A Tank WI: The Battle of Flers–Courcelette

The first use of the Tank in offensive operations was in the Battle of Flers–Courcelette in September 1916, as part of the Somme offensive. At the time, Haig ordered that the forty-nine avaliable machines be used to break the German lines. He placed this order in spite of the demands of the French Government overrule him, so that a large number of Tanks could be massed in a bid to smash the German lines and break the deadlock in the Western Front.

My question is simple. What if the French Government had been successful and the number of Tanks behind the lines had been built up until the Spring of 1917. Could a massed attack of British and French Tanks have smashed the German lines and broke the stalemate of the Western Front?

Could it have won the Entente the war?
 
Could it have won the Entente the war?

Hardly. At best, these machines could advance 7 to 8 kilometres. Thus, a bulge might be created, just like at Cambrai (November 1917), but perhaps a little bit smaller. - That still enables the defender to bring in more reinforcements via rail and seal the bulge - than the attacker can bring forward units across the battlefield.
 
Without Flers-Courcelette it would take longer to notice the flaws in the designs of the Mark I, so in that future "Cambrai" there wouldn't be any Mark IV (They didn't go into production in May 1917)
 
Hardly. At best, these machines could advance 7 to 8 kilometres. Thus, a bulge might be created, just like at Cambrai (November 1917), but perhaps a little bit smaller. - That still enables the defender to bring in more reinforcements via rail and seal the bulge - than the attacker can bring forward units across the battlefield.
The first thing I would say is that the shock value would have been huge.

In the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, they gained around two miles with forty-nine Tanks. German Infantry had not faced anything like the Tank and as a result, the shock value was an advantage. It is not unreasonable to expect that with a force many times larger with local superiority it could break the German lines if concentrated correctly. Perhaps winning the war was a bit optimistic, but I could see it creating a massive dent in the Gerrman lines, bigger than anything in 1916 certainly.
 
It would be a tremendous shock, will gain several miles of ground over a fairly wide frontage. Many prisoners and guns will be captured.

Then all the tanks will be out of action for several weeks. The German army will not break, and will seal off the rupture with reinforcements. The salient thus formed will be a vulnerable spot for some time.

The Germans will also be instantly and thoroughly convinced of the need for massive AT measures.

Thanks to this being the first use of tanks, the Entente will not know how best to use them, to properly coordinate them with infantry and artillery, and the tanks will have a LOT of hidden design deficiencies.

Plus, these early tanks don't solve the big problem of how to supply your offensive through the devastated region and into open country.

So it'll be a powerful yet clumsy blow that cannot be repeated swiftly and cannot be transformed into a Breakout.
 
In spring of 1917, there would be:
- approx. 130 French Schneider tanks (from the 400 tanks planned)
- approx. 120 Britsh Mk.Is (from the 150 built)

IOTL, the French vehicles were used at the Aisne; they didn't make an impression as they were unable to cross wide trenches.
IOTL, the British used 60 Mk.Is (including some Mk.II training tanks) at Arras, where they weren't making an impression either, because most got stuck in the mud - although the initial infantry/artillery attack did gain a nice bulge.

In an TTL combined attack, the French part can be trusted to be a failure; the British will perhaps be able to produce a petty bulge, which they did IOTL as well, without that the German front collapsed.
Also keep in mind that the surprise tank attack hadn't been invented yet, thus the assault would occur after several days of severe shelling, which is a sure recipe for being unable to exploit initial gains.
 
In spring of 1917, there would be:
- approx. 130 French Schneider tanks (from the 400 tanks planned)
- approx. 120 Britsh Mk.Is (from the 150 built)

IOTL, the French vehicles were used at the Aisne; they didn't make an impression as they were unable to cross wide trenches.
IOTL, the British used 60 Mk.Is (including some Mk.II training tanks) at Arras, where they weren't making an impression either, because most got stuck in the mud - although the initial infantry/artillery attack did gain a nice bulge.

In an TTL combined attack, the French part can be trusted to be a failure; the British will perhaps be able to produce a petty bulge, which they did IOTL as well, without that the German front collapsed.
Also keep in mind that the surprise tank attack hadn't been invented yet, thus the assault would occur after several days of severe shelling, which is a sure recipe for being unable to exploit initial gains.

Hmm. Guess I thought they'd have more Mk.Is available by then. Thanks for the figures.
 
Hmm. Guess I thought they'd have more Mk.Is available by then. Thanks for the figures.

Originally, they had anticipated to make use of 240 new Mk.IV tanks, which, however, failed to materialise. Thus, 60 of the old Mk.I (including some soft-armoured Mk.IIs) had to be refurbished for the attack.

ITTL, there wouldn't be any Mk.IVs. The Mk.Is would still be an untried weapon, accompanied by exaggerated expectations.
 
Originally, they had anticipated to make use of 240 new Mk.IV tanks, which, however, failed to materialise. Thus, 60 of the old Mk.I (including some soft-armoured Mk.IIs) had to be refurbished for the attack.

ITTL, there wouldn't be any Mk.IVs. The Mk.Is would still be an untried weapon, accompanied by exaggerated expectations.

Yes, that is most likely. They wouldn't have learned, by small-scale trial and error, the serious limitations of the machines, the better methods of employing them, nor more effective tactics of combining them with infantry and artillery.

Ironically, the "error" of premature penny-packet commitment was very likely a godsend.

So, a what-if on the specified terms might plausibly result in everyone concluding that tanks were little better than a gimmick weapon, with consequent loss of focus on armored development. That'd be interesting!
 
When the French used the tanks in the f the Schneiders were badly deployed and suffered 50% losses from German long-range artillery. The Saint-Chamond tanks, first deployed on 5 May, proved to be so badly designed that they were unable to cross the first line of German trenches.ailed Nivelle offensive,

Could this fact may led to Haig thinking that the tanks are not worthwhile going on wit with in this ATL?
 
Could this fact may led to Haig thinking that the tanks are not worthwhile going on wit with in this ATL?

Don't think so. Haig didn't care a damn what the French were doing. He would look at his own tanks and judge from their peformance.

IOTL, the rather modest successes of the few Mk.Is at the Somme did convince him to demand 1,000 tanks for 1917.
 
Don't think so. Haig didn't care a damn what the French were doing. He would look at his own tanks and judge from their peformance.

IOTL, the rather modest successes of the few Mk.Is at the Somme did convince him to demand 1,000 tanks for 1917.

Indeed. But there had been no success, not even modest, in this ATL.
 
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