ABM system moscow

The whole notion of "knocking systems out on the ground" and "disrupting the C3I" network is fascinating, but utterly beside the point. BOTH sides in the Cold War were keenly aware of this threat (the Soviets, with their large inventory of liquid-fuelled missiles well into the 80s were even more so), and too extensive organizational precautions to prevent that scenario. Look up Dead Hand, as an example, and consider the rather large deployment of SSBNs in the Artic 'bastion' that the Soviets were so fond of. Since there is no hard proof of their existence, we can ignore more exotic concepts such as planted bombs or doomsday machines, but even so, countermeasures to render a decapitating strike moot had already been taken.

The point of a decapitating strike wouldn't be to eliminate the Soviet ability to launch a retaliatory strike, but to disrupt it. Even a few minutes is enough time to catch a few hundred extra missiles on the ground. The objective wouldn't be to "win" a nuclear war, which is impossible anyway after 1965 at the absolute latest. It would be damage limitation - a move of desperation, when you're convinced that a strategic nuclear exchange is coming and this offers a chance to cut the incoming warheads from 12,000 to 10,000. One might ask what difference that makes, but even saving an extra 1% of the US population is saving three million people.

As I said before, I don't believe it would be worth it even under the most dire circumstances. Best to try to fight a limited war; it almost certainly wouldn't work, but a slim chance is better than none, and at least you'll go down with a marginally cleaner conscience. But I wouldn't describe it as nonsense.
 
Other than a completely successful BOOB (bolt out of the blue) attack a truly decapitating attack working in the sense of seriously preventing a command directed response to an attack. Hitting C3I like Moscow/DC is not about preventing a response, but degrading effectiveness of post first exchange response - for example if post strike target strike analysis is not obtained/distributed targets already destroyed will be hit, viable ones igniored..wasting enemies remaining assets.
 

Clipper747

Banned
I doubt there would even be a decapitation strike unless our leadership was hit first.
Decapitation means there's no one left to stop the war.

Moscow wouldn't be struck until NYC got plastered.

All cities would be considered "hostage" targets and are on the bottom of the strike list.

Unfortunately in the US many of our military bases are right next to urban areas, and since military facilities are target #1 we would lose a number of communities right off the bat.
 
Force Asymmetry

Maniakes,

You quote one of my favorite lines from Dr. Strangelove! +1 to you!

Seriously though, the problem with that analysis is that it overlooks the differences in both the forces available to each side, and the way that they were deployed. The Soviets were an ICBM heavy force (the lack of good ports and the plethora of isolated wasteland was a big factor in this, along with the technical problems in building worthwhile SLBMs) where only about 20% of their total warhead count was on SLBMs, even by the end of the Cold War. This means that they were far, far less likely to be willing to 'ride out' any sort of first strike, and far more likely to adopt measures to shorten the decision cycle, thus rendering even a decapitating strike valueless.

More to the point, their subs were deployed very differently than ours. First, most were tied up at port most of the time, which means that they were potentially vulnerable to a first strike. Those that were NOT, however, were in 'bastions', localized geographic areas, protected by minefields, attack subs, and surface vessels. This is very, very different from our own sub patrols, where were individual subs hiding in the oceans. Soviet SLBMs, even at the end of the Cold War had terrible guidance systems, with CEPs of well over 400-500 meters in many cases, which meant that they were almost exclusively used for countervalue targets. These missiles carried reasonably large (500 kt to 1Mt class) warheads, and thus didn't need accuracy to take out their large, soft targets. Soviet planning presumed that these bastion subs would have the ability to provide a survivable second strike against even the most successful American first strike, and that most NATO ASW efforts (designed for open-ocean protection of their own naval assets, not hunting SSBNs in protected waters) would be largely valueless. Note that our own assessments tended to agree with this...

So the result would not be the 20 vs 150, it would be 100 vs 150, with far more dirty desparation measures thrown in for good measure. By the way, you will have to take my word for it, but we absolutely DID know about Dead Hand (not as such) certainly from the mid 70s onwards. Even if you don't want to take my word for it (and to be honest, I wouldn't take offense, lots of bullshitters here...sigh), it was hardly an unknown bit of speculation among various targeteers. Both Kissinger and Kahn discussed the idea openly in the early 1960s (this is where the basis for much of Dr. Strangelove and Fail-Safe came from, by the way), and there was nothing magical or even particularly complicated about the approach that was used.

Asnys,

Given the relative force distributions of each side (and please see my note above to Maniakes), the decapitating strike would not significantly degrade any potential Soviet second strike capability, and might in fact accidentally enhance it, as the Soviets threw in whatever desparation, 'last ditch' nastiness that they had available in such a situation. Remember, once you shoot out the only people able to stay 'Stop', the entire system is going to empty itself against you, with no concerns about tactics, reserves, or limitations. The presumption would be that there won't be anything or anyone to care. If that sounds inhuman, remember that the people on both sides thought long and hard about making it as terrifying as possible, and providing as much certainty regarding its use as possible as well.

Ironically, as missile CEPs went down, it slowly became (remotely) possible to fight a limited (i.e. counterforce) war without total wargasm. Granted, the scenarios are somewhat specialized, but the notion that once the first nuke was used everything would go simply was not in the cards. But for any of this to happen, it was vital that the chain of command NOT be too badly disrupted, and both sides went out fo their way to ensure that would be the case. Ironically, when I lived in DC in the 80s, I had the somewhat odd comfort of being in one of the safest places in the US. The dangerous place was St. Louis (I leave the answer as to why this is the case as a puzzle for the intelligent reader....)

Clipper747,

A minor quibble...most of the military bases that the Soviets cared about were ICBMs and SAC airfields, and very few (not NONE, but FEW) of these were anywhere near major population centers. Fallout was another matter, but the limited cases we are talking about would not create so many casualties as to 'force the hand' of the attacked party. Your point about cities being 'held hostage' is most insightful, as is your comment regarding the drawback of decapitation.
 

Clipper747

Banned
I think it was a common myth to think that a nuclear exchange would be fought in one day. The reality is that it would last weeks with opposing forces slowly becoming more independent from the center and striking out when it was suitable. The last holdouts would've been the missile boats on either side.
 
I think it was a common myth to think that a nuclear exchange would be fought in one day. The reality is that it would last weeks with opposing forces slowly becoming more independent from the center and striking out when it was suitable. The last holdouts would've been the missile boats on either side.

but it's not a myth....
soviet ICBMs could have smashed minuteman missile fields.....
better launch 2/3 of your nukes, and keep the rest for counterstrikes....
even then the war would probably be a day at the most.....
missiles take 20 minutes to reach their targets
 
but it's not a myth....
soviet ICBMs could have smashed minuteman missile fields.....
better launch 2/3 of your nukes, and keep the rest for counterstrikes....
even then the war would probably be a day at the most.....
missiles take 20 minutes to reach their targets

The land-based stuff would be gone in about 4 hours....that takes into account first strike, assessment, follow-ups (with what land-based stuff remained...not very much, but some...probably about a dozen or two), then the long, slow killing from the boomers and the bombers. The bombers and the ALCMs would finish up (not much to return home to, but some strips to be sure...not sure what sort of a welcome home they would get) in about 8-12 hours, but the boomers...anywhere from 2 - 6 weeks for the last of those little surprises to come raining down. None of this includes ugliness like biologicals and charming surprises like planted bombs (no proof, but some great stories...), and even a few things sicker than that...

Nope, not over in a day, but for all intents and purposes, we would have been....
 
Asnys,

Given the relative force distributions of each side (and please see my note above to Maniakes), the decapitating strike would not significantly degrade any potential Soviet second strike capability, and might in fact accidentally enhance it, as the Soviets threw in whatever desparation, 'last ditch' nastiness that they had available in such a situation. Remember, once you shoot out the only people able to stay 'Stop', the entire system is going to empty itself against you, with no concerns about tactics, reserves, or limitations. The presumption would be that there won't be anything or anyone to care. If that sounds inhuman, remember that the people on both sides thought long and hard about making it as terrifying as possible, and providing as much certainty regarding its use as possible as well.

Ironically, as missile CEPs went down, it slowly became (remotely) possible to fight a limited (i.e. counterforce) war without total wargasm. Granted, the scenarios are somewhat specialized, but the notion that once the first nuke was used everything would go simply was not in the cards. But for any of this to happen, it was vital that the chain of command NOT be too badly disrupted, and both sides went out fo their way to ensure that would be the case.

I'm starting to get the feeling you know more about this than I do. In any event, I'm tired of defending an argument I don't agree with.

Ironically, when I lived in DC in the 80s, I had the somewhat odd comfort of being in one of the safest places in the US. The dangerous place was St. Louis (I leave the answer as to why this is the case as a puzzle for the intelligent reader....)

Air Mobility Command at Scott AFB? I'd have thought the most dangerous place would be Omaha, with SAC headquarters.
 
St Louis and footprints...

St Louis happens to sit directly in the fallout footprint from any large strike against ICBM silos not too far off. It has the distinction of being the ONLY major city in North America that sits in what would be the lethal part of any major fallout plume from a likely first-strike target. SAC HQ (for reasons I have mentioned earlier) would be a far less attractive target, thus Omaha would be reasonably safe unless we were looking at a full-scale wargasm, in which case we are all dead (the lucky ones) anyway.

You are right about Scott AFB, by the way....a very high priority target...
 
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