Across the high frontier: a Big Gemini space TL

So is the design for the GE D-2 differing from this? It certainly has the advantage of offering a greater habitable volume for a given Spacecraft Mass (light enough for a Titan III with UA1205's?) but as was 'said' by Gordon, it does heavily resemble a Soyuz. Though it has been said that the Soyuz design was copied from the initial D-2, and most likely simply reached independently by Korolev's OKB-1 Design Bureau, there is a certain, symmetry to having the US superficially take from the USSR for once. :p

But I still think that either Big Gemini (Helios) and Apollo are gonna come out on top, one for spacecraft experience, the other for having a lot it can be built on.
 

Archibald

Banned
So is the design for the GE D-2 differing from this? It certainly has the advantage of offering a greater habitable volume for a given Spacecraft Mass (light enough for a Titan III with UA1205's?) but as was 'said' by Gordon, it does heavily resemble a Soyuz. Though it has been said that the Soyuz design was copied from the initial D-2, and most likely simply reached independently by Korolev's OKB-1 Design Bureau, there is a certain, symmetry to having the US superficially take from the USSR for once. :p

But I still think that either Big Gemini (Helios) and Apollo are gonna come out on top, one for spacecraft experience, the other for having a lot it can be built on.

Yes - it is the very same GE D-2 design of 1961. I'd always liked its resemblance to the Soyuz, which by itself is a clever design - the escape system is just amazing when you think about it (how do you save a crew stuck with a heavy module above ther heads, where the usual, Apollo escape tower stands ?) The end of the shuttle meant that the last gasp of the 1969 STG is over, so NASA takes its chance to starts again from a clean sheet of paper - and contractors know that, so they take their chance, too. It's 1961 Apollo bidding contest all over again.
And you're right - these two will come out on top (I'm bad at creating suspense - I knew it ! :p )
 
Europe in space (6)

Archibald

Banned
small Europe update

"The attention of the second ESC-NASA joint group of experts which met at Neuilly (Paris) from 8 to 11 February 1972 took account of the changing context of US-European cooperation. As of December, apart from the prospects of European participation in the shuttle even in reduced terms, two other areas of cooperation had been envisaged:
1. the tug system, on which ELDO had issued a Phase A report since the first meeting;
2. an orbital system or module and some studies on experiment definition.
From the beginning of 1972 the various orbital system concepts had crystallised in the form of a "sortie module", i.e. a laboratory transported by the shuttle that would remain attached to it throughout its stay in orbit.
It happened that within a space station program both elements might survive in some form or another. The sortie lab would evolve into a fully-fledged station module, probably derived from Big Gemini cargo section.

The real surprise was NASA change of attitude over ELDO involvement in the space tug. From the very beginning this had been the part of the post-Apollo programme in which Europe could have best profited from technology transfer; yet in shuttle days NASA had been markedly reluctant.

The reason officially given were mainly technical. This, it was said, was the less advanced project, in terms of the development phase, of the post-Apollo programme; it was not clear how, when and indeed if ever it would be built.

The secondary literature gives additional reasons including:
1. American scepticism, widely shared in Europe, over Europe's technical ability to develop the tug on its own, especially as far as propulsion was concerned;
2. The necessity for the USA not to transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable US technology;
3. NASA's concern over the safety of housing a tug with its planned cryogenic fuel in the shuttle's payload bay;
4. Military willingness to take complete control over the device.
5.The cost of the Sortie lab was then estimated at $200 million, against an estimated cost for shuttle tug of about $500 million for prospect of a production line of 20 to 30 units over a decade.

This difference has been considered to be an important element in the launcher-versus-post-Apollo dilemma.

In the end the much less expensive space station tug freed relevant European financial contributions in favour of Ariane just like the sortie lab would have.

The new tug was indeed a different beast than its shuttle predecessor.

Tug missions now amount to bridge the distance between orbital injection by the launch vehicle and the space station itself, including docking.

The tug would no longer be carried by a manned vehicle; cryogenic propulsion was deemed totally unnecessary; and the military had no longer interest in the project. It was on this renewed basis that NASA encouraged ELDO involvement in the space tug.


Excerpt from: A history of the European Space Agency, 1958 - 1987
 
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1972: NASA hell of a year (9)

Archibald

Banned
here come the post-Skylab space station

This is going to be a very big entry, the largest in the TL so far. After all the new space station is the centerpiece of NASA future. :cool:

April 20, 1972

Maxwell Hunter of Lockheed space division went to the stage of the little conference room located in Building 1, Johnson Space Flight Center, Houston, Texas.
On the view graph machine appeared a foil with a title:

AN ARCHITECTURE UTILIZING EXISTING APOLLO ASSETS TO COMPLETE AND RESUPPLY THE 1980 SPACE STATION.



Hunter faced the little group gathered around the table. There were NASA Administrator James Beggs, his deputy George Low, Eberhard Reese from Marshall; Kurt Debus, of the Kennedy Space Center.

There were also representatives from Martin Marietta, the builder of the Titan launch vehicle. Former MSC director Bob Gilruth and his successor at the head in Houston, Chris Kraft, were also present.
To Hunter surprise retired USAF general Bernard Schriever was also there. Schriever: the man behind the formidable build-up of America’s missile force in the 50’s.
Beggs introduced the meeting.
Future of the human spaceflight program is now assured beyond Skylab and an eventual joint flight with the soviets, the last Apollos. We have a manned ship. We have plenty of options from contractors; lifting bodies, winged ships, and capsules – Corona, Apollo, and Big Gemini.We will pick a winner in August. Whatever manned ship it carries, Titan III-M, being mostly buy off the shelf from USAF, is too little work for our large Apollo workforce.
We have reports of former engineers of ours driving taxicabs, and the Florida space coast looks devastated.

Even if we manage to secure a space station, many Apollo ground-based assets are threatened. Marshall and Launch Complex 39 may fell victim of bean counters, just like the shuttle.
George Low went to the view graph machine.
As you can see as early as February early sketches of the so-called 1980 space station show a modified Skylab with Crew Transfer Vehicles, and pressurised logistic modules that are gradually added to the workshop, extending its capabilities."
However our hopes of using the two workshops as the core of the future station are rapidly vanishing.

Skylab A construction is far too advanced, while Skylab B is to be kept in reserve as backup. Beyond that, the Skylabs are not build for resupply, and use outdated Apollo subsystems.


We have four space stations and only three Saturn V to launch them. Or we cancel another Apollo mission, or the second Skylab will have no launcher.

I suggest that if the first Skylab fail in orbit, parts of its lost experiments should be flown on early Crew Transfer Vehicles, or space station missions, and not on Skylab B." Low continued.
"Another issue is how to emplace the space station modules on the core; how to fly them from orbital insertion to their final destination.
Integration of the propulsion and navigation systems within the modules would make them too heavy for the Titan; we need a separate space tug instead, although much different from the shuttle vehicle.

We did a quick review of existing upper stages - solid-fueled kick stages plus the Agena, Transtage and Centaur.”

The solid-fueled stage are extremely cheap, but lacks flexibility – no restart. The Transtage is just too big. As for the Centaur...” Beggs marked a pause.
"The Centaur," Gilruth interrupted "should be considered further, if only for long term manned missions to geosynchronous or low lunar orbit.

We could stage such missions from the future low earth orbit manned platform.” He paused.

“I tend to think that, if ten years ago we had started with a space station instead of the race to the Moon, it would have been easier to sustain public support over the long haul. If only we had used it as a platform to support a Moon landing !

As Apollo close from conclusion, we are left with a “what next?” problem that NASA really has to solve. A space station at that point sounds a bit anticlimactic - unless we try and found a way to tie to a manned deep space program."

Beggs was half convinced by the argument.

“So you're telling me the Centaur allows us to extend the range of our manned space operations up to cislunar space." Gilruth nodded. "Fine, but it is still a big step backward compared to Apollo surface operations. We can't even use the Centaur with an ordinary Apollo, first because the ship is too heavy, secondly because the Centaur is not man-rated - a fragile bubble of metal wrapped around very cold liquid hydrogen. That's how I see it. George won't contradict me"


Low was cornered by its past comments on the Centaur reliability, or lack of. "In the end the Agena apeared to be the most reasonable approach. It is small, it is versatile. To you, Maxwell.”

Let me first summarize the current situation.
"NASA expected to be able to utilize the Space Shuttle to fill the role as the primary crew and cargo delivery system throughout the life of an eventual future space station. However, last October under pressure of president Nixon’s OMB the shuttle effort was put on hold.

We sought alternate means to perform assembly of a space station.

We imagined that the manned crew capsule could be launched together with a module, and ferry it to the core space station.
This way of building a space station, however, has been established when the shuttle was assumed to be the primary manned delivery system for NASA. As a result missions as currently planned will not be able to fully meet the 1980 space station non-shuttle cargo delivery requirements, not mentioning the crucial problem of station assembly.

NASA estimations of the Crew Transfer Vehicle show a mass of 6200 kg, a mass to be shaved of Titan III payload to the space station orbit, around 12000 kg.
This is not acceptable, and Lockheed has been developing a low-risk cost-effective approach for delivering assembly elements, then outfitting hardware, science payloads, and re-supply cargo to the 1980 space station in the incoming non-Shuttle decade.

We adapted our Shuttle Agena tug to the new paradigm.

Rather than developing new space vehicles, Lockheed’s approach leverages existing Apollo assets to satisfy the projected annual upmass requirements of the 1980 space station.

This ensures maximum utilization of the more than $20 billion of U.S. taxpayer and corporate investments in developing Apollo space systems, launch vehicles, ground infrastructure and processes, and trained personnel. Further, utilizing existing, proven, and operational space assets minimizes development costs and risks.

Existing Apollo ground infrastructure assets include NASA’s extensive manufacturing, production, integration and launch facilities at Michoud (Louisiana), Huntington Beach in California and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). NASA’s operational launch site infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center includes Launch Complex 39B for Saturn IB, which would be used to support space station assembly mission requirements.

The payload processing requirements in support of space station module assembly missions are compatible with the Skylab facilities available at KSC for the pre-launch servicing and integration with Saturn V.”

Hunter was now in full sale-pitch mode.

Last year NASA accorded Lockheed contract NAS9-11949. The object was a study of Agena potential as space tug for the space shuttle. The report was issued February 25, 1972.

Before that - when the shuttle was cancelled - we started running an internal study as how to use the Agena for the build-up of a space station, its logistics, and many others missions. Results have been extremely promising."
Hunter paused.
"So here’s the Agena Service Module. “

The view-graph showed the distinctive shape of the Agena: a slim, silvered cylinder with a squat truss assembly housing varied subsystems.

Others views showed Agena-based missions: the SERT-II electric propulsion testbed, and a Gemini Target Vehicle.

Back in 1965 manned Gemini capsules had performed orbital rendezvous and docking with Atlas-launched Agenas, followed by boosts to higher orbits, Gemini 11 climbing as high as 800 miles.

For space station assembly the Agena will ride an uprated Saturn IB, which is currently the widest operational U.S. launcher capable of lifting 6.60m large modules to the space station LEO transfer orbit - nominally 300 km circular at 51 degrees inclination.

"In a typical assembly mission the Agena service module - ASM - would be mated to the station module, both being encapsulated in a 6.60m Skylab shroud and mounted atop a Saturn IB launch vehicle.
The ASM and its payload would then be launched into an insertion orbit and join the space station planned 51.6 degree, 250 nautical mile low Earth orbit.


Once in orbit, the Agena, under ground control, would rise the orbit and manoeuvre to bring the module to the vicinity of the space station.


Once close from it, a sophisticated, automated system will perform the final approach and docking manoeuvres. Such system consists of a spaceborne laser radar (LADAR) configured to meet the requirements for rendezvous and docking with a cooperative object in low-earth-orbit.”


We initiated research on such system for the Shuttle tug, the study I mentioned earlier.

The LADAR we studied used existing pulsed CO2 laser technology. We analysed the performance of a family of candidate LADARS, and performed tradeoffs studies as a function of size, weight, and power consumption were carried out for maximum ranges of 50, 100, 200, and 300 nautical miles. 50 miles was considered enough, and is now the preferred option.

The investigation supports our contention that a rendezvous and docking LADAR can be constructed to offer a cost effective and reliable solution to the envisioned space missions.


Logistics will be provided by derivatives of existing boosters such as Atlas, Delta and Titan, If expanded to leftover Saturn IB and Europe future L3B, a very large range of missions might be covered.

Delta, Atlas and L3B might launch stretched or shortened Agena service modules, to be used for space station reboost. This may be used as basis for International flights. The Agena can easily be stored in space; clusters of cheap Agenas might provide a low-cost Earth-Moon Transfer Stage.”


George Low simply asked “Tell us more about the Agena itself, and how do you intend to accomplish the mission with it”

Hunter continued

The existing Agena D is 5 ft in diameter, weighs approximately 15,000 lbs and uses Acid/UDMH propellant. As conceived, the Agena is a core stage to which mission peculiar equipment is attached.

Off the shelf "peculiars" include two versions of secondary propulsion systems (SPS), cold gas attitude control kits, various battery and power options, as well as communication options.


The Agena has been used as a stable platform providing power and commands to many varied types of payloads--maximum injected payloads have exceeded 8000 lbs. The present Agena engine system using the Bell Aerosystem 8247 engine can restart at least fifteen times in space.

"Back in 1968 Lockheed was developing an advanced Agena using the Apollo propellants. It was a new stage using Apollo propellants having a higher performing Bell engine.”

Hunter shuffled notes, foils and view-graphs charts.

"Gentlemen, the idea of using Agena for a space station is not new. It is at least four years old !” On the view-graph machine appeared the front page of study.


BELLCOMM, INC.
1100 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036
SUBJECT: A Titan-IIIM Launched Space Station
DATE: July 23, 1968
Program -Case 710
FROM: E. D. Marion and J. A. Schelke


ABSTRACT

To achieve some understanding of the range of orbital programs available in the post-AAP period, Bellcomm initiated a study to see if a space program could be constructed using a series of small specialist space stations. The experiment requirements from the Saturn V Workshop Study were used to size the small space station modules.

The results showed that a group of small space stations could economically support the maximum experiment package. These spacecraft would be launched on a Titan IIIM, and be assembled in space through rendezvous and docking. The crew ascent and return vehicle was the Gemini-B modified to permit aft-end docking. An unmanned logistics vehicle, flying on an Atlas-Centaur class vehicle, proved to be the most economical approach to resupply.”

As you can see, the idea of a Gemini Agena -serviced space station had been floated many years ago” Hunter added triumphantly.

Istate that the first Agena in a production group for NASA purposes can be available 18-to-20 months after go-ahead.

Each succeeding bird would require 13 months; less time if mission peculiar subsystems become standardized.


Just think about the potential of such spacecraft !” Hunter enthusiastically added.

”A standard Agena on top an Atlas or a Titan IIIB could reboost the station on its orbit. Again the Bellcomm study we dug out describes such operation.” Hunter added, showing another chart


(…) the rendezvous capability is included in the Agena vehicle, although the manoeuvre is controlled from the manned station.

A large pressurizable transfer tube connects the cargo compartment to the space station cabin.


Umbilical connections to the logistics vehicle fuel tanks can be made in several ways.

The docking operation itself could join two quick disconnect fittings outside the transfer tube or fittings inside the tube could be connected manually by the crew.


The first operation is to transfer propellants. When this is completed, the propellant tank is severed and the Agena backs away, carrying the propellant tanks and some of the docking structure with it (…)


We discovered that the Agena could perform many missions.
Just think about it !

We could test this tug using the old Skylab workshop and eventually reboost it.

We could desorbit the workshop properly, without risking a crew’s life.

We could add a small pressurised module to the Agena and create a very cheap logistic spacecraft, as described in this study.

We could plug Big Gemini nose into an Agena and boost the ship to higher orbits. The military would love that.

Agena presently is required to be propulsively desorbited at mission completion. This last firing has been routinely accomplished after orbital durations in excess of 3 months. No restart problems are anticipated in mission times over a year, although we strongly recommend a thorough reexamination of engine components – seals. We could actually store Agenas in orbit !"

Hunter exclaimed.

In conclusion I would say that an Agena can easily be made into an active rendezvous stage with translation and soft docking capability. In fact, a stage having almost this capability have undergone qualification in an anechoic chamber in 1968. Details are classified”.

"Any comments ?" Beggs asked. "Eberhard ?"

Rees noted “You can’t reboost Skylab with your Agena, not with the main engine. The workshop structure won’t resist, as we found when we envisaged to use Apollo big engine, which has a similar thrust level.”

So, how will you reboost Skylab ?” Hunter replied

We will use the Apollo reaction control system. Well, you told us that Lockheed planned an upgraded of the Agena with Apollo RCS, so the Agena might work as well.”

Indeed. Beyond that we have more ambitious plans” Hunter continued

The first is the AMV – Agena Manoeuvring Vehicle. This is an Agena without the main engine only RCS thrusters remain. This vehicle will catch platforms in the immediate neighbourhood of the space station, and dock them.

"An extension of this concept is the ATV – Agena Transfer Vehicle. It’s a space tug, much like the cancelled shuttle reusable upper stage. In conclusion, the Agena can perform many unmanned missions, and would be an ideal complement to Big Gemini.”

Thank you. This Agena looks an interesting, well-thought solution. However your idea of using a Saturn IB, not a Titan III, as launcher, is intriguing at least. Can representatives of Marshall tell us more about current situation of the center, and how many Saturns are left ? Eberhard Rees maybe ?“

Well, we have hopes that the Shuttle is not totally dead; maybe we will revive the program once the station orbit and completed, around 1983. However my center need work NOW, and in a hurry, if we want to survive the present decade. Shall I remember you what Nixon options mentioned back in 1969 ?"

Two other options, at $2.5 billion, also permit flight of Skylab with its three visits. There could even be a space station in 1980, with Titan III-Gemini for logistics. However, there will be no space shuttle. NASA-Marshall will close, while activity at the Manned Spacecraft Center (Houston) would fall substantially.

This paragraph was part of an OMB larger review of President Nixon space options for FY71 and beyond. Well, the shuttle had been canned, so over the last six months I attempted diversification, with mixed results.

Marshall attempted to capitalize on Skylab solar observatory success for the Large Space Telescope, but the leadership went to Goddard.

Rees continued

"The Agena might be of interest for us. Indeed it was Marshall that was responsible for the Shuttle space tug – and your mention of the L3B reminded me that the Europeans were very interested by a cooperation.

But the military were reluctant, they didn’t wanted any foreign involvement because of their use of the Shuttle and its tug to ferry some of their classified satellites. At least this problem disappears if we use the tug for assembly of a civilian space station.”


Indeed. We should discuss further of possible cooperation with ESRO on the subject of the tug.” Beggs answered. “Now tell us, how many Saturns are in existence ?”


Ach so ! That the moment Reese had been waiting for so long.
Fuck the shuttle.
Fuck the Titan.
Long live the Saturns !
It is the last opportunity to return the Saturn to production status.
Don't fool it !
Of the fourteen Saturn IB build before closure of the production line in 1968, four have been expanded in unmanned tests, and one has been used for Apollo 7.

Three more will boost Skylab crews to the station, and the ninth (AS-209) is held in reserve as rescue vehicle.”


And so remain five Saturn IBs that have been build for Apollo Applications Program missions now cancelled.

AS-210 will be expanded in a join flight with the soviets; however AS-209 won’t fly if no accident happens, so this rocket will be available as soon as Apollo-Soyuz will land safely, in 1975.


In conclusion five Saturn IB are available, barely enough to build a space station.”


Nobody noticed that Rees had made a major mistake. It was not five, but seven Saturn IBs that had been left.

The procurement of long leadtime components for four additional Saturn IB Launch Vehicles (SA-213 through SA-216) was approved in August 1966.

This approval was granted to retain the option to continue uninterrupted production of the Saturn IB Launch Vehicle if the requirement for additional launch vehicles became firm. The procurement of these additional launch vehicles (SA-213 through SA-216) was approved by Mr. Webb, NASA Administrator, on January 18, 1968. follow-on Saturn IB Launch Vehicles.

Some long leadtime components such as tanks, structures, etc., have already been fabricated for vehicles 213 through 216. Steps are being taken to reorient the production and support activities to give the most economically sound program feasible that will result in qualified, flightworthy launch vehicles.


To Rees credit, these last two Saturn IBs were nothing more than some first stage structure elements and Redstone tanks that had been manufactured and stored at Michoud, but never assembled into stages. Plus their S-IVBs had never been build. Rees later remembered this fact, but it was too late to save Marshall.

I suppose that these Saturns should be modified to received the Agena. Are further modifications needed ?”

Excellent !

We discussed of such problem since the shuttle had been cancelled. Result is the Saturn Life Extension Program – SLEP.

Saturn IBs stored at Marshall will be disassembled and their stages send back to Michoud and Huntington Beach for upgrade.

Mods includes Minuteman strapons and Agena integration above the S-IVB - a handful of S-IVBs might be transferred from Saturn V to Saturn IB, to complete the last three clusters.

Hmm, that’s may be expensive… why not simply add the Agena, or use a Titan III ? In other words how on Earth will we justify to Congress the expense of two similar rockets – Saturn IB and Titan III - flying from launch pads only kilometres away, for years ?” Beggs asked dryly.

That was the very issue, but Rees had plenty of arguments to shoot that one down. Representatives from Martin Marietta, however, shot first.

The Titan is cheap heavy lift. Back in 1961 the Department of Defence envisaged up to 72 space launches a year from three Titan III pads at the Cape. Yes: seventy-two.

As planning progressed, one pad was eliminated and maximum launch rate cut to five a month. The idea was that the DoD would be launching large numbers of manned and unmanned military spacecraft from the Cape during the 1965 to 1975 period and that such a launching rate would require a rapid-fire assembly and checkout complex.


As it turned out, only three Titan 3Cs were launched per year in 1965 and 1966 and an average of two flew from the complex over the next years.

Launch rate is not expected to go beyond three or four per year in the next future. Thus as of today an excess of Titans exists, and it is apparent that the costly Titan 3C launch complex will never be used to its full capability.

Our cost analyses showed that such a facility would save money if a launch rate of 18 per year was achieved.

We expected the Titan 3 family production rate to be 18 vehicles per year from 1970.

A Titan bird for use by NASA, built from scratch, could be made available within 24 months - if pulled from a production line, the availability could be improved to 13 weeks from order.

However the 1970 production rate we described represents half the plant and tooling capacity.

Obviously this extra tooling has been mothballed. We are not talking about airframes here; contractors have similar overcapacity. Aerojet, for example, could build plenty of Titan engines. At a production rate of 18 per year, Martin-Marietta will deliver Titan IIIs for only $9 million per unit.


Then we have to clear another interrogation. What solids for the man-rated Titan ? should we use the five segment or the more powerful seven segment rocket motors ?

Favouring the seven segment motor is the fact that USAF consider Titan III-M as man-rated.


Unmanned spaceflight would certainly benefit from more lift-off thrust: Mariner Jupiter-Saturn and Viking could be heavier or faster.

The seven-segment motor, however, should be stacked on the pad, not on the current building, with modifications to the launch pad. Costs could be shared with the Air Force. The five segment main advantage is, well, that it is already in use.”


George Low sighed

“I’d prefer the seven segment solid. Maybe USAF could be involved through Big Gemini MOL-like missions. They have an unfinished pad at Vandenberg they built for the Manned Orbital Laboratory.”

Flight rate estimation is a difficult problem. Eberhard, any word on the Saturn IB ? How do we justify the use of it to carry the space station modules when Titan is such a bargain ?”

Rees had patiently waited the end of the Marietta rant.

The first thing to remember is that we only use spare Saturns. We won’t reopen the production line - not immediately.

Secondly, obtaining a space station won’t be easy, unless we draw heavily on Skylab.

In fact Skylabs might be key, even if we can’t really build the station directly from it. Here’s my argumentation for the 1980 station, based on Skylab.

We can argue we need Saturn V to launch the 1980 space station because it’s a Skylab derivative.
We can also argue we need the Saturn IBs because Skylab is build from an S-IVB. Station modules could be derivatives of the Skylab workshop – light enough to ride on a Saturn IB if we get ride of the large supply on board, and airlock.
We can argue that North American Rockwell Space Division need something to replace both the Shuttle orbiter and the Apollo – why not a dry workshop S-II ?

As Maxwell showed us the Titan is hampered by the CTV reentry module mass. Even with the Agena and a payload equal to Saturn IB, the Titan can’t lift an orbital workshop because Skylab is too wide.

We have a large stock of Saturn, and we should use them, even if our manned capsule ride to space on top of a Titan. I see no contradictions in that.” Rees added “Otherwise there will be massive layouts, and not only at Marshall. Kurt ?”

Kurt Debus was boss of Cap Canaveral, and an ally of Reese.

We really need something to fill Launch Complex 39 in the next years. We can’t just demolish such huge infrastructure !

In my opinion, even if we obtain more Skylabs, that’s only two or three more Saturn V over the next ten years, before an eventual shuttle. Saturn V are expensive and scarce, while smaller Saturn IBs are many and cheap.

We already have modified LC-39B for Saturn IB with the milkstool. Adding Saturn IB to Saturn V schedule would give us six to eight launches, depending on how many Saturn V we will use to build the 1980 space station. “

Reese jumped on.

"Gentleman, we have to remember my fellow von Braun opinions about manned spaceflight. Rule of thumb is to never fly astronauts on a launch vehicle with solid rocket motors. Destructive events are generally violent and very fast, overtaking launch escape systems. That why I suggest a gradual path to return Saturn IB to production status."

He took a deep breath.

Don't fool it up !

"I told you five Saturn IB remained in storage. We should launch space station modules with them, introducing gradual upgrades in the process before reopening the production line.

Then, I suggest to lower Saturn cost by sharing technology with the Delta booster. The Delta 3000 features nine small graphite epoxy solid rocket motors, and Apollo engines on its upper stage. We could cluster eight Deltas to create a new Saturn cluster ! The S-IVB second stage would first be modestly upgraded with the J-2S; later the XLR-129 would result in a massive performance boost.

We plan to use that latter engine in the shuttle; flying it on the Saturn first would provide valuable data.

Every step in this process - the small solids, Delta cluster, and XLR-129 - is gradual and flexible, the end result being a very powerful and reliable launcher.

The Delta, like the S-IVB, is build by Douglas; this contractor would thus takeover production of the full rocket."


"Now I would like to talk a little bit more of the S-IVB itself. For its huge size it can nonetheless be made cheap.

A Bellcom memo of April 1969 discussed the matter, and the conclusions remain pertinent even today.

The subject of low cost low earth orbit (LEO) transportation systems is under extensive study throughout NASA, the military and the industry. Approaches under study have included launch vehicles which vary from near term expendable configurations based on Saturn hardware to completely flyback recoverable concepts such as that proposed by General Dynamics/Convair Division.
A major option under consideration is development of a near term intermediate launch vehicle (ILV).
A technology aspect which deserves consideration is a cheap version of the S-IVB Stage 2 which is proposed as the second stage of all candidate neaz term ILV configurations.

The SIVB stage is the only operational manrated cryogenic high performance stage of a size concomitant with an ILV. NASA Marshall has recently funded McDonnell Douglas to initiate design of a "scrubdown" version of the SIVB.

In a recent study the Aerospace Corporation estimated the cost of the NASA 260-inch diameter solid /S-IVB rocket at 260 $/Ib to LEO on the basis of a 15 vehicle buy, launched at a rate of five per year. It may be deduced therefore that SRM/SIVB vehicles are indeed competitive to Air Force configuration SRM/ liquid upper stages.
It is apparent that the SIVB stage is a prime candidate upper stage for a near term ILV. The SIVB is man-rated, in the inventory, and competitive in cost with a new stage when installed above either clustered solid rocket motors of whatever diameter (120 inc, 156 inch or the monster 260 inch).

A cheap S-IVB ?

In all candidate ILV configurations with the exception of the INT-20, the S-IVB is by far the costlier piece of hardware according to the cost analyses which have been carried out. The S-IVB under existing ground rules has been priced out at twice the cost of a typical solid first stage. At the present time however there is abundant evidence that the SIVB can be available at substantially reduced price, in a configuration which also eliminates the need for a separate instrument unit.

On a production basis of 60 vehicles at 12/year (half for Saturn V use), an SIVB for use on a Saturn IB was priced at $4.5 million a copy (launch costs not included). Including J-2 engine the stage cost was roughly $6.5 million.

In the end it might be possible to launch a typical SRM/SIVB (say from E'TR not KSC), for (1969 dollars) $20 million per launch or 200 $/Ib to low earth orbit.

Even in 1965 it was recognized that a "cheap" S-IVB must be as close to a "production run Chinese copy" as possible. The SIVB stage now has demonstrated satisfactory reliability. If low costs are to be attained, testing, instrumentation, inspection procedures, documentation, etc. must be eased in accordance with moving out of an R&D phase and into a true production phase.
More recent MDA studies show that more automated manufacturing techniques and redesign to reduce the number of (sub)assemblies are principal tools to further reduce recurring unit costs. As stated previously, one of the keys to cheap hardware is the "hands-off," minimum inspection, minimum test "Chinese copy" production line.


It is highly probable that the Air Force may be the forcing function behind an ILV program. Previous discussions have shown that there is no apparent reason why a solid / S-IVB launch vehicle could not be used from Vandenberg. The present Cape Canaveral Integrated Transfer Launch (ITL) facility used presently for Titan operations might well be expanded for the ILV operation.

The preceding sections briefly state the utility of a cheap SIVB. However, it is well understood that "cheaper" costing, necessitates a new way of doing business at NASA.

The Saturn V production gapping provides the ideal time span to "phase program plan" a cheap SIVB. One might concede the "maintenance of caPability" concept as necessary or that a reasonable contractor support effort is justified to support Saturn V flight operations. If true, the level of support required to "keep" the MDA facility open at Huntington Beach might well fund a cheap SIVB to the end of Phase C (design) of a phased program plan. A three year program is possible which would probably not require special funds until program approval--say at the end of 2 years (FY71).
The reduction of launch costs of a S-IVB Intermediate Launch Vehicle to say $200/Ib would be in itself a worthy achievement. For the sake of comparison the space shuttle launch cost target is 100 dollars per pound launched to low earth orbit."

"There is a lot of good points made in that report - with the exception of the solid cluster. I suggest instead to use a cluster od Delta rockets."

Reese concluded its sale pitch, and awaited critics and feelings.

They were mixed.

"Shall I need to remember you the Saturn production line was closed five years ago ? And the bureau of budget made clear he wants that Titan III."

George Low noted.

"Many payloads are going to orbit a top a Titan these days, including military satellites.

A sticky point is that the Saturn lacks a third stage to go beyond low Earth orbit. The Centaur is evidently the best choice, but we lost that battle five years ago; Viking will go to Mars atop a Centaur, but that Centaur will be boosted by a Titan, not your Saturn.

This decision is impossible to reverse !"

Reese knew that better than anyone else.

"Indeed. but we could introduce the Centaur at a later date, and fill the gap with different upper stages; for example the Apollo service module, or a stripped down two-stage Lunar Module !

Again, the Delta already features surplus Apollo engines on its second stage... just think about it. Calculation show that a four stage Saturn with all the upgrades I described earlier could be a match for the Titan, even without the high energy Centaur !"

Faces around the table were dubious.

"We should discuss of Saturn and Titan launchers at a later meeting. We can now define a tentative roadmap for the next ten years.” Beggs continued. “We will build a space station from Skylab and S-II stages.

"If Skylab A works, then we won’t need neither Skylab B; I suggest we turn Skylab B into a ground-based mockup of the future space station.

"If Skylab A fails, then we will flown most experiments on a month-long early CTV mission augmented by a logistic module, probably circa 1977, or on the space station at a later date. The CTV will ferry cargo and astronauts to this station, completed by unmanned Agenas. We will fly the remaining Saturn IBs and try to restart the shuttle program, probably in the 80’s.”

The meeting was over, and most people left the room – excepted Beggs, Low, and General Schriever.

So that’s the reason Schriever is there. What will USAF decide… ? Maxwell Hunter really wanted to know. But he was to go.

Once the three were alone, Beggs turned toward Schriever. The Air Force General had returned from retirement to manage the military manned space program – or what was left of it after the shuttle fiasco.

What a fine meeting that was.” Schriever poked. “That’s a nice future you’re building. As for us military – without a shuttle we will stuck with the Titan III for the next future, trying to drop costs down by flying more missions.

We could also reuse the large solid rocket motors if we parachute them in the ocean. It may save some money.”
Every program I pushed in the past decade – DynaSoar, Blue Gemini, Manned Orbital Laboratory, all cancelled, aimed to put USAF pilots in orbit.
In November 1966 we placed a MOL mockup in orbit with a Titan.

We reused the Gemini 2 capsule, cut a hatch through the heatshield, and recovered it. I strongly recommend to launch a similar Big Gemini mockup.
It could be Gemini 2 again, or you should cut a hatch through an Apollo heatshield, and bolt it to a boilerplate Big Gemini crew module.

"When the Manned Orbiting Laboratory was canned in June 1969 the first pathfinding flight was tentatively scheduled for February 1972.
It would have been conducted by two Air Force pilots: Commander Jim Taylor and Pilot Al Crews.

Further two-man teams would then have been despatched at nine-month intervals for roughly 30-day orbital stays until the fifth and final manned mission in February 1975.

At least one MOL flight, it was expected, would carry two US Navy officers, probably Bob Crippen and Dick Truly.

So I say - we could bring that program back on the cheap by buying some Big Geminis of yours." Schriever said. "If you ever pick Big Gemini of course !
Whatever, the spaceplane problem will remain unresolved in the next future. DynaSoar might have been a useful testbed for the shuttle, but McNamara cancelled it in December 1963. This marked a serious setback for our strategic reconnaissance systems.

Gary Power U-2 shot down over USSR in May 1960 meant than even our mach 3 Blackbirds or Oxcarts could no longer overfly USSR.
I thus pushed for a suborbital spaceplane called ISINGLASS. Mach 20, 400 000 ft, dropped from a B-52. Pure rocket – no airbreathing engines. We developed a marvel called the XLR-129 with four time the performance of the J-2. Very high pressure.”


Thank you, General. The XLR-129 was not exactly suited to the space shuttle; it had not enough thrust. However it formed the basis for the SSME.”

Beggs continued. “We should develop this engine at prototype level, a demonstrator. We will perfect our baseline shuttle in the next years.”


Schriever evidently had not finished yet.

"What about a successor to the X-15 ? Might be useful to gather some data on shuttle reentry or hypersonic regime."


"We have nothing to date. Perhaps it will be a lifting body; we are currently modifying a X-24A into the sleeker X-24B.

Still modestly supersonic, however. Perhaps an eventual rocket powered, mach 8 X-24C could be build, but we lack money. Time is hard for high-speed flight. You saw this with your ISINGLASS..."

"Hell, yes. Perhaps we should blend together a reborn ISINGLASS and your X-24C; both are rocket powered and dropped from a B-52 mothership. The XLR-129 would be perfect."

Schriever continued

"Now let's talk about this Agena tug you described. You ought to know the Agena is a cornerstone of our military space assets. We had and still have many classified projects involving Agena either as upper stage or satellite bus."

Schriever blue eyes narrowed

"those programs are heavily classified; NASA shall and will not interfere with our activities. If you have to use the Agena in the future, we will have to set clear lines that will never be crossed.

The soviets should never be able to gather data on military satellites through civilian programs involving Agenas. Is this clear ?"
Schriever tone left no place for doubt.

"But NASA already used Agena in more sensitive times, for Gemini. USAF and NASA had a workable agreement" Beggs protested.
Low analysed Schriever slightly menacing tone he did not understood immediately. Then he reminded the SAINT program - an Agena was to carry a reconnaissance package in orbit, inspecting satellites with a television camera, reporting to the military on the ground. Next step was obvious - destroy the red satellite ! But Eisenhower had vetoed the idea.

Satellite inspection, by the way, might also be of interest for NASA.

We really hoped to fly military astronauts onboard the shuttle to deploy satellites. By contrast your Crew Transfer Vehicle might be of little interest to us – with the exception of Douglas entry, what you call Big Gemini.”

What ?

Big Gemini is similar enough to MOL so that we can fly some military missions from Vandenberg SLC-6. This pad is currently in mothball, finishing it for Big Gemini operations should be straightforward; overall the ship is similar to the Manned Orbiting Laboratory.”

Shit. Old general Schriever is telling us what CTV proposal the military would prefer. He wants the MOL back through Big Gemini. How about that.

George Low waved his arms at the growing tension.

Now let me says it starts looking like a balanced space program” he noted. “F-1A and XLR-129 engine demonstrators for a future shuttle. CTV flights to a Space Station build with spare Saturns and Agena tugs. Agena unmanned resupply flights. Maybe we could involve the Europeans in this scheme since they were interested in the space tug... thank you, General.”

Schriever walked away.

Beggs had a little discussion with Low.
"That Schriever – Jesus, he is frightening. To think he was nearly NASA administrator in 1969.” Beggs said.

Yeah, he was and still his a good friend of Nixon.”

With him at the controlsGod know what would have happened to the civilian space program. Low shivered.

Well, the hell with that cold war General. George, we will need a renewed space station task force.
I, have two names ontop of my list to chair that group.

First is George Mueller. The other is the Ames director, Hans Mark.
Incidentally, we don't know what to do with Ames, they had that PAET - Planetary Atmosphere Experiments Test last June flying on a Scout rocket: a technical success but also a budget buster."


"Didn't Ames planned to fly operational PAETs on a low-cost Venus mission ?"
"Sure, but the project has been put on hold last January. George, is there any interest in having unmanned return capsules on a manned space station ?"

"Perhaps. We should take this into consideration."

In the afternoon Low and Beggs discussed space station costs with George Mueller
Mueller had retreated from NASA late 1969 for a post into private space industry.

On demand of Low since March he had compiled various space station studies made at NASA over the last decade.

Look what I’ve found” Mueller started enthusiastically “a dozen of space station report and concepts…” he started to pile-up volumes of paper on Low’s desk.

This is Douglas EOSS – Early Orbit Space Station, kind of six-man Skylab from 1967.
"This one is the SLA workshop, a station build within the Saturn Launch Adapter –how about that ?
"Now have a look at the MORL – Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory, a Langley project.
"The Manned Orbiting Laboratory was the USAF military station, launched atop a Titan III. Boeing concepts are also of interest. This is the Orbital Launch Facility… a single launch, four decks, 33ft space station…

"Lockheed 1965Modular Space Station proposal suggested that future space stations be constructed out of a common 460cm (183in) diameter building block designed to be mounted in the LM adapter of the S-IVB stage… and we have as many as fifty proposals based on Skylab.

Quite a lot of interesting studies.” Beggs interrupted the flow. “But we are pressed by time… what does these studies tell us about our future space station ?”

They tell us first that uprated Saturn IBs can launch 22 ft-wide modules.

We can certainly build those modules from S-IVBs, just like Skylab.
We can build a reasonably cheap modular space station with a strong science content. Look at this report” he added, adding another paper entitled Workshop costs estimates based on EOSS and MORL to the pile already menacing George Low desk by its weight.

$2.5 billions for the MORL, as much as Skylab. MORL was smaller, but a clean sheet, much more sophisticated design. The Langley guys really invented Salyut long before the soviets… we can build something similar.” Mueller added.

Have a look at the Modular Space Station final reports issued last month. There were two variants: one with very large modules launched by Saturn Vs, another with modules scaled-down to fit in the shuttle payload bay. I recommend the Saturn V launch 12-men space station…

In my own view - Boeing’s four decks, 33ft space station core with four MORLs to complete it. One Saturn INT-21, four Saturn IBs, Helios / Titan III for logistics. Put as much Skylab as possible in the design, and there you are.”


Mueller went away, leaving Low and Beggs facing each other.

"Mueller did a good job - there's no lack of space station concepts, and now we have some idea about how much do they cost."

"Sure. This is not an issue. You know where the real trouble is." Low said.

"You mean, I am - you are - literally assaulted by Marshall and Houston representatives ?" Beggs raised his eyebrows.

"This. Do you really think one of the two centers will give ground ?"

"I give up any hope." Beggs sighed. "The situation is totally deadlocked."

"We need two things." Low said. "We need either a bulldozer or a referee to end that turf fight. A bulldozer to knock the two fighters; or a referee to try a mediation. Pick your solution."

"Do you have something in mind ?" Beggs, like many people, admired Low no-nonsense pragmatism.

"Yes. We need Rocco Petrone as our bulldozer; and we need Bellcomm as a neutral referee."

"Bellcomm ?" Beggs was surprised. "Didn't we disbanded that team ?"

"...Bellcomm" Low muttered with admiration in his voice.

"I consider it one of Jim Webb strokes of genius. He just conjured that we’re going to have problems in communicating with astronauts, and that takes a lot of engineering and a lot of communication expertise. Who has that kind of thing?

"At the time AT&T was the main place for all of this high-caliber engineering. So Jim Webb wrote a letter to the chairman of AT&T requesting the company assistance in the nation’s quest, and asking the company put together a team to work with NASA to resolve all the problems of communication that we were going to encounter, not just with the astronauts, but from the Moon, behind the Moon, because we don’t know what we’re going to deal with.

It seems that the chairman of AT&T took this to the board and the board loved it and they all voted absolutely, put all your best into this thing.

They agreed to get all of the big minds of AT&T with their own support teams and move them lock, stock, and barrel to NASA Headquarters as part of NASA Headquarters to work for cost, because this is working for the nation. It was a national quest we were working on, so there should be no profit in this. The Bell labs did it for the good of our country."

"Amazing" Beggs said.

"So Bellcomm was then put as a component to support NASA Headquarters to work for cost plus $1 a year.

That was in the contract, and Bellcomm did such a good job that the contract has been renewed again and again, until in June 1970 we told them it was the last time. You have to understand that the deal between NASA and AT&T is akin to
I’m going to give you all those people that you need for as long as the Apollo program is on. The day Apollo ends, goodbye, because these are my own people, I want them back home.

This is the deal.

"You mean that, by Apollo 17 time - when came the splashdown of Apollo 17 - Bellcomm will fold ?" Beggs said.


"Spot on. But Apollo 17 isn't planned before December of that year." Low noted. "You’ve got to realize Bellcomm is not an experimental laboratory organization. It is a people organization supplying talent to NASA Headquarters to conduct studies, analyze issues and problems, look at what the NASA programs are doing, critique those. They are in a strange role in a sense, it is very unusual. That in itself created some early problems - or solved some, it is just a matter of point of view."

"Which bring us back to our issue of the Marshall / Houston turf war, I suppose."

"Yes. You are well familiar with the Manned Spacecraft Center. The last thing Houston ever wants or needs is more insight and advice from us - from NASA Headquarters and their cronies.

Well, it took a couple of years, but those Bellcomm people were ultimately accepted by the Houston - and Marshall ! - mafias."

"I can imagine their suspicious figures and grumpy comments" Beggs laughed. "What are these outsiders doing? What do they know? We’re the experts.” Low approved.

"Headquarters has always been looked somewhat suspiciously at by the Centers. We all know the usual tete-a-tete that goes on between the field and NASA Headquarters, don't we ?"

Low smiled wyrily.


"Well, in Apollo that was all pretty well overcome, largely I think because Bellcomm has people who, number one, aren’t trying to pretend that they are running the show, but are working with the centers to help define and ensure that everybody are getting the data that supports the Apollo landings. Even if the Bellcomm employees works in the name of NASA Headquarters."

"Amazing." Beggs repeated. "Now that what I call an achievement."

"Webb was a management genius. As for Bellcomm, the real genius behind it is that these people in Washington DC, are not NASA employees but AT&T - and this is paramount.

None of these people have a boss right there, so when Bellcomm employees are asked something by Houston or Marshall directors or managers they answer for the good of the program - not for the interest of the center.

Beggs evidently appreciated the idea.

"Regardless of whose idea it is, who in NASA Headquarters would like it, and who would not like it." he said. "It is irrelevant. It is for the good of the program, period. When back at NASA Headquarters, they can say anything to the Apollo program director, to the NASA Administrator, to anybody in the group, to the engineers, to anyone, for the good of the program, because he has nothing on them."

Low approved and continued.

"When Bellcomm employees work with the Centers, when they goes to any of the Centers, they have a badge that said NASA Headquarters. They have a kind of one-upmanship with people at the Headquarters with the Centers, because they represent NASA Headquarters. That way they can get things done outside of the realm, within the structures at the Centers, because they are outside.

"It is unreal. I’ve never seen anything like it before." Beggs approved.

"In the end Bellcomm big strength is - it’s not aligned, there is no jealousy from within NASA and, most importantly, no pressure."

"Spot on."

"Excellent then, makes one think. How about our bulldozer now, that Petrone ?"

"The way it works is that Bellcomm offices are always in the same building, and in many cases on the same floor as the Apollo Program Director.

Which, incidentally, was (and still is) Rocco Petrone - since August 1969, when he replaced Sam Philips, you see."


"Here we are."

"Rocco Petrone was one of the major dynamos behind the success of Apollo. He was once an Army officer, football player, big and bulky, as tough as nails.

Also smart - he has a PhD even though he was a football player and in the Army. Petrone has another interesting aspect: much like the Bellcomm fellows, he is neither on Huntsville nor Houston side. He managed the Kennedy space center, then he went to Headquarters."


"So he may be our troubleshooter." Beggs suggested.

"Absolutely. I have no worries he will shot any trouble on its way. Fletcher once told me he wanted to send him at Marshall to throw a wrench into the German thoroughly planned dynasty - von Braun was replaced by Rees that was replaced by Lucas, and all maintained statu quo..."

"There's no reason for Marshall alone to endure the wrath of Don Corpetrone." Beggs smiled.

"We are going to make Houston and Huntsville an offer they won't be able to refuse.

Bluntly, if they don't listen our Bellcomm missi dominici, we will send Petrone as a hitman or troubleshooter. Dare I say, it will be Bellcomm last stand.

Just one last question - are they allowed to discuss the space program past Apollo itself ?"

"Of course they are. Unmanned spaceflight, Mars landers, Saturn upgrades, space stations - no taboo. They even assessed the shuttle recently." Low concluded, thinking - the next weeks are going to be fun, for sure.



 
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just brilliant

alone the Idea that USAF take Big G as replacement for MOL.

or the S-IB stage build from cluster of Delta 3000 first stage
interesting is that Delta 3000 used R-27 engines, modified H-1 engine from Saturn-IB

on cheap S-IVB
Manufactory Douglas (later as McDD) look into matter one was to drop cost by mass produce them like for Saturn INT-20 rocket
another was Boeing who study the use of J-2S (S for Simplified) that would reduce allot of S-IVB subsystems and mass
making the S-IVB cheaper in production
 

Archibald

Banned
alone the Idea that USAF take Big G as replacement for MOL.
The NRO stuff thy declassified feed a lot of my imagination. I feel very lucky they started declassification from 2008, just when I started writting the TL.
As I said earlier, the NRO will play a big role ITTL.

The NRO spy satellites have an exceptionnal coolness factor. We didn't build a Mars Excursion Module, but we build the KH-9 Hexagon.

They will be a lot more of NASA-NRO cooperation ITTL.

P4.jpg




P8.jpg
 
For the record, I'm French, and as you can guess today I feel pretty bad. Fucking terrorists. In those troubled times we need the space program more than ever.

I'm currently in Gandalf mode https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4UfAL9f74I

YOU SHALL NOT PAST !!!

My condolences to victims family of this massacre.
It's Time that French government take serious action and send Foreign Legion and Air Force to Syria and Iraq and clean that mess up.
 
back to topic

in last chapter
MSFC try to get Saturn IB production because higher Payload compare to Titan IIIM

Now in 1965 the Manufacture for Titan Solid United Aircraft Corporation (UA) proposed radical idea
Put two additional Solid booster to Titan IIIC calling the concept Titan IIID 2+2.
it need only modification in Titan Core stage, not Launch pad

The Titan IIID launch with Solid 1+2 ignite, enough thrust to get up.
35 seconds after liftoff and far away from launch Pad, the Solid 3+4 ignite now.
They all four burn together until 70 seconds after liftoff the Solid 1+2 are empty and drop
140 second after liftoff solid are empty and drop while Titan Core engine ignites

Titan IIID 2+2 could bring 37000 lb. or 17 tons into low orbit.
now UA look also into use of Seven segment solid for 2+2 concept.

source:
Titan III-D Standard Space Launch Vehicle
United Technology Center (division of United Aircraft Corporation)
UTC-c-63207-3, august 1965
 
back to topic

in last chapter
MSFC try to get Saturn IB production because higher Payload compare to Titan IIIM

Now in 1965 the Manufacture for Titan Solid United Aircraft Corporation (UA) proposed radical idea
Put two additional Solid booster to Titan IIIC calling the concept Titan IIID 2+2.
it need only modification in Titan Core stage, not Launch pad

The Titan IIID launch with Solid 1+2 ignite, enough thrust to get up.
35 seconds after liftoff and far away from launch Pad, the Solid 3+4 ignite now.
They all four burn together until 70 seconds after liftoff the Solid 1+2 are empty and drop
140 second after liftoff solid are empty and drop while Titan Core engine ignites

Titan IIID 2+2 could bring 37000 lb. or 17 tons into low orbit.
now UA look also into use of Seven segment solid for 2+2 concept.

source:
Titan III-D Standard Space Launch Vehicle
United Technology Center (division of United Aircraft Corporation)
UTC-c-63207-3, august 1965

37,00lbs? Pshaaw... Saturn-1B-11.5 (standard, non-stretched S-1B stage with 4 five segment SRBs) would do 78,000lbs using the same boosters AND far less "modification" (due to the spider-beam) needed :) Throw in the 7 segment boosters and payload goes way up fast. Lowest concept was, again a non-stretched S-1B stage, with 4 strap on SRBs made from Minuteman first stages to put 51,000lbs into LEO. Add in stage stretches,,,
(Source: Improving the Saturn-I by C. E. Tharratt Program Manager, Advanced Vehicle Systems, Chrysler Corporation.)

Point where this is going to flounder though (as Archibald keeps pointing out here and there :) ) BoB already said that Titan is pretty much a given no matter what NASA says :)

Randy
 
A understandably reaction of french men on Massacre in Paris
But this forum has strict rules you must respect

he will be back in a couple of days
 
1972: NASA hell of a year (10)

Archibald

Banned
back from Coventry (why Conventry ? I don't understand)

"Tucked away in last year’s NASA authorization act is a provision calling for a permanent group to review space science on a regular basis.

In fiscal year 1973 a NASA Science Missions Board will be set forth which shall contract with the National Academies for a review of the goals, core capabilities, and direction of human space science, using the goals set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the goals set forth in this Act, and goals set forth in any existing statement of space policy issued by the President.

The study’s scope, timeframe and use of the National Academies has caused many people to liken this to the decadal surveys used in various space science disciplines, such as the recently-released planetary science decadal survey by Charles Townes.

The NASA Science Missions Board will be an advisory committee of outside scientists to succeed the disbanded Lunar and Planetary Missions Board and Astronomy Missions Board. Unlike those groups, which members were appointed by the administrator, board members will be picked up by the agency chief scientist - also head of the Office of Space Science and Applications. The executive director, as required by law, will be a NASA employee detailed from OSSA. Unlike the Academies Space Science Board, its members will have access to NASA internal documents..."

Excerpt from: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - May 10, 1972.


***



During Jerry's senior year at Cal Tech, Rob had held his nose, sighed, and taken the job of manager of the Advanced Maneuverable Bus project. "It's that or join the army of the unemployed" Rob insisted wanly. "Besides, it's not as if the damn thing doesn't have potential civilian applications"

The AMB was typical of the myriad low-profile cheap projects related to Star Wars. The AMB was basically an upscaling and redesign of the MX "Peacekeeper" ICBM fourth stage warhead bus, supposedly to be used to deploy scores of cheap little orbital interceptors, at least as far as Congress was concerned.

But what the Air Force had really commissioned behind that smoke screen was a platform that could be launched into LEO with a variable mixed payload of at least twenty reentry vehicles and/or boost-phase interceptors. It had to be able to station-keep for a year without refueling, change orbits up to a point, juke and jerk to avoid satellite killers, and launch its payloads with a high degree of accuracy.

"Shitcan the warheads and interceptors, give it a big fuel tank and corresponding thrusters, mount a pressure cabin on it, and you've got yourself a space jeep to take you from LEO to GEO. Rob would muse dreamily.

When Jerry graduated, Rob was able to hire him on as an entry-level wage slave on the AMB project. But even a naif like Jerry could see what Rob was doing once he got to Rockwell.

What was going on was that Rob , like the Air Force itself, was pursuing his own hidden agenda. He was using the Air Force funding to design a low orbit to geosynchronous orbit ferry with the capability to take crews to a GEO space station that didn't exist – in the guise of giving them their AMB.

The thrusters were far bigger than anything a warhead and interceptor bus needed. The so-called refuelling colar was being designed to take a large fuel tank neatly balanced along the long axis to handle a 1-G thrust. The bus platform itself was being designed to accomodate forty interceptors so that a pressure cabin have room atop it. And so forth.

Norman Spinrad, Russian Spring



***


"The space tug is undergoing a major shift in its possible roles. With the shuttle on the backburner satellite ferrying to geosynchronous orbit has been replaced by space station assembly in low Earth orbit.
As such high-energy propellants are no longer necessary.

NASA has published a new set of mission requirements.
One of the most demanding missions is Large Space Telescope retrieval, servicing, and reboost, because the space tug has to be able to propel the 11-tonne observatory with unfurled solar arrays, constraining the propulsion system to 0-002g acceleration.

The other design reference missions were:

payload placement; delivering 1,590kg to a 630km higher orbit and returning it in event of failure, with a 1° plane change each way;

multiple payload; delivering a 2,268kg satellite 157km higher and then a 4,536kg payload 46km further;

payload retrieval; returning a 4,990kg satellite from 408km higher with a 1° plane change;

payload reboost; docking with a 11,340kg satellite 185km higher and boosting it 204km further;

module transfer; raising a 22,680kg module 204km with a 0.5° plane change, and returning a similar module (this is a propulsion system driver);

payload deorbit; docking with a 34,020kg payload in a 296km orbit and dispatching it towards re-entry (this defines propulsion system upper thrust limit);

sub-satellite mission; Space Tug with 2,268kg payload becoming a free-flyer for up to seven days and 180° away from base in the same orbit;

in situ servicing; where a 2,268kg servicing mission kit is flown 740km higher and returned;

payload viewing; rendezvousing with and imaging a satellite 1,556km higher during a flyaround (this defines reactioncontrol- system propellant requirement)

Many expendable upper stages were considered for the role. Solid-fuel stages like the Burner lacked flexibility and performance; they couldn't be restarted.
That left four contenders. They were the Delta second stage; the Agena; the Transtage; and the Centaur.

After a brief hesitation NASA decided the space station would be in Earth orbit; a lunar orbit space station was a step too far and has no practical interest.
Because of that, the space tug role shrunk to ferrying space station modules around Earth – from an injection 100 miles high to a docking 300 miles high.

The Centaur is totally overkill for such job; it is fragile, and its cryogenic propellants are hard to handle.

This left only three hypergolic contenders. Among them the Transtage is the biggest; it takes a Titan III to haul it into orbit. Much like the Centaur the Transtage is just too big for the job.
The Agena and Delta stage 2 are much smaller, and they were retained as finalists in the competition.

The Transtage bid has an interesting backstory.

There, Martin Marietta teamed with Boeing. The two companies had their space tug proposal interwined with the manned spacecraft competition that ran in parallel – with Martin Marietta Transtage mated to Boeing DynaSoar space plane. While a Titan IIIC can orbit 30 000 pounds, the DynaSoar glider by itself barely weighs 15 000 pounds.
The difference is filled by Titan III partially fueled Transtage upper stage that remain attached to the DynaSoar "glider". It acts as an extremely powerful booster that allows for all kind of large orbital manoeuvers – such as climbs up to 1000 miles !

Boeing pitched a revamped DynaSoar as a “poor man's space shuttle” but NASA did not cared.


From 1962 onwards Lee Scherer had an impressive career with NASA. He was first Lunar Orbiter program manager at Headquarters until 1967, when the program ended. He was then director of George Mueller Apollo Lunar Exploration Office.

ec76-5266_scherer.jpg


In spring 1971 Sherer become Director of the Dryden Flight Research Center, California. Then a set of events happened that changed Scherer career forever. The space shuttle was canned in the fall of 1971.
Because the now defunct shuttle had been the last piece in the 1969 Space Task Group plan to survive budget cuts, a whole new manned spacecraft program had to be rebuild from zero.

Unbestknown to the public, Scherer Lunar Orbiter was nothing less than a failed spy satellite. In the early 60's the highly secret National Reconnaissance Office had build the Samos E-1 satellite to image the Soviet Union at a very high resolution. But for a hosts of reasons, the Samos E-1 never worked properly, so the NRO tried to get ride of it.

In the end the very secretive military agency offered Samos to NASA. The failed spy satellite was still good enough to map the Moon at high resolution to pick Apollo landing sites from the frames. As the Lunar Orbiter manager Scherer knew its origins as a spysat. Of course he had been sworn to secrecy by the NRO. Scherer, however, could see how tense the military was.

They logically feared of NASA used of a spy satellite. They feared it might disclose the highlysecret NRO to the public – and Soviet – eye. Scherer however was an outstanding manager and he very skillfully handled those tensions, reassuring the NRO by all means.

That experience was to prove extremely useful a decade later, in 1972 when NASA picked up the Agena as its space tug against the Delta second stage. The military had hoped NASA would pick Delta stage 2 as a space tug; they had good reasons for that.
But NASA chose the Agena instead, triggering a storm of protests from the military. The issue was, well, that all of the NRO spy satellites – Corona and Gambit - had been designed around the Agena. As a result, massive use of the Agena by a public, civilian agency made the NRO extremely nervous.

This explain why, in spring 1972, new NASA administrator James Beggs hand-picked Lee Scherer from his post of Dryden director to the newly created Space Tug (later piloted science) Program Office.

Over the next decade, as use of the civilian Agena extended further and further from NASA to private companies, Scherer had once again to manage growing tensions with the NRO.

The Agena-based KH-4 Corona has been withdrawn from service in May 1972, so that was no longer an issue.

Yet the KH-8 Gambit, also based on the Agena, was to remain in service for years to come.
In the end the NRO chose to abruptly withdrawn the KH-8 early on (by the mid-70's) by fear civilian use of the Agena might disclose the Gambit to the public eye. Scherer had to manage that crisis from the civilian side, and he did it with talent. For the record, existence of the NRO was only made public after the Cold War ended, in the late 90's !
 
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Welcome Back from Exile, Archibald !

nice to see that Agena become US Space Tug

on NRO problem with KH Corona, i not understand clearly, it was decommission in May 1972, replace by the KH-9 Hexagon.
Yes the early KH satellite were literally build around the Agena stage and launch as scientific Discovery satellite.
But from KH-4 Corona the Payload was located on top of Agena, while NASA use the stage as Target for Gemini and launch probes with Atlas Agena.
and from 1971 the KH Hexagon not needed a Agena, it got it own propulsion system

640px-KH-4_CORONA-M_%28Agena-D%29.jpg

Copyright Giuseppe De Chiara

640px-KH-9_HEXAGON.jpg

Copyright Giuseppe De Chiara
 

Archibald

Banned
It was a late development in the story, that I managed to swap KH-10 and KH-8 respective fates. The KH-8 will be gone a decade earlier than OTL (1975 instead of 1984)
Even paid by NASA however the Blue Helios (Blue Big Gemini souds very bad) manned system will remain expensive.
Since I don't plan to change politics (not yet), it will be ok under Nixon and Ford, but harder during the Carter years (although there is a little change with Carter VP)
 
Soviets in space (5)

Archibald

Banned
meanwhile on the other side of the Iron Curtain...

Spring 1972 The massive Salyut sat in the background, with technicians buzzing around it. Launch was planned for July.

Vasily Mishin stood in the huge hall. He hesitantly raised his hand in the direction of Chelomey.

He was not sure what would happen next, but Chelomey smiled and shook that hand. Their contract was a go.

"I agree with all this. Make sense, not only for you and I but for the whole program. That Salyut heresy has to stop." Chelomey says.
"So I give you all four Salyuts..."
"And I blend them within the Almaz program, as was the case before Ustinov silliness in 1970."
"Good. Then no more Salyuts, just Almaz, and that's it." Mishin approved.

"Because I manage all the small space stations, you are free to work on the massive programs, the lunar L3M and that huge MOK space complex - with the MKBS, the Multipurpose Space Base Station serving as an orbiting garage."
"Indeed. The idea so far is the satellites in the constellation to be serviced either at the MKBS or regularly be visited by MKBS-based crews flying light versions of the Soyuz outfitted with a manipulator arm. The satellites themselves will be orbited by expendable rockets."
"But that MKBS is much bigger than my Almaz... or Salyut. So you need a bigger and better crew and cargo vehicle than Soyuz."
"You mean, a space shuttle like the one the American have just killed ?" Chelomey asked hesitantly.

Mishin did not answered immediately.

Late April they had both atended a meeting at TsNIIMash - the Central Research Institute of Machine Building, near Moscow, to discuss reusable launch vehicles. In the wake of the American shuttle fiasco, the meeting conclusion had been obvious. Reusable launch vehicles were less efficient that expendables on the way up - as for the way down, there was no need to bring satellites down to Earth surface when they could be repaired at Mishin MKBS.

Even Glushko agreed with Mishin and Chelomey on that conclusion, and that fact by itself spoke volume.

"No." Mishin continued. "No need for a shuttle, not with that vehicle you are currently building - the TKS." Mishin smiled. "May I borrow it for the MKBS ?"

"Of course you can. We could introduce reusable transportation systems later." "Spiral, for example, if Mikoyan ever overcome the technical craziness of his space plane."

"So we agree on everything. How about that. Let's send that document, that contract, to our supporters - Andrei Grechko and his deputy, the big hammer, Serguey Afanasyev.

I just can just imagine Ustinov figure when he will found the fait accompli. Delightful." Chelomey said with a wryly smile.

"Glushko will be equally devastated." Mishin noted.

Chelomey suddendly reminded that, a decade earlier, Glushko had stabbed Mishin late boss Korolev in the back by refusing to build big engines for the N-1.

We have many things in common, Chelomey told himself.

As Mishin departed, he called him back. "I have another idea to make Glushko and Ustinov mad."

"What ?"

"The joint flight with the Americans. Apollo was to dock with a bloody Salyut. But it is not ready. We need an alternate plan."

Mishin was surprised.

"Are you seriously suggesting we dock their Apollo to an Almaz or to the TKS ?"
"No. But how about your Soyuz ?"

"Good idea. Perhaps we should add an post-scriptum to that contract before it goes to Grechko and Afanysev."
...

"The Americans' basic purpose for these meetings in Moscow had been to obtain assurance from the Soviets that there could be agreement on the organizational structure to conduct a joint mission and that the mission could be carried out according to a specified timetable. Low in his opening remarks on Tuesday, April 4, 1972 told the Soviets that NASA was sure that a joint mission was technically feasible, but the agency was not sure that in managerial terms it was possible. Before the two sides pursued this point further, Kotelnikov said that he had an important statement that he would like to make.
Kotelnikov told the NASA people that in re-evaluating the proposed test mission the Soviets had come to the conclusion that it would not be technically and economically feasible to fly the mission using Salyut. Salyut had only one docking port and the addition of a second port would be very difficult technically and very costly in both time and money. Therefore, the Soviets proposed to conduct the test flight using Soyuz, which could accept all the modifications necessary for such a mission. They were quite forceful in stating that there would be no changes in any of the agreements made thus far.
Surprise was perhaps the mildest word for the Americans' reaction. Nevertheless, Low quickly responded and told Kotelnikov that barring any technical difficulties, the switch from Salyut to Soyuz would be acceptable. He turned to Lunney and asked him if he saw any technical reason for opposing such a change, and Lunney could think of none. Operationally, this would present a simpler mission since it would involve only two coordinated launches - Apollo and Soyuz and not three - Apollo, Salyut, and Soyuz. Low and Frutkin tried to think through any "political" implications and found none. It would still be possible to exchange crews, which would be the major public impact of the mission, and such a mission would give the Americans an added advantage - not calling attention to the fact that the Soviets already had a space station flying and NASA did not."

(excerpt from: NASA history series - SP-4209 The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 1978)

...

And indeed Dmitryi Ustinov was all rage, and he knew Glushko shared a similar feeling.

It happened that their best ennemies Vasily Mishin and Vladimir Chelomey had joined forces. Against them.

The unexpected alliance was kind of landmark since Soviet rocket designers - the Ustinov, Korolev, Mishin, Yangel, Chelomey, Glushko- rather killed themselves than working together.

To Ustinov, it was very much the alliance of the soviet space program underdogs.

Just six years before, Vasily Mishin had had the daunting honor of replacing the legendary Serguei Korolev of Sputnik and Gagarin fame - and he had mostly failed at the task. So far his record included dying astronauts, crippled space stations, and lunar rockets immense explosions akin to tactical nuclear bombs over the steppe.

Just eight years before, Vladimir Chelomey had been Krushchev favourite rocket designer, and as a result his projects had been ruined by Brezhnev and its supporters. Chelomey rocket plant would have been erased from the face of the Soviet Union had he not been supported by the ministry of defence apparatchiks - Andrei Grechko and Viktor Afanasyev, that somewhat protected him from Ustinov.

Damn Grechko - damn that man. I have to be patient - he beat me to the post of Defence minister in 1967, but we won't last an eternity.

And when he will die, I will destroy both Afanasyev and Chelomey.


And now Mishin and Chelomey had joined their forces.

Such old rivalries and hatred had cost the Soviet Union the Moon.
 
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Soviets in space (6)

Archibald

Banned
Glushko biography - with a twist

Glushko, Valentin Petrovich (1908-1989)

Soviet Chief Designer, responsible for all large liquid propellant engines for missiles and LVs.

Led Glushko bureau, 1946-1974; Headed OKB-52 1974-1989, directing development of Buran launch vehicles, TKS spaceship, RD-270 engine and Salyut / Almaz space stations.

Soviet rocketry pioneer. Chief Designer and General Designer 1946-1976 of OKB-456.
Preeminent Soviet designer of rocket engines for missiles and launch vehicles.

Glushko was born to Ukrainian parents of Cossack and Russian peasant stock. In the spring of 1921, at the age of 15, he began reading the works of Jules Verne. From the Earth to the Moon and Around the Moon made a particular impression on him.
He began to devour astronomy books, notably those by Flammarion and Klein.

By 1922 the teenager was involved with the local observatory through a youth group and began work on a (modest!) book – ‘Historical Development of the Idea of Interplanetary and Interstellar Travel'.

Glushko next traveled to Leningrad (St. Petersburg, Russia), where he attended Leningrad State University to study mathematics and physics. He left before graduating in April 1929, having found the programs uninteresting.

He soon joined the Gas Dynamics Laboratory to study the design of liquid and electric propellant rocket engines. By 1931, he joined RNII (Reaction Propulsion Scientific Research Institute), which was formed from Korolev's Moscow-based GIRD (Group for Investigation of Reactive Motion).

Glushko was made supervisor for development of liquid rocket engines there.

Glushko’s life might have continued on relatively smoothly but for Stalin, who organized the “Great Terror” in the late 1930s to supposedly fend off the scourge of “Trotskyites” (Trotsky, the ex-War Minister of the USSR and living in exile in Mexico, was once Stalin’s greatest rival before being pushed out of power).

Glushko’s life turned a dark corner on March 23rd, 1938, when Stalin’s secret police (the NKVD) arrested him.

He was afterwards imprisoned in Butyrka Prison, and by the 15th of August 1939 was sentenced to eight years in the Gulag.

It was supposedly during this initial time of imprisonment that Glushko, most likely under duress, denounced Sergei Korolev.

Korolev was arrested on the 22nd of June, 1938, and also sentenced to work in the Gulag. It was his time in the Gulag that ruined his health and was to lead to his premature death in 1966.

Korolev might very well have died in Kolyma's gulag - and God know how different a space race would have unfolded without him :p

In contrast to Korolev, Glushko had a relatively easier life working on aircraft projects alongside fellow imprisoned engineers and scientists.

By 1941, Glushko, despite still officially being imprisoned, was running his own design bureau in charge of developing liquid rocket engines. It was only in 1944 when he was finally released by a special decree because of the USSR's need of his talents.

He had demonstrated these with his successful development of the RD-1 liquid rocket engine while imprisoned. Glushko and Korolev, whose relationship was to vary from cordial to frictional, were put to work together on designing the RD-1 auxiliary rocket motor. It was tested on a piston-engined fighter meant to protect Moscow from high-altitude Luftwaffe bombing sorties.


He was sent with Korolev, along with many of the USSR’s top rocket scientists and engineers, to Germany in the war’s aftermath to study the German V-2 rocket.

By 1946, Glushko was officially the chief designer of his own bureau (OKB 456), which he would remain as until 1976.

He was to become Russia’s foremost authority of liquid rocket engines while working there. The bureau’s early work included the RD-101 (used on R-2), the RD-110 (on R-3), and the RD-103 (used on R-5).

Glushko and Korolev, despite their frictions, successfully collaborated on the designs of the R-7 (the first ICBM and satellite launcher) and R-9 (an improved 2-stage ICBM), with Glushko’s bureau designing the engines and Korolev’s bureau the rockets.

Variants of the RD-107 engine on the R-7 still power Soyuz rockets today. Glushko’s bureau also produced engines for Mikhael Yangel’s R-12 medium-range ballistic missile, which was one of the rockets sent to Cuba that helped precipitate the Cuban Missile Crisis.


In 1960, Glushko’s bureau began design work on an engine that used propellants that burned on contact (AKA hypergolic propellants). This simplified engine design and would allow the Soviets to launch ICBMs at the US at any time.

Glushko’s bureau was commissioned to deliver the engines for a new mega ICBM, called the UR-500. Wanting more performance, his bureau delivered the RD-253 engine, which was the first in the world to combine the staged combustion cycle with hypergolic propellants.

The UR-500, later to be known as the Proton rocket, was designed to deliver a 100 mt warhead. It was initially unreliable and proved too large as an ICBM, but later would prove itself as the USSR’s heavy launcher.

While working on the Proton’s engines, Glushko’s bureau pressed ahead with a much larger staged combustion hypergolic engine, the RD-270, in 1962.


Korolev and Glushko's relationship came to a low point, according to Korolev's colleagues, when the USSR began looking into building a moon rocket, the N-1.

The preliminary work for the project started in 1959, and it was only formally initiated in 1960.

Its design outline was approved in 1960, and had the USSR begun devoting major resources to it then, they might have gotten to the Moon first.

As it happened, funding for the N-1 and its attempt to go to the Moon did not arrive until 1962, and it was meager compared to the resources spent developing the Saturn V.

According to Korolev's colleagues, Sergei Pavlovich Korolev wanted two things that Glushko refused to deliver for him: sizable kerolox booster engines (though under 600 tonnes-force in thrust) and hydrolox engines for the rocket's Earth Departure Stage.

Countering this claim are official documents from the USSR archives showing no such engines were ever requested of Glushko's bureau by Korolev.

Glushko certainly had made no secret of his dislike of such large kerolox engines, citing the dangers of combustion instability, and also scoffed at hydrogen's suitability as a rocket propellant.

One can almost imagine the gnashing of Korolev’s teeth at Glushko’s anti-hydrogen bias, particularly as the Americans’ were already launching hydrogen-powered upper stages by 1965.

Unsurprisingly Glushko thought Chelomei's hypergolic UR-700 monster a better, quicker, cheaper-to-develop option with more likelihood of success, and his bureau openly developed the engines needed for this rival HLV. Korolev perhaps not too surprisingly decided instead to work with Kuznetsov's bureau, which would have large consequences later on.


Vladimir Chelomei's UR-700, based around Glushko’s massive 1.4 m lbs-force (6.27 MN) RD-270 engine, was a far more compact but potent design than the N-1.

The UR-700 had a height of 76 m, a diameter of 17.6 m, and a gross lift-off mass of 4,823 metric tons, or 10.632 million lbs, and would have topped even the legendary Saturn V in capability.

Designed to be modular and rail-transportable (thanks to its tri-core layout), it was still reportedly projected to be able to launch 151,000 kg to LEO, and some 50,000 kg to lunar orbit.

The UR-700's first stage consisted of six 4.15 m diameter modules in pairs, while the second stage consisted of three 4.15 m modules, and its third stage was made of a core 4.15 m module with three 1.6 m diameter tanks.


Glushko's engine for this monster was to be the ultimate in hypergolic engines, featuring both a full-flow staged combustion cycle and thrust nearly equal to the Americans’ F-1.

Korolev was adamant that the toxic propellants needed to fuel such engines were not appropriate for a manned rocket.

It was only when the N-1 ran into problems in 1965-1967, that the UR-700 project was seriously considered as an alternative.

Unlike with the Saturn V and N-1, the UR-700 was designed to enable a lunar direct ascent mission, which Chelomei felt was safer than Korolev's preferred lunar-orbit rendezvous approach.

So capable was this rocket, thanks to largest single-chamber engine ever developed in the USSR, that Chelomei envisioned creating a lunar expeditionary base with it.

Other possible missions he imagined (and hoped the USSR would fund) for the hypergolic monster rocket were ahead of their time, including an automated Mars complex, Mars soil return, a Jupiter orbiter, Saturn probes, manned flybys of the Sun, Mars, Venus and Mercury, a piloted Mars orbiter, a Mars surface expedition, manned orbital battle stations (for destroying ICBMs and enemy satellites), geosynchronous "civilian" radio jamming satellites, heavy commercial communications satellites, and heavy spacecraft meant for space combat.

Tellingly, Chertok once asked Chelomei what would happen if, God forbid, such a booster exploded on the launch pad. "Wouldn't the entire launch complex be rendered a dead zone for 18 to 20 years?" Chelomei's reply was that it wouldn't explode, since Glushko's engines were reliable and didn't fail. That is amazing faith in an engine manufacturer, but probably too optimistic an assessment of the chances for an explosive failure.

By 1966 Korolev was dead, and his less competent deputy, Vasily Mishin, was put in charge of the USSR’s manned space program. Vasily Mishin oversaw the development of the underfunded N-1, and meanwhile the numerous critics of the UR-700 (including Mishin) managed to convince the Politburo to cut funding of Glushko’s RD-270 engine and the rival UR-700 rocket in 1969.

Their funding was totally cut by 1974.
There were of course many good reasons for doing this, including the danger of such a large hypergolic exploding on the pad and also the needless waste of funding two rival HLVs.

Mishin’s fortunes would soon be crushed by the Americans’ success, the four failures of the N-1 rocket, and the loss of four Soviet Cosmonauts during the initial flights of the Soyuz spaceship.

Following these failures, in 1973 Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev wanted to consolidate the Soviet space program into a single bureau.
With Ustinov help, Glushko was ready to head that bureau.

But Glushko was too ambitious and first set his conditions to Ustinov.

Glushko’s very first act would be to fire Vasily Mishin, and Ustinov had no issue with that.

Things come to halt, however, when Glushko said he would suspend the N-1 program as soon as possible (somewhat ironically Glushko may have been a big part of the reason why the program failed).

There Ustinov disagreed for the simple reason that, since the American had cancelled the shuttle and mothballed a pair of Saturn V, the N-1 remained an adequate answer.

Worse, the N-1 was to launch the MKBS giant space station; and its upper stages could replace both Proton and Soyuz rockets (N-11 and N-111 boosters).

That's how OKB-1 was saved, with Mishin replaced by Boris Chertok.

A furious Glushko was given instead the Chelomei design bureau, OKB-52.

Glushko inherited the Proton rocket he had designed the RD-253 engines a decade earlier.

He also inherited the Almaz small military station.

Meanwhile Chertok OKB-1 dumped Salyut back to OKB-52 to work on the much larger MKBS.


So from 1978 onwards Glushko had the Salyut, Almaz, the latter TKS manned cargo ship, and the huge RD-270 engine.

Although he could not formally kill the N-1 as he wanted, Glushko killed it indirectly.

Indeed Ustinov decided that, while the N-11 and N-111 preserved the N-1 by flying its upper stages, a new first stage was to be build to replace the thirty-NK-33 kludge, although this was given a low priority since NASA didn't build any new Saturn V.

Glushko was thus allowed to resume work on the RD-270, with a condition: that he switched from hypergolics to the more begnin kerolox propellants.

Building from Almaz, Salyut, the TKS and the RD-270 Glushko ran his own space program, although his ambitions were largely cut by lack of funding.

In the 80's most Soviet space funding was channeled into the huge MKBS space station; what little funding was left went to the "Universal rockets" N-11 (that replaced Proton) and N-111 (Soyuz successor).

Glushko died in spring 1989, never ruling entirely the soviet space program as he longued for. Chertok OKB-1resisted until the end of Cold War.
 
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