ACW: Does diplomatic recognition of the CSA inevitably lead to military intervention?

dcharles

Banned
In numerous ACW ATLs, it is postulated that through some means or another, the Confederacy receives diplomatic recognition (usually from the UK and/or France). It seems to be taken as a given that once the CS receives formal diplomatic recognition, that military intervention by the powers extending recognition follows.

How plausible is this?

It seems to me that there's quite a leap from sitting down with Confederate ambassadors to negotiate trade agreements--or even taking Confederate money to build warships--to spilling blood and spending money on their behalf.

Let's imagine the Confederates win a big victory in the Maryland Campaign instead of OTL's result of Antietam. The Emancipation Proclamation is forestalled. The UK and the French formally receive Confederate diplomats. Palmerston and Louis-Napoleon offer to mediate to put an end to the conflict.

This still doesn't change the fact that Washington DC remains in Union hands (I think Lee taking Washington in Sept 1862 is pretty much ASB). New Orleans is occupied by Union troops. The Mississippi Valley is slowly being conquered by Grant. The most pro-Confederate and economically robust parts of Tennessee are still in Union hands.

Consequently, Lincoln politely but firmly rejects their offer of mediation. How and why would we get from "no, thank you" to a shooting war?

What's the theory of the pro-interventionist case?
 
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Technically, Lincoln said anyone who recognizes the rebellion would face war, but i think that was mostly bluffing to keep them off his back unil he got a win to proclaim some emancipation
 
What @Nivek and @KingOnTheEdge said. I don't know too much about how other countries viewed the US Civil War, but pretty much everyone in a position to intervene had more to lose and less to gain from a war with the US, especially one that invites so much division and strife. Acknowledging the CSA is more along the lines of saber-rattling than a pitstop on the road to war.
 

dcharles

Banned
What @Nivek and @KingOnTheEdge said. I don't know too much about how other countries viewed the US Civil War, but pretty much everyone in a position to intervene had more to lose and less to gain from a war with the US, especially one that invites so much division and strife. Acknowledging the CSA is more along the lines of saber-rattling than a pitstop on the road to war.

Fair enough, but that still begs the question, what is the pro-interventionist theory of the case?
 

AlexG

Banned
Fair enough, but that still begs the question, what is the pro-interventionist theory of the case?

I guess it would be that the Confederacy would be much more indebted to the power that backs its independence both financially and politically and create a sort of dependency on that power. That said, the reverse is also true for the Union. It would adopt a long term hostile stance against the power(s) that back the confederacy and ally with that powers enemies.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
The answer is that it would become nearly inevitable, and the reason is extremely simple: a sovereign power will demand the right to trade, unmolested, with another sovereign power that it has recognised. The one power by far the most likely to recognise the CSA (compared to any other power, that is, for the eventuality is actually not at all probable in absolute terms) is Great Britain, which is also the power that is by far the most likely to insist on this matter in no uncertain terms.

The Union is blockading the CSA, which it doesn't recognise. If Britain recognises the CSA, it will expect and demand that the USA let any and all ships flying the Union Jack pass by the blockade freely. This means the blockade becomes instantly meaningless, and that the CSA now has essentially unrestricted access to the world and its markets again. The USA, from a military perspective, cannot allow this.

Therefore, the Civil War either ends there and then via negotiated peace, or the USA takes action against ships sailing under the British flag -- at which point the USA has given Britain grounds for war, which will be prosecuted. (Because, no matter what else Britain may think or feel about any factor involved, the precedent of letting the USA dictate terms to the Royal Navy is unacceptable.)
 

dcharles

Banned
The answer is that it would become nearly inevitable, and the reason is extremely simple: a sovereign power will demand the right to trade, unmolested, with another sovereign power that it has recognised. The one power by far the most likely to recognise the CSA (compared to any other power, that is, for the eventuality is actually not at all probable in absolute terms) is Great Britain, which is also the power that is by far the most likely to insist on this matter in no uncertain terms.

The Union is blockading the CSA, which it doesn't recognise. If Britain recognises the CSA, it will expect and demand that the USA let any and all ships flying the Union Jack pass by the blockade freely. This means the blockade becomes instantly meaningless, and that the CSA now has essentially unrestricted access to the world and its markets again. The USA, from a military perspective, cannot allow this.

Therefore, the Civil War either ends there and then via negotiated peace, or the USA takes action against ships sailing under the British flag -- at which point the USA has given Britain grounds for war, which will be prosecuted. (Because, no matter what else Britain may think or feel about any factor involved, the precedent of letting the USA dictate terms to the Royal Navy is unacceptable.)

So this is interesting to me.

Assume the general scenario as outlined in the OP. The UK formally receives Confederate diplomats and offers to mediate between the two powers. Lincoln rejects the offer of mediation.

There's no way that's Palmerston extends recognition and the offer to mediate if he thinks it's going to lead to war (or to shortcut it, if he thinks the US would refuse). So he's miscalculated in this case. If I understand you correctly, you're saying the UK will declare war upon the US because the US will not allow UK merchant vessels past the blockade.

IOTL during the Great War, the US recognized the Empire of Germany and while neutral, tried to trade with Germany, but was largely unsuccessful because of the British blockade. US merchant ships were seized or turned away from the German coast. Obviously, this did not result in war between the US and the UK.

What's to stop the UK in this ATL from doing what the US did during the early stages of WW1 IOTL?

It is simply a case of national pride?
 
Technically, Lincoln said anyone who recognizes the rebellion would face war, but i think that was mostly bluffing to keep them off his back unil he got a win to proclaim some emancipation

I agree, but the threat would lead the European powers to go to war even of Lincoln was bluffing.
No point in recognising the CSA unless they help fight for their independence.
The Question is what do the Brtish and French get out of such a move.
Free trade with the CSA and a place to export manufactured goods and rails etc cheaper that what could be produced in the union.
CSA would become major exporter of rice, naval stores, tobacco, cotton and indigo etc to Europe.
A divided America is one less great power what could rival the British and French empires.
Down side Europe is short of food due to bad harvests and is heavily dependent on import of wheat from the Union.
There could be a navy building race between the Union and the British and French.
The Union could build commerce raiders for the IRB crewed by union office to cripple British and French trade with their empire. Arms might be smuggled to the Irish , Boers or other who might rebel against the British or French.
Insurance rates at Lloyd's of London would go though the roof.
There would be unrest in England for the abolitionists.
I am not sure what would happen to British or French investment in the Union.
Canada now needs a lot more British troops to defend it.
It would be a risky move for the British and French and a direct challenge to the Monroe doctrine.
The Union might seek later alliances with other power like Germany or the Russian empire etc.

Once they British recognise the CSA conflict is bound to come as this would be seen as intervention American internal affairs and violation of the Monroe.
This in the view of Lincoln as stated in the Gettysburg address "that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”
The Union might see a CSA becoming independent as the start of the great powers in Europe attempting to carve the union in to small spheres of influence and end to the America republic and the symbol it gave to democracy worldwide.
 
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So this is interesting to me.

Assume the general scenario as outlined in the OP. The UK formally receives Confederate diplomats and offers to mediate between the two powers. Lincoln rejects the offer of mediation.

There's no way that's Palmerston extends recognition and the offer to mediate if he thinks it's going to lead to war (or to shortcut it, if he thinks the US would refuse). So he's miscalculated in this case. If I understand you correctly, you're saying the UK will declare war upon the US because the US will not allow UK merchant vessels past the blockade.

IOTL during the Great War, the US recognized the Empire of Germany and while neutral, tried to trade with Germany, but was largely unsuccessful because of the British blockade. US merchant ships were seized or turned away from the German coast. Obviously, this did not result in war between the US and the UK.

What's to stop the UK in this ATL from doing what the US did during the early stages of WW1 IOTL?

It is simply a case of national pride?

The difference is Britain had no problem with America or anyone else recognising Germany ,as Britain already accepted Germany was a nation. The Union see the CSA as a internal rebellion and not a Nation.
The British had a history of expecting countries to accept a coastal naval blockade in time of war.
 
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dcharles

Banned
The difference is Britain had no problem with America or anyone else recognising Germany ,as Britain already accepted Germany was a nation. The Union see the CSA as a internal rebellion and not a Nation.
The British had a history of expecting countries to accept a coastal naval blockade in time of war.

I understand that the UK didn't have a problem with anyone recognizing Germany. My point is to show an example of of neutral nation having it's right to trade with the belligerent in a war impeded and that not leading to a war with the nation doing the impeding.
 
I understand that the UK didn't have a problem with anyone recognizing Germany. My point is to show an example of of neutral nation having it's right to trade with the belligerent in a war impeded and that not leading to a war with the nation doing the impeding.

I agree, the blockade of the coast would not lead to war. But the seizure on a British ship in international waters outside with confederate diplomats on board could.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
So this is interesting to me.

Assume the general scenario as outlined in the OP. The UK formally receives Confederate diplomats and offers to mediate between the two powers. Lincoln rejects the offer of mediation.

There's no way that's Palmerston extends recognition and the offer to mediate if he thinks it's going to lead to war (or to shortcut it, if he thinks the US would refuse). So he's miscalculated in this case. If I understand you correctly, you're saying the UK will declare war upon the US because the US will not allow UK merchant vessels past the blockade.

IOTL during the Great War, the US recognized the Empire of Germany and while neutral, tried to trade with Germany, but was largely unsuccessful because of the British blockade. US merchant ships were seized or turned away from the German coast. Obviously, this did not result in war between the US and the UK.

What's to stop the UK in this ATL from doing what the US did during the early stages of WW1 IOTL?

It is simply a case of national pride?
The scenario is quite unlikely -- as I pointed out -- precisely because it wouldn't be advantageous to Britain at all.

Yet supposing it happens, which is the point of this thread, Britain will then back up its position with whatever power is required. The world in the 1860s is decidely not the same as the world in the 1910s. In the latter case, the USA was, compared to the powers of Europe, a military non-entity when World War One started; the USA also favoured the Entente, despite the neutrality.

In the 1860s, Britain ruled the waves. Not metaphorically. Literally. No challenge to that supremacy was tolerated. Note that the whole Trent affair was utterly minor in the grand scheme of things, and almost nobody with any real power in Britain wanted war to come from it. But Britain still made clear that unless the USA back-tracked like the devil in daylight, there would nevertheless be war. Britain saw its Royal Navy, not without good cause, as the oceanic equavelent of the Roman legion. Which is why a ship flying the Union Jack was to Britain the same thing as the words 'Civis romanus sum' to Rome. It meant "Challenge this at your peril."

If Britain recognised the CSA, and British ships got stopped, or (what would be worse) seized, or (what would be worse still) attacked by the US Navy... then that would be the Trent affair times a thousand. And it would unavoidably mean war. Vaguely equal powers can talk about these things. And lesser powers usually accept the will of greater powers, willingly or unwillingly. But the world's foremost power cannot ever tolerate things like these from its "lessers". The precedent would be too dangerous.
 

dcharles

Banned
The scenario is quite unlikely -- as I pointed out -- precisely because it wouldn't be advantageous to Britain at all.

Yet supposing it happens, which is the point of this thread, Britain will then back up its position with whatever power is required. The world in the 1860s is decidely not the same as the world in the 1910s. In the latter case, the USA was, compared to the powers of Europe, a military non-entity when World War One started; the USA also favoured the Entente, despite the neutrality.

Under what circumstances do you consider diplomatic recognition likely?

[/quote]In the 1860s, Britain ruled the waves. Not metaphorically. Literally. No challenge to that supremacy was tolerated. Note that the whole Trent affair was utterly minor in the grand scheme of things, and almost nobody with any real power in Britain wanted war to come from it. But Britain still made clear that unless the USA back-tracked like the devil in daylight, there would nevertheless be war. Britain saw its Royal Navy, not without good cause, as the oceanic equavelent of the Roman legion. Which is why a ship flying the Union Jack was to Britain the same thing as the words 'Civis romanus sum' to Rome. It meant "Challenge this at your peril."

If Britain recognised the CSA, and British ships got stopped, or (what would be worse) seized, or (what would be worse still) attacked by the US Navy... then that would be the Trent affair times a thousand. And it would unavoidably mean war. Vaguely equal powers can talk about these things. And lesser powers usually accept the will of greater powers, willingly or unwillingly. But the world's foremost power cannot ever tolerate things like these from its "lessers". The precedent would be too dangerous.
[/QUOTE]

Do you think it more likely that Lincoln would simply lift the blockade?
 

Skallagrim

Banned
Under what circumstances do you consider diplomatic recognition likely?
Virtually none.

The most probable cause is that the USA somehow offends Britain (e.g. the Trent affair) and refuses to back-track. This in itself would be a vanishingly unlikely scenario. (I have previously mentioned that Lincoln was kicked in the head by a horse when he was ten, which left him with lasting head-aches, and suggested a scenario where the man receives a further blow to the head as President, causing brain damage that makes him more aggressive and impulsive. That is just about the only situation I can contrive where Lincoln would let the Trent mess escalate, thus causing war. That course of events would make Britain and the CSA co-belligerents, and that would almost certainly prompt diplomatic recognition.)

The only alternative is that the CSA, by a persistent stroke of near-impossible luck, wins a whole slew of battles that they didn't in OTL> I've suggested the following in a previous thread:
Ideally for them, the Confederates would have to win First Manassas (July 21, 1861) decisively, thus setting the tone for the Eastern Theatre. If that then proceeds roughly the way it did in OTL up to Second Manassas (August 28-30, 1862), it will very much seem like the Confederates are going strong. This will lead to yet more of the same (overly) cautious hesitation on the Union's part. After that, have butterflied culminate in complete surprise at Battle of Antietam (September 17, 1862) as was intended, leading to a clear Confederate victory. [Obviously, I'm killing butterflies here; assume a similar but not identical set of battles occurring.]

That's the Eastern theatre. In the West, I don't think Shiloh would be enough. Again, ideally for the Confederates, they'd have to dedicate themselves to striking hard, and preventing the OTL Union victories at Fort Henry (February 6, 1862) and Fort Donelson (February 11-16, 1862). This would deny the Union its OTL control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. No fall of Nashville shortly thereafter. In an analogue to Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862) the Confederates should beat back the Union decisively. Also, A.S. Johnston should survive, since losing him was a big hit. This keeps the Confederates able to hold the line, and (combined with the lack of Union control of the rivers) prevents the fall of Memphis.

Finally, and this may well be the hardest to achieve, the fall of New Orleans must be prevented. Even if you keep the line in the Western Theatre up North, the war is lost as soon as the Union controls the mouth of the Mississippi. Once that happens, you may as well surrender and try to negotiate a deal where you publicly denounce secession as a mistake (and illegal) in return for blanket amnesty-- something Lincoln was more than willing to offer. So you need to ensure Farragut fails to take the city, no matter the cost.

At that point, it's just a matter of waiting it out in the West and South, and keeping up the pressure in the East. The ATL Antietam victory would bolster the Confederates and prevent the Emancipation Proclamation (since Lincoln was waiting for a victory to announce it). With the Confederates being perceived as more dangerous than in OTL, the invasion of the North would look like a success. A Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville analogue on Northern soil would be within reach, and once that is achieved, it becomes the decisive battlefield victory that Lee wished Gettysburg to be in OTL. With this string of Confederate successes and Union failures, you may except diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy by Britain and/or France at the close of 1862.
It goes without saying that this is all extremely unlikely to occur.

------------------------------------

Do you think it more likely that Lincoln would simply lift the blockade?
I think that -- unless Lincoln indeed has suffered brain damage -- we would have to be looking at a scenario where the CSA is doing so (implausibly) well that it's rapidly going to be a moot point. Peace talks would appear increasingly inevitable.
 
Under what circumstances do you consider diplomatic recognition likely?

In the 1860s, Britain ruled the waves. Not metaphorically. Literally. No challenge to that supremacy was tolerated. Note that the whole Trent affair was utterly minor in the grand scheme of things, and almost nobody with any real power in Britain wanted war to come from it. But Britain still made clear that unless the USA back-tracked like the devil in daylight, there would nevertheless be war. Britain saw its Royal Navy, not without good cause, as the oceanic equavelent of the Roman legion. Which is why a ship flying the Union Jack was to Britain the same thing as the words 'Civis romanus sum' to Rome. It meant "Challenge this at your peril."

If Britain recognised the CSA, and British ships got stopped, or (what would be worse) seized, or (what would be worse still) attacked by the US Navy... then that would be the Trent affair times a thousand. And it would unavoidably mean war. Vaguely equal powers can talk about these things. And lesser powers usually accept the will of greater powers, willingly or unwillingly. But the world's foremost power cannot ever tolerate things like these from its "lessers". The precedent would be too dangerous.

Do you think it more likely that Lincoln would simply lift the blockade?
if Lincoln lifts the blockade then he will need to capture all the southern ports to stop trade.
 
I just did a bit of reading on Cotton Diplomacy, cuz I figure that that'd pretty much be an inevitable factor in any foreign government recognizing the CSA. There were cotton manufacturers and merchants in both the UK and France that pressured for recognition of the CSA in exchange for cotton. They were denied because the British were fearful of the safety of Canada in the event of war and were increasingly dependent on US wheat and corn, while France desired a strong counterbalance to Britain's power. I'm not sure what would have to be altered for either there to recognize the CSA, but it'd be inevitably related to those reasons. Just throwing that out there.
 
Another thing to consider is the public opinion in the European states - now granted, the governments in most nations were free to set foreign policy with gleeful disregard of what "the masses" thought about it - but negro slavery in the US had become an odious institution. What's more, the governments generally found it as odious as the public sentiment did, but they chose to overlook it as long as they were profiting from trade in the US. Diplomatic recognition of the CSA would be political suicide for some elected officials in France and the UK - and a war in support of the CSA would be more unpopular still, to say the least.

Europe had been quite dependent on southern exports in the early 1800's, but that was no longer the case by the 1860's, as their expanding colonial empires started providing product that they once relied on the American south for. If I'm not mistaken, India became a source for cotton for the UK as an example. Neither the UK nor France, or any other Euro power I can think of would have been advantaged by recognition of the CSA as anything other than a belligerent, and none would have thought that meddling in, what was to them, a purely internal matter of the US was a good idea.
 

dcharles

Banned
Another thing to consider is the public opinion in the European states - now granted, the governments in most nations were free to set foreign policy with gleeful disregard of what "the masses" thought about it - but negro slavery in the US had become an odious institution. What's more, the governments generally found it as odious as the public sentiment did, but they chose to overlook it as long as they were profiting from trade in the US. Diplomatic recognition of the CSA would be political suicide for some elected officials in France and the UK - and a war in support of the CSA would be more unpopular still, to say the least.

Europe had been quite dependent on southern exports in the early 1800's, but that was no longer the case by the 1860's, as their expanding colonial empires started providing product that they once relied on the American south for. If I'm not mistaken, India became a source for cotton for the UK as an example. Neither the UK nor France, or any other Euro power I can think of would have been advantaged by recognition of the CSA as anything other than a belligerent, and none would have thought that meddling in, what was to them, a purely internal matter of the US was a good idea.


Well the question is not so much about public opinion or cotton exports before diplomatic recognition, but the effects of those factors subsequent to recognition. It seems to me that there would be a logical middle ground between recognition and intervention, but obviously, other commentators disagree. (And I'm not saying they're wrong.)

Does it make sense that elite favorability towards diplomatic recognition might influence actions on the diplomatic front, and that popular opinion against the Confederacy might influence actions against actual military aid?
 
Well the question is not so much about public opinion or cotton exports before diplomatic recognition, but the effects of those factors subsequent to recognition. It seems to me that there would be a logical middle ground between recognition and intervention, but obviously, other commentators disagree. (And I'm not saying they're wrong.)

Does it make sense that elite favorability towards diplomatic recognition might influence actions on the diplomatic front, and that popular opinion against the Confederacy might influence actions against actual military aid?
Makes perfect sense... but how to resolve it is the question. The two would inevitably turn into conflict ie diplomatic recognition could put a country into the position of "picking a side" between the USA and the CSA, and favoritism toward the CSA - even short of military intervention - could lead to a political backlash. That's a calculus that I don't think very many members of the UK House of Commons or the French Parlement were willing to take on. It was enough of an issue that private firms in France, the UK, and Denmark outfitted ships and ironclads for the CSA...
 
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