Admiral Richardson Remains US Pacific Fleet CIC

So no PH attack by Japan.[/QUOTE]
Once again the Japanese wanted to weaken the US, so they would have attacked all the bases they could.
 
Tizoc

That may be true for the planned construction but at the moment the USN has 15BB and 6CV and a number of the chief commanders see the former as the core of the fleet. Think it was planned than in the event of a war with Japan the advance westwards would have the battle-fleet at its core and the CVs would be used individually for scouting in support of the fleet.

Even after the planned construction had been completed the total number of BBs would have exceeded the number of CVs, presuming no losses.

Steve

Not trying to dis Steve here, but his post is a useful starting point for making a few points about the USN of 1941/42.

First off the US strategy for a Pacific war was to lay back for 12-18 months and not seek decisive battle until the massive construction program underway had provided the fleet with a batch of new ships. Aside from the battle ships & Essex class carriers there was the most critical component, the fleet train, or logistics ships intended to act as mobile bases. The idea was to rapidly turn undeveloped anchorages into forward naval bases in a few weeks or months, rather than requiring many months or a year+ to build complete ashore facilities.

This strategy had been developed and refined for over two decades. The USN had been contemplating War Plan Orange since 1905-10. Annual wargames, at sea and on the map tested a wide variety of variations and alternative strategies. One consistent result of these exercises was the problems of a 'Early Offensive' were throughly revealed. The logistics problems for a extended Pacific offensive were shown over and over, as was the necessity to modernize the fleet to the maximum extent before starting any serious offensive.

Until this new fleet was ready the USN plan was to aggresively raid and probe. While large scale decisive engagements were to be avoided opportunities to attrition or otherwise damamge the Japanese navy were to be sought. For a raiding strategy to work at least one significant base was needed beyond the US west coast. Oahu had long been developed as that base. In OTL New Zealand and to a less extent Australia also served the USN as Pacific raiding bases during 1942-43 before the main offensive went forward.

The US Pacific fleet had been based for extended periods at Oahu for two decades. The withdrawl to the US west coast in the mid 1930s had several reasons beyond a Depresion era cost saving action. The desire to return the main fleet to Oahu in 1940 had to do with supporting the fundamental US strategy in War Plan Orange.

Each USN admiral had his own idea of what the details of WPO might be. Some were more aggresive, some less. Some thought Oahu central to WPO, others thought it just one of several Pacific bases. Some thought the big offensive should be launched as soon as the US fleet had a small numerical superiority, others thought to wait until a huge superiority was had. No single admiral agreed completely with the official version of WPO & those who led in WWII, from King to Nimitz & others, had some heated arguments over the actual execution.

I have read little or nothing about the reasons for Richardsons reassingment. I do know Roosevelt prefered aggresive admirals like King or Halsey. If Richardson had been less than ethusiastic about putting WPO forward then Roosevelt may have become a bit impatient with it.
 
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Paul V McNutt said:
Once again the Japanese wanted to weaken the US, so they would have attacked all the bases they could.
They wouldn't. The idea was to prevent interference by the Fleet. Attacking bases presupposes a long war, which Japan expected not to happen.
 
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If the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor WITHOUT te fleet being based there, they might even inflict more damage than i nOTL to the US Navy. Not by sinking ships, but by wrecking the support facilities.

If thevJapanese manage to shoot up the subs support base and set the tank farm ablaze, the US Navy might have more difficulties projecting power early in the war than in OTL.
 

GarethC

Donor
A few barely-related points:

1) Aircraft
One of the biggest impacts of the PH attack was the neutralization of the USAAF in the Pacific (well, that and the calamity of the FEAF a few hours later). The loss of hundreds of planes (including IIRC all the medium bombers) is an enormous advantage to Japan, because those are the forces which are (relatively) easily deployable. Without the attacks on the PH airfields, at least some of those aircraft could have been diverted to Wake or the Philippines. Instead, it was left to the navy and marines to manage the air war alone for some months.

Even if there is no fleet at PH, the possibility of destroying the airforce-in-being makes it a valuable target; how much of the air presence on Dec 7th was there because the Pacific Fleet was there as well?

2) Japanese doctrine
Pearl was attacked to sink the US fleet, because the premise (wrongly, but there you go) on which the southern strategy rested was that the destruction of the in-theater force would lead to a capitulation by FDR, and (correctly) that the chance for such a victory was slipping away after the Vinson-Walsh Act set out to pay for a really really big navy.

It's pretty much a Mahanian Decisive Battle with some clever bells and whistles tacked on. The IJN battle line existed to sink the USN battle line - preferably after a lot of torpedoes (from both land-based and carrier aircraft, submarines, and destroyers-at-night) had whittled it down a bit.

If the fleet's not at Pearl and thus not vulnerable to the post-Taranto in-port carrier strike, the IJN endgame is still going to be based around it's prior doctrine of getting the USN to sail all the way to the PI, being torpedoed all the way, until what's left meets Yamato et al and makes a new set of reefs there.

That points to the IJN strategy not just being to neutralize the PI as the source of a threat to the SLOC to the DEI, but also to take all the islands they can reach (Wake, Midway, plus the southern ones like Rabaul) in order to provide bases for non-capital unit forces and similarly to deny the US bases for land-based air cover for the Pacific Fleet battle line.

3) PI response.
MacArthur is in command of the US presence. I cannot imagine his formidable political acumen being turned towards any end other than to ensure that any Japanese attack on the Philippines is turned into an career-enhancing opportunity for Mac - which means having, and winning, a short, victorious war, preferably with pithy quotes, good newsreel footage, and some nice live broadcasts with Edward Murrow on the way to the White House.
 
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I always thought Richardsons objection to basing out of Pearl was his view that the Fleet could not fulfill its essentially aggressive deterrence role because it would be spending all its effort defending its own base.

Him being in command implies that his view prevails.

One of two consequences, not deploying forward as stated AND accepting that Japan will not be deterred, the other is improved base defences at Pearl including patrol, ASW, air defence.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I always thought Richardsons objection to basing out of Pearl was his view that the Fleet could not fulfill its essentially aggressive deterrence role because it would be spending all its effort defending its own base.

Him being in command implies that his view prevails.

One of two consequences, not deploying forward as stated AND accepting that Japan will not be deterred, the other is improved base defences at Pearl including patrol, ASW, air defence.


Two part objection.

Basing in Hawaii did not make sense because there was not enough fuel and ammo to conduct plan orange. At the time he was relieved, there was enough fuel to sail to Truk, fight for a few hours, then come home. Out of fuel and ammo when you come back to Pearl. He wanted to wait until the logistics were fixed.

As to Pearl, if you sink a ship in channel, the fleet is trapped. This is why he based the fleet on the Big Island.
 
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