A Victorious Nazi Germany with Lebensraum would...
- Thread starter GlobalHumanism
- Start date
People go for superpower Nazi Germany or Nazi Germany conquering everything on the planet.
I've come to fancy the idea of a dull victorious Germany that can only become as powerful as Great Britain on a good day, and collapses after serious economic mismanagement in the long term.
I've come to fancy the idea of a dull victorious Germany that can only become as powerful as Great Britain on a good day, and collapses after serious economic mismanagement in the long term.
nbcman
Donor
Japan doesn't have the Army to seriously attack the Soviets while they are up to their neck in China. Also, it is unlikely that Italy and a small German contingent will be able to bring an Axis victory even if the SU loses. The Italian navy and merchant marine is too small to supply enough forces to occupy North Africa let alone all of Africa.
Then they are Notzis as opposed to Nazis. The Nazis were not going to treat the Slavs 'nice' after years of indoctrination. Who is going to starve when there is insufficient food in 1941, a German Landser or Hausfrau versus a Soviet POW or Ukrainian peasant?
There was an avalanche of resources shipped to Germany from Russia in May and June 1941 including over 14,000 tons of natural rubber in addition to the grains, oil and other items which the Germans used to build up their stocks before invading the SU.
What will the Germans not ship to the front lines when they have to ship the winter equipment-ammunition, food, fuel??
Where will the Germans get the resources to increase production especially since they had resource shortages with their OTL 1940-1941 production.
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Deleted member 1487
It seems no one is familiar with the Kwantung Army:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kwantung_Army#Second_World_War
Or that they could have added the Southern Strike forces onto it too instead of invading the Pacific and South Asia. China could wait because they left the Kwantung army in Manchuria in OTL and used the Southern strike forces against the Allies all while being in China. Later the Kwangtung army was split up and part used for the Ichi-Go offensive. So they had probably 2 million men or more to use against Siberia if they wanted, but it would have to come at the expense of the Southern Strike.
As a side note before people bring up Kkhalkhin Gol as proof of Soviet superiority, remember that that battle was conducted by overwhelming forces by the Soviets in a surprise attack, not by outnumbered Soviet forces, as they would be in a North Strike by Japan during Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol
Interesting. What would the numbers of Kwangtung Army vs Soviet Far Eastern forces be for a strike north beginning, say, around the same time as Operation Typhoon?
Actually, the leadership of the Wehrmacht didn`t like to carry out some of the atrocities of the Nazi regime (even though they did comply in the end). And while many Germans were indoctrinated there is a reason why concentration camps were run and most mass shootings were conducted by special forces of the SS and not by the Wehrmacht. If Hitler would have ordered the Wehrmacht to treat russians like prisoners of war, they would have complied gladly. And everybody knows that Stalin treated Ukrainians and Russians like shit (I just want to mention holodomor)....millions of russians would have fought against the red army.
And as I told you, if that would have been just a ruse, a tactic to destabilize the SU, the Nazi party would have complied.
The thing with the food would have only been a problem if the war would last long, but I doubt that. The SU either collapses in the first two years of the war or it doesn`t collapse and then the war is lost either way.
That`s not an argument, the original plan was actually to start operation Barbarossa one month before it actually started. It was only postponed because Jugoslavia betrayed Germany. So in this alternate timeline Hitler just would have to diplomatically solve the problem with Jugoslavia. Or crush Jugoslavia faster.
There was no problem with logistics at the start of operation barbarossa. The problem was that Hitler didn`t plan for a winter campaign. He (his military staff and the military of the British too by the way) thought the SU would be defeated after 2 months. So the Wehrmacht didn`t produce enough winter clothing etc beforehand. A grave mistake.
While it is true that they didn`t have available as much ressources as 1942, there was still much room for improvement. Source: wikipedia
"
At the time of Speer's accession to the office, the German economy, unlike the British one, was not fully geared for war production. Consumer goods were still being produced at nearly as high a level as during peacetime. No fewer than five "Supreme Authorities" had jurisdiction over armament production—one of which, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, had declared in November 1941 that conditions did not permit an increase in armament production. Few women were employed in the factories, which were running only one shift. One evening soon after his appointment, Speer went to visit a Berlin armament factory; he found no one on the premises.
Speer overcame these difficulties by centralizing power over the war economy in himself. Factories were given autonomy, or as Speer put it, "self-responsibility", and each factory concentrated on a single product"
There you can see how successful Speer was.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alber...anzerwagen_in_Deutschland_1941-1944_ver.2.png
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Thats a strange map. They respects Finnish independence(and not Swedish neutrality) but take land that is rightfully Italian territory.
Anyway a victorious Nazi regime is basically like the victorious Ho Chi Minh regime. In war they wre effective and knew how to win but once there was peace they had no idea how to run the country and went to the extreme with everything untill it all collapsed.
Anyway a victorious Nazi regime is basically like the victorious Ho Chi Minh regime. In war they wre effective and knew how to win but once there was peace they had no idea how to run the country and went to the extreme with everything untill it all collapsed.
nbcman
Donor
See this thread from a few months ago about a Japanese invasion of the USSR.
I had not forgotten the Kwantung Army but it was not large enough to seriously attack without being reinforced. Adding the 11 divisions used for the Southern strike would not be enough to activate the limited land grab against a collapsing Soviet Union envisioned by Operation Kantokuen (approximately 700,000 men). Also note that Operation Kantokuen was not created until after the Nazi's attacked. Prior to that, the plan was for a full strength invasion 'Hachi-go' which called for 1.3 million men or 80% of their total Army strength of 1.7 million including pulling the majority of the IJA forces from China.
Deleted member 1487
Japan wouldn't attack until the Soviets thinned out their numbers and looked ready to collapse, so probably not until September-October. The Kwantung army alone had IIRC about 1.3 million men and with the Southern Strike reinforcements probably over 2 million, while in the Soviet Far East there were ostensibly over 1 million Soviet troops, but low quality ones with old equipment as the best men and weapons were sent West. So no T-34s or even more modern pre-T34 tanks.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=149223
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Red_Banner_Army#22_June_1941
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Red_Banner_Army
Deleted member 1487
Yet the IJA had 5.5 million men by 1945:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Army#World_War_II
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Kantogun
24 divisions was enough to pull off the invasion in phases, including cutting off a lot of Soviet forces around Vladivostok with naval help and no Soviet hope for rescue. The 24 divisions were actually more men than just 700k.
Plus they could mobilize more men, as the fact that they did mobilize 5.5 million by 1945 demonstrated.
That then cuts off over 50% of LL aid.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_Route
In 1941-42 then anything that came in via Murmansk or Persia was not going against Japan. Soviet force projection was only going to come via the Siberian RR, but Stalin couldn't send help anyway. They just had to use what they had on hand, which was only old men and boys with the old equipment that wasn't of use in the West.
So while the Soviets might have had more divisions spread out over the area the Japanese could concentrate theirs for phased attacks, focusing on cutting off and wiping out in detail Soviet forces in various areas, while using the poor infrastructure of the Soviet Far East as a defensive buffer, as the Soviets won't then able to mass and attack in certain areas like out of Mongolia, while using the mountains to their north to shield them as they cut off Vladivostok.
Claims that the Japanese were going to run out of fuel don't hold water as they stockpiled fuel for 2-3 years of major combat and IOTL did not get much out of the DEI due to the US USW campaign against their tankers and the sabotage by the Dutch of the oil fields, yet they were able to fight from 1942-45 mostly on existing stocks.
http://www.ww2f.com/topic/30105-ope...k-is-neutral-and-japan-attacks-siberia/page-3
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TFSmith121
Banned
Wait, so now Nazi Germany has conquered Sweden?
Wait, so now Nazi Germany has conquered Sweden?
You're all over the .... map.
Best,
Wait, so now Nazi Germany has conquered Sweden?
You're all over the .... map.
Best,
Ah..I see what you did there.
But it's from the the wikipedia page about Lebensraum. So take your disagreements to them!
I think they'd go the same way as the Soviet Union did. They'd be one of two competing Superpowers next to the United States but would, after many decades of competing against Capitalism, eventually fracture and fall apart as internal tensions between the sides that want to open up to the world economy and the sides that still believe in the ideology fail to reconcile.
The difference is you'd be left with a Europe that's got a huge population slant towards Germans: given a few decades of killing Slavs and encouraging German girls to have as many kids as they can handle will result in what was the Warsaw Pact in Europe being populated predominantly by Germans, though I suspect that no real cities of importance will exist past Kiev: all that is Ukraine, Belarus and European Russia today would be a vast, almost empty land of self-contained agricultural towns.
I think an interesting question is what happens to the Reich? Does it fragment into German-Ukraine, German-Belarus, German-Poland and so on? Or does the whole Reich generally stay together but ends up being forced to ditch Naziism and become a Capitalist country?
The difference is you'd be left with a Europe that's got a huge population slant towards Germans: given a few decades of killing Slavs and encouraging German girls to have as many kids as they can handle will result in what was the Warsaw Pact in Europe being populated predominantly by Germans, though I suspect that no real cities of importance will exist past Kiev: all that is Ukraine, Belarus and European Russia today would be a vast, almost empty land of self-contained agricultural towns.
I think an interesting question is what happens to the Reich? Does it fragment into German-Ukraine, German-Belarus, German-Poland and so on? Or does the whole Reich generally stay together but ends up being forced to ditch Naziism and become a Capitalist country?
Which was not the Army the Japanese wanted to execute Hachi-Go. Indeed, said army never existed. The 43-division plan drafted prior to Khalkin Gol was wholly theoretical. "Japanese Operational Planning against the USSR" notes that of the Seventh Army, slated to arrive from the Home Islands, and assist in the offensive against Soviet defences west of Vladivostok with an additional seven divisions, (the aforementioned source document) notes, "Although this army was included in projected plans, it was never actually organized." [emphasis mine]. The assault on Amur to the north in this 43 division plan was also to be undertaken by the Second Army, but again, the source document notes, "The Second Army was not organized until July 1942." [p.84] [emphasis mine, again] In short, the 43 division plan used forces that did not exist.
Another important part is what the IJA actually thought of their ability to execute it. Namely, that they couldn't. To quote "Japanese Operational Planning against the USSR" at length:
"After a joint study with the War Ministry, [IGH] reached the conclusion that Concept B [of Hachi-go] could be carried out only if (1) certain railroads (sketch 9) were made operational, (2) about 200,000 motor vehicles were made ready and (3) a great quantity of war materiel were stockpiled in the Hailar Plain area. Moreover, IGH felt that these requirements could not be satisfied for the time being due to the general situation, especially as regards the national power of Japan and particularly its natural resources." [p.108]
Planning for Hachi-go had revealed other problems with Japanese assumptions. Under Concept B the Japanese had assumed that relatively small forces in northern Manchuria could sever the Trans-Siberian railroad and cut off forces in Ussuri. Soviet stockpiling of supplies in Ussuri, and the construction of a parallel rail line some 200km north of the Trans Siberian railroad rendered these assumptions void. [p.114] This meant more significant forces would have to be devoted to the north and east - forces the Japanese could not support - not and also launch a major offensive west. If the Japanese could not isolate Soviet forces in the east, the Japanese were faced with the very real possibility of the envelopment of their own forces rather than the enemy. [p.117]
The planners also noted that victory under Concept B would require the army to achieve motorization and mechanization which, as of the plan's inception, it had not done so. [pp.134-135] Similarly it would have to attain superior strength in the air so as to ensure air superiority. [p.135]
Support for Concept B completely evaporated after Nomonhan, which revealed the key assumptions of Soviet strength and mobility, and Japanese ability to conduct offensive actions to the west to be sharply at odds with reality.
"The battle at Nomonhan provided a clear picture of the scale and characteristics of operations on the vast wasteland of the Hailar Plain, and suggested that a large-scale modern war might be fought in that area in the future. Japan's limited national strength at that time, however, did not permit the build-up of an army, the development of munitions industries, and the execution of pre-war preparations in the field to the extent of meeting the requirements of Concept B of Operational Plan no. 8." [p.136]
Furthermore, Japanese entry against the Soviets would hardly have doomed the Soviets. Defeat in the Far East in August-December of 1941 wouldn't have changed the Battle for Moscow, and the Japanese had no means to push further west against areas that would have actually mattered for the Soviet Union. The same barren terrain and limited lines of communication the Japanese were (rather blithely) counting on to prevent large scale Soviet responses would also have allowed relatively small Soviet blocking forces to prevent further movement west by the IJA. The Soviets could economize in forces in the area until they were ready to drive the Japanese out.
The loss of the Far East would have hardly costed the Soviets anything they needed for victory either. The loss of Vladivostok would have hurt, since half of all Lend Lease ran through that port - but the allies used Vladivostok so much because it was the safest route, as well as the closest to the American west coast. Had Vladivostok been closed they'd have delivered the cargo through the Indian ocean, or the northern route. Longer and more perilous, but the allies had a surfeit of transport.
So not 1941.
Absolutely hilarious. In March 1941, the Japanese had a stockpile of 42.7 million barrels of oil million barrels. In 1942-'44 they consumed more then twice of that. So where did those extra 50 million+ barrels come from?
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TFSmith121
Banned
Ah... Wikipedians...
Ah... Wikipedians... I hate those guys.
Best,
Ah..I see what you did there.
Ah... Wikipedians... I hate those guys.
Best,
Deleted member 1487
You realize your entire point is only based in a world pre-Barbarossa right? By then the Far East forces were heavily drawn down and the Soviets had no ability to counterattack because of all of their combat capable formations being drawn Westward. If the Soviets were not at war with anyone else, such as in 1938-39 when the planning you're referring to was done, then that would be right, but the situation as of Autumn 1941 was drastically different and the Soviets were not at all able to resist even a limited Japanese invasion because of the major weakening of Soviet forces to support resistance against the Germans.
This entire passage is pretty irrelevant to discussing cutting of Vladivostok or phase 1 and 2 of the move north:
That was in Mongolia to the west, not in the East where the invasion in 1941 would have taken place and have been far more supportable as there was infrastructure there. All your references to Japanese needs to organize motorized supply only refer to operations in Mongolia not against Vladivostok, the initial target on the map I posted above.
Also you're completely wrong about the re-routing of LL, as Iran was not set up to receive major shipments until 1943 when the UK/US modernized and upgraded its infrastructure and Murmansk was largely topped and and its shipments mostly used to supply forces in the North, especially in 1941-42.
This shows some more RRs:
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Domestic production of crude oil, at it's peak in 1941, was 1.9 million barrels. Consumption of that crude, based on the fall of stocks and factoring in imports and production, was nearly 20 million barrels a year. So basically Japan was unable to cover up the difference even with imports, completely imploding your idea that Japan could sustain itself on domestic production alone.
Resorting to outright dishonesty now, eh?:
The Japanese disagreed. As the monograph Japanese Preparations For Operations in Manchuria (prior to 1943), which states:
"At the conference held on 9 August [1941] the Army and the Navy Departments of IGH decided to abandon hope for a favorable opportunity to exploit the situation in the north against the USSR, and to concentrate all efforts southward, regardless of any new developments in the German-Soviet war."
Barbarossa began on 22 June. The Japanese launched their Pacific offensive on 7 December. The decision was thus made after Germany invaded the USSR, but before the Japanese Empire became fully enmeshed in the Pacific. An ability to read calendar dates means that estimate of success was based on Japan and Germany against the USSR, and the Japanese didn't like the odds.
Not at all.
Given that LL didn't start to matter until 1943, that is just as well. Incidentally, this is when the Pacific shipments also started to become a major factor.
Where it's impact was utterly insignificant.
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