here come the POD !
September 19, 1971
NASA Headquarters, Washington DC
Nixon answer to Weinberger gave George Low reasons to believe that piloted flight might survive, if only at a bare-bones level. That meeting was to be the last before administrator Fletcher send its budget request to the Bureau of the Budget.
Around the table were NASA new boss James Fletcher; and two shuttle program managers, Dale Myers and Leroy Day.
James Fletcher was, above all, an honest man.
"Gentlemen, I will be direct: the situation of the shuttle program is bad enough that I and George discussed of alternatives. As you can see, we have now a half-baked supporter at the Office of Management and budget.
Caspar Weinberger warned President Nixon about how our budget was being cut to alarming levels. Nixon answer has been mixed. It amounts to a blessing of manned spaceflight, but not of the space shuttle itself ! George ?"
"Well, bluntly, the reason why Weinberger and Nixon wants manned spaceflight to continue its because it is already there. Negative symbolism - that what would be felt by the American people if men stopped flying in space only three years having set a foot on the Moon. The Soviets would laugh at us. Our boys that fight in Vietnam - further loss of an already low morale. So we have to hang on, perhaps according to the message that Weinberger and the President passed us in August."
"What do you mean ?" Low could felt the anguish in Dale Myers voice.
"I mean – for a minute, let's dissociate manned spaceflight and the space shuttle."
It was as if a mortar shell had exploded in the room. Low continued, undisturbed.
"My own view of all this that we might be able to bring the 1973 budget back to the 1972 level, but that our chances of bringing it above that level are essentially non-existent. You all know that the 1972 budget had been too small to launch the Shuttle as a new start. If future budgets continue at that level, a shuttle will be out of the question. Like it or not, but in my opinion, we face no other choice than to kill the space shuttle. Right now."
Low took a deep breath and continued, facing outraged faces.
"Yes, we should come up with a new manned space flight program. I’ve struggled to detail such option since last May. In my view, this program should be based on an evolutionary space station development, leading from Skylab through a series of research and applications modules – RAMs - to a distant goal of a permanent space station.
"The transportation system for this manned space flightprogram would consist of first, Apollo or Gemini capsules to Skylab.
"Then, a glider - a shuttle without rocket engines - launched on an expendable booster for the research and applications modules; and finally, the shuttle but delayed 5 to 10 years beyond our present thinking.
The new element in this plan is the glider. The whole program ties together in that none of it is dead-ended. The glider would be both an up and down logistics system for the research and applications modules, and, at the same time, lead toward the development of a shuttle in the future..."
Low ended its speech. Faces around the table were not exactly encouraging. Dale Myers notably looked appalled. That old bald head and glasses, a foot in both worlds of contractors - North American and NASA.
Myers was evidently outraged.
“That is not acceptable. Neither economically nor technically. This glider would be a typical bureaucratic compromise. You know, a camel is nothing more than a horse designed by a committee… It would be a combination of uneconomic expendables with expensive and risky spaceplane, satisfying neither NASA nor the Bureau of Budget in the end. James ?” Myers called out Fletcher.
"Yes, we talked about alternate space programs recently. But in my opinion we can't drop the shuttle, not now. We recently dropped the fully reusable shuttle in favour of a partially reusable concept. Mathematica told us that this is less expensive to built, but more expensive to fly. Now this glider is something like one third of a reusable shuttle; is such reusability level still worth the price? I don’t think so.”
Leroy Day gave the final blow
"Lacking its own propulsion, a glider would require its own enormous booster; a two-stage rocket which you throw away each time which and would drive the cost per flight as high as $35 million. And so you have an operating cost that is getting to be kind of ridiculous. The vehicle size and everything- it doesn't have much utility. It will certainly be a nice research vehicle that you could have studied re-entry with – but not a good space station logistic vehicle. The Office of Management and Budget and Congress will never support it.
“So we all agreed that the glider is unacceptable.” Fletcher said “sorry George, but we just can’t accept such concept. "Now I want to discuss another subject with you. George Schultz, director of the Budget, send me a staff memo.
Look at this:
“ The President read with interest and agreed with Mr. Weinberger's memorandum of August 12, 1971 on the subject of the future of NASA. Further, the President approved Mr. Weinberger's plan to find enough reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the 3.3 - 3.4 billion dollar level, or about 400 to 500 million more than the present planning targets. “
“As you can see, this approval does not embrace the Shuttle itself, only manned spaceflight.” Fletcher noted. He eyed an agitated Low. “George ?”
“We should debate further on alternate plans.” Low tried again. “Maybe not forego the Shuttle entirely and develop instead some alternative manned space flight program. I recognize that the glider I have described can’t be substitute for a true Shuttle.
"Even cheaper than this reusable spaceplane are capsules, either a block III Apollo or Big Gemini. I was present in September 1969 when Mayo killed the Space Task Group report. I remember Mayo shown Paine and I a report from its Bureau of Budget.
"They mentioned a possible $2.5 billion annual budget [...] adding that even at such level there could be a space station in 1980. However, there would be no space shuttle, rather Titan III-Gemini for logistics. Maybe we should go this way; it would result in a more balanced space program, a logistic vehicle plus a space station.
"Truth is, with such tight budget we have to cut down the logistic vehicle to the glider or Big Gemini or Apollo level if we want to run a space station program in parallel. Anything bigger and more expensive than the glider push the space station far into the 80’s, after the logistic vehicle development is complete. What’s the usefulness of a space station logistic vehicle if it has no space station to go, at least in the first ten years ? will we build a shuttle to nowhere ?"
Myers was boiling. So was Leroy Day, a leading manager in shuttle development.
“George, you know we just can’t accept such options. We can’t return to expendable capsules and rockets. Don’t forget our mantra and the shuttle raison d’etre is lower costs to orbit before space station logistics.”
“But you don’t realise that the Saturn Shuttle is in trouble within OMB and this new Flax Committee." Low retorqued. "It is still much too expensive for the budget Weinberger gave us. We can’t spend $2 billion a year on the shuttle when our overall budget is barely above $3 billion ! “ Low hammered them.
Fletcher intervened. “We just can’t drop the shuttle, not now. George, there's another way around the issues you highlighted. We can go past the glider if we cut deep into the full-size shuttle development costs. I think we can obtain the Saturn-Shuttle if we stage its development. The idea is to build early shuttles using Apollo technology we will phase out later. We would develop first a Mark I shuttle using Apollo J-2s and ablative heatshield. At a later date Mark II will introduce the higher performance SSME engines together with the reusable heatshield. Another way of cutting cost furthermore consists of having a ballistic, unmanned pressure-fed booster instead of the flyback Saturn."
"Taking into account these two fall-back options – phased approach and pressure-fed booster – I’m sure we can obtain a decent Shuttle. The glider is definitively unacceptable; it is too much of a compromise. If we have to use an expendable booster for manned spaceflight, we should better upgrading an Apollo or a Gemini capsule. But we won’t do this; I will insist of the phased Saturn shuttle.”
The meeting concluded with these words. George Low hardly was convinced.
We are arguing about a dangerously compromised shuttle that will suck whatever meagre budget we will have in the next future. We are debating low earth orbit operations – no Moon, no Mars. No, really, it should have been different.
Post-Apollo realities had been sometimes hard to accept, even for a pragmatic like Low. As he listened Fletcher pledge for the shuttle, he was reminded of another meeting exactly two years before.
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... late 1968, as NASA feverishly readied Apollo 8 for flight, newly elected President Richard Nixon had had Nobel Prize Charles Townes leading its transition team on space. Apollo 8 immense popular success ensured that Townes report would be positive.
Low had not been surprised by the report tone. He had learned to appreciate Townes over the years. Townes report to Nixon report expressively pushed for more lunar exploration through Apollo systems !
Sure, there would be no nuclear shuttle, no Mars expedition and no space shuttle to an Earth orbit space station. But flights to the Moon would continue, certainly leading to a moonbase in the late 70's.
NASA had made plans for moonbases since the early days of Apollo. Boeing 1966 Lunar Exploration Systems for Apollo - LESA - really matched Townes vision. A vision George Low might have very well accepted had he been the NASA administrator. But he was not, for personnal reasons.
Unfortunately the astute Webb was gone, replaced by Thomas Paine, a naive dreamer without any political clout. And Paine lobbied against Townes, befriending that idiotic vice-President Spiro Agnew.
As a result Nixon formed the Space Task Group, that over the course of spring and summer Agnew and Paine committed into an expensive program full of clean-sheet designs.
The Space Task Group made its final report on September 15, 1969.
A week later, the Bureau of Budget chief bean counter - Robert Mayo - exposed its feelings on the STG work and NASA future.
Mayo was harsh.
“The Space Task Group report is totally inadequate as a basis for Presidential decision or a published justification of Administration decision. The president is confused over what to decide or not, and this report doesn’t helps at all. Indeed the central issue - What is thefuture of civilian manned space flight activities ? - is not directly addressed. In the end this report is nothing more than an interesting catalogue of expensive options.”
Low reminded how pathetic a clash it had been.
Paine and Mayo each had three options on hand. But they were not exactly similar, not at all ! Paine thought of rocketships far in the future, while Mayo had its hands full of Vietnam war, decaying housing projects, riots, poverty and the ensuing rampant criminality.
Paine imagined NASA flying to Mars spending $10 billion each year.
Mayo saw NASA without manned spaceflight at all (!) running with $1.5 billion annually !
Paine shot first, exposing his own vision.
"Option I is illustrative of a decision to increase funding dramatically and results in early accomplishment of the major manned and unmanned mission opportunities, including launch of a manned mission to Mars in the mid-1980's, establishment of an orbiting lunar station, a 50 man earth-orbit space base and a lunar surface base. Funding would rise from the present $4 billion level to $8-10 billion in 1980.
Options II and III illustrate a decision to maintain funding initially at recent levels and then gradually increasing.
Option II includes a later decision to launch a Mars landing in 1986; in Option III this decision is deferred even futher, probably to the year 2000.
Funding for both options would remain approximately level at $4 billion for the next two fiscal years and then would rise to a peak of $5.7 billion in 1976 - this increase reflecting simultaneous peak resource requirements of space station and space shuttle developments. If these developments were conducted in series, lower funding levels ($4-5 billion) could be achieved. Option II would have a later peak of nearly $8 billion in the early 1980's resulting from the manned Mars landing program. »
As he heard Paine, Mayo eyebrows shot upwards. It was obvious negociations would be difficult.
“Fine. Of course we at the Bureau of Budget also considered various options. These options are based on budget levels, not on the missions themselves.
As you can see, it outlines the consequences of holding NASA to future budgets as low as $1.5 billion. Higher levels are $2.5 billion and $3.5 billion."
Paine opened his mouth, but Mayo waved him silent.
"Alternative A, at $3.5 billion per year, eliminates NERVA and stops production of Saturn V and Apollo spacecraft. This option, however, will maintain a vigorous program in piloted flight, featuring Skylab with three visits as well as six additional Apollo lunar missions. Better yet, such a budget will accommodate a Space Transportation System and Space Station module development with launch of both in 1979.
"Options B1 and B2, at $2.5 billion, also permits flight of Skylab with its three visits, along with the six Apollos. There will be a space station in 1980, with Titan III-Gemini for logistics.
However, there will be no space shuttle.
"Option C is a $1.5 billion budget. The piloted space program will shut down entirely. All manned space flight ceases with Apollo 14 in July 1970. Saturn launch facilities at Cape Canaveral shut down. Yet we will continue to maintain a vigorous program of automated space flight.
« Even at $1.5 billion, NASA could send six Viking landers to Mars, and could take advantage of a rare alignment of the outer planets to send spacecraft to Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. NASA would conduct at least one planetary launch each year in the decade, and would pursue a relatively ambitious science and applications program with 95 launches in the decade.
“If – and that’s a big IF – manned spaceflight ever continues, it will be without the shuttle. Upgraded Titan III can certainly do the job unless the shuttle flew sixty times a year - a flight per week !" Mayo concluded.
Within the space of three minutes NASA future budget melted from $10 billion to $1.5 billion. Jesus, we are doomed.
Low could see how Paine took it bad, and how hard it would be for him to answer.
Paine fumbled with budget charts.
“I have begun by assembling my associates wish list that totals $5.4 billion and includes $1.0 billion in new starts. I recognized this is too much and responded their requests were not consistent with the recommendations made to the President by the STG, and far exceed the dollar level that can be reasonably expected.
Hence Mr Mayo I requests $4.2 billion in outlays and $4.497 billion in new budget authority. I can't see how we could cut farther without inflicting serious damage to our space program."
Mayo barely raised an eyebrow.
“You just don’t understand. $3.5 billion is the maximum you will have. The President has no intention of granting anything above that level."
Paine nearly lost his temper
“You can’t do this ! It represents a cut of over a billion dollars or more than 25 percent in my request. Do you realize that your budget mean no commitment to either a space station or a shuttle; cutting the launch rate for Apollo missions to as low as one flight per year; slams the door on continued production of the Saturn V; and even prohibits any new starts even in automated spacecraft ! Do you see that ? I just can’t think the President want this. Be sure I'll meet him personally as soon as possible."
And Paine wrote to Nixon, directly, urging a curtailed and Spartan level of $4.075 billion that would keep the Saturn V in production, or a level of $3.935 billion that would suspend Saturn V production but provide startup funds for a space station and shuttle.
And Nixon didn't changed his opinion.
And Paine had to accept the BoB figures of $3.7 billion in budget authority and $3.825 billion in outlays. These were the numbers that would go to Congress in the President's budget.
Even worse, ordinarily NASA would have absorbed this cut and made the best of it. Alas, the cuts for FY 1971 were only beginning. And this was merely Nixon's requested budget. Congress was free to make further cuts !
In the ensuing budget debates NASA faced its best enemies - Walter Mondale, William Proxmire and Joseph Karth.
In spring 1970 the manned spaceflight program experimented near-death experience. Only the shuttle and space station survived the political storm. Soon however further cut forced a difficult choice - shuttle OR station ? The shuttle had been chosen, and the space station postponed to better days.
Two years later however, the space shuttle, last survivor of Paine grandiose Space Task Group plans, was threatened. And the menace of a shutting down of the manned space flight program after Skylab still loomed over the horizon... as the meeting concluded, George Low mentally wished Fletcher and the shuttle a better fate than Tom Paine Mars dreams.
