Across the high frontier: a Big Gemini space TL

[Deleted member 87099]

I did a little search in your TL and I saw that late 1968 NASA had a different administrator. Couldn't find a lot of information on this general (can't remember his name)
Tom Paine was a democrat in Nixon republican administration so he knew that his head might be cut any time soon. Among those considered were Simon Ramo - the -R in TRW, and cold warrior General Bernard Schriever.
Ramo and Shrieber had developed the Minuteman ICBM early in the 60's. The whole development and deployement had been a tremendous success - work done in three or four years after starting from scratch.
NASA might have fell under military command, who knows.

In the end Nixon decided to keep Paine per lack of successor - they all knew that post-Apollo NASA was a poisonned calice (and indeed it was, and still is 45 years later)

Thanks for reading my TL. Your right, in 1968 NASA was still under James Webb. But by the time NASA diverges from OTL, Paine is acting administrator.

 

[Archibald]

Any story (potentially) featuring Big Gemini gets my approval.

Can't spoil now. Hey, you should restart your vapor trail TL

 

[Archibald]

time for the main POD

October 22, 1971.
Office of Management and Budget
Washington DC
Caspar Weinberger and its staff were well prepared for the so-called Director’s review. They had some important documents on hands. They consisted of two OMB staff papers; a letter from Fletcher; and varied memos from the Flax committee.
“NASA next manned vehicle concepts fall into two categories: large shuttle and alternatives.
"Large shuttle is essentially the full size Air force orbiter – 15*60 ft payload bay, 60 000 pound payload. Only boosters differs. NASA wants a Saturn first stage, we at OMB prefer a ballistic pressure fed booster.

“Alternatives fell into two categories, and we at OMB tasked Flax with reviewing these options. As you can see the glider, far from ranking lower than the least acceptable form of piloted space vehicle, is actually the most ambitious option that the Flax Committee is willing to endorse.

Moreover, the committee's glider would carry only 10,000 pounds of payload. But Flax did not stopped there, and asked himself: what could be less ambitious than this glider?
"There is the possibility of modifying Apollo spacecraft to make them refurbishable and continuing to fly them using the existing Saturn IB, on rare occasions.

Another option calls for developing the Titan III-M and Big Gemini, the latter really a chopped-up shuttle - imagine only a reusable cockpit with an expendable payload bay." Weinberger paused.
"Flax's report then address the subject of shuttle economics.” he continued “He deals specifically with NASA's preferred concept, which call for concurrent development of booster and orbiter, with the orbiter using phased technology. People describe this orbiter as "Mark I/Mark II," referring to an initial version that would later be upgraded with better engines, reusable thermal protection, and advanced onboard electronics.

NASA's estimate cost per flight are $9.0 million for Mark I, falling to $5.5 million for the improved Mark II.
"Significantly, and like the OMB, Flax does not challenge these estimates. He merely denies that they promise advantage.” economist John Sullivan added.
“So we will base our decision on four documents you all have in hand.

You have first an OMB Staff Paper, dated October 4 and entitled The Future Space Transportation System- An Economic Analysis of the Options.

"Dated October 14 is The U.S. Civilian Space Program—A Look at the Options which discuss post-Apollo/Skylab plan and includes an analysis of the shuttle.

"Then come Sullivan, Rice and Flax comparison of gliders and 3 stage vehicles (reusable 1st stage, expendable 2nd, powered orbiter).

"Last document is NASA answer to that, a letter Fletcher send to Cap, October 19 – three days ago.

I’ll add that on October 12 George Low recognized that NASA would need at least six more Titan III before the shuttle; he expected the military to have similar needs.”
”So let's see what we can do with this stuff.”Weinberger said
“Have a look at the 19 October letter I received from James Fletcher. He frantically calls for a shuttle. I call this blackmail."

The aerospace industry will be hurt by continuing indecision and further delay in the shuttle program. A firm go-ahead, on the other hand, will quickly create jobs in the industry.
It will not be possible to sustain the momentum now built up in the shuttle program much longer. A loss in momentum will have serious and costly consequences, and may even be irreversible.

“Gentlemen, what are you conclusions ? should we allow a full size orbiter ? some form of shuttle ? or something else ?” Weinberger asked his staff.
After half an hour of debate the OMB staff answer was blunt: cancel the Shuttle program.

Some then proposed that, if not feasible, the decision should be held off for another year, when the OMB would deal with the budget for FY 1974.
Don Rice asked for silence.
“So NASA wants the Mark I/Mark II orbiter with a very large recoverable booster – either the pressure-fed or the winged S-IC booster. Alexander Flax told us this is not realistic, and that we should consider less-costly alternatives, capsules or glider, all launched by Titan expendables. We will limit our choice to these two options. Caspar ?”

“Flax colleague Eugene Fubini told us that NASA staff violently rejected the glider a month ago*.

They consider it as the worst of both capsules and shuttle worlds. A backward move to 1963' when McNamara cancelled DynaSoar.
“So this mean that the only alternative are capsules - Big Gemini or an uprated Apollo ?”
“Exactly. We won’t approve any big shuttle; they don’t want the small shuttle atop a Titan III, so NASA will have to settle for capsules and expendable boosters."


Suddenly John Sullivan had a doubt. "Isn’t the alternate shuttle from Mathematica competitive ? Maybe we should consider it further."

"We won’t. The problem with this concept is that - well, Fletcher did not even requested it !

His budget request is all about the flyback Saturn, with the pressure-fed as Plan B. Not a trace of that Mathematica shuttle as far as I'm concerned. And this is not a surprise, however." Weinberger continued.

"Fubini told me that Myers and Fletcher don't really care about Mathematica's shuttle when compared to their pet projects. They certainly have sound reasons for that, on technical grounds perhaps.

Whatever their reasons, in the end it doesn't really matters since this TAOS is still a big orbiter shuttle, so Flax argument applies to it after all.

I say it before and I say it again: we won't fund anything bigger than an enlarged Dynasoar on top of a Titan III-L. If they don't accept that, they will end with more capsules, Apollo or Super Gemini."
The argument was over, and the little group separated on a consensus summarized by Weinberger final speech.
"Flax opposition to large orbiters is actually justified since the shuttle economics are doubtful even with the inclusion of every military and commercial payloads. Since the shuttle can not be justified on economic grounds and had nowhere to go it had no role and thus its high development costs can't be justified."

*together with September 19 and 24 entries - this alternate history point of divergence.
In our universe - within the first three week of October 1971 (up to October 22) NASA fell from Saturn-shuttle to glider.

After a violent reaction from Mathematica six days later (October 28), the space agency managed to rebound from the glider to the familiar, full-size shuttle we all know.
Both the glider and Big Gemini were launched by some Titan III; the difference was that Big G had no wings and no payload bay. Although a manned space station logistic vehicle (like the glider and shuttle), it had no wings and its cargo compartment was not recoverable. The glider actually had both, and as such it was the most basic form of shuttle; at least it was still a shuttle ! Big Gemini, by contrast, was not.
It is the point of no return: without the glider, the full-size shuttle can't return. The thin red line not to be crossed was drawn somewhere between Big Gemini and the glider; cross that line and the shuttle is lost !
In this alternate universe the space agency killed the glider late September after a little clash between Dale Myers and George Low. As such, a month later when the full-size shuttle was threatened the agency had no glider on which to *rebound*, and fell all the way from Saturn-shuttle heights to Big Gemini bottom... without any glider to stop the fall !

 

[LostCosmonaut]

Can't spoil now. Hey, you should restart your vapor trail TL

Oh lord, it's baby's first TL.

I hope my writing skill has improved a bit since then. I do eventually plan on doing a complete reboot, though God knows when that will happen.


On topic, here's a few things that might be of interest to readers.
The Space Shuttle as an Element in the National Space Program (published 1970)
Why Does the Space Shuttle Have Wings?: A Look at the Social Construction of Technology in Air and Space

Related to current topics of discussion here, and shows some of the OTL reasoning that went on. And an alternate method of development;

Improved Saturn V Variants

 

[Bahamut-255]

Does this mean that what becomes STS is now dead? If not yet officially?

So either an uprated Apollo or Big Gemini then?

This I have to see.

 

[Archibald]

the time they are a-changing

NASA top brass was heavily in love with the space shuttle, so they won't give up so easily.
Another heavy player is Klaus Heiss (and Oskar Morgenstern) Mathematica institute, Princeton.
Up to this point NASA didn't give a rat about Mathematica TAOS concepts. Fletcher didn't cared. Myers didn't care. Now they have better to care about.
The difference with OTL is that the George Low / Eugene Fubini's glider is dead - and so are two master atributes of any shuttle, that is
a) wings
b) payload bay
This red line has been crossed by the OMB, and now NASA has to fight back that decision from a position even worse than OTL.
By the way and just like OTL they are re-discovering our *familiar* shuttle as pushed hard by the Mathematica Institute.

 

[Michel Van]

Here what Klaus Heiss and Oskar Morgenstern from Mathematica institute had to say about the space Shuttle

 

[Archibald]

Klaus Heiss, Oskar Morgenstern and the space shuttle

Indeed that their final report that come too late - late January 1972 when Nixon already had started the program.

They knew they would be way too late, so they hastily summarized their finding on a memo dated October 28, 1971 (see below)

Until the very end of his life (2010) Klaus Heiss ferociously defended his analysis and the shuttle that come out of it.
There was a High Frontier (yes, Reagan conservative think tank) paper dated 2008 where you can feel Heiss anger even after all those years.

so on 28 October Heiss counter-attacked the OMB decision as explained here

(more on this soon)

 

[Archibald]

October 25
Manned Spaceflight Center, Houston, Texas

George Low faced Dale Myers one more time.

“Dale, I and James Fletcher spent a lot of time with Alexander Flax and Eugene Fubini. You have to understand that the so-called Flax committee has a lot of influence over the OMB.
We have to understand what does that Flax committee exactly wants, because their perspective will have a lot to do with the kind of shuttle we will be able to sell the OMB.”
“Ok George. I understand very well. So tell me – what is, according to you, Flax and Fubini vision of the space shuttle ?”
“Fubini is in fact leading the pack. And Fubini wants a big DynaSoar. He wants a glider launched by a fat Titan, a Titan III-L.”

Myers figure as he heard Low was of disgust.

“Here we go again – that damn glider. Your glider in fact. You know my opinion about it, do you ?"

“Oh please, Dale. You still don't understand. I know very well that you and your teams in Huntsville and Houston are convinced that a full-size shuttle is the only way to go.
What you fail to understand is the scope of the crisis we are embroiled in.
The matter goes far beyond the shuttle.
If we insist too much on a shuttle, we might lose, not only the shuttle, but manned spaceflight entirely. No, I'm not pessimistic. That's the harsh reality.
So Dale, we – you – must study all the alternatives in great detail so that those that are discarded should be discarded, not through arm-waving, but through facts.
By alternatives I mean the glider and, damn it, I even mean Big Gemini or Apollo, if that keep manned spaceflight going. Understand ?”

Myers looked hardly convinced the crisis was that serious.

As for Low, he felt his pledge fell of deaf ears. But what could he do about it ?

 

[Archibald]

In ordinary circumstances Klaus Heiss would have send the memo to Dale Myers, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight.
But these were not ordinary times, so he decided to go to James Fletcher directly.
Heiss bypassed Myers because the NASA manager was still obsessed with two stages fully reusable shuttle concepts.
He had a reason for that: the lower booster would go to Marshall, the orbiter to Houston. The two center were devoted to manned spaceflight and they hated each other.

Document title: Klaus P. Heiss and Oskar Morgenstern,

Memorandum for Dr. James C. Fletcher, Administrator, NASA,

"Factors for a Decision on a New Reusable Space Transportation System,"

October 28, 1971

Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

... the key question raised in our May 31, 1971 report is: Does there exist a precise and detailed NASA and national space program for the 1980's?

We did receive detailed mission models of OSSA (NASA scientists), OMSF (manned spaceflight), the DoD, non-NASA applications and others. Yet these continue to change substantially. A space program consists of individual missions which must be specified and integrated into an overall plan of not negligible firmness, though some flexibility must also be allowed for.
To allow the space shuttle decision on the basis of the Two Stage Shuttle funding requirements, many of the important missions were postponed recently by NASA to fit the shuttle development into the expected funding limitation.

A far more sophisticated analysis needs to be done that allows the scheduling of types of payloads. The importance of payloads, the interdependence among payloads within missions and between missions, as well as an analysis of resupply, updating, maintenance, and reliability. Utilizing programming tools that are available today in operations research, substantial work can be performed, some of which is incorporated in the present ongoing work by our group.
Thus, within these constraints an acceptable Space Shuttle development program is indeed difficult: budget limitation by year, total program costs, the timing of different components of the system, the need for a Space Tug and an early full operational capability, and comprehensive and justified national space program alternatives for the 1980's.

Our Major Conclusions Are as follow

1. In the May 31, 1971 report by MATHEMATICA, Economic Analysis of New Space Transportation Systems, the overall economic worth of a reusable space transportation system was examined. The study was based on the two-stage fully reusable concept then under investigation by Phase B contractors and NASA.

That report has demonstrated how an economic justification of a space shuttle system, including a space tug, with an IOC date of 1978 has to be made. The report was not concerned with identifying the most economic choice among alternative space shuttle configurations to be considered.

2. The Baseline, fully reusable, space transportation system had attached to it a non-recurring cost of between $10 and $14 billion when the costs of all systems were included. This large investment outlay would be largely independent of the time span within which these funds are expended. These high non-recurring costs coupled with a relatively high risk led to the study of many alternate configurations.

Among the many other approaches studied by NASA and industry, our calculations show the emergence of an economical and acceptable solution to the question of the best strategy for NASA to achieve a reusable space transportation system for the 1980's at acceptable costs.

3. Over 200 space programs were analyzed by MATHEMATICA, comparing

(a) the Baseline two-stage fully reusable system,
(b) the Baseline, external hydrogen tank system,
(c) the Mark I-Mark II (reusable S1C) system,
(d) the RATO system of McDonnell Douglas,
(e) the TAHO system of Grumman-Boeing,
(f) the Stage and One-Half of Lockheed Corporation, and
(g) the Identical Vehicle Concept of McDonnell Douglas.

The Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle concepts (TAOS) which include concepts like RATO and TAHO, emerge as the most preferred systems within the space programs so far analyzed, using the economic methodology as exemplified in the May 31, 1971 report.

The common feature of TAOS concepts is a single orbiter with external hydrogen/oxygen tanks and rocket assists in the form of solid rocket motors or high pressure fed unmanned boosters. This eliminates the need to develop a large manned, reusable booster.
(...)
(c) Timing of the Space Tug should be such that its IOC date comes closely after the IOC date of the Space Shuttle. If European countries undertake the tug development --after assurance that NASA will have a Space Shuttle System!--then tug funding becomes a problem outside the NASA budget and these expenditures should not affect the shuttle decision itself. They were, however, fully allowed for in our analysis.
(…)
The Thrust Assisted Orbiter (TAOS) concepts emerge as the most economic systems within the space programs analyzed. TAOS with external hydrogen and oxygen tanks, a 60 x 15 payload bay, and a 40,000 pound polar orbit capability, if possible by 1979, clearly dominates any other configuration.
The TAOS concept foregoes the development of a Two Stage Shuttle System. With the use of thrust assists of either solid rocket motors or high pressure fed systems--which can be made in part reusable for low staging velocities-
The detailed economic justifications of the TAOS concept--when compared to any two stage reusable system are:

1. The non-recurring costs of TAOS are estimated by industry to be $6 billion or less over the period to 1979 or to 1984-85, depending on the objectives and choices of NASA. The TAOS concepts promise a reduction of the non-recurring costs (RDT&E and initial fleet investment) from about $9 billion or more (two stage systems, including reusable S-IC) to about $6 billion or less, with a minimal operating cost increase, if any, in the operating phase of the TAOS system.

2. The risks in the TAOS development are in balance lower but still substantial.
Intact abort with external hydrogen and oxygen tanks is feasible; lagging performance in the engine area can be made up by added external tank capability. A large reusable manned booster is not needed.

3. The TAOS's that were analyzed promise the same capabilities as the original two stage shuttle, including a 40,000 pound lift capability into polar orbit and a 60 x 15 feet payload bay.

4. The TAOS can carry the Space Tug and capture high energy missions from 1979 on.

5. The most economic TAOS would use the advanced orbiter engines immediately. Our calculations indicate that among the alternative TAOS configurations an early full operational capability (i. e., high performance engines on the orbiter) is economically most advantageous, and feasible, within budget constraints of $1 billion peak funding.

6. The TAOS can use J2S engines on the orbiter for an interim period.

7. The TAOS abolishes completely the immediate need to decide on a reusable booster and allows postponement of that decision without blocking later transition to that system if still desired. Thereby, TAOS eliminates or lowers the risk and potential cost overruns in booster development.

8. The TAOS can use "parallel burn" concepts, which, if feasible, may change the reusable booster decision.

9. Technological progress may make tank costs, and thrust assisted rocket costs less expensive, thus further aiding TAOS concepts when compared to two stage concepts.

10. TAOS assures NASA an early program definition, and a purpose to the agency. An agreement on TAOS will allow NASA Headquarters a quick and clear reorganization of major NASA centers to meet the TAOS development requirements economically.

11.The TAOS funding schedule make an early Space Tug development possible. The space tug is an important part of the space shuttle system. A 1979 Space Tug should recover its complete development costs before 1985 even with the stretched build of Shuttle missions from 1979 to 1985.

12 A clear policy on TAOS development will give an incentive to European countries to undertake and fund the space tug development – threbypossibly even eliminating Space Tug from NASA budget.

13.The cost per launch of TAOS can be as low as $6million or even less on an incremental cost basis, with reuse of parts of the thrust assist rockets (either SRM or pressure-fed). With Point 9 realized, the costs of TAOS would practically match the costs per launch of two stage fully reusable systems.

14. TAOS practically assures NASA of a reusable space transportation system with major objectives achieved.


RATO AND TAHO SHUTTLES

 

[Usili]

So the Saturn-Shuttle basically?

Sounds quite interesting here, and I feel like the J-2S might be staying around on the Space Shuttle for a long period here.

 

[Archibald]

the shuttle is half dead.. yet it might be even worse for NASA

November 3, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PETER FLANIGAN

BY:

CLAY . T. WHITEHEAD

(NOTE: Peter Flanigan was named Nixon's deputy campaign manager in 1968. He served as a presidential assistant until 1972. Such was Flanigan's influence and support for big business that Ralph Nader labeled him as the "mini-president". He resigned from the Nixon administration in June 1974)

I am having lunch with Jim Fletcher this Friday. I intend to convey to him our concern (I.e. , yours and the Administration's) that the President deserves better planning in the space area than we have had to date.
I will say that there seems to be a nonconstructive battle between NASA and OMB, and that you want to see planning over a longer time horizon. I would like to emphasize your willingness to facilitate such an activity on the condition that Fletcher recognize the constraints and limitations under which the President must work as well as his broad objectives.
The key to all this is to get Fletcher off the battle line he seems to be drawing publicly -- that it's the Shuttle program or nothing - and to get him to work with us toward defining a space program the President can enthusiastically endorse.

The first step in this is to discuss with him the attached draft of the Administration's criteria for the future of the space program. It is consistent with, but more detailed than, the President's statement of last year. I will tell Fletcher that you have asked me to work with him to develop the outline of such planning preparatory to your meeting with him and then possibly with the President.


ATTACHEMENTS

How and when do we achieve NASA's agreement to resize its institutional base?
While none of these actions would directly impact the FY 1973 budget, at least a tentative understanding about future Center closures should probably be worked out with Dr. Fletcher at this time.

In particular, a decision to proceed with a shuttle program could be conditioned on the need to shut down the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). If a small unpowered shuttle is selected, it would have neither orbiter engines nor a reusable booster, which just about eliminates any need for MSFC.

The shutdown of Marshall could provide about 40% of the funds required for a reduced cost shuttle.


Possible options

A - Shutdown Marshall, Huntsville, Ala. (1/74 - after Skylab) Transfer 500 top Marshall technical experts to MSC, Houston, Texas.

B- Shutdown JPL, Pasadena, Calf. (1/75 - after Viking orbiters fab.) Transfer 400 top JPL planetary experts to Langley or Goddard =MI +400 - Reduce Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio (7/73)


Conclusions
1. Seriousness of a gap in manned flight cannot be substansiated on programmatic grounds. The scientific return would be meager. There is no intrinsic urgency for these missions.

2. However, if for reasons of national prestige a manned space program is considered mandatory during the mid-1970's, these options could provide the cheapest method of conducting manned space flight.

3. A Soviet rendezvous is justified only on the basis of international political cooperation and national prestige. Although spectacular, it would have little programmatic value and similar objectives could probably be achieved by other means at much less cost.

4. Unemployment effects of the scheduled Apollo/Skylab phasedown would be reduced to a more gradual decline, particularly in the near term.

5. All of the options can be achieved without the services of the Marshall Space Flight Center.


Clay T. Whitehead - :11/3/71

 

[Michel Van]

i don't get it, why shut down JPL ?

 

[Archibald]

It might be because Viking cost was balooning out of control while the Grand Tour was not secured yet (only in 1972, more on this soon JPL had no future after Viking, so why not shutting it down ?
It is mostly forgotten today but in the 70's a certain number of NASA centers got very close of being shut down.
I can tell you ITTL NASA year 1972 is going to be hectic - far worse, far more agitated than OTL 1972 (which was already a landmark year in NASA history)

 

[Michel Van]

It might be because Viking cost was balooning out of control while the Grand Tour was not secured yet (only in 1972, more on this soon JPL had no future after Viking, so why not shutting it down ?
It is mostly forgotten today but in the 70's a certain number of NASA centers got very close of being shut down.
I can tell you ITTL NASA year 1972 is going to be hectic - far worse, far more agitated than OTL 1972 (which was already a landmark year in NASA history)

yes they even proposed to close the Johnson Spacecraft center in Texas together with Marshall Space Flight Center after ASTP in case the Shuttle was not build.
Viking was brain child of Langley not JPL who Voyager Mars probe got canceled in 1967
because it's reaching for TWO Billion dollar and needed a Saturn V to launch two probes to Mars !
but Langley had not experience with Orbiter, what JPL had so they build the Viking orbiter, while Langley give Martin Marinetta the order to build the Lander.

on Closing NASA center, Clay t. Whitehead will face, very, very, very, angry Senators, congress men and Governors of California, Texas and Alabama...

 

[Archibald]

meanwhile, on the European side of the space program...

Kourou
French Guyana
November 5 1971


Europa F11 exploded two and half minute in flight.

The rocket was in fact doomed for a moment, flying erratically like a beheaded duck. Telemetry had been lost 107 seconds into the flight, after the inertial platform went dead.

Five minutes later, fragments of the rocket rained in the Atlantic Ocean, 500 km away from French Guyana. The Europa program sunk with them.

Months later, the inquiry (led by a bright german engineer with the name of Lutz Kayser) would conclude that none stage fitted exactly onto the other; Great Britain, France and Germany had built perfectly uncooperative segments, dooming the program.

Europa F11’s failure echoed Shuttle cancellation by some days.
Both ESRO and NASA were now deep in problems.

Goodbye, Europa...

 

[Archibald]

battle for the shuttle - phase II

November 8 1971

Since the 22 October Director's review, every people involved in the shuttle program hold their breath. Weinberger rejection of the shuttle had come as a shock, notably for James Fletcher.

In less than three weeks, NASA future manned spacecraft had shrunk from Saturn-Shuttle to dumb expendable Titan carrying capsules.
First to react had been Mathematica. Heiss document, dated of October 28 and entitled Factors for a Decision on a New Reusable Space Transportation System, sat in Fletcher desk.

Fletcher looked determined.

“This is an excellent work by Mathematica, but alas it came six days too late for the shuttle” he declared.

“Have a look at this. Klaus Heiss states that their studies show the thrust assisted orbiter shuttle (TAOS) to be the economically preferred choice.
“By using the orbiter engines at take-off the booster size and velocity are reduced furthermore, to the point we may even use solid rocket motors ! Of course with the main engines running for all the flight the external tank has to be fatter.

“Among the reasons given for TAOS economic superiority are: lower development costs of less than $6 billion; lower development risks; equal capability with the originally proposed system; elimination of the need for an immediate decision on a reusable booster; and the assurance of an early programme definition and thus a purpose to the agency."

Fletcher made a brief pause and continued reading.

"I wish we considered that Mathematica's shuttle earlier" Fletcher sighed. "Truth be told, I neglected this proposal, convinced as I was the Saturn or press-fed Shuttle was the way to go. George, do you think we can still reverse Weinberger decision, and substitute that TAOS to Big Gemini - Titan ?"

Here we are. Decision point once again, George.

"I fear we aren't. In my opinion the OMB crossed a red line at the director’s review. For the first time, they talked about a capsule. Before that date, cutting costs meant downgrading the shuttle: at least we kept some form of spaceplane. Shuttle equalled manned spaceflight, you see ? Even Fubini’s glider was some form of shuttle, in the sense it has wings and a payload bay."

What Low kept for himself was his early support for the glider, long before Fubini. In fact the very idea originated from him. I killed the space shuttle, damn it.

"But we rejected it, out of hand and too early - in August - and thus the most basic spaceplane, the smallest and cheaper shuttles of all, died with it. Only capsules can be less expensive. Do you remember Weinberger memo to Nixon dated August 12 ? His mind was set on no shuttle equals no manned spaceflight.

Now he knows this is wrong… a cheaper capsule can do the job. Enough said.”

"But we haveto reverse this decision !" Fletcher retorqued. "I won't sit still for the other options, for damn Big Gemini or the glider or anything of that sort, because they really don't have the full capabilities that we need. I will go as far as the president himself if needed. To think that early October I had nearly convinced those OMB bureaucrats that the pressure-fed booster shuttle was the way to go. Then they changed their mind in a hurry…how did this happened, by the way ?"

"It's because the Flax committee tell them that the problem was not the booster, it was the orbiter size and payload. Plus the Titan was cheaper. After once we rejected the glider, Weinberger simply chose Big Gemini as the least expensive option."

"That Flax committee held meeting every six weeks… the next should be close no ?"
"It will happen on November 17 – 18."

"You will have to convince them of the Mathematica Shuttle merits, George. I will do the same within the Bureau of Budget. We will convince Nixon advisors, be them bean counters or scientists, of the value of the shuttle." Fletcher did not minced his words.

"I've heard that the men from Mathematica - Morgenstern and Heiss - have a very strong motivation. They won't give up easily." Low tried to reassure Fletcher.

He tried to assess the situation further. Evidently, something had gone wrong with the glider, someday in September… it was a shame, because, even if the Glider was unattractive, at least its wings and payload bay made it a shuttle.

By contrast, he felt Big Gemini was too far from any shuttle concept.
The gap we have now to fill is too wide. The glider would have made that gap narrower…we would be in a much less difficult situation in our quest for the Mathematica full size orbiter.

He was not sure Fletcher fully grasped how desesperate the shuttle situation was. Meanwhile that Whitehead mid-staffer from Flanigan office was pushing hard for some kind of alternative, something more balanced than Fletcher "shuttle or burst" vision.

-------------------------

 

[Bahamut-255]

Really does feel that Shuttle is quite, quite dead now. With the Europa F11 flight dooming that programme too.

With Europa, IIRC, the British-built Blue Streak 1st stage was the only part that consistently worked, with the French and German built upper stages that kept failing. And yet it was the British that had effectively pulled out by this point.

 

[Michel Van]

The F11 launch was total disaster.
A partially tested Flight computer, never tested integral on a rocket, that never truly work entirely.
That happen if partners work side by side, instead of interworking.

The wet and moistly tropical climate of French Guyana launch site was not reconsider, Original the Europa rocket were launch in dry desert of Australia.
So during launch the electrostatic forces build up and discharge into Flight electronic and fried the computer.

but not end of ELDO yet
They work on replacement rocket Europa III to be launch in 1980s.
Here French and Germany work in cooperation, with french CNES in charge.
in summer 1973 ELDO was terminated by European ministers, order formation of ESA and work on Europa III stop.
Out that Project remains became low-cost rocket L3S, renamed Ariane

while Lutz Kayser founded the notorious ORTAG company

 

[Archibald]

"... The Symphonie communication satellites were to have been launched on the Europa II but with that launcher failure the French and Germans were obliged to pay the Americans for a launcher.

Under an international agreement between the Western industralized nations signed in August 1964, responsability for international satellite communications was assigned to Intelsat - which was 56% owned by its American branch, Comsat.
Under article 14 of the Intelsat Convention, member states agreed no to take actions that might be finacially prejudicial to Intelsat.

In this context Symphonie was seen as a threat under article 14 and to the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by American launchers and satellites makers. The French and Germans argued that, as a regional European satellite it posed no serious threat to American interests - but that argument fell on deaf ears.
Without a national launcher as Europa II the French and Germans had no choice but to go back to the Americans, who agreed to launch Symphonie only if it was used for experimental, not commercial, purposes.

The French learned a hard lesson from this experience, namely the absolute importance of an independant European launcher. Indeed many years later several French leaders mused whether there ever would have been an Ariane without the American pig-headedness over Intelsat article 14.