They over-estimated the Argentine fleet.
SunilTanna,
I don't think so because they knew held an undeniable trump card; SSNs.
The Royal Navy sank
one ARA combatant, tugs really don't count, and the ARA spent the rest of the war in port. The Royal Navy accomplished that within
one day of the task force's arrival off the Falklands too.
While the war was still ongoing, we were told in training that the RN had been actively shadowing by SSN both of Argentina's naval pincers during the lead up to the events of May 1st and 2nd. We were told that weather conditions; i.e. wind and sea state, had prevented
Skyhawk air operations off
Vientecinco De Mayo during the 1st and that was known by Britain at the time. We were also told that Britain deliberately
choose which ARA major combatant to sink and, when you remember that the shoot order was discussed at the Cabinet level, that rings true.
There were less than 1,200 men aboard
Belgrano and 1,300 men plus an air wing aboard
Vientecinco De Mayo. If a major combatant had to be sunk,
Belgrano would be the better choice. Remember, that decision was made
before the Argentine air force and Naval air force proved to be so effective.
After the Argentine land-based air attacks began, targeting the carrier and the
Skyhawks she carried is a no-brainer. Before those air attacks occur howeveer, targeting
Belgrano is an graduated step in the process of routing the ARA back to it's bases. Sink a smaller number of men, see if that does the trick, and then sink a larger number of men only if necessary. As a First World nation, nuclear power, and possessor of SSNs, Britain could have very chosen to follow such a process against a second tier foe, especially a foe that they admittedly underestimated.
Britain's claims and admissions both during and immediately after the war are suspect, IMHO, because many of them have changed over the last quarter century. The operational presence of ARA
San Luis was vehemently denied for years, a possible third torpedo striking one of
Belgrano's escorts is seemingly supported by physical evidence, and the actual pre-invasion departure dates of Britian's SSNs weren't known until fairly recently. Even though the presence of SAS troops in Argentina and Chile is now admitted, their actual operations can only be guessed at. I believe we still don't know everything that happened off the Falklands and, given the Official Secrets Act, we might not know for many more decades.
As we know however, they understimated the Argentine air force and Argentine naval air force.
That they did, and they freely and repeatedly admitted it during the war. There's one famous quote about how they could have thought Argentine pilots wouldn't be good when Argentina produces so many excellent race car drivers.
Bill