with a reliable contact exploder that runs at the right depth. Fixing the magnetic detonator is IMO not important. It seems many skippers stopped using it when they realized it was broken but never bothered to tell their superiors.
 

Bearcat

Banned
The key is realizing the Mk.14 and 15 have flaws. All it takes are some math and test shots without live warheads.

The tip of the fishes was the same design as the one of the older, slower ones. Now kinetic engery increases to the square of the speed, thus it shuld have been obvious that increasing the speed from 34 to 46 knots and the weight by 1,000lb would require a stronger torp tip. Add some test shots without warheads into nets and there you got a torp with a reliable contact exploder that runs at the right depth. Fixing the magnetic detonator is IMO not important. It seems many skippers stopped using it when they realized it was broken but never bothered to tell their superiors.

Fixing or ditching the influence exploder was important in that it revealed the flaw in the contact exploder. I doubt you find the contact problem pre-war unless you find the magnetic one first.

Of course, both of those only get revealed after you fix the depth-keeping problem. ;)

The political dimension with Newport and the Rhode Island congressional delegation cannot be understated. Well into ww2, Newport was a wrench in the navy's works when it came to getting more torpedoes.

If the USN's fleet boats have say 18 improved Mark 14s and 6 homing torpedoes on day one of the Pacific War, the IJN is going to find it a bit different than IOTL. Not an America-Wank, but it'll be far more costly and the whole overwrought edifice of Japanese strategy might just collapse.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
There is no real need to do anything dramatic. Anything that gets the Navy to actually test a couple Mk 14 is all that is required.

I would suggest some Intel from the British regarding Kriegsmarine exploder failures and the likelihood that it is due to the influence detonator might be a place to start.

The weapon itself was easily correctable. All that is needed is the knowledge that all is not right and proper, as was demonstrated IOTL.

By the end of the war the USN air dropped torpedoes were arguably the best in the world, with a deployment profile that exceeded the performance envelope of any aircraft in service that was able to loft that much weight while the submarine and surface weapons were reliabe to a remarkable degree. The later surface engagements between the IJN and USN when torpedoes were used came out rather lopsidedly on the American side of the ledger.
 
Other than the actions in and around Surigao Strait and the ambush of Taffy 3, I know of no 'later surface actions'.
 
Preferably with a POD not earlier than the mid-1930s, can the US get into service by 12/7/1941:

1. A better version of the Mark 14 and Mark 15 type, with either a working influence exploder, or with the influence exploder removed.

2. A first-generation passive homing acoustic torpedo. I'm thinking for surface use only, against escorts, oilers and transports. Maybe 25ish knots speed and several thousand yards theoretical range (though of course a sub will never launch at over a thousand yards or so). I'm not looking for a total ASB Mark 48, I'm thinking of something like the wartime German G7es / GNAT.

I see three categories of issues here.

1. Technical. Can the US build a GNAT-type torpedo by, say, 1939? -ie, in time for it to reach the fleet in reasonable numbers.

2. Political / Motivational. How does the Mark 14 get sorted out? How does the money get freed up for live fire testing during the depression? Something with getting FDR involved?

How do you get the Newport Torpedo Station to admit any flaws and fix them? FDR again? Remember the station has powerful patrons in Congress who protected it IOTL. Horse trading or a scandal?

3. Production. Pre-war, funding is scarce. The USN entered the war with alarmingly few torpedoes on hand, and little ability to build more quickly. Newport would not 'allow' a second source facility to be built. How do you get around that?


The main problem was the financial one, since the USA and most other Navies reduced funds for development of weapons in the period of recession, unlike Japan and the UK, who continued to keep the development going, dispite the costs.

One way of getting more money available for better working torpedoes was to abbort the new battleships for more usefull weapons on existing platforms, such as submarines, aircraft for aircraft carriers and destroyers. The cancelation of just ten weaponplatforms would result in a multitude of other weaponplatforms being more effective as a whole. Not bad it seems, given the actual results that could have been with the weapons that should have worked, for what the battleships actually achieved.
 

Bearcat

Banned
Actually, there is plenty of money available by mid-1940, and probably enough a little earlier.

The political aspect kept anyone from infringing on Newport by setting up a second production facility. Which also kept anyone from checking Newport's work to find the hideous error in not redesigning the depth-keeping system when the torpedo speed was increased. If you break Newport's monopoly, all the dominos may very well begin to fall. Evidence of problems leads to testing, which then leads to live fire testing, which leads to redesign and more testing. Meanwhile, with outside technical experts now having access, a homing torpedo program gets off the ground earlier than IOTL.

My dim memory is that the navy offered to hold one semi-live fire test, without a live warhead, but Newport was told they'd have to basically pay for it out of their budget, and that if the target sank, Newport was responsible for that too. This was in the depths of the Depression. Needless to say, Newport passed on that one.

If FDR or someone high in the navy remembers this in 1939, with war in Europe, maybe we can get a real firing late in 1939, leading to redesign in the first half of 1940, and production starting in '40-'41.

An experimental homing program for an American GNAT would not see production until 1941, but would produce enough for small numbers in the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets by Pearl Harbor. A US GNAT would be seen as an anti-escort weapon, and also for use against transports moving to attack the PI, etc. Not for every sundry maru in the Pacific, at least at first.
 

Bearcat

Banned
Didn't the engineer who designed it refused to believe there were any flaws with it?

A lot of people, at Newport and in the Navy, refused to believe it.

;)

One other thing to consider: what the OP is not. I'm not changing prewar USN doctrine, which was not very aggressive in the use of subs -calling for attacks by sonar, without ever exposing a periscope, etc.

I'm not replacing inept or too conservative sub commanders prewar. Only the experience of combat will separate the wheat from the chaff.

So even with better materiel, this will go better for the US, but not wanktastically better, at least in '41-'42.
 
Actually, there is plenty of money available by mid-1940, and probably enough a little earlier.

The political aspect kept anyone from infringing on Newport by setting up a second production facility. Which also kept anyone from checking Newport's work to find the hideous error in not redesigning the depth-keeping system when the torpedo speed was increased. If you break Newport's monopoly, all the dominos may very well begin to fall. Evidence of problems leads to testing, which then leads to live fire testing, which leads to redesign and more testing. Meanwhile, with outside technical experts now having access, a homing torpedo program gets off the ground earlier than IOTL.

My dim memory is that the navy offered to hold one semi-live fire test, without a live warhead, but Newport was told they'd have to basically pay for it out of their budget, and that if the target sank, Newport was responsible for that too. This was in the depths of the Depression. Needless to say, Newport passed on that one.

If FDR or someone high in the navy remembers this in 1939, with war in Europe, maybe we can get a real firing late in 1939, leading to redesign in the first half of 1940, and production starting in '40-'41.

An experimental homing program for an American GNAT would not see production until 1941, but would produce enough for small numbers in the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets by Pearl Harbor. A US GNAT would be seen as an anti-escort weapon, and also for use against transports moving to attack the PI, etc. Not for every sundry maru in the Pacific, at least at first.

You remember correctly about the one abortive live-fire excercise- the hulk of the destroyer Ericsson (DD-56, one of the 1000-ton type ships,) slated to be scrapped was offered as a target in 1934 after being returned to the Navy by the Coast Guard, but the Newport Torpedo Station was told that if they sunk the target, they'd have to pay for her to be salvaged & repaired just so she could be hauled off to the scrapyard. (insert WTF smiley)

There was only one actual live fire test, which took place in 1926, which sank the submarine L-8, 'proving' that the magnetic exploder worked.

Another factor that might need to be dealt with would be the institutional arrogance of Newport & BuOrd, who felt that they were the only ones who knew or could know anything useful about torpedos, and that the forces afloat who were actually using the things didn't know what they were doing, nor did any outside consultants, blaming them for anything that went wrong. It got to the point, that even during the war, Newport refused to cooperate at all, or even provide any information to any outside company, university, or naval station working on the issues with the torpedoes, or developing other kinds of torpedoes, and it took Ernie King tearing several of their higher-ups new ones late in 1943 for anything to change.

0804808[1].jpg
 

Bearcat

Banned
You remember correctly about the one abortive live-fire excercise- the hulk of the destroyer Ericsson (DD-56, one of the 1000-ton type ships,) slated to be scrapped was offered as a target in 1934 after being returned to the Navy by the Coast Guard, but the Newport Torpedo Station was told that if they sunk the target, they'd have to pay for her to be salvaged & repaired just so she could be hauled off to the scrapyard. (insert WTF smiley)

There was only one actual live fire test, which took place in 1926, which sank the submarine L-8, 'proving' that the magnetic exploder worked.

WTF indeed. It boggles the mind.

I'm assuming that of course the L-8 was sunk in the north Atlantic, where the influence exploder generally worked okay. What was needed was a test at southern latitudes where the shape of the geomagnetic field has a very different shape (larger horizontal component), which meant that deep shots didn't set off the exploder, and shallow ones detonated too soon.

With all the useless old hulks the navy had in the thirties surely a couple could be found if the will existed. Hell, they still had freaking colliers afloat, for Gods sake.

Another factor that might need to be dealt with would be the institutional arrogance of Newport & BuOrd, who felt that they were the only ones who knew or could know anything useful about torpedos, and that the forces afloat who were actually using the things didn't know what they were doing, nor did any outside consultants, blaming them for anything that went wrong. It got to the point, that even during the war, Newport refused to cooperate at all, or even provide any information to any outside company, university, or naval station working on the issues with the torpedoes, or developing other kinds of torpedoes, and it took Ernie King tearing several of their higher-ups new ones late in 1943 for anything to change.

This is what i'm talking about regarding the political dimension. The arrogance was astounding and it was backed up by a small state congressional delegation absolutely intent on maintaining Newport's monopoly, even stranglehold, on torpedo production. Its the one real roadblock to a far better TL for the US.

As for Ernie King... who better to tear some new ones? :D Short of Beelzebub himself, Ernie was about the meanest SOB ever. :cool:
 
Question: I know the Asiatic fleet was on the bottom of the list for new equipment. Even if new torpedoes are developed, what are the odds that the Asiatic fleet will get significant numbers to affect the early days of the Pacific War?
 
There's still the problem that Clay Blair mentions in Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan: three of the senior sub officers in the Pacific had been at Newport and worked on the Mark-14 at least: RADM Robert English, COMSUBPAC from early 1942 until his death in a plane crash in 1943; RADM Ralph Christie, COMSUBSWPAC (Fremantle/Perth); and CAPT James Fife, TF-42 (Brisbane). All three stuck to the Mark-14 and the magnetic exploder, mainly because they had worked on it, and as Christie once said to a skipper complaining about it "I helped work on the magnetic exploder: I know it works." It took RADM Charles Lockwood, first in Fremantle (Christie was his successor), then at Pearl Harbor as English's successor with Nimitz's full support (he was also a submariner by training) doing the field fixes before Nimitz urged King to do what had to be done to fix the torpedo problem at the source: Newport. Westinghouse got around Newport by getting the contract to do the Mark-18 electric torpedo-based on a German G7e found on a New Jersey Beach, but Newport tried blocking them-and failed as King tore into them over the Mark-14. The Mark-13 aerial torpedo and the Mark-15 surface torpedo were just as bad as the Mark-14, btw. Even when Pearl Harbor dropped the magnetic exploder and redesigned the contact one, Christie stuck to both until Dec '43, when VADM Thomas Kinkaid took over as Com7thFlt: and he ordered Christie to drop the magnetic exploder and use the new contact exploder (under pressure from both Nimitz and King)
 

Bearcat

Banned
Question: I know the Asiatic fleet was on the bottom of the list for new equipment. Even if new torpedoes are developed, what are the odds that the Asiatic fleet will get significant numbers to affect the early days of the Pacific War?

The Asiatic Fleet didn't get many surface vessels - Mahanian thought encouraged the main strength of the fleet to remain concentrated, either in the Pacific, or in the case of war in Europe only, the Atlantic. However, the Asiatic Fleet WAS provided with a goodly number of modern submarines. The subs were seen as helpful to the defense of the PI. I would presume a torpedo excellent at attacking slower targets like troopships and their escorts would be an obvious thing to send as well.
 

Bearcat

Banned
There's still the problem that Clay Blair mentions in Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan: three of the senior sub officers in the Pacific had been at Newport and worked on the Mark-14 at least: RADM Robert English, COMSUBPAC from early 1942 until his death in a plane crash in 1943; RADM Ralph Christie, COMSUBSWPAC (Fremantle/Perth); and CAPT James Fife, TF-42 (Brisbane). All three stuck to the Mark-14 and the magnetic exploder, mainly because they had worked on it, and as Christie once said to a skipper complaining about it "I helped work on the magnetic exploder: I know it works." It took RADM Charles Lockwood, first in Fremantle (Christie was his successor), then at Pearl Harbor as English's successor with Nimitz's full support (he was also a submariner by training) doing the field fixes before Nimitz urged King to do what had to be done to fix the torpedo problem at the source: Newport. Westinghouse got around Newport by getting the contract to do the Mark-18 electric torpedo-based on a German G7e found on a New Jersey Beach, but Newport tried blocking them-and failed as King tore into them over the Mark-14. The Mark-13 aerial torpedo and the Mark-15 surface torpedo were just as bad as the Mark-14, btw. Even when Pearl Harbor dropped the magnetic exploder and redesigned the contact one, Christie stuck to both until Dec '43, when VADM Thomas Kinkaid took over as Com7thFlt: and he ordered Christie to drop the magnetic exploder and use the new contact exploder (under pressure from both Nimitz and King)

As I see it, you'd need to remove Newport's political protection first - perhaps by a nasty little scandal up there in Rhode Island. Maybe during the investigation, rumors reach the navy that in addition to the political goings-on, something might be rotten at Newport.

The Navy investigates, and FDR orders someone from outside the torpedo community to get involved. It has to be someone senior who can tell Christie and English to go eff themselves if need be. Someone somewhat out of favor perhaps, not expected to hold another sea-going command because of his political liabilities. Someone like Ernie King.

Shit, meet fan. :cool:

Anyway, that's as far as I schemed the political end at this point...
 
As I see it, you'd need to remove Newport's political protection first - perhaps by a nasty little scandal up there in Rhode Island. Maybe during the investigation, rumors reach the navy that in addition to the political goings-on, something might be rotten at Newport.

The Navy investigates, and FDR orders someone from outside the torpedo community to get involved. It has to be someone senior who can tell Christie and English to go eff themselves if need be. Someone somewhat out of favor perhaps, not expected to hold another sea-going command because of his political liabilities. Someone like Ernie King.

Shit, meet fan. :cool:

Anyway, that's as far as I schemed the political end at this point...
It sounds good, Bearcat.
 
Top