ACW WI: William Rosecrans Commands Army of the Potomac, 1861

Japhy

Banned
So as an off the cuff way to put Rosecrans in the position that he is brought to Washington in the aftermath of the First Battle of Bull Run is the fact that at the start of the American Civil War George McClellan was contacted by agents of or received outright offers to command the state militias of either three or five states depending on the source. IOTL he accepted command of the Ohio militia and thus became the man sent into modern West Virginia where the minor battles of the campaign were taken as great victories and he was quickly summoned to Washington to build what would become the Army of the Potomac from the Bull Run survivors and various other commands. Having McClellan take the job in any of the other states that approached him (Pennsylvania and New York as open offers, New Jersey and Illinois as conversations) the West Virginia campaign is out of his hands.

Rosecrans IOTL was McClellans second in command in the campaign and due to the nature of it is the man who did a lot of the leg work that led to the various victories the Union gained in the region, with a near-universal consensus giving him more credit than McClellan for them, if only because of the distances and terrain involved, so for the sake of discussion I think its fair to say the campaign need not be too different, and if Rosecrans was the overall commander he is the hero of the hour and the closest option to bring to Washington to command the new Department of the Potomac.

And so, how do things develop differently from that point on? On one hand with the Army of the Potomac and the obvious potential of him becoming General-in-Chief as McClellan was for a time, Rosecrans was a firm believer in utilizing large Staffs in a manner more in line with Continental European Doctrine than his contemporaries. He was also noted for creating units of Pioneers as an elite engineering force in the Army of the Cumberland, which facilitated many of the rapid movements he used while in command of it, and which would be used after his relief. At the same time he certainly had a tendency for not moving until he was ready, something which goes without saying was a problem in the Eastern Theater of the War, he had clear political aspirations in opposition to the politics of the administration and the political coalition it commanded (Though no talk of dictatorship, either self-deprecatingly or openly) and of course there is the issue of his conduct when the war turned on him and left the field at Chickamagua.

***I am not asking for another rehash of the Grant vs McClellan discussions that have gone on in the last few ACW threads, or a discussion of McClellan's merits as a commander. Obviously we all have to talk about McClellan in this, but let us please try to keep the discussion limited to him vs Rosecrans and how Rosecrans would have operated been responded to both by the Confederates and the Federal Government differently***
 
I honestly think that however his performance is, I'm very curious about the engineering thing and especially the staffs. I wonder if 1) his approach would change the way the Union conducts war in the eastern theater(say, if he sets up staff planning to supervise specific areas or sections of the army to improve command and control, affecting how battles/campaigns that proceeded largely on a piecemeal basis OTL play out, or even if he asks his staff to attempt to model out campaigns-say "you guys are Lee's team and you guys are my team-I want you each to take the intelligence I'm giving you, draft what you intend to do from your position, and what you think the other team will do)
 
As commander of the Army of the Cumberland, Rosecrans displayed his true brilliance as a strategist, organizer, and innovator. Among his men, Rosecrans was beloved and referred to him as "Old Rosey". Rosecrans always stood up for his army's needs against Washington and saw himself and indeed was as simply the champion of his interests of his army. Rosecrans was an excellent administrator as well, and notably looked after the health of his army. (William Starke Rosecrans and U.S. Army Medicine | Chickamauga Blog) To his credit, Rosecrans also advocated and encouraged tactical innovation at lower levels and this consequently appeared in his army such as Advance Firing.

But how would he do in the Eastern Theater? His personality would be an issue for Washington D.C. His blunt honesty and hairpin temper caused him to constantly get in trouble with his superiors. He could be petty and unfair, as he responded to controversy over his role in the Battles of Iuka and Corinth by helping spread baseless rumors that Grant had been drunk at Iuka, and generally incompetent as well. Edwin Stanton absolutely despised him and would probably try to have him replaced (though a lack of candidates prevented him from doing so with McClellan). In addition, Rosecrans' decisions to stand up for his army's needs against Washington would put him in hot water and (OTL) alienate Washington D.C. Like McClellan, Rosecrans ITTL would be heavily pressured to start an advance onto Richmond.

I should note that Rosecrans' choice of staff was not particularly good and his staff did not gave a mixed performance during Chickamauga. During the Tullahoma Campaign, General Rosecrans held Col. Taylor, the Department's quartermaster, responsible for the slow resupply operations of the army. Yet Rosecrans sent a message to General Montgomery Meigs to relieve Col. Taylor. Although the War Department approved the army's quartermaster, Rosecrans was responsible for hiring, firing and training his staff. This is a prime example of how Rosecrans was hesitant in relieving his staff officers. By the end of the Chickamauga Campaign, Rosecrans was executing most of his staff's work.

There is also the question of how Rosecrans would invade Virginia. I am not certain if Rosecrans would see the opportunities and benefits that an invasion of the Peninsula could lead to. However, Rosecrans was a master of strategy and operations. Rosecrans would understand the difficult terrain of Northern Virginia and decide to work around it. Hence it may be possible that Rosecrans would invade the Peninsula. Alternatively, Rosecrans could attempt something similar to the Overland campaign or Hooker's Chancellorsville campaign.

It's on the battlefield that Rosecrans' generalship attracts the most debate. His performance in Iuka and Corinth have been the subject of debate on whether or not his tactical performance played a positive role during the battles. At Stones River, Rosecrans undoubtedly did a good job of personally rallying and steadying his men, but the constant stream of orders he sent from his headquarters probably confused matters more than it helped. In the Chickamauga campaign, some of Rosecrans' personal flaws were on full display; he was erratic, high-strung, volatile, and tended to work himself to exhaustion. His mood swung from gloom to overconfidence and he gave chase to Bragg recklessly. Thanks partially to George Thomas, and to bungling from Bragg's subordinates, Rosecrans largely got away unpunished and reassembled his army to fight Bragg at Chickamauga.

How this would play out in Virginia would be interesting. Rosecrans would probably be present on the battlefield more often than McClellan and how his presence would influence the battles would be interesting.

Overall, I would definitely give Rosecrans' generalship a much higher score than McClellan's. The Army of the Potomac would certainly benefit from Rosecrans' brilliant tactical innovations and ideas.
 
Rosecrans wasn't Grant, or even Thomas, but he was good enough to win with the advantages of the AotP in the East. He was willing to fight and take risks, and until Chickamauga, he didn't break down under the stress. He wouldn't be quite the organizer McClellan was, but he didn't need to be. He would be more competent than Burnside; he wouldn't be paralyzed by the responsibility of top command like Hooker. As noted, he would have the loyalty of his men.

There remains the possibility that he would risk too much, and get hammered by Lee. Rosecrans gained his successes against Van Dorn at Corinth (defending with superior numbers) and against Bragg. Attacking against Lee or even Johnston would be much chancier.
 
He could be petty and unfair, as he responded to controversy over his role in the Battles of Iuka and Corinth by helping spread baseless rumors that Grant had been drunk at Iuka, and generally incompetent as well.

Please name one source to back this up. I have not seen any unbiased observer or historian claim this - not to be confused with either of the following:

-Rosecrans' Staff claiming that Grant had been drunk and incompetent (though even this is in dispute AFAIK)
-Grant's Staff thinking, with little or no cause, that Rosecrans and/or his staff claimed Grant had been drunk and incompetent, and making Grant believe it.

In addition, Rosecrans' decisions to stand up for his army's needs against Washington would put him in hot water and (OTL) alienate Washington D.C. Like McClellan, Rosecrans ITTL would be heavily pressured to start an advance onto Richmond.

Sounds much more plausible. To consider all sides, however, Rosecrans' OTL messages to Washington generally pushed for food supplies, equipment, time needed to procure both of the above, and cavalry to fight Confederate raiders in his theater. Comparing the supply situations of Union armies fighting in Virginia and in Tennessee, broadly speaking (I'll take any details into consideration), none of these except possibly the cavalry would have been a problem for Rosecrans fighting in the east (and even that would be less of a problem until the Confederate cavalry came under Stuart and grew in number in experience - and even *then*, would still not be as big a concern due to the shorter distances involved). Importantly, in OTL Rosecrans did not claim, as a primary reason for not moving, that he was significantly outnumbered. In the Stones River and Chickamauga campaigns, the numbers were fairly close to even in actuality, and Rosecrans believed this to be close to the case in reality. In both cases he moved forward eagerly once the rest of the supply situation was dealt with.

I should note that Rosecrans' choice of staff was not particularly good and his staff did not gave a mixed performance during Chickamauga. During the Tullahoma Campaign, General Rosecrans held Col. Taylor, the Department's quartermaster, responsible for the slow resupply operations of the army. Yet Rosecrans sent a message to General Montgomery Meigs to relieve Col. Taylor. Although the War Department approved the army's quartermaster, Rosecrans was responsible for hiring, firing and training his staff. This is a prime example of how Rosecrans was hesitant in relieving his staff officers. By the end of the Chickamauga Campaign, Rosecrans was executing most of his staff's work.

As far as I have read, Julius Garesche was an excellent Chief of Staff and well-liked by the rest of the officer corps, until a bullet to the head at Stones River ended his tenure. Garfield, for all of his political ambitions, also served as an effective bridge between Rosecrans and the rest of the army. Perhaps not as well as between Rosecrans and Washington... I had not heard this about Colonel Taylor - I am afraid I am confused as to the point you are making. If Rosecrans thought that Taylor was responsible for being slow at resupplying his army, then he was smart to ask him to be relieved, especially if he could not solely appoint a replacement as you seem to say is the case for quartermasters.

Now, I will absolutely agree that Rosecrans was far too hesitant at relieving (and even simply disciplining) some of his incompetent generals - see McCook and Crittenden to top the list, with a sick Stanley in 3rd spot - and that could be a major problem in Virginia.

His mood swung from gloom to overconfidence and he gave chase to Bragg recklessly. Thanks partially to George Thomas, and to bungling from Bragg's subordinates, Rosecrans largely got away unpunished and reassembled his army to fight Bragg at Chickamauga.

Much as I love Thomas I can't see giving him credit here. The lack-of-battle at Widow Bailey's Crossroads and then at Lee and Gordon's Mills, considering they were both explicitly ordered by Bragg, goes entirely to various of his subordinates. Thomas managed to close up his 2nd division on his leading division at the former, which may have prevented a complete rout had battle actually occurred, but would not prevent a signal defeat given the converging Confederates would still have outnumbered him something like 3:1.

Overall, I would definitely give Rosecrans' generalship a much higher score than McClellan's. The Army of the Potomac would certainly benefit from Rosecrans' brilliant tactical innovations and ideas.

I would guess Rosecrans to move forward sometime in Autumn 1861, given that the basic supply situation has been met. Given Rosecrans' penchant for flanking maneuvers, a move down the Potomac to Aquia Creek, turning Johnston out of the Bull Run line he is still in, stands out to me as plausible. Unless we make a full TL on this I hesitate to speculate further forward for now.
 
Rosecrans had an interesting life. He had converted to Catholicism at West Poiint, and was the only Catholic ACW general, at least in army command, though I don't think this would have mattered if he had commanded in the East, it certainly would not have mattered with Lincoln and may have been a plus given where the Army of the Potomac recruited.

I've seen comparisons of Rosecrans with Hooker, in terms of being aggressive generals with a penchant for maneuver that were quite good at administration, but both of who blew it in a big way in important battles.
 
Please name one source to back this up. I have not seen any unbiased observer or historian claim this - not to be confused with either of the following:

-Rosecrans' Staff claiming that Grant had been drunk and incompetent (though even this is in dispute AFAIK)
-Grant's Staff thinking, with little or no cause, that Rosecrans and/or his staff claimed Grant had been drunk and incompetent, and making Grant believe it.
My source is Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865 by Brooks D. Simpson, page no. 155.
Brooks D. Simpson said:
Rosecrans wasted no opportunity to promote his own fortunes at Grant's expense. Proof of this appeared when Cincinnati Commercial correspondent William D. Bickham, long one of Grant's enemies in the press and a favorite in Rosecrans' headquarters, composed several columns exalting Rosecrans and attacking Grant and Ord, including an implication that Grant was drunk at Iuka.

Sounds much more plausible. To consider all sides, however, Rosecrans' OTL messages to Washington generally pushed for food supplies, equipment, time needed to procure both of the above, and cavalry to fight Confederate raiders in his theater. Comparing the supply situations of Union armies fighting in Virginia and in Tennessee, broadly speaking (I'll take any details into consideration), none of these except possibly the cavalry would have been a problem for Rosecrans fighting in the east (and even that would be less of a problem until the Confederate cavalry came under Stuart and grew in number in experience - and even *then*, would still not be as big a concern due to the shorter distances involved). Importantly, in OTL Rosecrans did not claim, as a primary reason for not moving, that he was significantly outnumbered. In the Stones River and Chickamauga campaigns, the numbers were fairly close to even in actuality, and Rosecrans believed this to be close to the case in reality. In both cases he moved forward eagerly once the rest of the supply situation was dealt with.
True, Rosecrans was rightfully concerned about the tenuous nature of his supply lines and the raiders and guerillas infesting Tennessee and Kentucky. The all-important Louisville and Nashville Railroad was Rosecrans’ lifeline. Without it his army would starve. He also found himself desperately short of cavalry.

In the Eastern Theater, Rosecrans would have much more cavalry and less guerillas and raiders to worry about. However, the Union Cavalry is still God-awful in comparison to their Confederate counterparts.
As far as I have read, Julius Garesche was an excellent Chief of Staff and well-liked by the rest of the officer corps, until a bullet to the head at Stones River ended his tenure. Garfield, for all of his political ambitions, also served as an effective bridge between Rosecrans and the rest of the army. Perhaps not as well as between Rosecrans and Washington... I had not heard this about Colonel Taylor - I am afraid I am confused as to the point you are making. If Rosecrans thought that Taylor was responsible for being slow at resupplying his army, then he was smart to ask him to be relieved, especially if he could not solely appoint a replacement as you seem to say is the case for quartermasters.

Now, I will absolutely agree that Rosecrans was far too hesitant at relieving (and even simply disciplining) some of his incompetent generals - see McCook and Crittenden to top the list, with a sick Stanley in 3rd spot - and that could be a major problem in Virginia.
Sorry if I was unclear about my point, my point came out wrong. My point is that Rosecrans' reluctance to hire and fire staff led to a mixed performance by his staff. Garfield was not a very good Chief of Staff, during the Tullahoma Campaign, he relegated some of his responsibilities to assistant adjustant general officers. He failed to provide continuous attention to positioning of units after the campaign was completed.

As for Colonel Taylor, he was the Department's quartermaster and was responsible for slow resupply operations of the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans was very much aware of that and planned to replace him with Captain Hodges. On 27 July, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster General requesting Meigs to relieve Taylor and appoint Hodges as Quartermaster of the Army of the Cumberland. The thing is that the War Department only approves the army's quartermaster, it is Rosecrans' responsibility to hire and fire his staff.

As for Rosecrans' Corps commanders, I would have to defend them a bit. McCook was a mediocre Corps commander who lacked luck. At Perryville he fought alone, unsupported, while the bulk of the Federal army watched – largely because an acoustic shadow hid the sound of the fight from his army commander. At Stones River, he was struck by the main weight of Braxton Bragg’s assault – exactly as Rosecrans intended to have happen – but the army was again slow to come to his aid. And finally at Chickamauga, where Longstreet swept his men off the field.

As for Crittenden, his performance at Stones River was decent as he responded well when called upon to hustle his troops across the river to shore up the Union defenses. At Chickamauga, on September 19 he sent reinforcements to Thomas whenever asked to do so and played a significant role in the fighting at Viniard field, though not entirely successful. His one great failing was in not stopping in Rossville on September 20th, to assume command of the force that eventually collected there.
Much as I love Thomas I can't see giving him credit here. The lack-of-battle at Widow Bailey's Crossroads and then at Lee and Gordon's Mills, considering they were both explicitly ordered by Bragg, goes entirely to various of his subordinates. Thomas managed to close up his 2nd division on his leading division at the former, which may have prevented a complete rout had battle actually occurred, but would not prevent a signal defeat given the converging Confederates would still have outnumbered him something like 3:1.
I suppose so. Rosecrans' sins went unpunished thanks to the ineptness of Bragg's subordinates.

I would guess Rosecrans to move forward sometime in Autumn 1861, given that the basic supply situation has been met. Given Rosecrans' penchant for flanking maneuvers, a move down the Potomac to Aquia Creek, turning Johnston out of the Bull Run line he is still in, stands out to me as plausible. Unless we make a full TL on this I hesitate to speculate further forward for now.
Probably. I'm not too certain about the early state of the Army of the Potomac. Perhaps Rosecrans would spend time to train his men and logistically prepare for his advance.
 
I've seen comparisons of Rosecrans with Hooker, in terms of being aggressive generals with a penchant for maneuver that were quite good at administration, but both of who blew it in a big way in important battles.
That's rather unfair for Rosecrans. Hooker had the greatest opportunity to crush Lee easily throughout Chancellorsville, while Rosecrans fought Braxton Bragg whose army was barely smaller than Rosecrans' (Stones River). Chickamauga was a battle that Rosecrans had a slim chance to win. With Longstreet's Corps, Bragg had more than enough men to defeat Rosecrans' center and right. Not to mention the fact that General Thomas contributed to Rosecrans' defeat with his requests for reinforcements which lead to Rosecrans' decision to strip the center and right. Rosecrans' greatest mistake (at the advice of his Chief of Staff-Garfield) at Chickamauga was to go to Chattanooga to re-organise the troops, defenses and do staff work while Thomas' forces fought desperately.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The problem with an alternate commander for the AotP (and early victory) is basically twofold.

Firstly, you have that the army simply was not ready for major offensive operations in the 1861 campaign season - it took months of training to get it there, because there was essentially no cadre (as most of the regulars stayed as formed units) and because there were insufficient prewar troops to form the tip of the spear (for the mass of less well trained troops to support as in the way of the Mexican-American War, that is). Further, in January 1862 - despite months of trying - there were not sufficient weapons fit for the field to arm the full Army of the Potomac. Imagine how much worse it would have been on that front in October 1861, with about 200,000 fewer weapons available... sure, the Rebels would have the same problems, but it's much easier for newbie troops to defend fixed positions than to either attack fixed positions or manoeuvre in the field.


Secondly, you have the question of strategic approach. Put bluntly, you have to clear the Yorktown peninsula or you can't advance to Richmond - it's just too far to defend a land supply line, at least without overwhelming numerical superiority, and if you have that overwhelming numerical superiority you can't sustain them from the rail line. With Yorktown clear you can use riverine supply to get some or all of the way to the James River, and that makes attacking Richmond a much more realistic prospect.
This is why Grant's Overland campaign was able to function, it could use river-based supply to avoid having to defend or rely on the rail lines, but with Yorktown not cleared you can't use any of the tributaries of the York river - which functionally means you're drawing from the Rappahanock, and Rappahanock (Fredericksburg) to Richmond is on the order of fifty miles, all of it vulnerable.
This is also hampered by how the US Army of 1861 didn't really manage flying columns properly, and it's not really until Loudon Valley that it matures as a style of movement (that being late 1862).


What this means is that an alternate general would - in broad strategic approach - have to plan pretty similarly to what McClellan did, which is to say train over 1861 and then try and clear the Yorktown line in early 1862. If they then get the same scale of resources as McClellan, then they'll succeed to roughly the same extent - it's limited by the capabilities of the army at the time.


Now, if an alternate general has greater support from the Administration, that's another thing entirely and it's likely (perhaps "very" likely) to work in that case. The question, however, is why an alternate general would get that support - and whether he'd keep it, as McClellan started off viewed very well!
 
My source is Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865 by Brooks D. Simpson, page no. 155.

I realize I did not phrase my skepticism carefully enough, and had forgotten a detail from my past readings. According to General Grant and the Rewriting of History by Frank P. Varney, pages 68-69, while Simpson claims exactly what you have said, he does not provide a source for it.

So my concern is whether Rosecrans was the one who made this claim, as opposed to his staff or other people entirely. I know very well that several observers, with varying degrees of bias, claimed many *many* times that Grant was drunk at one time or another during and for half a century after the war (the claims, not the drunken-ness). We know that Grant did blame Rosecrans for making such an accusation after Iuka, and we know that Rosecrans' staff and/or other people who may have been close to Rosecrans could have made such a claim, but none of this means that Rosecrans in fact did so.

True, Rosecrans was rightfully concerned about the tenuous nature of his supply lines and the raiders and guerillas infesting Tennessee and Kentucky. The all-important Louisville and Nashville Railroad was Rosecrans’ lifeline. Without it his army would starve. He also found himself desperately short of cavalry.

In the Eastern Theater, Rosecrans would have much more cavalry and less guerillas and raiders to worry about. However, the Union Cavalry is still God-awful in comparison to their Confederate counterparts.

Full agreement here. Not only Rosecrans but *many* western commanders did not get nearly as much cavalry as they needed given the more open spaces involved - and the *quality* never really matched the Confederates until late 1864. The quality issue is still true in Virginia but the numbers more reasonable, and with less space to worry about.

Sorry if I was unclear about my point, my point came out wrong. My point is that Rosecrans' reluctance to hire and fire staff led to a mixed performance by his staff. Garfield was not a very good Chief of Staff, during the Tullahoma Campaign, he relegated some of his responsibilities to assistant adjustant general officers. He failed to provide continuous attention to positioning of units after the campaign was completed.

As for Colonel Taylor, he was the Department's quartermaster and was responsible for slow resupply operations of the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans was very much aware of that and planned to replace him with Captain Hodges. On 27 July, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Montgomery Meigs, Quartermaster General requesting Meigs to relieve Taylor and appoint Hodges as Quartermaster of the Army of the Cumberland. The thing is that the War Department only approves the army's quartermaster, it is Rosecrans' responsibility to hire and fire his staff.

Thanks for clarifying re: Taylor. True enough about division of responsibility; I concede the point.

My understanding though is that Garfield was ill leading up to the Tullahoma campaign and had to take recuperative leave during it (This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga by Peter Cozzens).

As for Rosecrans' Corps commanders, I would have to defend them a bit. McCook was a mediocre Corps commander who lacked luck. At Perryville he fought alone, unsupported, while the bulk of the Federal army watched – largely because an acoustic shadow hid the sound of the fight from his army commander. At Stones River, he was struck by the main weight of Braxton Bragg’s assault – exactly as Rosecrans intended to have happen – but the army was again slow to come to his aid. And finally at Chickamauga, where Longstreet swept his men off the field.

As for Crittenden, his performance at Stones River was decent as he responded well when called upon to hustle his troops across the river to shore up the Union defenses. At Chickamauga, on September 19 he sent reinforcements to Thomas whenever asked to do so and played a significant role in the fighting at Viniard field, though not entirely successful. His one great failing was in not stopping in Rossville on September 20th, to assume command of the force that eventually collected there.

I partially concede McCook's performance at Perryville - not his fault about the acoustic shadow and fighting alone. However, the numbers I've seen (which are not from a good source, and I'll take a better one) are that Bragg's whole present army was just about equal in size to McCook's wing - so fighting on the defensive he should have had a fair chance of winning or at least holding the Confederates off, rather than being routed.

At Stones River Rosecrans did intend for McCook to fight on the defensive - to refuse his flank and assume a strong defensive position so that he could hold off a Confederate attack for a few hours while the rest of the army smashed the Confederate's right. Given that the Union army had been in the area for a day before the battle, McCook should have been able to refuse more than 1 brigade and post a strong line mostly at the edge of the treeline. In OTL the rest of the army only had to come to McCook's aid because he had already broken practically at first contact (barring Sheridan and a couple other individual brigade commanders), which completely interrupted Rosecrans' planned attack.

As for Crittenden, I will first concede that he is better than McCook. He responded quickly enough to orders at Stones River to send troops, as you stated. His problem though, at all 3 battles we're talking about, was that he was largely invisible on the field. Not a part of Perryville, and mainly not in charge of his own troops at Stones River or Chickamauga. He actually did some effective work organizing an artillery reserve at the latter that slightly slowed down the Confederate breakthrough on the 20th (rather than leaving it all to Menendhall as at Stones River). So the issue is more that he was overall passive and inexperienced despite a year in corps command. This is not the same as being incompetent, and I generalized too quickly in my last post.

Probably. I'm not too certain about the early state of the Army of the Potomac. Perhaps Rosecrans would spend time to train his men and logistically prepare for his advance.

Also possible. I'm not saying a Fall 1861 advance is a sure thing. I'm also not sure that, if this is delayed until the winter, he might not try to conduct a winter campaign.

On a related note, since Saphroneth has brought the matter up, why does Rosecrans have to go to the peninsula? There are 2 perfectly good (well, 1 good and 1 mediocre) railroads that Rosecrans could advance up. Depending on when exactly he moves, at least one of said routes would be a very reasonable flanking move. If Rosecrans could afford to defend and garrison hundreds of miles of railroad line in Tennessee in OTL, I don't see why he can't defend <50 miles of the RF&P up to Aquia Creek. Or, if he uses the Orange & Alexandria to any great extent, based on his positive relationships with engineers in OTL, I think he would at least defer to Haupt in utilizing the line as fully as possible. Details would depend, again, on when exactly he moves.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
On a related note, since Saphroneth has brought the matter up, why does Rosecrans have to go to the peninsula? There are 2 perfectly good (well, 1 good and 1 mediocre) railroads that Rosecrans could advance up. Depending on when exactly he moves, at least one of said routes would be a very reasonable flanking move. If Rosecrans could afford to defend and garrison hundreds of miles of railroad line in Tennessee in OTL, I don't see why he can't defend <50 miles of the RF&P up to Aquia Creek.

It's the greater density of troops and the greater proximity of the centre of mass of the Confederacy. Take for example the first battle of the Seven Days - there Lee's army threw roughly 70,000 (PFD) in the column north of the Chicahominy, while keeping about 45,000 south of the river to defend Richmond itself.
The numbers may not be the same in an ATL battle, but the point is that the CSA is concentrating all their resources on attacking around the flank, and were successful at doing so. In order to be able to attack Richmond while still being able to keep the rail line secure, Rosecrans needs at least as many troops as the theoretical attacking column able to jump in (arguably more as they're spread out and the attacking column is concentrated, and as the Confederates have plentiful cavalry) while also having enough troops south of the river to overcome whatever defenders are present in Richmond.
In fact, since the march speed of infantry is roughly speaking a few miles an hour, and since supply wagons couldn't move more than about 15 miles a day, then a fifty mile stretch of rail line is functionally able to be modelled as at least two (and possibly three) independent garrisons. Each of these need to be as strong as the possible attacking force.

It was different in the west because the scale of the possible confederate raiders was much smaller (compared to the force available to the Union). Rosecrans doesn't have a problem with company-sized or regiment-sized cavalry raids, he has a problem with an entire division parking itself across his only supply line (e.g. at Hanover Junction).


If he overdoes the defenders of the rail line and draws too much away from the attacking-Richmond force, then obviously they can't advance; if he thins out the rail line forces too much, then the rail line is vulnerable to being cut.

Now, with the Peninsular Campaign having taken place, this is merely a big problem, because you have an alternate supply route (to whit, the James River and the York tributaries) to fall back on. Without the Peninsular Campaign having taken place, it's a disaster as the army now has no supply line and no way to get back to one, and will pretty promptly be forced to surrender.


If what's happened instead is an ATL Overland Campaign, then the problem there is simply that the route you're taking is known (cf: down the rail lines). That means going through multiple defences, and you can't even do what Grant did in the Overland Campaign because that relied on river supply - you have to slug south all the way down the eminently defensible terrain of northern Virginia, without being able to turn the flanks, and without being able to get more than 10-15 miles from your base of supply (because that's what the Army of the Potomac was like in 1862, as attested by Joinville).

But there's another problem if you have enough in the way of troops to adequately garrison the entire rail line. Firstly, there's that this is a huge commitment of resources, higher than the OTL commitment of force of the Army of the Potomac in 1862 (and if you've fought your way down through Northern Virginia in anything like an ATL Overland then you've probably lost a lot of troops, more than the Confederates have lost, and done serious damage to their army morale as well) and secondly the rail lines aren't simply magic - they have limits on how much supply they can provide, and if you have an army that's too large you reach the point that becomes a big worry (especially with the terrible weather of OTL's spring and summer 1862 potentially washing away bridges).
Then Lee sends a division on a raid into the valley, Wshington recalls a corps, and the whole strength balance has changed all over again.


Fundamentally, Grant's OTL 1864 campaign was only logistically feasible because of the 1862 campaign clearing Norfolk and Yorktown. It used river supply to get around some of the positions Lee's army was defending, rather than attacking head on.


Now, it's possible to picture a better-trained and better-equipped Army of the Potomac which is able to pull off the kind of slugging-match campaign in question (straight down the rail lines) but OTL the Army of the Potomac improved very fast - it's just that you need to do a heck of a lot of work to create an army from nearly nothing, and I doubt you'd get them moving at that quality before full summer 1862 (note: this is being very generous).
 
Last edited:

Japhy

Banned
I think, with all due respect that @Saphroneth is overstating the importance of the maritime supply route for the Overland Campaign. Grant only became dependent on the supplies coming though Hampton Roads until after Cold Harbor and the move to cross the James. Up until that point supplies were making it down to the Army of the Potomac directly from Washington or though Aquila Landing. Obviously not true in the context of the Army of the James of course.
 
I have seen Rosecrans get high praise from some sources, and considerable criticism from others so I will be interested in how this discussion goes.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Grant only became dependent on the supplies coming though Hampton Roads until after Cold Harbor and the move to cross the James. Up until that point supplies were making it down to the Army of the Potomac directly from Washington or though Aquila Landing. Obviously not true in the context of the Army of the James of course.

There were two wings of the army (the one which ended up in front of Richmond and the one which ended up in front of Petersburg).
OTL both switched supply from the rail line to using Port Royal (Rappahannock river) on the 22nd May, and then there was a switch on the 28th to White House Landing (which is on the Pamunkey, a tributary of the York, and is thus blocked by Yorktown). The Richmond wing drew from White House Landing for the rest of the war, and the Petersburg wing eventually switched to the James (specifically, City Point)

If Rosecrans is relying on rail and Rappahannock supply then he'll get as far as ATL North Anna and then be unable to turn that position - leaving him functionally stuck on the northern side of the North Anna. Even if he gets past that, however, his lines still have to stretch as far north as Hanover Junction and then protect at least one of the rail lines north of that.

Note by the way that supplies coming up the York don't go through Hampton Roads (as Hampton Roads is where the James empties into the Chesapeake) but they do go past Yorktown.
 
The problem with an alternate commander for the AotP (and early victory) is basically twofold.

Firstly, you have that the army simply was not ready for major offensive operations in the 1861 campaign season - it took months of training to get it there, because there was essentially no cadre (as most of the regulars stayed as formed units) and because there were insufficient prewar troops to form the tip of the spear (for the mass of less well trained troops to support as in the way of the Mexican-American War, that is). Further, in January 1862 - despite months of trying - there were not sufficient weapons fit for the field to arm the full Army of the Potomac. Imagine how much worse it would have been on that front in October 1861, with about 200,000 fewer weapons available... sure, the Rebels would have the same problems, but it's much easier for newbie troops to defend fixed positions than to either attack fixed positions or manoeuvre in the field.

What's your source on the lack of enough weapons to fight? Other Union armies were fighting before then.

McClellan did not start from zero, he inherited McDowell's Army of Northeastern Virginia as the core of the Army of the Potomac - a force of 30,000, who had fought a major battle, and received some training in the two months before that battle. McClellan also inherited the troops of Mansfield's Department of Washington, which had undergone a couple months training; and Bank's forces from the Shenandoah, who had some training and in some cases, combat experience. In March 1862, McClellan finally started the Peninsula Campaign, eight months after he'd been given command.

Lets compare that with Don Carlos Buell, who was hardly noted for his speed. In November 1861, he took over the Army of the Ohio. Three months later, Buell had taken Nashville.

This is also hampered by how the US Army of 1861 didn't really manage flying columns properly, and it's not really until Loudon Valley that it matures as a style of movement (that being late 1862).

Have you got anybody (besides 67th Tigers) who claims McClellan used a flying column in the Loudin Valley?

Now, if an alternate general has greater support from the Administration, that's another thing entirely and it's likely (perhaps "very" likely) to work in that case. The question, however, is why an alternate general would get that support - and whether he'd keep it, as McClellan started off viewed very well!

An alternate general would have several advantages over McClellan. An alternate general probably wouldn't undermine general-in-chief Scott to get his position - not only was Scott a better general, the bad example this provided encouraged subordinate generals to undermine leaders of the Army of the Potomac. An alternate general wouldn't have shown the gross disrespect that McClellan showed towards Scott, Lincoln, and Stanton; undermining his own position. An alternate general would have had a more realistic view of enemy numbers, McClellan's fears affected much more than just his actions. Those fears communicated themselves to many in the Army of the Potomac's officer corps, who were afraid Lee was " suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time", even after McClellan was gone. Those fears also communicated themselves to the Lincoln administration, convincing them that large numbers of soldiers were needed to guard the capitol, a fear that helped deprive McClellan of the number of troops he wanted in the Peninsula Campaign. An alternate general would probably move faster the McClellan, possibly much faster, which would also make for better relations between the alternative general and the Lincoln administration.
 
Top