Fearless Leader
Donor
Hey Everyone,
Recently I was going through the files on my computer and I came across a bunch of my old TL's. Not only did this remind me how long I've been doing AH, but it also made me want to return and try and salvage some of my old TL's.
This one was egregiously awful...in an effort to fix it, I've chosen a slightly different POD and style that's more to my liking. So without further ado...
Part I: Preparations
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereux)
...Most discussions of the pivotal battles of Wake Island focus on the multiple naval engagements that took place around the atoll during the early months of the War in the Pacific. Yet few give adequate mention to the immense efforts that took place in 1941 which enabled the island’s defenders to resist the initial attacks and come to pose such a nuisance to the Japanese plans of Pacific mastery…
…Though the strategic usefulness of Wake Atoll had long been recognized by the Americans and the US Navy in particular, work on turning the island into a valuable naval base was continually delayed. As early as 1938 the Hepburn Report recommended that the Atoll be fortified and turned into an airbase capable of supporting US Operations in the region. Yet budgetary constraints stemming from the Great Depression and the requirements of a peacetime military, coupled with a failure to adequately perceive the threat posed by Japan led to these recommendations being shuffled off to the side. Construction on preliminary base construction activities only began in 1941 and completely neglected and defensive preparations…
…Any thought of fortifying the island would have to wait until April 18th 1941 when Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, alarmed at Wake’s defenseless state, petitioned the Chief of Naval Operations in what would later become a prophetic study, saying:
“The strategic importance of Wake is increasingly evident, as one inquires into means by which the Pacific Fleet may carry on offensive operations to the westward. It is 2,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, over 1,000 miles from Midway, and about 1,400 miles from Johnston. On the other hand, it is but 450 miles from Bikini in the Marshalls, while Marcus, which itself is an outpost of the Bonins and Marianas, is 765 miles to the northwestward.
As an operating patrol plane base, it could prove highly valuable to us in observing the Marshalls, or in covering advance of our forces toward the Saipan-Honshu line. In the hands of the Japanese, it would be a serious obstacle to surprise raids in the Northern Marshalls, or on Marcus, Port Lloyd, or Saipan, and would be capable of causing serious interference with other secret movements of our forces.
To deny Wake to the enemy, without occupying it ourselves would be difficult; to recapture it if the Japanese should seize it in the early period of hostilities, would require operations of some magnitude. Since the Japanese Fourth Fleet includes transports, and troops with equipment especially suited for landing operations, it appears not unlikely that one of the initial operations of the Japanese may be directed against Wake.
If Wake be defended, then for the Japanese to reduce it would require extended operations of the naval forces in an area where we might be able to get at them; thus affording us opportunity to get at naval forces with naval forces. We should try, by every possible means, to get the Japanese to expose naval units. In order to do this, we must provide objectives that require such exposure.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is considered essential that the construction work now in progress on Wake be proceeded with and that the eventuality of war should not interrupt it. To this end, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, believes that defense installations and defense forces should be established on Wake at the earliest possible date, even at the expense of slowing down construction. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that in the absence of defense forces, construction on Wake, in the event of war, is subject to serious interruption or even complete stoppage, through enemy action.
It is therefore recommended that units of a marine defense battalion be progressively established on Wake as facilities there permit.” (1)…
...Fortunately, Kimmel’s recommendations, unlike those of the Hepburn Report did not fall completely on deaf ears and on June 23rd 1941, as Hitler’s panzers were rolling into the Soviet Union, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the establishment of elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion on Wake Atoll “as soon as practicable”. This order became the rallying cry for immediate action by the Pacific fleet, and on August 1st 1941, advance elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion under Major James Devereux began loading the USS Regulus(2)…
…However, recently released private papers reveal that efforts to fortify Wake Atoll actually began much earlier than the arrival of the Marines on the island on the 19th of August (3). In fact almost immediately after the CNO authorized the establishment of the Marines on the island, work had begun, through backchannels, string pulling, favor calling, and perhaps blackmail to aid them in their efforts (4). The exchange that occurred between the powers that be and courageous Marine administrators during the summer of 1941 is a testament to the classic quote which reads “Good generals think about tactics, great generals think about logistics.” Marine administrators were quick to note that the CNO’s plans were simply unfeasible for the paltry number of Marines being sent to Wake. Not only were the Marines, less than 200 strong at the time, supposed to construct coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, they were to do so without any aid from the civilian contractors on the island, ostensibly using only hand tools. In addition they were expected to serve as stevedores, as the port facilities had not yet been built, and later refuel Army Air Force B-17 bombers as they transited from Hawaii to Clark Field in the Philippines (5). Such responsibilities would certainly have sucked up more man hours than the Marines had at their disposal and distracted them from their primary duties of preparing to defend the island. Possessed of an urgency uncommon to the administrative apparatus around them, a network of people began to labor to ensure that Wake Island could be adequately defended…
…Efforts to aid the Marines in their efforts to fortify Wake began innocently enough, as attempts were made to facilitate cooperation between the lavishly supplied force of 1200 civilian laborers on the island and the Marines. Initial hopes were paltry in comparison to later concessions, the loaning of bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy equipment (6). Yet the intransigence of some civilian and military authorities provoked an equally drastic response on the part of the Marines. Though details remain unclear, the results of their actions are not, by the time Major Devereux and the 1st Marines arrived on the island, the 1200 men working on building the naval air base had been effectively placed under Marine control. Marine projects were to receive the highest priority in regards to men and equipment. In general the attitude of the men on Wake Atoll from August 1941 onward is best summed up in a line from a communique to the island “For all intents and purposes your men are to behave as if the Japanese declared war yesterday.” (7)…
…This fit in perfectly with the urgency felt by the commander of the 1st Marines, recently assigned Major James Devereux. The urgency felt by Devereux had been a major factor in the decision to put him in charge of the island. Strict and by the book, Devereux was tough but fair. Knowing he was working against the clock, he pushed all of his men, Marine and civilian to their limit in order to prepare for what he saw as a quickly approaching inevitable conflict. Though at only 5’5”, not a man of impressive stature, Devereux surprised many with his willingness to work alongside his men, and subject himself to the same grueling construction work…
…It should be noted that much of the feverish work that took place in the late summer and early autumn of 1941 would not have been possible without the cooperation of Lieutenant Elmer B. Greey, the USN’s construction representative and N.D. Peters, the civilian contractor superintendent. These men in addition to the other labourers on the island had no real qualms in aiding the Marines, in fact the real resistance came from officials elsewhere, primarily in Washington. Had they been less cooperative it is highly unlikely that as much work would have been accomplished in fortifying the island (8)…
…Before examining the numerous preparations that took place in 1941, it is prudent to reacquaint ourselves with the physical layout of the atoll itself. A “V” shaped atoll, Wake is divided into 3 islands, Wake proper which forms the “body” of the V and upon which the main airbase was built, and Wilkes and Peale Islands that form the tips of the V. The entire atoll is roughly 2600 acres, most of which was covered in low dense brush unlike many other Pacific island atolls. Yet despite being a relatively small atoll, Wake possesses over 21 miles of coastline, itself surrounded by treacherous coral reefs that extend from 30-1100 yards beyond it. By the time the Marines arrived and assumed control of the construction activities, the workers had already begun transforming the island, blasting out a small runway and road network in addition to other smaller projects….
…The arrival of the Marines and the prioritization of defensive works put an end to many of the smaller projects being undertaken by the civilian workforce, or at the very least severely retarded them. Creature comforts and provisions for what would ultimately become a seaplane base were put on hold in order to ensure that the island did not first fall into enemy hands…
…Aided by nearly 1200 civilian workers, work on Wake’s defensive positions progressed rapidly. Though the Marines lacked many critical parts or spares for the guns themselves, the infrastructure surrounding the guns had been largely completed by the end of September 1941. All of the guns had been emplaced camouflaged and sandbagged, large underground magazines had been constructed, and an underground telephone network had been completed linking all the batteries to a central command post (9)…
…The garrison at Wake also received a steady trickle of supplies from the most unlikely of sources. An inventive clerk found a way to ensure that vital parts for the island’s gun batteries made the treacherous journey to the island onboard the dozens of Army Airforce B-17 bombers that transited through the region. Ironically, as most of these bombers would be destroyed on the ground at Clark Field during the opening days of the Pacific War, their task in carrying rangefinders, spare parts, and gunnery director parts, to Wake would prove to be their only solid contribution to the war effort…
…As the fortifications around Wake began to be completed, work on civilian projects resumed and the task of the Marine garrison began to shift towards preparing for the defense of the island. Standard tables of organization required a force of roughly 1000 men on the island to man the various guns and provide a significant mobile reserve. Even with war on the horizon, this proved to be too much, even for the intrepid body of bureaucrats working to supply the garrison. What could not be supplied quantitatively was made up for in quality, as certain fields were emphasized over others. Rather than request mere riflemen, requests were made for gunnery crews, radar sets and operators, as well as for surplus weaponry(10)…
…Having worked under the Marines for over a month, many of the civilian contractors had developed an affinity to the leathernecks. Furthermore, they had been impressed with the need to aid in the defense. It was decided that it would be prudent to be able to defend themselves if the Japanese were to attack, and so as early as October 1941, groups of volunteers began to drill and train with the Marines to fill in for their lack of manpower. Usually these men served as assistants on the desperately understaffed AA batteries, or as extra riflemen. Civilian authorities also proved helpful in arranging the inclusion of defense related materiel to the islands(10)...
…The next large infusion of Marines occurred on the 1st of November with the arrival of the USS Castor. Though the arrival of dedicated gunnery crews and gunnery directors for the 3 and 5 inch batteries should not be discounted, by far the most important were the arrival of the SCR-268 fire-control radar, the SCR-270B search radar, and their operators. All told, roughly 220 personnel were added to the total strength on the island that day (11)…
…With the arrival of the vital radar sets, Wake’s defensive preparations were roughly finished. After their emplacement, the Marine garrison, less than half its official strength, began to increase the frequency of drills and training exercises. A particular focus was given to the undermanned AA gunnery crews who by this point included a large number of civilian volunteers. As the war loomed ever closer, these drills became increasingly realistic and regular in the hopes of being ready for an inevitable Japanese attack (12)…
…What would be the final piece of the initial portion of Wake’s final defenses arrived mere days before the Japanese attack. The men and machines of VMF-211 arrived on the island between November 28th and December 4th. Ground support staff for the squadron arrived first onboard what would be the last peacetime supply shipment to the Marines onboard the USS Wright. On December 4th 12 F4F-3 Wildcats, flying off the USS Enterprise safely landed on the island with the aid of a PBY Catalina. Unfortunately, these men would only have a few days to familiarize themselves with their new surroundings…
…Yet they would not be alone, for the Wright also delivered 63,000 gallons of gasoline, 50 more gunners, and the island’s new commander, Winfield S. Cunningham. As the ranking officer on the island Cunningham assumed the office previously held by Devereux of Island commander, however as he was far less familiar with the defensive situation on the island, Cunningham was prepared to defer to Devereux until such time that he was (13)…
…For the duration of 1941, it had felt like the Japanese could attack at any minute. A constant sense of urgency and some help from higher command had enabled Devereux, the 1st Marines, and the often overlooked civilian contractors to do something quite extraordinary. In the course of only 4 months they had managed to complete an impressive set of fortifications. Though they remained critically undermanned at the outbreak of the war, possessing less than half of their authorized strength, they had managed to create a defensive bulwark that would catch the Japanese completely by surprise…
Footnotes
1. Quote is from OTL
2. Different from OTL, but not the POD in and of itself…in OTL Devereux only became commander of the island on October 15th.
3. Date is again from OTL, Major Lewis A. Hohn, the original commander of the advance detachment (Replaced by Devereux on October 15th), 4 other officers and 173 enlisted men arrived on the island in OTL on this date.
3. Here’s the initial Point of Divergence.
4. All of these responsibilities were held by the Marines in OTL and inhibited their work on preparing the island for war.
5. Though there would be some cooperation between the Marines and civilians along these lines in OTL. A strict separation between the two groups was maintained even after the events of December 7th until the island’s surrender on the 23rd. Upon surrendering the civilian laborers were taken prisoner along with the rest of the island’s defenders and subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Most were shipped to China. Those that remained on the island laboured on coastal defenses until an American raid prompted the Japanese to execute them and bury them in a mass grave.
6. Though there was mounting pressure to enact a measure to this end for the duration of 1941, no concrete actions were taken. The Marines were forced to construct the coastal and AA batteries on Wake using little more than hand tools, sweat, and a little ingenuity.
7. In OTL both Greey and Peters did as much as they could to try and aid the Marines, lending them equipment to help emplace the 5 and 3 inch guns.
8. Compare this to OTL where on December 6th 1941, the telephone line was all above ground, and the various batteries, while emplaced, lacked many necessary features and fortifications.
9. In OTL the construction work was not nearly as advanced requiring more brute labour. Wake in TTL is more prepared and ready to accept said shipments. Furthermore all of the civilians and 20% of the military personnel (non-Marines) were unarmed during the Japanese invasion, not so in TTL…
10. Again there was some degree of cooperation between the civilians and the Marines in OTL. Volunteers helped man machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons beginning in November. More resources, cooperation, and urgency means that TTL’s civilian volunteers get more training for longer and are thus better prepared.
11. Again a difference from OTL, the radar sets, gunnery directors, and gunners were all in Pearl Habor on December 7th. The Marine force is also slightly bigger than OTL due to the need to include radar officers.
12. Having completed their fortification works, the Marines are now free to do something they did precious little of in OTL, actually prepare for the defense of the island.
13. Mostly OTL, however in TTL fewer civilian workers arrive with the Wright due to more pressure for Marine gunners to man the AA batteries. The 50 gunners sent in TTL are above and beyond what was sent in OTL.
Recently I was going through the files on my computer and I came across a bunch of my old TL's. Not only did this remind me how long I've been doing AH, but it also made me want to return and try and salvage some of my old TL's.
This one was egregiously awful...in an effort to fix it, I've chosen a slightly different POD and style that's more to my liking. So without further ado...
A True and Better Alamo: The Battle for Wake Atoll
Part I: Preparations
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereux)
...Most discussions of the pivotal battles of Wake Island focus on the multiple naval engagements that took place around the atoll during the early months of the War in the Pacific. Yet few give adequate mention to the immense efforts that took place in 1941 which enabled the island’s defenders to resist the initial attacks and come to pose such a nuisance to the Japanese plans of Pacific mastery…
…Though the strategic usefulness of Wake Atoll had long been recognized by the Americans and the US Navy in particular, work on turning the island into a valuable naval base was continually delayed. As early as 1938 the Hepburn Report recommended that the Atoll be fortified and turned into an airbase capable of supporting US Operations in the region. Yet budgetary constraints stemming from the Great Depression and the requirements of a peacetime military, coupled with a failure to adequately perceive the threat posed by Japan led to these recommendations being shuffled off to the side. Construction on preliminary base construction activities only began in 1941 and completely neglected and defensive preparations…
…Any thought of fortifying the island would have to wait until April 18th 1941 when Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, alarmed at Wake’s defenseless state, petitioned the Chief of Naval Operations in what would later become a prophetic study, saying:
“The strategic importance of Wake is increasingly evident, as one inquires into means by which the Pacific Fleet may carry on offensive operations to the westward. It is 2,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, over 1,000 miles from Midway, and about 1,400 miles from Johnston. On the other hand, it is but 450 miles from Bikini in the Marshalls, while Marcus, which itself is an outpost of the Bonins and Marianas, is 765 miles to the northwestward.
As an operating patrol plane base, it could prove highly valuable to us in observing the Marshalls, or in covering advance of our forces toward the Saipan-Honshu line. In the hands of the Japanese, it would be a serious obstacle to surprise raids in the Northern Marshalls, or on Marcus, Port Lloyd, or Saipan, and would be capable of causing serious interference with other secret movements of our forces.
To deny Wake to the enemy, without occupying it ourselves would be difficult; to recapture it if the Japanese should seize it in the early period of hostilities, would require operations of some magnitude. Since the Japanese Fourth Fleet includes transports, and troops with equipment especially suited for landing operations, it appears not unlikely that one of the initial operations of the Japanese may be directed against Wake.
If Wake be defended, then for the Japanese to reduce it would require extended operations of the naval forces in an area where we might be able to get at them; thus affording us opportunity to get at naval forces with naval forces. We should try, by every possible means, to get the Japanese to expose naval units. In order to do this, we must provide objectives that require such exposure.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is considered essential that the construction work now in progress on Wake be proceeded with and that the eventuality of war should not interrupt it. To this end, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, believes that defense installations and defense forces should be established on Wake at the earliest possible date, even at the expense of slowing down construction. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that in the absence of defense forces, construction on Wake, in the event of war, is subject to serious interruption or even complete stoppage, through enemy action.
It is therefore recommended that units of a marine defense battalion be progressively established on Wake as facilities there permit.” (1)…
...Fortunately, Kimmel’s recommendations, unlike those of the Hepburn Report did not fall completely on deaf ears and on June 23rd 1941, as Hitler’s panzers were rolling into the Soviet Union, the Chief of Naval Operations authorized the establishment of elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion on Wake Atoll “as soon as practicable”. This order became the rallying cry for immediate action by the Pacific fleet, and on August 1st 1941, advance elements of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion under Major James Devereux began loading the USS Regulus(2)…
…However, recently released private papers reveal that efforts to fortify Wake Atoll actually began much earlier than the arrival of the Marines on the island on the 19th of August (3). In fact almost immediately after the CNO authorized the establishment of the Marines on the island, work had begun, through backchannels, string pulling, favor calling, and perhaps blackmail to aid them in their efforts (4). The exchange that occurred between the powers that be and courageous Marine administrators during the summer of 1941 is a testament to the classic quote which reads “Good generals think about tactics, great generals think about logistics.” Marine administrators were quick to note that the CNO’s plans were simply unfeasible for the paltry number of Marines being sent to Wake. Not only were the Marines, less than 200 strong at the time, supposed to construct coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, they were to do so without any aid from the civilian contractors on the island, ostensibly using only hand tools. In addition they were expected to serve as stevedores, as the port facilities had not yet been built, and later refuel Army Air Force B-17 bombers as they transited from Hawaii to Clark Field in the Philippines (5). Such responsibilities would certainly have sucked up more man hours than the Marines had at their disposal and distracted them from their primary duties of preparing to defend the island. Possessed of an urgency uncommon to the administrative apparatus around them, a network of people began to labor to ensure that Wake Island could be adequately defended…
…Efforts to aid the Marines in their efforts to fortify Wake began innocently enough, as attempts were made to facilitate cooperation between the lavishly supplied force of 1200 civilian laborers on the island and the Marines. Initial hopes were paltry in comparison to later concessions, the loaning of bulldozers, trucks, and other heavy equipment (6). Yet the intransigence of some civilian and military authorities provoked an equally drastic response on the part of the Marines. Though details remain unclear, the results of their actions are not, by the time Major Devereux and the 1st Marines arrived on the island, the 1200 men working on building the naval air base had been effectively placed under Marine control. Marine projects were to receive the highest priority in regards to men and equipment. In general the attitude of the men on Wake Atoll from August 1941 onward is best summed up in a line from a communique to the island “For all intents and purposes your men are to behave as if the Japanese declared war yesterday.” (7)…
…This fit in perfectly with the urgency felt by the commander of the 1st Marines, recently assigned Major James Devereux. The urgency felt by Devereux had been a major factor in the decision to put him in charge of the island. Strict and by the book, Devereux was tough but fair. Knowing he was working against the clock, he pushed all of his men, Marine and civilian to their limit in order to prepare for what he saw as a quickly approaching inevitable conflict. Though at only 5’5”, not a man of impressive stature, Devereux surprised many with his willingness to work alongside his men, and subject himself to the same grueling construction work…
…It should be noted that much of the feverish work that took place in the late summer and early autumn of 1941 would not have been possible without the cooperation of Lieutenant Elmer B. Greey, the USN’s construction representative and N.D. Peters, the civilian contractor superintendent. These men in addition to the other labourers on the island had no real qualms in aiding the Marines, in fact the real resistance came from officials elsewhere, primarily in Washington. Had they been less cooperative it is highly unlikely that as much work would have been accomplished in fortifying the island (8)…
…Before examining the numerous preparations that took place in 1941, it is prudent to reacquaint ourselves with the physical layout of the atoll itself. A “V” shaped atoll, Wake is divided into 3 islands, Wake proper which forms the “body” of the V and upon which the main airbase was built, and Wilkes and Peale Islands that form the tips of the V. The entire atoll is roughly 2600 acres, most of which was covered in low dense brush unlike many other Pacific island atolls. Yet despite being a relatively small atoll, Wake possesses over 21 miles of coastline, itself surrounded by treacherous coral reefs that extend from 30-1100 yards beyond it. By the time the Marines arrived and assumed control of the construction activities, the workers had already begun transforming the island, blasting out a small runway and road network in addition to other smaller projects….
…The arrival of the Marines and the prioritization of defensive works put an end to many of the smaller projects being undertaken by the civilian workforce, or at the very least severely retarded them. Creature comforts and provisions for what would ultimately become a seaplane base were put on hold in order to ensure that the island did not first fall into enemy hands…
…Aided by nearly 1200 civilian workers, work on Wake’s defensive positions progressed rapidly. Though the Marines lacked many critical parts or spares for the guns themselves, the infrastructure surrounding the guns had been largely completed by the end of September 1941. All of the guns had been emplaced camouflaged and sandbagged, large underground magazines had been constructed, and an underground telephone network had been completed linking all the batteries to a central command post (9)…
…The garrison at Wake also received a steady trickle of supplies from the most unlikely of sources. An inventive clerk found a way to ensure that vital parts for the island’s gun batteries made the treacherous journey to the island onboard the dozens of Army Airforce B-17 bombers that transited through the region. Ironically, as most of these bombers would be destroyed on the ground at Clark Field during the opening days of the Pacific War, their task in carrying rangefinders, spare parts, and gunnery director parts, to Wake would prove to be their only solid contribution to the war effort…
…As the fortifications around Wake began to be completed, work on civilian projects resumed and the task of the Marine garrison began to shift towards preparing for the defense of the island. Standard tables of organization required a force of roughly 1000 men on the island to man the various guns and provide a significant mobile reserve. Even with war on the horizon, this proved to be too much, even for the intrepid body of bureaucrats working to supply the garrison. What could not be supplied quantitatively was made up for in quality, as certain fields were emphasized over others. Rather than request mere riflemen, requests were made for gunnery crews, radar sets and operators, as well as for surplus weaponry(10)…
…Having worked under the Marines for over a month, many of the civilian contractors had developed an affinity to the leathernecks. Furthermore, they had been impressed with the need to aid in the defense. It was decided that it would be prudent to be able to defend themselves if the Japanese were to attack, and so as early as October 1941, groups of volunteers began to drill and train with the Marines to fill in for their lack of manpower. Usually these men served as assistants on the desperately understaffed AA batteries, or as extra riflemen. Civilian authorities also proved helpful in arranging the inclusion of defense related materiel to the islands(10)...
…The next large infusion of Marines occurred on the 1st of November with the arrival of the USS Castor. Though the arrival of dedicated gunnery crews and gunnery directors for the 3 and 5 inch batteries should not be discounted, by far the most important were the arrival of the SCR-268 fire-control radar, the SCR-270B search radar, and their operators. All told, roughly 220 personnel were added to the total strength on the island that day (11)…
…With the arrival of the vital radar sets, Wake’s defensive preparations were roughly finished. After their emplacement, the Marine garrison, less than half its official strength, began to increase the frequency of drills and training exercises. A particular focus was given to the undermanned AA gunnery crews who by this point included a large number of civilian volunteers. As the war loomed ever closer, these drills became increasingly realistic and regular in the hopes of being ready for an inevitable Japanese attack (12)…
…What would be the final piece of the initial portion of Wake’s final defenses arrived mere days before the Japanese attack. The men and machines of VMF-211 arrived on the island between November 28th and December 4th. Ground support staff for the squadron arrived first onboard what would be the last peacetime supply shipment to the Marines onboard the USS Wright. On December 4th 12 F4F-3 Wildcats, flying off the USS Enterprise safely landed on the island with the aid of a PBY Catalina. Unfortunately, these men would only have a few days to familiarize themselves with their new surroundings…
…Yet they would not be alone, for the Wright also delivered 63,000 gallons of gasoline, 50 more gunners, and the island’s new commander, Winfield S. Cunningham. As the ranking officer on the island Cunningham assumed the office previously held by Devereux of Island commander, however as he was far less familiar with the defensive situation on the island, Cunningham was prepared to defer to Devereux until such time that he was (13)…
…For the duration of 1941, it had felt like the Japanese could attack at any minute. A constant sense of urgency and some help from higher command had enabled Devereux, the 1st Marines, and the often overlooked civilian contractors to do something quite extraordinary. In the course of only 4 months they had managed to complete an impressive set of fortifications. Though they remained critically undermanned at the outbreak of the war, possessing less than half of their authorized strength, they had managed to create a defensive bulwark that would catch the Japanese completely by surprise…
Footnotes
1. Quote is from OTL
2. Different from OTL, but not the POD in and of itself…in OTL Devereux only became commander of the island on October 15th.
3. Date is again from OTL, Major Lewis A. Hohn, the original commander of the advance detachment (Replaced by Devereux on October 15th), 4 other officers and 173 enlisted men arrived on the island in OTL on this date.
3. Here’s the initial Point of Divergence.
4. All of these responsibilities were held by the Marines in OTL and inhibited their work on preparing the island for war.
5. Though there would be some cooperation between the Marines and civilians along these lines in OTL. A strict separation between the two groups was maintained even after the events of December 7th until the island’s surrender on the 23rd. Upon surrendering the civilian laborers were taken prisoner along with the rest of the island’s defenders and subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Most were shipped to China. Those that remained on the island laboured on coastal defenses until an American raid prompted the Japanese to execute them and bury them in a mass grave.
6. Though there was mounting pressure to enact a measure to this end for the duration of 1941, no concrete actions were taken. The Marines were forced to construct the coastal and AA batteries on Wake using little more than hand tools, sweat, and a little ingenuity.
7. In OTL both Greey and Peters did as much as they could to try and aid the Marines, lending them equipment to help emplace the 5 and 3 inch guns.
8. Compare this to OTL where on December 6th 1941, the telephone line was all above ground, and the various batteries, while emplaced, lacked many necessary features and fortifications.
9. In OTL the construction work was not nearly as advanced requiring more brute labour. Wake in TTL is more prepared and ready to accept said shipments. Furthermore all of the civilians and 20% of the military personnel (non-Marines) were unarmed during the Japanese invasion, not so in TTL…
10. Again there was some degree of cooperation between the civilians and the Marines in OTL. Volunteers helped man machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons beginning in November. More resources, cooperation, and urgency means that TTL’s civilian volunteers get more training for longer and are thus better prepared.
11. Again a difference from OTL, the radar sets, gunnery directors, and gunners were all in Pearl Habor on December 7th. The Marine force is also slightly bigger than OTL due to the need to include radar officers.
12. Having completed their fortification works, the Marines are now free to do something they did precious little of in OTL, actually prepare for the defense of the island.
13. Mostly OTL, however in TTL fewer civilian workers arrive with the Wright due to more pressure for Marine gunners to man the AA batteries. The 50 gunners sent in TTL are above and beyond what was sent in OTL.
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