ACW- guerilla warfare after Union victory at 1st Bull Run

This thread is inspired by an article in an ACW mag I read yest- which was discussing how the widespread guerilla warfare which occurred throut the South has been very neglected by historians, due to the main focus being on the big setpiece battles such as Antietam, Gettysburg, etc. 1 contributor to that article speculated- WI the Union had won a quick resounding victory at 1st Bull Run which destroyed the Confederate army in the field- but could a mass guerilla movement have then started throut the CSA instead of there being a definitive decisive US victory which restores the entire Union ?
 
I think your right. Whenever I am traveling in Virginia on some back road, my father will point out Mosby Road, which gets its name from Mosby's Raiders. They were a group who operated out of a swamp and raided Union supply lines, and they were just one group of many. The war worked out perfectly to dissuad a larger scale guerilla movement, by having major CSA victories draw out larger Confederate armies, just to have them crushed at the end of the war. There are numerous situations in the war where the Confederates could have retreated into the mountains after a defeat and waged a long term guerilla war.
 
I think your right. Whenever I am traveling in Virginia on some back road, my father will point out Mosby Road, which gets its name from Mosby's Raiders. They were a group who operated out of a swamp and raided Union supply lines, and they were just one group of many. The war worked out perfectly to dissuad a larger scale guerilla movement, by having major CSA victories draw out larger Confederate armies, just to have them crushed at the end of the war. There are numerous situations in the war where the Confederates could have retreated into the mountains after a defeat and waged a long term guerilla war.

Well, I'm not so sure the psychology of the Confederates would have allowed for such. They had a 'Southern' identity, but both sides moral were very much tide to reports of victory or failure from the battlefield during the civil war. American newspapers, north or south, were pretty hysterical in that era. (And the people seemed to be too.) I'm thinking that by the time the South committed itself to resists principally through gurrilla warfare, it'd be only after its conventional armies had been completely defeated.

Also, adopting such a strategy so early on really cripples it in the eyes of foreignors, on whom it'd rely alot on for much of its support. I'm not so sure as many guns and ammunition get into the south, without the early sense of optimism / inevitability of the South's victory in European courts.

And even if the Union wins at 1st Bull Run, it's not likely to be able to move on Richmond before another army can be put in its way, assuming the Confederates put up half a fight.

Also, adopting a gurilla strategy would probably open up unionist areas of the south to invading northern armies sooner than otl, further undercutting their effort. (The appalachians, from Virgina, Tennessee, and North Carolina. Obviously, the south needs to use conventional forces there, as their gurrillas aren't going to be able to operate there.)

Not to mention the gurilla warfare becomes more complicated when an if abolition becomes a Union war-aim, although that's still not likely to happen until after the first 85,000k Union KIAs or so.

Attacking union lines of communication, and picking of security details, are all good ideas. But to be successful, there's still going to need to be able to keep the Union out of its major cities, drive it from the major rivers or hold the river forts, defend its own railroads and lines of communication, and ideally (though its hard to see how) keep open a port. All of which is going to take conventional armies.
 
Your completely right; I was refering to a defeat that would smash the armies of the CSA. I just think that many Southerns would have beening willing to fight a guerllia/terrorist war against Union occupiers had they not been so throughly smashed during the five years of war.


Well, there would be benefits to adopting a guerilla strategy. Although I think the chief, ironically, would be that guerilla's would suffer from less disease deaths then men gathered into a great 19th century army. And that's a huge factor, since as many soldiers or more died from disease as combat. It'd therefore function as a manpower modifier.

Although I doubt the south would ever become the North's 19th century Vietnam, for two reasons:

1) Southern nationalism was comparatively weak. A lot of men died fighting for the Confederacy, for sure. A lot fought to the death, but a lot were willing to swear the oath once their neighboorhood came under union control. And notably, the south was only able to keep about 3-4% of its population under arms. Compared to the 10% typically maintained by nations at total war. Or the 15-20% the nation of Paraguay was able to muster in its war to remain independent at the time. So, I think there's a real 'will' question on the side of the south's, when compared compared to others nationalistic movements. There's no doubt the South surrender before its absolute military capacity to resist was estinguished, OTL. (Throught guerilla and other means)

2) The South was largely fighting to preserve a way of life. If independence, and independence alone, were its chief goal, then it retained the means to resists circa 1865. (Being no worse of then say, the Spanish, in their resistence against napoelon earlier in the century, of the Paraguaians.) But while the Union might not have been able to subjugate the south, it'd always be able to disrupt its way of life beyond repair, moresoe against guerillas.

And while the South could continue to resist, or earlier adopt guerilla style tactics, such tactics would de-facto undermine the institution of slavery in the South, and weaken white-supremacy. Prolongued war of any kind would do this, so Once it became unclear, as it would after pro-longed guerilla warfare, whether or not white-supremacy in the south would be served better by reunion or continued resistence, I think the will to resist would completely collapse, not withstanding run-of-the-mill battlefatigue.
 
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