Abbasid Caliphate: A short discussion into the fall and decline.

Sorry for the mistaken title. I decided to write about the state structure roughly. Deu tot he massive lengths to which I was writing expanding more and more on the decline and fall. So, forgive me for that.

As was discussed earlier, in another thread that I created which focused on the military matters of the height of the Abbasid period, here I wish to discuss more abstract questions on the Abbasid period. Namely, here I wish to discuss the size and nature of the Abbasid state apparatus.

To begin, I will discuss the basis for Abbasid rule in its ideal and its realities.


Like the Umayyad before it, the Abbasid period was characterized by the rule of the Sharia law system or that which is the law of Allah and the traditions past down from Muhammad who relayed this information unto the Arab peoples. Shar'i codes are varied, but in the Abbasid period it referred to the general state of organizing the Islamic society at all levels. It was the unspoken law, no edict carried the Sharia or enforced it overtly, it was a socially enforced code to a great extent. This fits with almost all thinkers of Islam who say clearly, Sharia is not necessarily enforced by the state but enforced person to person, community to community and state to state (invasion..). However, the hadood, or the penal codes of Shar'i (sharia does not necessarily have penal codes, it is simply the laws, whereas hadood is the penal codes and penalties associated with breaking the sharia or individual shar'i codes [Sharia is made up of shar'i codes, so you can break one code whilst still upholding the whole sharia]) are enforced by the caliph of Islam.

In Abbasid society, it was to set to function (ideally) as the Islamic society or ummah operating independently their religious and secular roles without the tyranny of direct rule of the state. Thus, it was to be a situation whereby the state was limited in its functions by the 'law of Allah' which mandated that man operate his loyalty to Allah above all. This has its origins within two subjects of Islamic theology and jurisprudence (fiqh). The first of which, is Tawheed ar-Raboobiyyah which mandates that Allah is the lord of the entire earth and all things within. Thus, Allah is the one who is truly the master of the people and the subjects of the Caliphate follow him before a secular state. Instead, the Caliph is the one entrusted as leader of the Ummah in the sense of a commander, but not truly a king. Which is why, the lord of the Abbasid hegemony was never called emperor, king, etc... Always either prince or caliph which is a special way or shorthand for commander of the faithful (Amr al-Mu'minin). The second is, Tawheed al-Hakimiyyah, which means that Allah alone is the legislator of the affairs of man. His laws thus, have already been decreed and edicts given unto man and are then interpreted by his Ulema. What this entails is, that the Caliph becomes chained to what new laws can be enforced (in theory)as such would make him a legislator, which is not according to Fiqh. So in theory, the Caliph is limited in his actions and in practical terms he was limited in what he could do.

Some practical examples:

1. Taxation: While there were some land taxes that were not enumerated by the Sharia, the extent to which subjects (1) were taxed, was extremely limited when compared to later European states or in the Tang dynasty. A concept such as a tax that is generally imposed on all would be seen as insanity and as a perversion of the law of Allah. In fact, it is said that the state enforcing taxes is a sin greater than adultery. Taxes in Islam is very complex, but to put it very clearly, it is permissible to take taxes or levies for extreme circumstances. Some circumstances, include war, massive land ownership disparity (Umayyad caliphate imposed a land tax for this reason), empty treasury, etc... If the needs are met by the state in question, the parameters are strict. Namely, the tax can only be a flat rate never gaining more based upon class or standing and not overbearing. See Fatwa 138115 for more information (it is only in Arabic I believe, but if you want me to help with understanding it, just message me). After reading this, you can imagine how fiscally the Caliph was limited. It should also be noted that tax evasion of any kind was rampant even if there was a tax imposed and the zakaah could be avoided by hiding your actual wealth(2).


"Everything that is taken unlawfully is like a tax, and is haraam. It is not permissible for anyone to take his brother’s wealth unlawfully, as the Prophet (blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) said: “If you sell fruit to your brother then the crop (on the tree) fails, it is not permissible for you to take anything of it (his brother’s money). On what basis would you consume your brother’s wealth unlawfully?” But the Muslim is required to hear and obey; he should listen to those in authority and obey those in authority. If they ask him for money for such matters, he should give it to them. Then if he has a right to it, he will find it restored (i.e., on the Day of Resurrection), and if it he does not have any right to it, in that it was taken from him in a justifiable manner, then there will be nothing to be settled. What matters is that what we are obliged to do is to hear and obey with regard to those in authority. The Prophet (blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) said: “Hear and obey, even if your back is beaten and your wealth is taken.” It is not permissible to take these matters as an excuse to criticize those in authority and to slander them in gatherings and the like. We should be patient and whatever we do not get in this world we will get in the Hereafter."

-Shaykh Uthaymeen on taxation, such an opinion is almost libertarian in its implications.

(1) The extent to which one was a subject is disputed. They were not subjects of the Caliph in theory, but subjects of the Islamic community as a whole and the caliph was the commander of that community or deputy of the faith.

(2) The zakaah refers to the tithe incumbent upon Muslim. The jizya or the tax of protection of non Muslim, was also avoidable through loopholes such as working for little pay in certain courts or simple avoidance of tax collection and hiding of wealth (the jizya is only enforced at a certain wealth, decided by the ulema). It was common for Syriac Christian scribes to not pay taxes by working for the Abbasid courts or such. Since, Jizya is payed not to the community or Ummah, but is payed directly to the commander of the Islamic community (state). This comes from the understanding that jizya is a peace treaty or protection money (a racket), so it is given to the holder of the military or armed forces.


2. Military: The Caliph was not allowed to levy troops by coercion as it was in most parts of the world. Instead, the Abbasid army relied upon slaves and professional soldiers who made a life of looting or jihad. This is the reason that Mamluks became so common in the Abbasid period and similar slave castes in Islamic society, since it was taboo and considered tyranny for the ruler to force the people into an army for war. The ruler, was to have power without having to call upon the collective of the ummah. Limits on this, created the situation whereby, Arab tribalism developed so independently from the state structures, whose own military while Arab speaking, where generally non Arabs. The standing army composed primarily of non Arabs and then on campaigns were bolstered by Arabs seeking loot or jihad. Such is a limitation not seen in most areas of the world then or later.


3. Transportation: Unlike in Byzantium, where the state achieved such a massive size, that the movement of people was restricted completely and controlled; the Abbasid caliphate was restricted by the Shariah in that, subjects had the right to travel across the lands within the rule of Islam. The only restriction was the question of whether it was permissible for one to leave the lands of Islam to the lands of the kafr unless it was for war.


After all this, the Abbasid where hampered in their position as absolute rulers. However, the Caliph held certain privileges and powers that made the position worthwhile and increased the willingness for a family to keep closer to the ideals. Namely, as lords of Islam and the titular commander of the three faiths, the caliph required all Muslims both foreign and domestic to pledge allegiance to him (bayait). Thus, the caliph in terms of titles, was both commander of those Muslim within the Abbasid hegemony as well as those Muslims outside the protection of the Abbasid lands. As well, all Muslim groups, peoples or states, were demanded by Abbasid tradition to give them bayait. In most ways, this meant, surrendering your nation to rule by the Abbasid. However, once joint, you had extreme autonomy. ^

^Do note, this is the reason for me referring to the Abbasid as a hegemony or dominion, as it held lands by complex protection pacts and its position as the Ideal Masters of Islam. It directly did not rule much of its lands and allocated most of it to autonomous vassals or governors/emirs. This is partly why order ruptured so rapidly and the Abbasid seemingly lost its entire lands within less than a decade.

Though the Caliph was restricted, so was the subject/Muslim. It was considered a transgression (tagha) fro a leader to break the shariah and go beyond his limitations, he became a taghoot (transgressor). However on the same token, the subjects were disallowed from rebellion without clear signs of kufr from the Caliph. Such a rebellion, was the mantra of the Khawarij, Shi'i, etc.. Such crimes of rebellion was called fitnah (mischief) and carried a gruesome death of the highest degree, namely a public execution, often times, crucified then beheaded.

To sum all this quickly, the Abbasid structure was one of a highly limited state, decentralized and based upon more local laws (Sharia). The Abbasid, however, benefitted from the position as masters of Islam, through this, receiving large sums of tribute, prestige, power and the loyalty of the ummah.

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A rough breakdown of the state structure and power:

1. The Caliph and his court. This was centered in the city of Baghdad and for a time at Samarra, it was the titular ruler of Islam. His duties included:

-Maintaining a coherent foreign policy for the Muslims. He also was responsible for Emirs who broke his foreign policy goals. Say, an emir in Anatolian emir attacks and raids a local prince in Armenia who has signed a pact with the Caliph? The Caliph would then be sent an emissary to arbitrate between the two parties and the emir would be told to hold back and likely, both parties would be compensated, the Emir for his inability to loot and the prince for his lost goods.

-Arbitrate between factions. While disputed by the Khawarij, the Caliph had a duty to arbitrate between the factions of his realm. Especially, when it came to governors waging war against one another. It was his position to correct the issue and create a semblance of peace between opposing parties or at least keep armed conflict form occurring.

-Provide for the people mosques and other Islamic functions. Including the payment of Islamic scholars, collecting of zakaah, repairs to mosques, etc... This did not include schooling.

-Creation of fortifications for large populations.

-Arbitration in terms of contracts and land ownership/disputes. The Abbasid though, were secondary in this role, which was usually local.

-Jihad, the Caliph was required to wage war upon exterior enemies or exact a tribute from them to ensure peace. This was one that was truly taken seriously and it was not uncommon for the Abbasid throne to be fighting wars and skirmishes on all of its borders at once or in times p]of treaty, engaging an enemy elsewhere. Usually though, this was state sanctioned looting and banditry as opposed to campaigns seeking to conquer completely. Despite this role, the Abbasids were not obliged to capture slaves for the Ummah, this was a decision for the actual soldiers to capture on their own or acquire when the loot was divided between warriors. Often military pay, was this loot the Abbasid gained, thus campaigns were typically were targeted at rich foes or with the intent to acquire slaves.

2. The emirs, or those who were either governors or warlords and under the Caliphal authority. Duties included:

-Maintaining a rough military of some sort. These were especially needed for the defense of frontiers and the acquiring of loot.

-The distributors of Abbasid policy, in terms of power.

- Agreeing to Abbasid tributes and calls to join in wars. If one was to reject this, they were made anathema to Islam and engaged by the Abbasid in a war. This is what befell the Tulunids for rejecting tribute.

These were often placed by the Abbasid throne and then kept within a family. However, the Abbasid attempted to curb this tendency by subversion and causing wars between various families; giving the Abbasid the opportunity to replace positions with new and loyal subjects. Abbasid powers especially favored Turkic governors for these posts, who in technical terms, were still slaves and thus legally increasing their power over the emirs. One example was the Abbasid enticing of various Iranian nobility into inner conflict then accusation of various crimes, followed by an execution. Much of the Iranian nobility was replaced by Turkic Mamluks or Abbasid yes-men after the Khurramiyyah rebellion.


3. Wazirs and diwans. The wazir or the viceroy (?I am actually not sure how to fully translate this in English) was the titular second in command of the Caliphate and in control of the day to day events in the court. He also, was empowered to control the bureaucracies. Though, typically, was not in control of military matters in the actual Abbasid court, but this was not uniform in situations of more local establishments. A diwan is a bureau however, and is the general bureaucracies of the Abbasid throne.

There were three main Abbasid bureaus:

-Diwan al-Kharaj, which was the bureaucracy that operated on tax collection, fiscal policy and investigating sources of income.

-Diwan al-Jaysh, the bureaucracy responsible for funding the military. Though, this bureaucracy was quite limited, as soldiers often paid themselves through divided loot (loot is mandated by sharia to be divided after a campaign or battle). Further, the Mamluks were not paid in any sense as well as any other slave warriors. Yet, their armor, weapons, mounts, were paid for. This includes any funding for logistics, such as camel trains, wagons, servants, night stays, etc...

-Diwan al-rasa'il, the bureaucracy that was centered upon record keeping. This is where much of our knowledge of the Abbasid period come from.

The bureaucracy in any state, is known as the deep state or the state that controls the general movement of affairs and in a sense is the state that exists without sight. In any bureaucracy, their occupants do not ever work as a whole without a particular view of the state or ideology. Generally, the bureaucracy was one of the most diverse areas of occupation in the Islamic world, however, it was not proportionate. While the society as a whole eschewed primarily Sunni Islam, the bureaucracy, was made heavily of Christians, Jews and Mu'Tazilah. This was a stratagem by the Abbasid throne (my opinion, never stated) to make a loyal bureaucracy as well as one that would be unlikely to side with a widespread revolt. Mu'Tazilah, especially, dominated the bureaucracies leadership and highest posts in Baghdad/Samarra, especially in the area of record keepings and historical works.

The bureaucracy though, differed between the outer edges of the realm and that of the actual city of Baghdad. Within the capital, the bureaucrats doubled as courtesans and intellectuals within the court of the Abbasid throne. They became famous for their schemes and grabs for power between one another.

While these were state institutions, they held not absolute power. At local levels there were hierarchies and powers not tied to the state apparatus.

-Tribal Chiefs: These operated much as they do today, as powerful non state actors in local areas. These Arab chiefdoms could be of any creed, but usually, they opposed the heavy handed diwans and the Turkic Mamluks. However, the Arab tribes nearly always served loyally to the Caliph in times of wars, especially during the Khawarij revolt of 866, where the tribes actively waged a vicious war against the Khawarij in a manner similar to the recent wars in Iraq. This also includes non Arab chiefs. In much of Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, Christian Syriacs had tribes and such, but operated almost wholly loyal to the Abbasid throne (exceptions of course abound).

-Ulema: This was another type of bureaucracy, but not controlled by the state to any extent (except the Mihna). Ulema were those who have great knowledge of the Islamic fiqh or religion and are a separate class from the Ummah, like the Caliph, in that they perform the duty of interpreting the words of Allah or the prophet. The ulema was present everywhere in society, often deciding disputes, holding Islamic courts for a community, giving financial advice to merchants, etc... The Ulema primarily opposed the increasing power of the Abbasid.

This is not mentioning actual groups of people and communities that in most ways, ruled themselves without state compulsion or general people in society.

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So, with all the overlaying levels of states, it was not a burden for the average person as the state often was faraway or distant to their actual life, focused on income, spirituality and familial relations.

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Caliphal provinces are as follows/ name and capital(s)

1. Ifriqiya-- Kairouan
2. Barka-- Barneeq
3. Egypt/Misr-- Fustat/Alexandria
4 al-Awasim-- Malatya
5. al-Jazira-- Aleppo
6. Syria-- Damascus
7. Hijaz-- Makkah
8. Nejd/Arabia-- N/A
9. Bahrain-- al-Ahsa
10. Yemen-- Sana'a
11. Oman-- Masqat
12. Iraq-- Baghdad/Samarra/Basra (depended)
13. Ninewah-- Mosul
14. Armenia--Bagaran
15.Ahvaz-Karun-- Suq al-Ahvaz
16. Arran-- Ganja
17. Azerbayjan-- Qarom
18. Tabarestan--Lafur
19. Gilan-- Rasht
20. Moh-- Hamadan
21. Isfahan--Isfahan
22. Rayy--Rayy or Rhagei
23. Jujan--Nisa
24. Fars-- Shiraz
25. Kirman--Kirman
26. Sistan and Zabul-- Zabul/Zwambinar
27.Makran-- N/A
28. Khursan-- Qabul and Herat
29. Marwannahr-- Samarqand
30 Kwarezm-- Gurganj and Konjikala
31. Wazirastan-- Peshawar
32. Hindustan-- None, was a province by name but not conquered.
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Hope this was informative to someone.
 
This is really informative for sure.



How much did they claim as Hindustan? Just the Indo-Gangetic Plain, or including South India?

Primarily down to modern Delhi. They had broken through the exterior of modern India, but never held it completely. Hindustan, in many ways refers to Lahore down to Bengal. If the Abbasids ever conquered more of India, it would be broken into many provinces, Hindustan, Rajputana, Gujarat, Sindh, Kashmir, etc... And likely into many, many provinces like how Iran was.

Thanks, if you have any more questions, do ask.
 
Primarily down to modern Delhi. They had broken through the exterior of modern India, but never held it completely. Hindustan, in many ways refers to Lahore down to Bengal. If the Abbasids ever conquered more of India, it would be broken into many provinces, Hindustan, Rajputana, Gujarat, Sindh, Kashmir, etc... And likely into many, many provinces like how Iran was.
That sounds cool. Is there any way the Abbasids, with enough stregth and control over their eastern provinces, could have conquered such a region?
Would weakening the Gurjara-Pratiharas be a good enough PoD?
 
That sounds cool. Is there any way the Abbasids, with enough stregth and control over their eastern provinces, could have conquered such a region?
Would weakening the Gurjara-Pratiharas be a good enough PoD?

I highly doubt it. The Abbasids have firepower, but it is primarily defensive or based around looting. However, it is possible if you can avoid the rebellion of Ya'qub ibn Layth al-Saffar and keep al-Afshin alive and thus weaken the Samanids. With those conditions met, you either have Ya'qub al-Saffar and his successors focus on invading into Hindustan following his subduing of the Khawarij of Baluchistan and his victory of over the Zunbils. Or, more preferably, speed up the arrival of Turkic emirs in the east, such as Mahmud al-Ghazna who then with additional Abbasid support, could breakthrough the Rajputs and thus conquer the fertile lands of Hindustan.

This would increase the population of the Abbasid realm immeasurably. Hindu populations however, would produce no tax at first, but I suspect the Abbasids would devise some method to tax them as hard working tax earners are more valuable than a massive population of rebellious slaves. Do understand, if Hindustan was conquered, the largest religion in the Abbasid realm would be Hinduism... The implications of this, would be interesting indeed.
 
Almost any outside country that barely takes a piece of India or China is going to be majority Chinese or Indian, those 2 regions stand out demographically like nothing else.
 
I highly doubt it. The Abbasids have firepower, but it is primarily defensive or based around looting.

Well, you've given another way, but I have an idea. What if Harsha's empire, which existed across northern India from Gujarat to Bengal, survived albeit under weak and unpopular emperors? One of the main reasons behind the Arab conquest of Sindh was that the ruling dynasty was incredibly unpopular, and so the Arabs were invited with open arms by the desperate population, in stark contrast to the situation as close as Gujarat. If this could be replicated this across India, could that then mean that the Arab invasions of India be much more successful?

This would increase the population of the Abbasid realm immeasurably. Hindu populations however, would produce no tax at first, but I suspect the Abbasids would devise some method to tax them as hard working tax earners are more valuable than a massive population of rebellious slaves. Do understand, if Hindustan was conquered, the largest religion in the Abbasid realm would be Hinduism... The implications of this, would be interesting indeed.

If they successfully conquer Hindustan, and are able to convert a sizeable amount of the population (which doesn't necessarily mean majority-Muslim. By the end of Arab rule of Sindh, I suspect the population was majority-Hindu, and that it only became majority Muslim under the Turks. There was a massive Hindu minority there right until Partition, and even today, it's the only part of Pakistan with a sizeable Hindu population, not counting claimed Jammu), could that then mean a somewhat Indianized Caliphate? Much of the reasons why India is so culturally Persian is because of constant Persian and Persianized Turkic invasions, and here, that would not be the case. Here, could we get culturally "Hindu" Islam rather than culturally "Persian" Islam?
 
Almost any outside country that barely takes a piece of India or China is going to be majority Chinese or Indian, those 2 regions stand out demographically like nothing else.

I am not sure it would be the majority of the caliphate if it only encompasses downto Delhi, but it wound be cutting it close. I believe, India as a whole collective, held between 225-315 million people by the high middle-ages. If the Abbasid Caliphate absorbed only some of it, the Abbasid population in the greater Mid East, would still be higher, but it would be close. If it only included the Gujarat and Sindh, the Abbasids would have quite an advantage in population over the new Dharmic subjects. However, if they annex all the way to Bengal, then the Hindus would certainly overtake the Abbasid general population. However, do remember, that the Abbasid hegemony is the largest nation on earth in terms of geographical extent and the second largest in population by 800.
 
Well, you've given another way, but I have an idea. What if Harsha's empire, which existed across northern India from Gujarat to Bengal, survived albeit under weak and unpopular emperors? One of the main reasons behind the Arab conquest of Sindh was that the ruling dynasty was incredibly unpopular, and so the Arabs were invited with open arms by the desperate population, in stark contrast to the situation as close as Gujarat. If this could be replicated this across India, could that then mean that the Arab invasions of India be much more successful?



If they successfully conquer Hindustan, and are able to convert a sizeable amount of the population (which doesn't necessarily mean majority-Muslim. By the end of Arab rule of Sindh, I suspect the population was majority-Hindu, and that it only became majority Muslim under the Turks. There was a massive Hindu minority there right until Partition, and even today, it's the only part of Pakistan with a sizeable Hindu population, not counting claimed Jammu), could that then mean a somewhat Indianized Caliphate? Much of the reasons why India is so culturally Persian is because of constant Persian and Persianized Turkic invasions, and here, that would not be the case. Here, could we get culturally "Hindu" Islam rather than culturally "Persian" Islam?


I doubt that the entirety of Northern India could be conquered in this manner. Abbasid occupation would not be that alluring to surrender so much. Also, the Arabs will not simply invade to absorb land, they will demand tribute or they will loot, remember that the Abbasid standing army will likely not be there, but will instead be made up of contingents of Abbasid vassals. I cannot imagine an Abbasid Caliph campaigning this Far East unless it was defensive.

Regardless, the Harsha would have to last another 100 years at least to face the Abbasids in battle. By that point, they will not be in a position to terrorize their subjects enough for them to submit to the Abbasids.

What do you mean by an Indianized Caliphate? The Abbasid, are very unlikely to adopt large amounts of Indian customs whilst they still reside in Baghdad. It should be noted, if the Abbasids are to rule large swathes of India, they will need a system of travel between Baghdad to India... Perhaps in an Abbasid wank, there can be extensive infrastructure work from Baghdad to Hormuz, which leads to a large traffic on the sea to Gujarat. Or less fascinating, but more plausible, Basra sea traffic to and from Gujarat with the Persian gulf to Gujarat all becoming domestic sea lanes.
 
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So given that the Abbasid court was able to gain receive huge sums of tribute, was their anyway possible for them to extend their actual power over at least some parts of their domain through the expansion of the bureaucracy? Although you have stated that the Abbasid state was restricted by the sharia in terms of its power, surely such restrictions would also apply to what local Amirs were also able to exercise over their populations. Thus could the Abbasids subvert the power of these Amirs by establishing stronger ties with local governance under the Amir's domain.

Also were the Ulema's opposition to the Caliphs power based on religious grounds or was their also a political desire to do so as well? Couldn't perhaps strong relations between the Abasid court and Ulema allow the former to increase its power through the latter. Or alternatively, could the Ulema act as a bureaucracy that effectively governed the Abbasid state if we have a situation where the Abbasid court was particularly weak. I suppose this would depend largely on the degree of uniformity and structure of the Ulema.
 

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Do understand, if Hindustan was conquered, the largest religion in the Abbasid realm would be Hinduism... The implications of this, would be interesting indeed.
With travel time and cost in the ancient era, would that really affect the core of the Abbasid Caliphate? Practically, only a very small contingent of traders and maybe recruits would or could travel from India to Mesopotamia, the Levant, and Arabia.
 
With travel time and cost in the ancient era, would that really affect the core of the Abbasid Caliphate? Practically, only a very small contingent of traders and maybe recruits would or could travel from India to Mesopotamia, the Levant, and Arabia.

Probably not, however, it would be useful to connect the two large populations of the Abbasid hegemony. It would likely, become an aspiration of young princes with dreams of grandeur. Even possibly recreating images of Alexander and his own conquest of Hindustan.
 
So given that the Abbasid court was able to gain receive huge sums of tribute, was their anyway possible for them to extend their actual power over at least some parts of their domain through the expansion of the bureaucracy? Although you have stated that the Abbasid state was restricted by the sharia in terms of its power, surely such restrictions would also apply to what local Amirs were also able to exercise over their populations. Thus could the Abbasids subvert the power of these Amirs by establishing stronger ties with local governance under the Amir's domain.

Also were the Ulema's opposition to the Caliphs power based on religious grounds or was their also a political desire to do so as well? Couldn't perhaps strong relations between the Abasid court and Ulema allow the former to increase its power through the latter. Or alternatively, could the Ulema act as a bureaucracy that effectively governed the Abbasid state if we have a situation where the Abbasid court was particularly weak. I suppose this would depend largely on the degree of uniformity and structure of the Ulema.


1. The Emirs were certainly restricted as well, their main power however was their military prowess. Abbasid authorities rightly feared the strength of these emirs and thus attempted to allocate their attention to the exteriors of the realm to wage wars. Mind you, the Abbasids did subvert the emirs greatly and certainly had greater relations with locals than the emirs, but they also lacked the military power to push emirs out. There is a reason that Ya'qub al-Safar was not attacked immediately, the Abbasids knew he was too powerful and thus waited for him to attack.

Expanding the bureaucracy has to come with a reason. Also, there would need to be benefits for bureaucracy to live outside Baghdad or Iraq, where they tended to flock to. It is hard to get a talented burueacrat from Baghdad to settle in Iran and not begin to side with the local emirs and just as hard as in Egypt which was notoriously interested in local issues as opposed to the interests of the whole.

2. There was certainly political reasons and economic reasons for ulema to want independence from the state. The primary one, is limiting Caliphal power allowed unqualified ulema to act as judges, lawyers and community leaders.

The Abbasid could use the ulema for bureaucrats and I would advocate this in a better performed Abbasid realm. The key, is to use them outside Iraq, ulema would be much more likely to work as bureaucrats than a cosmopolitan Mu'Tazalite from Baghdad who likely washed excessively and held peasants in contempt. The issue, is this tended to be a bureaucrat of the Abbasid period, a trope of a pretentious intellectual from cosmopolitan population centers.
 
1. Interesting, It seems as though governance for the Abbasids was a constant act of scheming and balancing to maintain control over the hegemony

2.So what was the major impediment then that prevented the Abbasid court from utilising the Ulema as an effective bureaucracy for governance. Was it conflicting ambitions between the two that triggered this. Alternatively perhaps it would be more fruitful to perhaps see an inverse where the Caliphs became figureheads for the Ulema, as would seem to befit their role more as Commander of the faithful while actual governance is placed in the hands of the Ulema who were involved in running the Islamic courts. Although the fact that the Ulema doesn't control a military force would be a major impediment to it increasing its power vis a vis the Caliph or even local Emir's and tribes who would be more restricted with a Ulema-Bureacracy. You can only achieve so much centralisation in a pre modern state.

Also, what role did the Sufi orders play during the period, did they wield much clout as organisations as they would later on in other Muslim societies?
 
Within the capital, the bureaucrats doubled as courtesans and intellectuals within the court of the Abbasid throne.
Did you intend the older meaning of courtesan, rather than how the term developed in the Renaissance? (IE. were they courtiers or literal whores?)
 
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1. Interesting, It seems as though governance for the Abbasids was a constant act of scheming and balancing to maintain control over the hegemony

2.So what was the major impediment then that prevented the Abbasid court from utilising the Ulema as an effective bureaucracy for governance. Was it conflicting ambitions between the two that triggered this. Alternatively perhaps it would be more fruitful to perhaps see an inverse where the Caliphs became figureheads for the Ulema, as would seem to befit their role more as Commander of the faithful while actual governance is placed in the hands of the Ulema who were involved in running the Islamic courts. Although the fact that the Ulema doesn't control a military force would be a major impediment to it increasing its power vis a vis the Caliph or even local Emir's and tribes who would be more restricted with a Ulema-Bureacracy. You can only achieve so much centralisation in a pre modern state.

Also, what role did the Sufi orders play during the period, did they wield much clout as organisations as they would later on in other Muslim societies?

1. Very correct. The Abbasids by their end, were masters of subversion and diplomatic subtlety. This would become their downfall as they suspected they could do this to the Mongols, as opposed to the most sure way of victory, force of arms.

2. The impediment was that that the Abbasid court had already a set clique of deep state. Namely, the Mu'Tazilah, Mamluks and the religious minorities whom the Abbasid surrounded themselves. The Mu'Tazilah deep state is what caused the Abbasid state to go down a path of total war with the Sunni ulema and then the path of open war with the Shi'i. Mamluks also, held such considerable sway post 845, that they primarily decided the lordship of Islam and also controlled most matters of enforcement and tribute collection. Further, as time moved on, Mamluk emirs seemed to be more disobedient than Arabs, Iranians, Egyptians, etc... A complete miscalculation by the Abbasid ruling elite, who assumed the slaves would remain servile. Abbasid courtly decadence, also limited the martial skills of Abbasid rulers who allocated nearly everything outside of pleasure to their Mamluk slaves. It is not befitting for the commander of Islam to be a decadent opium addict or sadistic teenager.

Sufi were not as defined as they would become later. Importance of Sufi came about primarily with the Ottoman period in Sunni Islam and within Iran with the Safavid empire. The Abbasid period was characterized by a harsher materialism within Islamic circles and focus on reason (more so) and strict shariah law than on mysticism (not counting Shi'i).
 
Did you intend the older meaning of courtesan, rather than how the term developed in the Renaissance? (IE. were they courtiers or literal whores?)

Courtiers! I did not know this word meant a whore... This was not my intention. Forgive me, my command of English may seem archaic or lacking.
 
1. Very correct. The Abbasids by their end, were masters of subversion and diplomatic subtlety. This would become their downfall as they suspected they could do this to the Mongols, as opposed to the most sure way of victory, force of arms.

2. The impediment was that that the Abbasid court had already a set clique of deep state. Namely, the Mu'Tazilah, Mamluks and the religious minorities whom the Abbasid surrounded themselves. The Mu'Tazilah deep state is what caused the Abbasid state to go down a path of total war with the Sunni ulema and then the path of open war with the Shi'i. Mamluks also, held such considerable sway post 845, that they primarily decided the lordship of Islam and also controlled most matters of enforcement and tribute collection. Further, as time moved on, Mamluk emirs seemed to be more disobedient than Arabs, Iranians, Egyptians, etc... A complete miscalculation by the Abbasid ruling elite, who assumed the slaves would remain servile. Abbasid courtly decadence, also limited the martial skills of Abbasid rulers who allocated nearly everything outside of pleasure to their Mamluk slaves. It is not befitting for the commander of Islam to be a decadent opium addict or sadistic teenager.

Sufi were not as defined as they would become later. Importance of Sufi came about primarily with the Ottoman period in Sunni Islam and within Iran with the Safavid empire. The Abbasid period was characterized by a harsher materialism within Islamic circles and focus on reason (more so) and strict shariah law than on mysticism (not counting Shi'i).
So what was it then that initially caused the Abbasids to align themselves with the Mu'Tazilite clique rather than the Sunni Ulema, was this a leftover from the Umayyads that the Abbasids inherited. Is there a possible POD in which you can have the Ulema rather than the clique you describe as becoming the primary allies of the Abbasids.
 
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