AH challange: carrier vs carrier engagement post 1974

I find it interesting that the RN of the early eighties period had a really very limited toolkit for surface action in general. They had recently got rid of some ships which would have been useful in a Falklands scenario when they were going for an all-out ASW function as part of NATO North Atlantic.

They had a lot of ships with Exocets. They were expecting a possible an Exocet vs Exocet surface battle - with losses to both sides, but British victory. They over-estimated the Argentine fleet. As we know however, they understimated the Argentine air force and Argentine naval air force.
 
They over-estimated the Argentine fleet.


SunilTanna,

I don't think so because they knew held an undeniable trump card; SSNs.

The Royal Navy sank one ARA combatant, tugs really don't count, and the ARA spent the rest of the war in port. The Royal Navy accomplished that within one day of the task force's arrival off the Falklands too.

While the war was still ongoing, we were told in training that the RN had been actively shadowing by SSN both of Argentina's naval pincers during the lead up to the events of May 1st and 2nd. We were told that weather conditions; i.e. wind and sea state, had prevented Skyhawk air operations off Vientecinco De Mayo during the 1st and that was known by Britain at the time. We were also told that Britain deliberately choose which ARA major combatant to sink and, when you remember that the shoot order was discussed at the Cabinet level, that rings true.

There were less than 1,200 men aboard Belgrano and 1,300 men plus an air wing aboard Vientecinco De Mayo. If a major combatant had to be sunk, Belgrano would be the better choice. Remember, that decision was made before the Argentine air force and Naval air force proved to be so effective.

After the Argentine land-based air attacks began, targeting the carrier and the Skyhawks she carried is a no-brainer. Before those air attacks occur howeveer, targeting Belgrano is an graduated step in the process of routing the ARA back to it's bases. Sink a smaller number of men, see if that does the trick, and then sink a larger number of men only if necessary. As a First World nation, nuclear power, and possessor of SSNs, Britain could have very chosen to follow such a process against a second tier foe, especially a foe that they admittedly underestimated.

Britain's claims and admissions both during and immediately after the war are suspect, IMHO, because many of them have changed over the last quarter century. The operational presence of ARA San Luis was vehemently denied for years, a possible third torpedo striking one of Belgrano's escorts is seemingly supported by physical evidence, and the actual pre-invasion departure dates of Britian's SSNs weren't known until fairly recently. Even though the presence of SAS troops in Argentina and Chile is now admitted, their actual operations can only be guessed at. I believe we still don't know everything that happened off the Falklands and, given the Official Secrets Act, we might not know for many more decades.

As we know however, they understimated the Argentine air force and Argentine naval air force.

That they did, and they freely and repeatedly admitted it during the war. There's one famous quote about how they could have thought Argentine pilots wouldn't be good when Argentina produces so many excellent race car drivers.


Bill
 
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The fact that the Argentine fleet ran to port after their first loss, is one of the way's the overestimated it. They expected the Argentine navy to be prepared to take heavy losses in a surface battle and passing the SSNs (to which some losses would be inevitable - the Captain of the Belgrano has himself said that he had no possible defense against SSNs because they were fast than him). The fact that Argentine navy wasn't prepared to take these kind of losses, was indeed one way they were overestimated by the British.

The real reason that the Argentine Carrier wasn't sunk, was it was being shadowed before the real shooting started, and peace negotiations were still a possibility. After that it was too late and no opportunity arose.

I don't really see why the presence of the SAS in Chile is relevant to this particular discussion, and in any case has been known about since the mid 80s if not earlier.
 
I don't really see why the presence of the SAS in Chile is relevant to this particular discussion, and in any case has been known about since the mid 80s if not earlier.


SunilTanna,

I brought that up only as an example of information about the war that came out well after the war was over.

Britain is still keeping certain secrets about the war and it's conduct. For example, the admission that the SSNs departed before the South Atlantic before the Argentine landings around Stanley and that at least one of those subs carried SAS troops wasn't made until almost a decade after the war was over.


Bill
 
They were SBS troops, not SAS. And it would have been remiss not to send SSNs, since intelligence was giving indications of possible Argentine aggression. But in any case, I don't believe it was a shocking revelation. It wasn't disclosed for the same reasons Callaghan didn't disclose his 1977 deployments until 1982 (and only then under parliamentary privilege) - the RN doesn't discuss SSN movements generally.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
I find it interesting that the RN of the early eighties period had a really very limited toolkit for surface action in general. They had recently got rid of some ships which would have been useful in a Falklands scenario when they were going for an all-out ASW function as part of NATO North Atlantic.

The *only* major assets they had left that could dictate the terms of a surface battle were the SSN's, which strikes me as putting too much in one basket :eek:

The Royal Navy's main job was to perform ASW in the GIUK Gap and keep the Soviet Navy's SSNs, SSKs, and SSBNs bottled up and unable to break out into the North Atlantic.
So in reality, they were spending cash towards what they thought was the most useful thing.
Also, there were successful administrations that were cutting their budget. The Royal Navy almost didn't even have the Harrier Carriers it had. They didn't have enough money to spend on everything, so they decided to spend money towards one thing. That one thing was not primarily surface warfare.
 
They over-estimated the Argentine fleet. As we know however, they understimated the Argentine air force and Argentine naval air force.

I dunno about that. The air threat was the major threat and the RN knew it - the enemy surface fleet could be countered by SSNs - it's just they had to get on with it with the tools they had. Same with Exocets: the ship-launched ones were not considered the primary threat, for the platform had a very good chance of being neutalised, the main focus was the air-launched ones. It was simply a case of having to do as best one could with the resources one had: very good submarines, promising but limited Sea Wolf point defence frigates, very limited air cover provided by an unproven (oft derided) aircraft, air defence ships that had little anti-missile defence - as very few NATO ships did then - and older vessels pretty much roled for ASW and lacking any decent anti-aircraft defence.

In fact, the Sea Harrier's unexpectedly good performance against (even last-generation) supersonic fighter aircraft rekindled interest in fixed wing aviation and helped lead to modernisation of the Harrier fleet.
 
Yeah but that's like clubbing baby seals. The Yak-38s that made up the Kiev class airwings were poor fighters easy pickings for F-14s or Hornets. Kiev itself packed SSMs IIRC but its going to get sunk before it even gets close. A less one sided blood bath might be a Kuneutoz class which had navalized Flankers are far better platforms to engage the USN fighters with. However could the Su-33s carry ASM?

I'm not sure the Soviet Navy would be trying to take on a carrier group even with the Kuznetsov. The purpose of the Soviet surface navy, if I remember correctly, was mainly to protect the SSBNs in Soviet home waters; trying to take on the US surface navy on the high seas with a single carrier would be pretty suicidal.

Also, if I recall correctly the navalised Flanker is a post-Soviet-Union development. It would have been the Yak Harrier-alike instead, which as you note is probably not going to have a fun time against even a single US carrier.
 
The Sea Eagle was undergoing trails with the Shar, and the aircraft fitted with the control panel for these trials was the first Harrier shot down in the war, IIRC the pilot's name was Glover and it was over West Falkand. There were no operational Sea Eagles in the Falklands, air attacks on the 25DeMayo would have been by iron bombs. The ARA only had 11 Skyhwks altogether, the 25DeMayo only carried 8 Skyhawks, and IIRC only 7 were operational on the 2 days when strikes against the RN were planned.
 
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