It is 1025, and Basil II the Bulgar-Slayer has died. Unlike in OTL, he has capable successors--several "Good Emperors"--in command of his 250,000-man army over the next few decades. During the reigns of these powerful emperors, the Eastern Roman Empire destroys most of its rivals, playing them off against one another as the Roman Emperors were so keen to do. By the 1200s, the entire Mediterranean basin is ruled from Constantinople, and Mare Nostrum is restored. But this time, Greeks are in command.

In a scenario like this, how do the Byzantines administrate their western territories? Would they be granted to exarchs? Strategoi? Dukes? Feudal lords?

Would the feudal structures of the west be maintained for a few decades, while divide and conquer strategies are used to destroy the power of local lords and build up imperial power? Or would the nature of governance in areas like Italy, Spain, and France become more imperial than feudal as soon as Byzantine rule extends to those areas?

Would the resurgent Byzantines be able to prevent the Great Schism and reconcile the differences between the Western and Eastern churches? Perhaps if the Holy Roman Emperor tried to gain undue power in Italy, against the wishes of the Pope, so the Pope actually tries to appease the Eastern Emperor? (In fact, calling the First Crusade was partially inspired by a desire to improve relations with Byzantium, to act as a balance against the reckless Normans).

Is it more likely that the expansion of the Byzantines would lead to western rulers trying to gain the favor of the powerful eastern Emperor, either to oppose the Holy Roman Emperor or to retain their privileges against a steadily expanding Roman Empire? Or would the Catholics band together against Orthodoxy, leading to a more violent schism and a religious war?

How would Byzantines treat Romance languages and Church Latin?
 
How do the Byzantines manage to gain control of the entire Iberian Mediterranean coastline, in addition to the entirety of southern France, in a span of 200 years? I can see with capable rulers them gaining control of much of Italy, the Levant, and even Egypt and North Africa again, but I don't see how any conquests in southern france and Iberia would be anything but fleeting.
 
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Deleted member 67076

Byzantine Grand Strategy at the time was not move slowly and thoroughly, so its very unlikely you'd get wide sweeping conquests in 200 years.

Also, they wouldn't focus on the Western Mediterranean much; they'd attempt to go for Egypt and the Levant, the wealthiest and most populated regions near them. After that, Italy and Tunisia.

France and Spain were far off, and comparatively poor.

As for how new regions tended to be run, feudalism would end. The Byzantines had a habit of uprooting local administration and traditions and replacing it with their own (alongside sending settlers to the region if they found it of particular interest).

For the Great Schism, it depends more on the timing of the conquest than anything, but I do think you could reasonably prevent it.

Regional languages would not be discriminated, but they would be sidelined in favor of Greek as the administrative language.
 
How do the Byzantines managed to gain control of the entire Iberian Mediterranean coastline, in addition to the entirety of southern France, in a span of 200 years? I can see with capable rulers them gaining control of much of Italy, the Levant, and even Egypt and North Africa again, but I don't see how any conquests in southern france and Iberia would be anything but fleeting.

The Roman Republic and early Empire conquered the Mediterranean in about 200 years, so it's not impossible.

If the Byzantines retain the massive, reformed and diversified army built by Basil II, which numbered 180,000-300,000 depending on estimate, then they have a military advantage over every one of their foes in manpower and materiel. The Fatimid Caliphate and Ghaznavids/later Seljuq Empire were both decentralized and hated each other, while the Normans would never have become a serious threat if Sicily was united and firmly under Byzantine control.

Numerically, Western European feudal armies would have been a joke compared to a unified Byzantine assault, raising armies an order of magnitude smaller. France was very decentralized, and most likely, by the time a resurgent Roman Empire would try to invade it, would be at war with England as OTL. If the French weren't embroiled in war with England, they might be at war with vassals of the Holy Roman Empire or with Andalusian taifas, which would also be easy for the Byzantines to exploit.

If the Almoravids rise as OTL, they will be the strongest enemy of the Byzantines, but the Greeks could get the allegiance of the Christian dukes and kings in Iberia against them. If the taifas remain divided and the Almoravids don't unite the area, then the Greeks could conquer the taifas one by one. The Christian Iberian states would be easy to deal with from there, with the exception of Vasconia/Navarra/Pamplona who have a geographical advantage.
 
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I can't see Byzantium at the time actually holding much of what they'd get. Anything outside of, say, Italy would likely be ephemeral and lapse back to local authorities within a couple of decades, as you might expect from a power that's overextended itself. I'm not sure the ERE of the time really has the capacity to conquer its way across Europe anymore with the POD we're talking about.
 
Also, they wouldn't focus on the Western Mediterranean much; they'd attempt to go for Egypt and the Levant, the wealthiest and most populated regions near them. After that, Italy and Tunisia.

This is a fine description of grand strategy under, say, John Tzimiskes or Nikephoros Phokas, but not for Basil II, whose intervention in the east was mostly restricted to a maintenance and consolidation of the status quo. The Fatimids handed Basil a number of perfectly good casus belli, like interfering in the ostensibly Byzantine vassal state of Aleppo and desecrating the Holy Sepulcher, but no serious military response was forthcoming. As we know, at the end of his life Basil turned his attention not to the East, but to Sicily. The claim that the Byzantines would have by their nature been more interested in the Levant/Egypt than Italy is not borne out by the facts.

Basil worked hard to crush the power and influence of the great eastern "military families." All the major usurpers (attempted and successful) during his life - Nikephoros Phokas, John Tzimiskes, Bardas Phokas, and Bardas Skleros - were military men originating from or strongly linked to Anatolia who rose to prominence on the basis of their military power and accomplishments in the east. By the time Basil was dead, the Phokades and other such military families had been greatly humbled or destroyed over a series of rebellions and land reform measures. These men represented an aggressive, eastern-focused military policy, and by the time Basil dies there's really nobody to carry the banner of that policy.

It's possible that Basil's hypothetical successor would abruptly change gears and target the Levant for expansion, but it's just as likely, if not more so, that Basil's European-oriented policy continues, in which case southern Italy and Sicily are the new military priorities of the empire. In the mid-11th century the Zirids of Tunisia turn their back on the Fatimids and shortly thereafter get mauled by the Bedouin; assuming that still happens on schedule and Sicily is Byzantine by then, you might see imperial intervention there. I don't think it's likely, but it's not the worst idea in the world.

Of course, the original question is "how would they administer it all." I can't really speak much to that, but as far as the Pope goes I will say that the mid-11th century is not such a bad time for the Byzantines to become heavily involved in Roman politics considering the regency of Henry IV. I do not, however, think the Pope is very likely to become a willing subordinate to Constantinople as in former times. More likely, you're going to see a peninsular tug-of-war between the two empires, and the popes - who never want anyone with firm control over Italy - are going to switch sides as needed to avoid being subjugated by either one. Unless the Byzantines just go hog wild and mop the floor with the Germans all over Italy, the best they are likely to get is a firm control over the south (which would be ruled in the traditional thematic style), loose influence over Rome, and maybe some independent-minded allies/clients in central/north Italy. Think late 12th century Italy (post-Legnano) except with the Greeks in the south instead of the Normans.
 
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The Roman Republic and early Empire conquered the Mediterranean in about 200 years, so it's not impossible.
Yes, and under vastly different geopolitical circumstances. Stretching merely as far as Justinian did in the 6th century political climate dangerously overstretched the empire then. The Byzantine Empire of the 11th century doesn't have anywhere near the resources and power projection the Empire of Justinian's time did. To say nothing of the fact that European states were more developed than they were then as well.

If the Byzantines retain the massive, reformed and diversified army built by Basil II, which numbered 180,000-300,000 depending on estimate, then they have a military advantage over every one of their foes in manpower and materiel. The Fatimid Caliphate and Ghaznavids/later Seljuq Empire were both decentralized and hated each other, while the Normans would never have become a serious threat if Sicily was united and firmly under Byzantine control.
That army has to be split up across several contentious frontiers.

Numerically, Western European feudal armies would have been a joke compared to a unified Byzantine assault, raising armies an order of magnitude smaller. France was very decentralized, and most likely, by the time a resurgent Roman Empire would try to invade it, would be at war with England as OTL. If the French weren't embroiled in war with England, they might be at war with vassals of the Holy Roman Empire or with Andalusian taifas, which would also be easy for the Byzantines to exploit.
It's easy to exploit geopolitical rivalries, but much harder to turn that into lasting conquests in places like Spain and southern France. More importantly, there's not much reason why the Byzantines would want such territory that would be much costlier to maintain control of than to just attempt to play their enemies in the region off each other.

If the Almoravids rise as OTL, they will be the strongest enemy of the Byzantines, but the Greeks could get the allegiance of the Christian dukes and kings in Iberia against them. If the taifas remain divided and the Almoravids don't unite the area, then the Greeks could conquer the taifas one by one. The Christian Iberian states would be easy to deal with from there, with the exception of Vasconia/Navarra/Pamplona who have a geographical advantage.
The Christian states of Spain were as often at war with themselves as they were with the Moors. The chances of them willingly giving up their sovereignty to an empire on the opposite side of the Mediterranean is almost 0. The chances of the Byzantines being able or willing to conquer them is also 0.
 
I must note that for the ERE to have any chance of major conquests like in the Roman days,they need major military advancements in doctrine and in weapory,just like the days of the old republic.
 
This is a fine description of grand strategy under, say, John Tzimiskes or Nikephoros Phokas, but not for Basil II, whose intervention in the east was mostly restricted to a maintenance and consolidation of the status quo. The Fatimids handed Basil a number of perfectly good casus belli, like interfering in the ostensibly Byzantine vassal state of Aleppo and desecrating the Holy Sepulcher, but no serious military response was forthcoming. As we know, at the end of his life Basil turned his attention not to the East, but to Sicily. The claim that the Byzantines would have by their nature been more interested in the Levant/Egypt than Italy is not borne out by the facts.

Basil worked hard to crush the power and influence of the great eastern "military families." All the major usurpers (attempted and successful) during his life - Nikephoros Phokas, John Tzimiskes, Bardas Phokas, and Bardas Skleros - were military men originating from or strongly linked to Anatolia who rose to prominence on the basis of their military power and accomplishments in the east. By the time Basil was dead, the Phokades and other such military families had been greatly humbled or destroyed over a series of rebellions and land reform measures. These men represented an aggressive, eastern-focused military policy, and by the time Basil dies there's really nobody to carry the banner of that policy.

It's possible that Basil's hypothetical successor would abruptly change gears and target the Levant for expansion, but it's just as likely, if not more so, that Basil's European-oriented policy continues, in which case southern Italy and Sicily are the new military priorities of the empire. In the mid-11th century the Zirids of Tunisia turn their back on the Fatimids and shortly thereafter get mauled by the Bedouin; assuming that still happens on schedule and Sicily is Byzantine by then, you might see imperial intervention there. I don't think it's likely, but it's not the worst idea in the world.

Of course, the original question is "how would they administer it all." I can't really speak much to that, but as far as the Pope goes I will say that the mid-11th century is not such a bad time for the Byzantines to become heavily involved in Roman politics considering the regency of Henry IV. I do not, however, think the Pope is very likely to become a willing subordinate to Constantinople as in former times. More likely, you're going to see a peninsular tug-of-war between the two empires, and the popes - who never want anyone with firm control over Italy - are going to switch sides as needed to avoid being subjugated by either one. Unless the Byzantines just go hog wild and mop the floor with the Germans all over Italy, the best they are likely to get is a firm control over the south (which would be ruled in the traditional thematic style), loose influence over Rome, and maybe some independent-minded allies/clients in central/north Italy. Think late 12th century Italy (post-Legnano) except with the Greeks in the south instead of the Normans.

Actually Basil II did respond to the Fatimid invasion of Aleppo, pushing the Fatimids away from Aleppo, and then attacked Tripoli and Tartus, occupying Tartus. I would call that a serious military response. Basil just didn't want to turn that response into a full-on invasion.

Of course, it does show that Basil II wasn't really interested in expanding south or east except to establish a defensible border. But I don't think that precludes his successor from attempting the same. Once Sicily, Salerno, and Naples fall to the Byzantines, there is no immediate reason to expand further in Italy. Like you said, there would be a peninsular-tug-of-war between the Holy Romans and the Byzantines.

(However, I don't think that Byzantine rule over Sicily would be thematic. Basil II was constantly trying to decrease his reliance on thematic reserves and increase reliance on tagmata, starting a trend that would culminate in the more mercenary focused later Byzantine empire. This was bad for the not-so-capable OTL emperors who created the conditions for defeat at Manzikert, but became a good thing for the Komnenians, and would be a good thing for a hypothetical, capable Macedonian emperor succeeding Basil II.)

Once Byzantine control over southern Italy has been solidified, there is only one sensible direction to expand, and that is south into the Fatimid Caliphate--which gradually became weaker and weaker as the 11th century progressed. Aleppo was consistently a point of tension, such as in 1030 during Romanus III's reign, and war with the declining Fatimids would occur no matter what. The question is whether Basil II's successor would turn this war into an opportunity for expansion. Because of the wealth of the Byzantine treasury and size of the army after Basil II's reign, such a task would seem pretty doable for "Basil III" or "Constantine IX", and also a way to bring new wealth into the empire and more prestige and respect to the emperor who could now prove his worth after his accession.

Also Sicily was theoretically a protectorate of the Fatimids, so the conflict could start even earlier. At that point it would be a two front war, which would be a more difficult challenge for the Greeks, but they could forestall the annexation of Sicily and send the bulk of their forces into the Levant--and in 1025, the Fatimids were fighting a Bedouin rebellion, diverting their strength.

Yes, and under vastly different geopolitical circumstances. Stretching merely as far as Justinian did in the 6th century political climate dangerously overstretched the empire then.

And Justinian also had the misfortune of 1/4 of the population of the empire dying to plague, as well as the Gothic War taking 20 years. Even then, significant parts of Justinian's conquests in Italy and Africa survived for decades to centuries after his death.

The Byzantine Empire of the 11th century doesn't have anywhere near the resources and power projection the Empire of Justinian's time did.

Basil II's empire had less resources, but it was also far more self-sufficient, not relying on Egyptian grain and wealth like Justinian's empire. Basil II was also not reliant on a Belisarius but led most of his own campaigns.

Justinian had greater power projection at sea, but I think on land, the two empires are equitable. Basil II's army may actually have been larger, as well, and probably had better cavalry.

To say nothing of the fact that European states were more developed than they were then as well.

Before the printing press, more developed states tend to be easier for empires to conquer and hold, rather than the other way around. Conquering a more developed area brings new wealth and power to an empire, conquering a less developed area means it has to be built up and is probably an expense for the empire. This is why the Roman conquest of Carthage catapulted the Republic's rise, while the decline of the West caused a lapse of imperial power.

Justinian's reconquest of Italy was a drain on the empire not because the logistics of taking Italy (in fact the strait of Otranto is only 45 miles wide), but because after multiple sacks of Rome, the fall of imperial power in the west, and 20 years of war with the Goths, Italy was no longer a wealthy prize for the empire but an expensive territory to maintain.

Of course, invading wealthy polities is generally more difficult for an empire, even if holding them is easier. But in 1025, the Byzantines were stronger financially and militarily than all of their rivals, and any country in the Mediterranean region. So despite the fact that their enemies were (arguably) stronger than the enemies of the Roman Republic and early Empire, the power disparity is about the same.

That army has to be split up across several contentious frontiers.

Yes but the Byzantines were willing to recruit non-Greeks. The army would expand as the empire does.

It's easy to exploit geopolitical rivalries, but much harder to turn that into lasting conquests in places like Spain and southern France. More importantly, there's not much reason why the Byzantines would want such territory that would be much costlier to maintain control of than to just attempt to play their enemies in the region off each other.

Spain and southern France were actually very wealthy at this time. Not as much as Anatolia, southern Italy, or Egypt, but there was definitely a lot to gain by taking Cordoba, Barcelona, or Languedoc.

The Christian states of Spain were as often at war with themselves as they were with the Moors. The chances of them willingly giving up their sovereignty to an empire on the opposite side of the Mediterranean is almost 0. The chances of the Byzantines being able or willing to conquer them is also 0.

I didn't mean that the Christian states of Spain would swear fealty to the emperor (at least at first), but rather that the Byzantines would ally with them to attack the Moors. After building a center of power in Iberia (this would be at least a century after Basil II's death, and half a century after no Manzikert), they could then divide and conquer the northern Christian states, maybe making one or two of them into favored client kingdoms while conquering the others.

Logistically it is no more difficult than the Roman or Umayyad conquests of Hispania; Rome was facing a largely tribal Iberia, while the Umayyads had their center of power in Damascus and had yet to perform any naval invasions.
 
I confess I have a difficult time seeing how you manage to have the ERE stomp across the Mediterranean without the Pope raising a couple of eyebrows.

A POD of 1020ish is probably a little late to avert the Great Schism. A militant Byzantium targeting the west probably just makes it worse and puts into play the prospect of the Pope declaring the ERE heretical and a fair target. Suddenly the Great Schism is an armed religious war between the Romes over matters of religious doctrine.
 
Actually Basil II did respond to the Fatimid invasion of Aleppo, pushing the Fatimids away from Aleppo, and then attacked Tripoli and Tartus, occupying Tartus. I would call that a serious military response. Basil just didn't want to turn that response into a full-on invasion.

The invasion of the 990s was responded to, but further Fatimid interference was largely unanswered. The Emir of Aleppo subsequently recognized Fatimid suzerainty, and when the evicted Hamdanid emir (a Byzantine client/ally) attempted to regain the city, the Byzantines merely encouraged other local Arab vassal states to support him; he failed and fled to Antioch. The Fatimids then directly occupied Aleppo in 1016, to which Basil's response was... a trade embargo.

Once Byzantine control over southern Italy has been solidified, there is only one sensible direction to expand, and that is south into the Fatimid Caliphate--which gradually became weaker and weaker as the 11th century progressed. Aleppo was consistently a point of tension, such as in 1030 during Romanus III's reign, and war with the declining Fatimids would occur no matter what. The question is whether Basil II's successor would turn this war into an opportunity for expansion. Because of the wealth of the Byzantine treasury and size of the army after Basil II's reign, such a task would seem pretty doable for "Basil III" or "Constantine IX", and also a way to bring new wealth into the empire and more prestige and respect to the emperor who could now prove his worth after his accession.

I think the problem with this view is that by the 1050s, you have the Seljuks posing a serious threat to the eastern frontier. Once the Seljuks are on the scene, action against the Fatimids is foolhardy - they're the only major power in the middle east that doesn't fall under the Turkish tide, and they are actively engaged in fighting the very same Seljuks who are menacing Armenia and Anatolia. Even if we assume that "Basil III" is maximally capable in matters both military and domestic, I doubt he'd countenance war against the Fatimids then; it would be an obvious strategic blunder. So he has at most a 30 year window - to conquer Italy and Sicily, play around a little with the Pope and the Germans, and then launch a major offensive (or, more likely, a series of offensives) against the Fatimids is pushing the timetable. It probably assumes that everything else goes right, and in Byzantine history (or anyone's history, really) foreign events rarely give you a decades-long breather to go about your business as you please.

The best chance for post-1025 Levant reconquest is if "Basil III" turns out to be Super-tzimskes. I think that would be a somewhat unlikely reversal of Basil's policy of weakening the Anatolian military class and the eastern themes - eastern expansion makes these troublesome forces stronger, not weaker - but since there's no accounting for imperial taste, I'm willing to consider that he might try it. Tzimskes got very nearly to Jerusalem in no more than 7 years of rule, so I'm sure Supertzimskes can do it in 30. The question then is whether these conquests prove ephemeral once the Byzantines are fighting both the Fatimids and Seljuks at once (unless the Byzantines are by this time already masters of Egypt, but that seems a bit too far to me, even for Supertzimskes).

IMO, the most convincing way to do all this is to backdate your POD so as to get rid of Basil II entirely. Yes, his reputation is great, but he wasn't always a golden god of warfare (especially early on - Gates of Trajan?). Have Bardas Skleros succeed in his rebellion after the death of John Tzimiskes - he's plenty capable as a commander and maybe even does a better job against the Bulgarians than young Basil. Now you've got the empire back in the hands of the eastern generals; toss the Macedonians in the dustbin of history and continue the line of "general-emperors" with the Skleroi, Phokades, and so on, whose power base is in Anatolia and who want nothing more than to mess with the Fatimids at every opportunity. You are thereby spared nearly 50 years of Basil's rule in which his eastern policy is pretty much just holding the line, though increased attention to the east may mean that Bulgaria survives in some form to make trouble another day.
 
The invasion of the 990s was responded to, but further Fatimid interference was largely unanswered. The Emir of Aleppo subsequently recognized Fatimid suzerainty, and when the evicted Hamdanid emir (a Byzantine client/ally) attempted to regain the city, the Byzantines merely encouraged other local Arab vassal states to support him; he failed and fled to Antioch. The Fatimids then directly occupied Aleppo in 1016, to which Basil's response was... a trade embargo.

I think the problem with this view is that by the 1050s, you have the Seljuks posing a serious threat to the eastern frontier. Once the Seljuks are on the scene, action against the Fatimids is foolhardy - they're the only major power in the middle east that doesn't fall under the Turkish tide, and they are actively engaged in fighting the very same Seljuks who are menacing Armenia and Anatolia. Even if we assume that "Basil III" is maximally capable in matters both military and domestic, I doubt he'd countenance war against the Fatimids then; it would be an obvious strategic blunder. So he has at most a 30 year window - to conquer Italy and Sicily, play around a little with the Pope and the Germans, and then launch a major offensive (or, more likely, a series of offensives) against the Fatimids is pushing the timetable. It probably assumes that everything else goes right, and in Byzantine history (or anyone's history, really) foreign events rarely give you a decades-long breather to go about your business as you please.

The best chance for post-1025 Levant reconquest is if "Basil III" turns out to be Super-tzimskes. I think that would be a somewhat unlikely reversal of Basil's policy of weakening the Anatolian military class and the eastern themes - eastern expansion makes these troublesome forces stronger, not weaker - but since there's no accounting for imperial taste, I'm willing to consider that he might try it. Tzimskes got very nearly to Jerusalem in no more than 7 years of rule, so I'm sure Supertzimskes can do it in 30. The question then is whether these conquests prove ephemeral once the Byzantines are fighting both the Fatimids and Seljuks at once (unless the Byzantines are by this time already masters of Egypt, but that seems a bit too far to me, even for Supertzimskes).

IMO, the most convincing way to do all this is to backdate your POD so as to get rid of Basil II entirely. Yes, his reputation is great, but he wasn't always a golden god of warfare (especially early on - Gates of Trajan?). Have Bardas Skleros succeed in his rebellion after the death of John Tzimiskes - he's plenty capable as a commander and maybe even does a better job against the Bulgarians than young Basil. Now you've got the empire back in the hands of the eastern generals; toss the Macedonians in the dustbin of history and continue the line of "general-emperors" with the Skleroi, Phokades, and so on, whose power base is in Anatolia and who want nothing more than to mess with the Fatimids at every opportunity. You are thereby spared nearly 50 years of Basil's rule in which his eastern policy is pretty much just holding the line, though increased attention to the east may mean that Bulgaria survives in some form to make trouble another day.

Well, I think the importance of imperial finances is being understated here. Yes, there are commanders who are better than Basil II on a purely tactical level. But as an emperor Basil II had many other strengths other than his above average military skill. Rather, it was Basil's astuteness and pragmatic administration, which increased the size of the Byzantine treasury to 14.4 million nomismata (200,000 pounds of gold), earning 5.9-7.0 million nomismata annually. More money means a stronger empire, especially since the Byzantines loved to use mercenaries in their armies.

And Basil's other great advantage was his respect for the common people of the empire, soldiers and smallholding farmers. By lowering taxes on the farmers who provided most of his supplies and served as most of his army, he made the 90% of the population that was his true power base love him--as opposed to the Skleroi and Phokades who were by and large just a threat. Also, the GDP per capita of the Byzantine Empire during Basil II's reign was higher than ever in the Byzantine Empire's history, and higher than any state in the world at the time.

Sure, having a strong aristocracy would make the frontiers stronger in times of defensive war. But it also increases the risk of the emperor being overthrown or becoming a puppet, and leads to a large drain on the treasury that could be better used to build fortifications, churches, monuments, roads, ships, and many other things. The theme system was good for the retracting empire devastated by iconoclastic controversies and raids from the Caliphate, but by this point had become an outdated system only useful for very local defense.

In fact, I would even argue that Bardas Skleros or a Phokas would be much worse at expansion than Basil, despite military skill. Sure, they might win a few extra victories on the battlefield. But to appease the other noble families, they would have to lower taxes on the aristocracy, weakening the treasury and strengthening possible rivals within the empire. To compensate, they would either have to increase taxes on the Church or on the smallholding farmers, the former increasing the possibility of civil war as the Church would support rival nobles, and the latter crushing the ability of the Empire to supply its own armies and possibly leading to peasant revolt.

Alexios Komnenos was successful at restoring the Byzantine Empire partly because he reined in the aristocracy and the Church at the same time, much like Basil II. If the Skleroi or Phokades were more successful emperors than Basil II, it would be because they enact domestic policies just like Basil's, but have more territorial ambitions. It would require them to turn on the other nobles and get the allegiance of the army, and at that point, they have just become an alternate version of Basil.

On the matter of southern and eastern expansion, I don't think it necessarily increases the power of the Anatolian landholding aristocracy. Let's say "Basil III" has conquered Sicily and Naples, humbled the Germans, and has too much cash lying around, so he begins an invasion of the Levant up to Jerusalem. Knowing it will be expensive to attempt to invade Egypt at this point, once he takes Jerusalem, he mops up the remnants of the Fatimid army and makes peace, with the Fatimids ceding the Holy Land and Aleppo.

There are a few different things the emperor can do here. He can give this land to various members Anatolian military aristocracy, which wouldn't make much sense because Basil II had already strengthened the tagmata to be the main part of the army. Or, most likely, he would do one or a combination of the following things:
- He could find local Muslim lords willing to convert to Orthodoxy or at least tolerate Christians, and allow them to keep their privileges--this seems likely.
- He could grant some of the lands to retired soldiers or smallholding farmers willing to settle the land, which seems in-character for a successor of Basil. This creates new allies and increases the allegiance of the army.
- He could grant some of the lands to smaller, loyalist noble families without great ambitions, like the early Komnenoi (who notably remained loyal to Basil against Bardas Skleros) or the Bulgarian nobles that Basil II granted privileges to. In the short-term, this creates loyal allies to the emperor. Long-term, decades later, it might create enemies, but Basil II never looked that far ahead and "Basil III" could easily make a mistake like this early in his reign.

And all three of these policies strengthen the power of the emperor, increase the wealth of the empire, and weaken the Anatolian aristocracy.

Hell, even if Basil III is an exact clone of Basil II, he would probably attack the Fatimids eventually. Because 10-20 years after taking Sicily, there is nowhere else to expand, and Basil II was very much an expansionist.
 
Centralization and suppression of the nobility works well in the short term, but both the Macedonians and Komnenids eventually saw what happens when you concentrate power in the person of the emperor and you get an emperor that's either a child or incompetent. A grand strategy which allows for the maximum exercise of the competence of a man like Basil is not necessarily a grand strategy that's good for the empire in the long term. We're assuming that Basil's successor is hyper-competent, but for the Macedonians to be hyper-competent forever is unrealistic - and the original premise of this thread was that Mediterranean domination is accomplished "by the 1200s." That's nearly two centuries from Basil's death. The best string of competent leaders the medieval empire ever had was the Komnenids from 1081-1180, or just shy of a century. I'll table that for now, since the premise here is "competent through the 1200s," but it's worth keeping in mind that this is a very remote possibility.

You seem to be making the claim that there is essentially only one way to be a "good emperor," and it is personified by Basil. As mentioned above, it's debatable whether Basil was really "good" in terms of securing the long-term health of the state, but again, that's tabled - let's assume for our purposes that Basil was indeed just that good. Instead, let's consider whether there were alternate ways to be a "good emperor." What about Basil's predecessors? Constantine VII was a scholar and diplomat with no evident military talent to speak of, and his son Romanos II was no great generalissimo either; both seem to have been largely relegated to the affairs of state in Constantinople (though Constantine was more interested in "affairs of state" than Romanos). Yet in the period of those two emperors, the Byzantines made some decent military achievements - the reconquest of Crete, the capture of Aleppo, and invasions of Cicilia, Syria, and upper Mesopotamia. This was accomplished not because Constantine or Romanos were the "fathers of the army," nor because they crushed the nobility into the ground, but because they had good people working for them and used them appropriately. Were they ruling the wrong way? Or, more to the point of this thread, were they ruling in such a way that made territorial expansion impossible?

I'm also not sure I quite buy the idea that Basil was "very much an expansionist." He acted mainly against the Bulgarians, who were rampaging through Thrace/Greece and had proclaimed themselves emperors - Bulgaria was an existential threat to the empire. Of course, Basil was supposedly planning to go after Sicily next, but this is also understandable from a defensive point of view - Sicily was a base for constant raids against Byzantine Italy in the late 10th century.

The Fatimids were never an existential threat to the empire, and because of their antagonism towards the Abbasids (and later Turks) they were never capable of giving the Byzantines their undivided attention. After the conquests of Nikephoros, the Byzantines had a strong geographical frontier in the east and a vassal state buffer to shield them from raiding (until Basil II basically abandoned it). A campaign against the Levant can't be justified in any defensive terms - as with the wars of Justinian, it's a campaign for the sake of claiming land and glory. Maybe Basil would be interested in that - but maybe not. He was, after all, a very practical man, and though he was of a military mind I don't think we can just assume that he would have rolled straight on to Jerusalem because it was "next."

Finally, I wonder if Basil's concentration of strength in the tagmata (as you've argued) and his relative neglect of the provinical/thematic forces would work against the kind of conquests you have in mind. Having a strong, central army commanded by and loyal to the emperor is great and all, but the larger the state gets and the more borders it has to hold, the less realistic this is. Once "Basil III" has the Holy Land - which we've agreed he could probably manage - is he going to march from Constantinople to Ascalon every time the Fatimids get uppity? Basil II was forced to turn back from the east on at least one occasion because of Bulgarian troubles, and the more he conquers the worse this situation is going to get. At some point he's going to need to delegate his frontier defense, and if he delegates it to the local thematic peasant forces, they're going to get rolled just like they got rolled by the Turks after the imperial army evaporated at Manzikert. If these conquests are going to last, the emperors are pretty much going to have to install men who will become the new dynatoi, yet setting up strong regional magnates is very un-Basil. There's a serious tension here and I'm not sure Basil's "all power vested in me" strategy is going to be viable in a context of continual expansion.
 
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Centralization and suppression of the nobility works well in the short term, but both the Macedonians and Komnenids eventually saw what happens when you concentrate power in the person of the emperor and you get an emperor that's either a child or incompetent. A grand strategy which allows for the maximum exercise of the competence of a man like Basil is not necessarily a grand strategy that's good for the empire in the long term. We're assuming that Basil's successor is hyper-competent, but for the Macedonians to be hyper-competent forever is unrealistic - and the original premise of this thread was that Mediterranean domination is accomplished "by the 1200s." That's nearly two centuries from Basil's death. The best string of competent leaders the medieval empire ever had was the Komnenids from 1081-1180, or just shy of a century. I'll table that for now, since the premise here is "competent through the 1200s," but it's worth keeping in mind that this is a very remote possibility.

I agree that Basil's and the Komnenians' consolidation of power toward the emperor turned out to be a disadvantage in OTL. That's why Basil II and his predecessors had their co-emperor system going. Basil not having a direct heir broke down this strategy. But if he did have an heir (perhaps a son of Constantine VIII) to appoint co-emperor, that capable successor would eventually choose one or more co-emperors from his sons. Like with Constantine VIII and Basil II, the better/more motivated emperor of those would probably become the primary power in imperial government and the other one being content with living the high life in Constantinople.

Of course, that could go wrong--if there are two or more ambitious co-emperors, their conflict with each other could weaken the empire. Although if their rivalry is not immediately hostile, it could expand the empire's influence--somewhat like the competition between wealthy figures of the late Roman Republic or princes of the early Ottoman Empire--yet if this goes on too long it would deplete the imperial treasury.

But it wouldn't necessarily end badly, as the co-regent policy worked pretty well during the reigns of Constantine VII, Romanos II, Nikephoros II Phokas, John I Tzimiskes, and of course Basil II.

Basil II or Basil III could even choose a non-Macedonian co-emperor; I don't think Nikephoros II Phokas had any hereditary claim to the throne, he was just from a distinguished family. With good emperors choosing good successors, theoretically, this system could work indefinitely (of course with Byzantine politics, we know how those things go).

You seem to be making the claim that there is essentially only one way to be a "good emperor," and it is personified by Basil. As mentioned above, it's debatable whether Basil was really "good" in terms of securing the long-term health of the state, but again, that's tabled - let's assume for our purposes that Basil was indeed just that good. Instead, let's consider whether there were alternate ways to be a "good emperor." What about Basil's predecessors? Constantine VII was a scholar and diplomat with no evident military talent to speak of, and his son Romanos II was no great generalissimo either; both seem to have been largely relegated to the affairs of state in Constantinople (though Constantine was more interested in "affairs of state" than Romanos). Yet in the period of those two emperors, the Byzantines made some decent military achievements - the reconquest of Crete, the capture of Aleppo, and invasions of Cicilia, Syria, and upper Mesopotamia. This was accomplished not because Constantine or Romanos were the "fathers of the army," nor because they crushed the nobility into the ground, but because they had good people working for them and used them appropriately. Were they ruling the wrong way? Or, more to the point of this thread, were they ruling in such a way that made territorial expansion impossible?

I don't think Basil II's reign was the only way to be a "good emperor" from the Byzantine perspective, and there are drawbacks to increasing the central power of the emperor so much. In fact a less ambitious emperor more willing to appease nobles is probably better for the Empire's long-term survival in its base territories of Greece and Anatolia.

But with the goal of expanding the Empire to its old territories across the Mediterranean, the economy needs to be as powerful as possible to finance continuous imperial projects. That means lowering taxes on the smallholding farmers to allow them to build up wealth, and raising taxes on the wealthiest parts of society that don't bring in much new wealth (nobles and the Church) while making deals with the wealthy sectors that do bring in wealth (traders).

200 years is a long time though, and in this scenario, perhaps there could be an emperor or multiple emperors from 1025 to the 1200s who does focus mostly on affairs of state.

I'm also not sure I quite buy the idea that Basil was "very much an expansionist." He acted mainly against the Bulgarians, who were rampaging through Thrace/Greece and had proclaimed themselves emperors - Bulgaria was an existential threat to the empire. Of course, Basil was supposedly planning to go after Sicily next, but this is also understandable from a defensive point of view - Sicily was a base for constant raids against Byzantine Italy in the late 10th century.

True. Although it is hard to know what his exact motivations were. It's even possible that he just had a huge grudge on Tsar Samuel from the Battle of the Gates of Trajan.

From an objective perspective, Basil focused most of his reign on expanding his territory. Even if it was mostly just north into the Bulgarian Empire, he still absorbed thousands of square miles of new land. Whether that was motivated by defensive reasons only, a grudge, or ambition can't be known with certainty, but he was at least somewhat expansionist.

The Fatimids were never an existential threat to the empire, and because of their antagonism towards the Abbasids (and later Turks) they were never capable of giving the Byzantines their undivided attention. After the conquests of Nikephoros, the Byzantines had a strong geographical frontier in the east and a vassal state buffer to shield them from raiding (until Basil II basically abandoned it). A campaign against the Levant can't be justified in any defensive terms - as with the wars of Justinian, it's a campaign for the sake of claiming land and glory. Maybe Basil would be interested in that - but maybe not. He was, after all, a very practical man, and though he was of a military mind I don't think we can just assume that he would have rolled straight on to Jerusalem because it was "next."

True, but claiming that land and glory does strengthen the empire. A large scale invasion is not the most pragmatic or conservative thing to do, but with a massive army, massive imperial treasury, and a medieval Roman perspective, it could become rational.

And Basil III wouldn't be a clone of Basil II, that was just an example. There are many scenarios in which Basil's successor would be the type of emperor to try expanding southward into Fatimid territory.

Finally, I wonder if Basil's concentration of strength in the tagmata (as you've argued) and his relative neglect of the provinical/thematic forces would work against the kind of conquests you have in mind. Having a strong, central army commanded by and loyal to the emperor is great and all, but the larger the state gets and the more borders it has to hold, the less realistic this is. Once "Basil III" has the Holy Land - which we've agreed he could probably manage - is he going to march from Constantinople to Ascalon every time the Fatimids get uppity? Basil II was forced to turn back from the east on at least one occasion because of Bulgarian troubles, and the more he conquers the worse this situation is going to get. At some point he's going to need to delegate his frontier defense, and if he delegates it to the local thematic peasant forces, they're going to get rolled just like they got rolled by the Turks after the imperial army evaporated at Manzikert. If these conquests are going to last, the emperors are pretty much going to have to install men who will become the new dynatoi, yet setting up strong regional magnates is very un-Basil. There's a serious tension here and I'm not sure Basil's "all power vested in me" strategy is going to be viable in a context of continual expansion.

Basil II actually did delegate his frontier defense; when the governor of Antioch, Bourtzes, failed to repel the Fatimids, Basil appoints Damian Dalassenos as the doux of Antioch. After Damian Dalassenos died, Basil appointed Nikephoros Ouranos.

In Thessalonica, Basil also appointed David Arianites as a strategos autokrator of Skopje and senior officer of conquered Bulgaria.

He was fine with delegation and having nobles, he just didn't want ambitious, landed families challenging his power, and was willing to appoint based on meritocracy rather than aristocracy.

Also, Basil II didn't concentrate the entire tagmata in one place. He stationed a lot of these units along the frontiers. It was similar to the legions of the earlier Roman Empire, or any standing army really.
 
Alexios Komnenos was successful at restoring the Byzantine Empire partly because he reined in the aristocracy and the Church at the same time, much like Basil II. If the Skleroi or Phokades were more successful emperors than Basil II, it would be because they enact domestic policies just like Basil's, but have more territorial ambitions. It would require them to turn on the other nobles and get the allegiance of the army, and at that point, they have just become an alternate version of Basil.

On the matter of southern and eastern expansion, I don't think it necessarily increases the power of the Anatolian landholding aristocracy. Let's say "Basil III" has conquered Sicily and Naples, humbled the Germans, and has too much cash lying around, so he begins an invasion of the Levant up to Jerusalem. Knowing it will be expensive to attempt to invade Egypt at this point, once he takes Jerusalem, he mops up the remnants of the Fatimid army and makes peace, with the Fatimids ceding the Holy Land and Aleppo.

There are a few different things the emperor can do here. He can give this land to various members Anatolian military aristocracy, which wouldn't make much sense because Basil II had already strengthened the tagmata to be the main part of the army. Or, most likely, he would do one or a combination of the following things:
- He could find local Muslim lords willing to convert to Orthodoxy or at least tolerate Christians, and allow them to keep their privileges--this seems likely.
- He could grant some of the lands to retired soldiers or smallholding farmers willing to settle the land, which seems in-character for a successor of Basil. This creates new allies and increases the allegiance of the army.
- He could grant some of the lands to smaller, loyalist noble families without great ambitions, like the early Komnenoi (who notably remained loyal to Basil against Bardas Skleros) or the Bulgarian nobles that Basil II granted privileges to. In the short-term, this creates loyal allies to the emperor. Long-term, decades later, it might create enemies, but Basil II never looked that far ahead and "Basil III" could easily make a mistake like this early in his reign.

And all three of these policies strengthen the power of the emperor, increase the wealth of the empire, and weaken the Anatolian aristocracy.

Hell, even if Basil III is an exact clone of Basil II, he would probably attack the Fatimids eventually. Because 10-20 years after taking Sicily, there is nowhere else to expand, and Basil II was very much an expansionist.
He did?My readings indicate that he didn't rein in the aristocracy as much as he compromised with them and gave them as much power as they wanted without being dissatisfied with his regime and revolt.The author believed that the reason why he wasn't deposed after repeated military defeats against the Normans was because the aristocracy being satisfied with the amount of power he gave them through the patronage system he kick started.
 
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He did?My readings indicate that he didn't rein in the aristocracy as much as he compromised with them and gave them as much power as they wanted without being dissatisfied with his regime and revolt.The author believed that the reason why he wasn't deposed after repeated military defeats against the Normans as the aristocracy being satisfied with the amount of power he gave them through the patronage system he kick started.
Well, he did at first when his situation was most precarious, giving essentially feudal grants to rebuild his army. In the last twenty years of his life, he began to heavily tax the aristocrats and remove tax exemptions on the Church, as well as melting down Church decorum. This was done to finance his reforms to the coinage. Technically, the taxes on the aristocrats were just reinstatements of phased-out older systems, but they were viewed as a de facto increase in taxes and built up imperial revenues.
 
Certainly this thread gives a lot of information about Eastern Roman Empire of beginning of XI Century. Very interesting to read.:)

In reference to the Iberian kingdoms, certainly the difficulties in vassalize them by the Eastern Roman Empire would be a problem of logistics and distance, but they were a lot of divided. Catalonia for example was formed by a lot of counties, with the most important the count of Barcelona although the count of Urgell for exemple played also an important paper.

After we have Navarra, Aragon, Castilla and Leon with serious interfighting between Castilla and Leon (sometimes united under a king, others fighting for the predominance) the same between Castilla and Navarra.

Iberian Peninsula was a mess at these times.
 
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