Fort Detroit in the early 19th century
The Miami War shook the Upper Country in a time when it was still sorting out just what its identity was. The fallout from the English Wars of Independence had brought peace among the continent’s major powers and recognition of the Upper Country as a single unit. The much smaller Kishwauki War (1822-1825) against Illinois defined its borders and clarified the relationship among the Francophone states. But much was left unsettled when it came to the Upper Country’s internal workings. It was not yet completely clear if the Grand Assembly in Detroit was a true government or a mere meeting of allied, self-governing countries. The governor, though chosen by the Assembly, still had to go to Quebec to confirm his position. Much of his power was military as the commander of Fort Detroit. He ruled his local domain of Detroit Country with nearly unchecked power; the old French paternalistic government was still basically in force there. The Miami War revealed the inherent conflict between the governor’s statewide and local roles. It also revealed that the structure of the Upper Country was fragile and inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population.
The conflict grew from the undefined boundaries between the constituent countries of the Pays-d’en-Haut. Sanduskey Country was simply defined as the largely English settlements around the bay and the islands. Did it extend up the shore a little? Who knew? It was not urgent when the population was small, but as the population of English and Mixed people grew and spread, the question became an important one. Likewise, Detroit country certainly included the land around Lake St. Clair and the newer settlements down on Lake Erie, but whether it extended farther was an open question. The lively Mixed town of Kekionga (*Ft. Wayne) was located at the forks of the river Miami-du-Lac and no one was sure how far downriver it extended.
The lower Miami-du-Lac and Miami Bay were thus located between three major clusters of settlements who all had reason to think of the area as their own natural backyard. By the 1820s it was becoming clear that it would be an important crossroads for trade and a big source of income for whoever controlled it. The three adjacent parts of the Upper Country began to compete to be the one that would have it.
So all three constituent countries made moves to get the land. They commissioned traders to build fortified posts at or near the mouth of the river. Militia came in to man the forts. There was no artillery - the separate towns could hardly afford that - but there were plenty of muskets and ammunition, and some of them were used to intimidate or attack the other side. There is no clear date when the “war” began, but parts of the Miami-du-Lac and western Lake Erie were decidedly unsafe by the the 1836 trading season.
The war’s only real offensive came at its climax in the spring of 1838. The key figure was Rémi Taschereau, member of a prominent Canadien family who had had an impressive military career in the Great Lakes. He had become Governor of the Upper Country five years earlier and therefore was also commander at Detroit. He agreed with the Detroit merchants that Miami-du-Lac was important to the town's interests. He also saw the actions of the Kekiongans and Sanduskeymen as an affront to his authority as governor. Taschereau resolved to drive them out of the area by force, occupy the Miami-du-Lac area, and use his authority to goad the state assembly into approving the new status quo.
Tashereau’s campaign was preceded by a delegation to the Kekiongans and Sanduskeymen with official orders to abandon their trading posts. The traders and militia did not quite know what to make of this, since the Upper Country’s governor had never ruled by decree outside of Detroit Country. Soon after came the Detroit Militia in two sloops and several dozen canoes, led by Tashereau. They quickly stormed the blockhouses of their rivals, who mostly fled at the approach of such a large armed force. But the attack had the effect of uniting the other two sides in the three-way rivalry. The Sanduskey militia joined the Kekiongans in paddling upstream to a defensible position at the fork of the Miami-du-Lac and the Glaise Rivers, where there sat an abandoned fort. They quickly dug in, reinforced by new militia companies called up from Kekionga. John Gibbs took command, a soldier of mixed Scottish, French, and Indian origin typical of the Mixed leadership in Kekionga. He enthusiastically re-declared the fort’s old name, Fort Defiance. By the time Taschereau and his men arrived, Gibbs was ready for them. The defenders of the fort threw back the first attack. Taschereau had no choice but to withdraw to the mouth of the river, having occupied the land that was his objective but failed to defeat the rival forces outright.
By then, delegates to the Grand Assembly were gathering in Detroit. Taschereau knew that the assembly could not begin proceedings without him, and he hoped to delay it until he could establish more firmly Detroit’s military control of the Miami-du-Lac. He sent word to his lieutenant, Pierre Jalbert, to send additional men. Most of the delegates in Detroit, however, were outraged at the heavy-handed way that Taschereau was acting. They met outdoors, in front of the fort and the newly built hall of assembly, and began to hold an extralegal session, speaking forcefully against the governor’s actions. Jalbert was unwilling to arrest en masse the leaders of the entire Upper Country, so the delegates continued meeting. The situation in Detroit was so tense, furthermore, that Jalbert feared that if he sent additional men to the Miami-du-Lac, he might lose control of the town entirely. Taschereau raged against his lieutenant’s inaction, but it probably kept the Upper Country from erupting into full-blown rebellion.
The delegates sent an appeal to Canada, whose judicial council still served as the court of last resort for the Upper Country. Canada ordered both Taschereau and Gibbs to stand down and the militia to disband. In a related ruling, they declared that the lower Miami-du-Lac valley was to be neutral territory subject directly to the state government of the Upper Country; the Grand Assembly was left to draw the borders with more specificity. The governor, afraid to return to Detroit, went to Montreal to account for his actions.
The crisis in Miami-du-Lac showed the serious need to reform the Upper Country’s institutions. First and foremost, the city and country of Detroit needed local governments separate from the governorship. Next, the powers of the Grand Assembly to make state laws had to be made clearer. Finally, the powers of militia had to be taken away from the individual towns and regions and made subject to the Upper Country’s civil government. The reforms passed over the next two years helped the Upper Country transform from a frontier alliance into a modern state.
The Miami War actually helped to create a more united Upper Country identity. Earlier it had been feared that largely Anglophone Sanduskey would eventually leave the state and join with Upper Connecticut, and the fact that it had sent no men to the Kishwauki War had fed those fears; but the Miami War confirmed its loyalty to the Pays-d’en-Haut, despite differences in language. Likewise Kekionga, in many ways tied more to the Ohio than to the Great Lakes, earned the sympathy of the lakeshore settlements and solidified its political and social ties to the rest of the state.
The rival trading posts at the mouth of the Miami-du-Lac were consolidated into one, termed Great Miami, which was under the direct authority of the state and the Grand Assembly. The town that took shape around it grew into an important commercial and industrial city, taking its name from the post. In 1862 it became the seat of its own country government, which it remains today.