After Stalingrad, can the Soviets be slowed/stopped?

Deleted member 1487

For what its worth (probably not all that much) my opinion is that the Germans might have been able to delay the Soviets substantially more than they did, but this requires major changes to their economic management. I tend to agree with ObsessedNuker that things like not doing Kursk, etc. is kind of just shuffling the chairs on the Titanic that might help a little, but not much. They need more resources.

Specifically, they need a Soviet style centrally controlled economy emphasizing mass production. In total, their economy (as I understand it) was actually somewhat larger than the Soviets, and they were spending a similar proportion of GDP on the war effort, but they were getting spectacularly little bang for the buck before 1944 because of so many inefficiencies and redundancies. I don't see that they would do this with Hitler in charge during 1941, because ubermensch, but lets say they do it in 1942 once the fighting in Stalingrad bogs down and it is clear they're not getting the oil fields.

For specific weapons, for God's sake, keep the good old Panzer IV, with the L/48 gun as the sole medium tank until 1944, when the Panther's teething problems can be worked out. It's cheap, reliable, and did very well even late in the war. Then ditch the Tiger tank series. Instead, put the 88mm L/71 gun on an assault gun/tank destroyer, using an existing chassis if possible. Put the resources left over, which should be substantial because of how ridiculously complex the Tigers were, into speeding up the Panther. Its not going to win the war, but it might have something of the effect the OP is looking for.

What all of this really brings out is how little chance the Germans had of making Barbarossa or anything like it work in the context of WW2. The Soviets were simply too advanced. Now, if it had been done earlier in the century, things might have been different. Actually, that sounds like an idea for a TL...:D

The economic issue is heavily muddied by selective stats.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=66&t=201813
Basically the USSR had a much smaller economy by 1942 and didn't recover until 1945 parity with Germany; they focused on a few areas of production to the exclusion of all else and by the end of 1942 their economy was at the point of collapse and it was LL that kept them going and allowed them to outsource much of their production to the US, which delivered not only raw materials and high capacity machine tools of cutting edge technology that was massively labor saving, but also high calorie foods, finished products like trucks, tanks, aircraft, engines, ships, etc. while spending billions of 1940 dollars on building up Siberian and Persian infrastructure to make sure they could get LL to the Soviets.

Germany was screwed due to US and UK strategic bombing. After that the invasions they launched; strategic bombing collapsed the German economy and drew in huge elements of production; by late 1941 around 45% of German military spending was dedicated to combating the Allies and by 1942 it had gotten to over 50% and climbed thereafter. By 1942 on average less than 50% of German AFVs were on the Eastern Front, even if they weren't in combat with the Allies, as much of the AFV strength was held back to guard territory against the Wallies and rebuild units at home, as well as keep a reserve. From 1942 on there was never more than 47% of AFV strength deployed against the Soviet. By 1943 60% of the Luftwaffe on average was deployed against the Wallies. It was really the threat of the über-US production that swamped the Axis and destroyed them; there is simply no way to win the war or get a stalemate in the East because of US production and Wallied strategic bombing collapsing the German economy and with it the ability to produce weapons to fight the Soviets and have enough firepower to stop them. Even in the act of trying to stop the Wallies the Axis spent most of its budget on things to fight them, namely air defense. So raw numbers don't really tell the tale of what's going on in the German economy because so much production was lost due to bombing and dispersion of industry, an issue the Soviets didn't have to cope with after 1942. In fact they got external support for their economy from the moment the war started in 1941 in the form first of purchasing from the US and LL from the British and US, as well as the second fronts. By 1943 it was too late, but there were things the Germans could have done differently to hold up the Soviets far better than the did IOTL and inflict a lot more damage while preserving their forces and avoiding the OTL encirclements (Hitler's orders to stand fast were a major help to the Soviets trying to pull of Cauldron battles).

1 on 1 the Germans could have taken the Soviets and won handily, but with the British in the war its impossible for them to pull off a victory during WW2, but they could get a stalemate; with the US as an active belligerent the Axis is toast in the long run without ASB.

For specific weapons, for God's sake, keep the good old Panzer IV, with the L/48 gun as the sole medium tank until 1944, when the Panther's teething problems can be worked out. It's cheap, reliable, and did very well even late in the war. Then ditch the Tiger tank series. Instead, put the 88mm L/71 gun on an assault gun/tank destroyer, using an existing chassis if possible. Put the resources left over, which should be substantial because of how ridiculously complex the Tigers were, into speeding up the Panther. Its not going to win the war, but it might have something of the effect the OP is looking for.
Fully agree. On all fronts the Pz IV was more than good enough, required less materials, had an effective gun, and having more of them keeps more men and machines alive, plus ensures that there are replacements and spare parts. I was actually thinking about asking that as a POD and did on another forum only to start a massive pissing match between two guys.
Anyway the 88mm Long was put on the Nashorn, which AFAIK worked pretty well. They just didn't have anywhere near enough of them (only ~350 produced IOTL). The Tiger had its uses, but on balance it would be better just to have more Pz IVs and Nashorns in 1943, with the Panther as the heaviest tank in 1944 (with 60mm frontal armor instead of 80 to keep weight down). Having double the number of Pz IVs and Nashorns in 1943 would make a huge difference. Actually looking at the numbers just in terms of weight alone they could have 2.5 times as many Pz IVs in 1943 if they didn't do the Tigers and Panthers; that's not accounting for economies of scale either, so its probably closer to 3 times.
 
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I agree with most of what you said. You make a very good case about the importance of Lend Lease, but I've also come across other people who make the case that it wasn't quite that critical. Regardless, I think Lend Lease falls under what I meant when I said "the context of WW2." In the context of WW2 or anything like it, I don't see a way the WAllies are not going to do L-L, so I treat it as a kind of constant.

About the vehicles, wow, I didn't think it would have quite that effect. If it did, I think they're probably going to have problems fueling all of them.

With regards to inefficiency, and they're being better off with Soviet-style control, even with all of the very real factors you mentioned, the bombing, the blockade, the need to station forces outside of the Eastern Front, etc. they were still able to substantially increase production in 1944 compared to 1943, so I think the point is still at least somewhat valid.

EDIT: Do you have a link to that thread on the other forum? Also, unless the Germans had huge numbers of trained tank crews sitting around unused, I think that crew quality is going to somewhat decline in a situation where they have 3 times the number of AFVs, not that it wouldn't be a lot better overall.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I agree with most of what you said. You make a very good case about the importance of Lend Lease, but I've also come across other people who make the case that it wasn't quite that critical. Regardless, I think Lend Lease falls under what I meant when I said "the context of WW2." In the context of WW2 or anything like it, I don't see a way the WAllies are not going to do L-L, so I treat it as a kind of constant.

About the vehicles, wow, I didn't think it would have quite that effect. If it did, I think they're probably going to have problems fueling all of them.

With regards to inefficiency, and they're being better off with Soviet-style control, even with all of the very real factors you mentioned, the bombing, the blockade, the need to station forces outside of the Eastern Front, etc. they were still able to substantially increase production in 1944 compared to 1943, so I think the point is still at least somewhat valid.
Having read an inordinate amount about LL and the Soviet and British war economies people that argue otherwise really don't know what they're talking about or have bought into Soviet propaganda that tried to downplay the role of LL. You're right that its pretty hard not to get LL at some point unless Britain doesn't stay in the war for some reason, then its possible that it doesn't come into play, but if the US is in the war then LL is happening because its stupid not to do it.

Basically the Germans did somewhat do Soviet style system as the war went on out of necessity, but the big problem was general Nazi political infighting that only started to tapper off in 1942, but had started up again by 1944 when strategic bombing really wrecked the economy; by then it didn't really matter because the economy had collapsed by the end of the year.
 
They were slowed at 3rd Kharkov, though that was more due to being overextended than German military strength. Maybe if the Germans didn't launch Operation Citadel they could have held on for a few months more, but there really wasn't much they could have done, especially with the Red Army starting to find its pace following the recovery from 1941-42. Plus there was the matter of the Western Allied attack in Italy and eventually France.
 
While we're on the subject of a better Barbarossa, I started a thread a few days ago entitled "Yet Another Germans do Better WW2 WI." The idea was that, around mid-1940, the high command had ordered as many factories as possible to switch to producing rail cars fitted to the Soviet gauge, or alternately reverse-engineered one of the Soviet rail cars that came across the border as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop trade. I solicited the opinions of ObsessedNuker and you on how many could be produced and what effect they would have on German logistics. He replied almost immediately and did a very, very good job of convincing me that it wouldn't have made a noticeable difference even it it was possible, but we never were able to establish how many could have been produced. As someone who has read a good deal about the German war economy, what would you say the number is assuming they went with the idea?
 

Deleted member 1487

While we're on the subject of a better Barbarossa, I started a thread a few days ago entitled "Yet Another Germans do Better WW2 WI." The idea was that, around mid-1940, the high command had ordered as many factories as possible to switch to producing rail cars fitted to the Soviet gauge, or alternately reverse-engineered one of the Soviet rail cars that came across the border as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop trade. I solicited the opinions of ObsessedNuker and you on how many could be produced and what effect they would have on German logistics. He replied almost immediately and did a very, very good job of convincing me that it wouldn't have made a noticeable difference even it it was possible, but we never were able to establish how many could have been produced. As someone who has read a good deal about the German war economy, what would you say the number is assuming they went with the idea?

Not sure if they could pull it off reasonably well. It would add all sorts of complications to the supply chain, as you can't have continuous travel then, you'd have to off load at the border and reload it on new trains; that worse than the 'solution' the Germans tried IOTL which was adjustable gauge trains that could be lifted on cranes and converted to the right gauge. Its just FAR more practical to convert the gauge, even if that means having to build more coaling/water stations, add more signalling equipment, etc. vs. having two gauges of trains and running totally foreign equipment. Soviet stuff was also quite old technology and ran on low capacity rails, meaning it wasn't just different width, but bigger equipment of lower quality to use the older rail lines that weren't really modernized. Also given that the Germans were interested in incorporating the East into the rest of Europe's economy its FAR more trouble than its worth to build and operate two different types of rail equipment permanent, so might as well just convert gauge and modernize the whole thing as you go.

Really to do what you suggest you'd need to build totally new factories with the ability to make bigger locomotives and rolling stock, not just wider undercarriage.
 
Thanks for the swift reply. To be clear, I wasn't suggesting doing this instead of converting the rail gauge, but in addition to it, so as to keep the spearheads better supplied in the interim, enabling deeper encirclements, swifter resumption of offensives, etc. In any case, I am now convinced that it is impractical.
 

Deleted member 1487

Thanks for the swift reply. To be clear, I wasn't suggesting doing this instead of converting the rail gauge, but in addition to it, so as to keep the spearheads better supplied in the interim, enabling deeper encirclements, swifter resumption of offensives, etc.
Probably still too much trouble, because they anticipated capturing a lot of Soviet rolling stock as they advanced, which didn't end up happening. So part of the problem besides the economy having too much trouble meeting existing production plans to convert to Soviet locomotive production was that planning, already unrealistic in 1941, anticipating capturing a lot more than the did, so assumed it was unnecessary to do any prep like building special trains.
 
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