The idea of using land-reform to try and drive agricultural landlords into areas of industrial development and investment sounds quite a bit like what Mexico did during the 1930s and 1940s.
A tale of Vietnam: Con rồng trở lại và ruồi phượng hoàng
- Thread starter La Rouge Beret
- Start date
The idea of using land-reform to try and drive agricultural landlords into areas of industrial development and investment sounds quite a bit like what Mexico did during the 1930s and 1940s.
Snake Featherston
Banned
I don't think changing the dictator alters that RVN was asked to do the impossible: preserve French colonialism in a watered-down form, complete with Catholics holding autocratic power and the European/white Allies of that Vietnam refusing to let it do anything on its own. Unless you're starting for one thing with the South Vietnamese leader coming from Vietnam, as opposed to a white society, the same problems reappear: South Vietnam is the pro-White Vietnam, the Vietnam that has nothing Vietnamese about it. North Vietnam, ally to the Eastern Bloc, at least makes a pretense of it and waters down its own dependence on its allies.
At the same time you need to get the ARVN to focus on the NVA, not on Vietnamese civilians or on the Vietnamese dictator. Doing this isn't going to be easy no matter which US-backed "democrat" you decide to put in charge here.
At the same time you need to get the ARVN to focus on the NVA, not on Vietnamese civilians or on the Vietnamese dictator. Doing this isn't going to be easy no matter which US-backed "democrat" you decide to put in charge here.
Snake Featherston
Banned
I think it's fairly clear that you're misunderstanding the fundamental problems Saigon had. The first sign of this in the ATL is when Catholic Vietnamese accept Buddhist anything telling them what to do and how to do it. The Catholic Vietnamese expected that working with the French entitled them to be leaders, something reinforced by the Diem regime IOTL. Second, your pacification campaign modeled on Malaya and the Philippines working that smoothly shows no grasp whatsoever of the huge difference between Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam: the Communists were Vietnamese, the people against them were Vietnamese. There is no readily-identifiable group lacking a strong foreign backer to repress.
Saigon needs a hugely different approach, so when you had this you pretty much passed the point of timeline and went right into wank. It's a good read, but the realism died at the second point most clearly.
Hyperion
Banned
I think he has somewhat of a point, even if it doesn't examine the whole picture.
South Vietnam needs to be able to stand on it's own two feet, and not need tens of thousands of US "advisors" helping to keep the government in power.
Even if the people in charger are better than OTL, and even if they've made better decisions so far, it remains to be seen if they will westernize Vietnam, or respect the history of the nation.
Personally I think you've got an interesting timeline going. That being said, if you can't handle critisism, even if it's bad critisism, then you shouldn't post here anymore.
Snake Featherston
Banned
I think when he argues that what worked in the Philippines (where the movement represented a particular minority without outside support) and Malaysia (where the movement was a minority of a minority which was easy to identify and thus to target) could be transplanted into Vietnam by any variant of Saigon, that crosses a line of realism. It could work, yes, but it would be a protracted process, neither that quick nor that simple. Saigon faces massive credibility gaps, gaps of the sort where adopting the methods of the British and the Americans aren't exactly what's required. What he wants *can* ultimately resolve the issues Saigon has, but not this quickly, or this smoothly, or with so little backlash produced. Hanoi couldn't work miracles like this in its own politics, Saigon was less efficient than Hanoi was.
[QUOTE}
Good to see someone that knows who the Trung sisters are, and the historical issues regarding Chinese suzerainity over Vietnam.
[/QUOTE]
Quite welcome; I live in LAand work for a Southeast Asian community group. My boss is tangentially involved with a collective of Vietnamese American community organizers and trainers called Hai Ba Trung.
I think Ho said it himself:
“The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life.” — Hồ Chí Minh, 1946
Good to see someone that knows who the Trung sisters are, and the historical issues regarding Chinese suzerainity over Vietnam.
[/QUOTE]
Quite welcome; I live in LAand work for a Southeast Asian community group. My boss is tangentially involved with a collective of Vietnamese American community organizers and trainers called Hai Ba Trung.
I think Ho said it himself:
“The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life.” — Hồ Chí Minh, 1946
La Rouge Beret
Donor
Something that I haven’t explained in my timeline, but which I will cover with the second version is that the Roman Catholics are divided in this TL. There is the refugee faction from the North that has a sense of gratitude towards the government and Dr Phan for their relocation and integration within the economy. The established Catholic families from the South, have had several leading figures defect to the Dr Phan camp. This occurred after a meeting with the Emperor, the Prime Minister and a leading light of the Roman Catholics –think of the way that the Thai King intervened in 1992 between the military and the opposition. The second version will also expand into South Vietnamese sports, arts, movies etc.
Those that remained against Dr Phan are now in hiding following the reaction by the regime to the attempted coups. The fears towards the government following the land redistribution campaign are ameliorated when the former Catholic landlords start making money in light industry.
So a counter insurgency campaign modelled on aggressive patrolling, intensive hearts and minds, combined with improving infrastructure and addressing the legitimate grievances of the populace has no place in South Vietnam? Local governance that encourages the local population to invest their time and money in infrastructure projects, so that they have a sense of ownership towards the new class room, well etc – this is not relevant?
Coincidentally these were the same techniques used by the Royal Thai Army against their own communist insurgency at the same time – who were surprisingly ethnically Thai as well. Additionally similar techniques were used by the TNI against the revolt by the Darul Islam group in the 1950’s and 1960’s - who you guessed it were ethnically Javanese. If you want a more ‘kinetic’ approach then look at the Korean Army and Marine Corps in Vietnam – although their approach was brutal at times.
Well the Australian Army’s record in Phuoc Tuy province would strongly disagree with your opinion on their lack of both relevance and effectiveness of the Malayan approach to South Vietnam, don’t take my word for it here’s a quote from a former VC commander.
"Worse than the Americans were the Australians. The Americans style was to hit us, then call for planes and artillery. Our response was to break contact and disappear if we could...The Australians were more patient than the Americans, better guerilla fighters, better at ambushes. They liked to stay with us instead of calling in the planes. We were more afraid of their style." From Paul Ham “Vietnam – The Australian War” pp 68
If you disregard his opinion as he is not an American, here’s a quote from Colonel David Hackworth
“The Aussies used squads to make contact… and brought in reinforcements to do the killing; they planned in the belief that a platoon on the battlefield could do anything."
Colonel Hackworth also talks positively about the Australian method of war and its application to South Vietnam in ‘Steel my Soldiers Hearts.’ In the words of Sir Robert Thomson my approach for this timeline is:
‘To win loyalties rather than kill insurgents, by giving the peasants a secure alternative to communism.’
So a emphasising a mission kill rather than a hard kill at all costs, think David Kilcullen and his arguments espoused in the ‘Accidental Guerilla.’
The posts that you are referring to occurred in the OTL six months later, and the Binh Xuyen gang will move against an emerging government, when they are weak and if the new Prime Minister is seen as a ‘goody two shoes.’ My POD here is the General Minh The survives. The criticqal need to deal with the Binh Xuyen syndicate is elaborated further inThe Last Confucian by Denis Warner pp 106.
The pacification success is from the OTL and the ‘Denounce the Communists,’ campaign launched in February 1955 in the Camau peninsula and Quang Nai and Binh Dinh. At no stages have I indicated that it has been smoothly rolled out across the entire country. They go into the Mekong Delta to secure the rice bowl to enable the country to expand agricultural exports, which will help subsidise industrial development. Another factor to consider after two coups is that the government has realised that they need to utilise the Army and National Police Field Force so that they do not have too much time on their hands to continue scheming.
The decrease from 60,000 to 1,000 by the end of 1956 was from the OTL. A point to note with this is that is only the official members of the Communist party, this official count is not taking into consideration those that retain covert sympathies towards the Viet Cong or those members that have travelled north for training. Something to take into consideration is that it goes from Point A to Point B in the space of two years, there will be an event that will help dramatically turn opinion against the Communists. All of these points can be found in Mark Moyar’s ‘Triumph Forsaken’ pp 50- 59.
However I recognise that any timeline where the South Vietnamese do better automatically becomes a wank in comparison to the original time line.
I also want to clear up the idea that there will be thousands of American advisers running the war. At no stage will this happen in TTL you will have assistance with training, and logistical support provided by Western orientated militaries. You will also have an Australian Sabre squadron as a result of the deteriorating situation in Laos, but in total the Western military presence will remain stable at around 1,500 to 2,000.
For those that remain interested I will have an update up over the next couple of days.
La Rouge Beret
Donor
From the National Army to the Royal Vietnamese Army
It was President Eisenhower’s decision to provide financial and military assistance to the Kingdom of Vietnam, that allowed the Army to become the backbone of the state. Pursuant to the articles of the Geneva Convention the Royal Vietnamese Army (RVA) was to be reduced in size to 100,000 soldiers. This size had been contingent on the continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps, which due to their involvement in both coup attempts and the continued insurgency in Algeria were withdrawn expeditiously.
Lieutenant General ‘Hanging Sam’ Williams was dispatched, under the auspices of the Military Assistance and Advisory Command, to report on the situation facing the Kingdom of Vietnam and to offer a recommendation on how to improve the RVA. Although initially envisioning a force of 150,000 soldiers, President Eisenhower was persuaded to defray a force of 180,000 soldiers and an expansion of the National Police Field Force to 80,000 following the report by Lieutenant General Williams.
As a consequence American advisers after completing a six week cultural course were embedded in Vietnamese training establishments, supply depots and staff headquarters units. Vietnamese officers and senior soldiers were sent en masse to training courses in the United States, Okinawa and the Philippines.
Following a chance meeting at the Pentagon, between the incoming head of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer and Lieutenant General Williams regarding counter insurgency. He recommended that the Army should have a limited counter insurgency role with its main focus on being able to stop a conventional invasion. The National Police Field Force with its special constables should bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. He justified his stance by stating that ‘A counterinsurgency campaign can hurt, but if the Army can’t stop a torrent of T-34’s flooding across the border – then it has failed itself and the country.’ Noting the inhospitable terrain facing both sides, any equipment that was used by the RVA had to be reliable and easy to carry.
The main personal weapon of the soldier was the M 1 Garand, with the M - 1 carbine version issued to armoured and airborne units. Due to their ease of manufacture mortars were attached at the company level. A small number of M 4 Shermans were supplied to augment the existing M – 24 Chaffees in service.
The army was concentrated around the Demilitarised zone, with detachments rotated throughout the country as required.
The conscript following the successful completion of his basic and employment training would be sent to a unit that held an affiliation with their home province. After their initial period of service of two years, they would be liable for continued training each year in their unit. A period of forty five days each year was mandatory and would coincide with the fallow periods of the agricultural calendar. The ‘activated’ reservists would join their unit and relieve permanent soldiers that had accrued leave throughout the year.
Those that wished to continue serving in the military were sent on a three month promotion course before being made up to Lance Corporal for a period of two to three years. After promotion to full Corporal they were allowed to marry and this coincided with a posting to a training establishment. As the junior non commissioned officer was viewed as the back bone of the Army, their time in rank prior to promotion would vary between 3 – 7 years depending upon their performance and Corps allocation.
Undergraduate Officer training was conducted at the prestigious Royal Military College at Dalat, the college held affiliations with the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Royal Military Academy in Canada and the Royal Military College at Duntroon. Two classmen were sent annually to one of their sister institutes.
Another alternative was the 12 month long Officer Candidate School (OCS) located at Thu Duc for those that held a baccalaureate. Upon receiving their conscription papers if the young man presented himself with an unopened envelope he could elect to serve as an officer. Alternatively if an ordinary conscript was deemed to be of a sufficient standard he was taken aside and offered the opportunity to serve as an officer. As a notable former soldier remarked of the then system:
‘As an officer you have three choices you can go through the front door – that’s Da Lat, you can go through the back door at Thu Duc or you can go through the trap door as a conscript. However it doesn’t matter if you come through the front, back or trap doors – someone from the front door will always be there to greet you.’
Below: A recruitment brochure for the Royal Military College
It was President Eisenhower’s decision to provide financial and military assistance to the Kingdom of Vietnam, that allowed the Army to become the backbone of the state. Pursuant to the articles of the Geneva Convention the Royal Vietnamese Army (RVA) was to be reduced in size to 100,000 soldiers. This size had been contingent on the continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps, which due to their involvement in both coup attempts and the continued insurgency in Algeria were withdrawn expeditiously.
Lieutenant General ‘Hanging Sam’ Williams was dispatched, under the auspices of the Military Assistance and Advisory Command, to report on the situation facing the Kingdom of Vietnam and to offer a recommendation on how to improve the RVA. Although initially envisioning a force of 150,000 soldiers, President Eisenhower was persuaded to defray a force of 180,000 soldiers and an expansion of the National Police Field Force to 80,000 following the report by Lieutenant General Williams.
As a consequence American advisers after completing a six week cultural course were embedded in Vietnamese training establishments, supply depots and staff headquarters units. Vietnamese officers and senior soldiers were sent en masse to training courses in the United States, Okinawa and the Philippines.
Following a chance meeting at the Pentagon, between the incoming head of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer and Lieutenant General Williams regarding counter insurgency. He recommended that the Army should have a limited counter insurgency role with its main focus on being able to stop a conventional invasion. The National Police Field Force with its special constables should bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. He justified his stance by stating that ‘A counterinsurgency campaign can hurt, but if the Army can’t stop a torrent of T-34’s flooding across the border – then it has failed itself and the country.’ Noting the inhospitable terrain facing both sides, any equipment that was used by the RVA had to be reliable and easy to carry.
The main personal weapon of the soldier was the M 1 Garand, with the M - 1 carbine version issued to armoured and airborne units. Due to their ease of manufacture mortars were attached at the company level. A small number of M 4 Shermans were supplied to augment the existing M – 24 Chaffees in service.
The army was concentrated around the Demilitarised zone, with detachments rotated throughout the country as required.
The conscript following the successful completion of his basic and employment training would be sent to a unit that held an affiliation with their home province. After their initial period of service of two years, they would be liable for continued training each year in their unit. A period of forty five days each year was mandatory and would coincide with the fallow periods of the agricultural calendar. The ‘activated’ reservists would join their unit and relieve permanent soldiers that had accrued leave throughout the year.
Those that wished to continue serving in the military were sent on a three month promotion course before being made up to Lance Corporal for a period of two to three years. After promotion to full Corporal they were allowed to marry and this coincided with a posting to a training establishment. As the junior non commissioned officer was viewed as the back bone of the Army, their time in rank prior to promotion would vary between 3 – 7 years depending upon their performance and Corps allocation.
Undergraduate Officer training was conducted at the prestigious Royal Military College at Dalat, the college held affiliations with the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Royal Military Academy in Canada and the Royal Military College at Duntroon. Two classmen were sent annually to one of their sister institutes.
Another alternative was the 12 month long Officer Candidate School (OCS) located at Thu Duc for those that held a baccalaureate. Upon receiving their conscription papers if the young man presented himself with an unopened envelope he could elect to serve as an officer. Alternatively if an ordinary conscript was deemed to be of a sufficient standard he was taken aside and offered the opportunity to serve as an officer. As a notable former soldier remarked of the then system:
‘As an officer you have three choices you can go through the front door – that’s Da Lat, you can go through the back door at Thu Duc or you can go through the trap door as a conscript. However it doesn’t matter if you come through the front, back or trap doors – someone from the front door will always be there to greet you.’
Below: A recruitment brochure for the Royal Military College
You sir, are kidding me...
Your choice of General Tun Gerald Templer (we Malaysian obliged to address him as Tun, as he was a former head of government...
) will eventually makes TTL Kingdom of Vietnam stronger than its OTL counterpart, what is better than a De-facto 'Dictator' of Malaya became a director of 'Hearts and Minds' program South Vietnam?
I propose: Upon his retirement(I dont know what date is this, is this after 1954?) Kingdom of South Vietnam will appoint him as director of Hearts and Minds campaign... That sir, would be awesome...
Your choice of General Tun Gerald Templer (we Malaysian obliged to address him as Tun, as he was a former head of government...
) will eventually makes TTL Kingdom of Vietnam stronger than its OTL counterpart, what is better than a De-facto 'Dictator' of Malaya became a director of 'Hearts and Minds' program South Vietnam?I propose: Upon his retirement(I dont know what date is this, is this after 1954?
) Kingdom of South Vietnam will appoint him as director of Hearts and Minds campaign... That sir, would be awesome...
La Rouge Beret
Donor
The ethos of this TL is 'Right man, right place, right time.' But when I draft version II it will require changes within the French administration to reflect the same idea. However I will continue with this TL to a pre determined point in time and then I will start refining my ideas.
I originally considered a TL with a pro western North Vietnam and a communist South I may revisit that idea in the second version. It is possible but requires a couple of very strong POD's. I thought that it would be interesting to be a pro western country sharing a border with two communist countries and how that would impact upon the development of the country and the military.
Something that I want to work through in the second version is how exposure to power changes a person's ethics. So originally the person is idealistic and over time, they may maintain their original goal but be more ruthless in how they achieve it.
I originally considered a TL with a pro western North Vietnam and a communist South I may revisit that idea in the second version. It is possible but requires a couple of very strong POD's. I thought that it would be interesting to be a pro western country sharing a border with two communist countries and how that would impact upon the development of the country and the military.
Something that I want to work through in the second version is how exposure to power changes a person's ethics. So originally the person is idealistic and over time, they may maintain their original goal but be more ruthless in how they achieve it.
Hyperion
Banned
Changes from France would help.
Perhaps due to the fallout of WW2, the French, for financial reasons and wanting to hold or reinforce other holdings closer to home, decide that while they are keeping troops in Indochina, the number compared to OTL levels will be reduced, and the number of bases they operate out of will be consolidated somewhat compared to OTL.
Vietnam would still need better people than OTL to sort out local internal matters among the Vietnamese people, but having fewer French soldiers than OTL in the post WW2 time period running around, even if only a slight decrease, could go a long way towards stabilizing the South. Of the remaining French troops in Vietnam through the OTL time of French withdrawal, maybe change the composition of the forces present somewhat. Replace two or three infantry and artillery battalions or regiments with medical or engineering units or something. Inact a policy of such non combat units going out and actively training local Vietnamese people, both military and police, as well as civilians, with some of these non combat skills. This would help to increase the number of locals the remaining French could rely on, and it would help pave the way for eventual Vietnamese self rule.
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La Rouge Beret
Donor
Royal Vietnamese Navy
RVNS Chi Lang I
00:15 hours South China Sea
‘Captain Sir, Officer of Watch.’
‘Captain’
‘Sir, we are 1000 yards off the starboard quarter of a suspected smuggler. My recommendation is to take the ship to boarding stations and to close within 500 yards of the smuggler.’
‘Concur Officer of the Watch. Have the searchlights trained on the vessel, once we are closed up at boarding stations illuminate the vessel at 500 yards, have the battle ensign hoisted and I am on my way to the bridge.’
‘Aye, Aye Sir.’
00:25 hours
‘Captain Sir, we are at 500 yards on the starboard quarter of the vessel and the vessel is confirmed at boarding stations.’
‘Very well, illuminate the vessel, launch the starboard sea boat with the boarding party, commence hailing the vessel and cover the boarding party with the 3 inch.’
‘Unidentified vessel this is Vietnamese naval ship on your starboard quarter we are going to board you, you are to reduce to six knots, and have your crew muster on the quarterdeck.’
The Executive Officer was peering through the large bridge wing binoculars, ‘Sir, they are not reducing speed and appear to be under wheel to port.’
‘Guns, Captain fire one round over their bow.’
The stubby three inch barked a single round over the bow of the vessel.
‘Captain Sir, the vessel is reducing speed and the crew is mustering on the quarterdeck.’
‘Very good.’
Background
Formed by former officers and sailors of the Marine National the Royal Vietnamese Navy (“RVN”) was the quiet achiever of the three services. Responsible for preventing the seaborne infiltration of men and material into South Vietnam by the Communists, it was also responsible for preserving the internal waterways of the country. The RVN was confined to a strictly littoral role until the purchase of the first three destroyer escorts in 1958.
Following the signing of the Geneva convention the RVN were provided four harbour minesweepers, three submarine chasers, eight Landing Crafts, and six patrol boats from the Marine National and the United States Navy. Due to the limited number of blue water patrol vessels the government used converted junks to patrol the territorial seas of South Vietnam. Despite their inherent limitations in a converted design, the junks of the coastal force proved remarkably effective. The junks were progressively phased out with the exception of the Yabuta class that were used in force reconnaissance operations north of the demilitarized zone.
The Navy was divided into two commands Fleet Command that was responsible for the operations on the open ocean and Riverine Command that was responsible for the conduct of Riverine operations. Both of these headquarters were based in Saigon and reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, although the majority of the fleet was based at Nha Trang. A single training centre was established at Nha Trang that conducted officer, sailor and specialist training.
Slowly the capabilities of Fleet Command were expanded with the acquisition of three Buckley class destroyer escorts in 1960 that provided the first capable surface combatant of the RVN. The Buckley class remained the largest surface combatant in service, until replaced by the Van Spejik class of in the mid 1970’s. The Van Spejik purchase was complemented by the acquisition of the three Oberon class submarines in 1972.
The Riverine Force initially comprised smaller patrol vessels and the landing vessels modeled on the French dinnasault convoys from the first Indochinese war. The popularity of attaining command at an early stage meant that the riverine force was a popular choice for junior officers of the RVN.
The Marine Corps
The Vietnamese Marine Corps (“VNMC”) were descended from the French organised commando companies and river patrol units. Two battalions of troops, which comprised of commando companies from the North and South were transferred to the control of Royal Vietnamese Navy on January 1 1954.
On October 1, 1954 the VNMC included one landing battalion, six riverine companies, five light infantry companies, one raiding party, headquarter detachment and training units. The light infantry companies were rotated through duties ashore and serving as boarding party detachments for the Royal Vietnamese Navy.
The Force Reconnaissance Marines were created as a way to launch seaborne infiltration missions on the North Vietnamese coastline and infiltrating riverine missions. The Marines also had the longest basic training lasting for six month prior to commencing their specialist training.
Navy Divers
With an exposed coastline and with a majority of foreign trade coming through their ports the ability to be able to protect their shipping from mining operations assumed importance. One of the first roles of the Navy was to be able to conduct minesweeping and mine clearance operations. It was the second role that the Navy formed its first of four clearance diving teams. Their role was orientated towards removing explosive ordinance from the hulls of ships and clearance of wharves. A point that was understated was that they were also capable of planting explosives on the hulls of ships and wharves as well. These capabilities were enhanced with combined training conducted with divers from the Navy of the Republic of China.
Below: RVNS Chi Lang I in USN service.
RVNS Chi Lang I
00:15 hours South China Sea
‘Captain Sir, Officer of Watch.’
‘Captain’
‘Sir, we are 1000 yards off the starboard quarter of a suspected smuggler. My recommendation is to take the ship to boarding stations and to close within 500 yards of the smuggler.’
‘Concur Officer of the Watch. Have the searchlights trained on the vessel, once we are closed up at boarding stations illuminate the vessel at 500 yards, have the battle ensign hoisted and I am on my way to the bridge.’
‘Aye, Aye Sir.’
00:25 hours
‘Captain Sir, we are at 500 yards on the starboard quarter of the vessel and the vessel is confirmed at boarding stations.’
‘Very well, illuminate the vessel, launch the starboard sea boat with the boarding party, commence hailing the vessel and cover the boarding party with the 3 inch.’
‘Unidentified vessel this is Vietnamese naval ship on your starboard quarter we are going to board you, you are to reduce to six knots, and have your crew muster on the quarterdeck.’
The Executive Officer was peering through the large bridge wing binoculars, ‘Sir, they are not reducing speed and appear to be under wheel to port.’
‘Guns, Captain fire one round over their bow.’
The stubby three inch barked a single round over the bow of the vessel.
‘Captain Sir, the vessel is reducing speed and the crew is mustering on the quarterdeck.’
‘Very good.’
Background
Formed by former officers and sailors of the Marine National the Royal Vietnamese Navy (“RVN”) was the quiet achiever of the three services. Responsible for preventing the seaborne infiltration of men and material into South Vietnam by the Communists, it was also responsible for preserving the internal waterways of the country. The RVN was confined to a strictly littoral role until the purchase of the first three destroyer escorts in 1958.
Following the signing of the Geneva convention the RVN were provided four harbour minesweepers, three submarine chasers, eight Landing Crafts, and six patrol boats from the Marine National and the United States Navy. Due to the limited number of blue water patrol vessels the government used converted junks to patrol the territorial seas of South Vietnam. Despite their inherent limitations in a converted design, the junks of the coastal force proved remarkably effective. The junks were progressively phased out with the exception of the Yabuta class that were used in force reconnaissance operations north of the demilitarized zone.
The Navy was divided into two commands Fleet Command that was responsible for the operations on the open ocean and Riverine Command that was responsible for the conduct of Riverine operations. Both of these headquarters were based in Saigon and reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, although the majority of the fleet was based at Nha Trang. A single training centre was established at Nha Trang that conducted officer, sailor and specialist training.
Slowly the capabilities of Fleet Command were expanded with the acquisition of three Buckley class destroyer escorts in 1960 that provided the first capable surface combatant of the RVN. The Buckley class remained the largest surface combatant in service, until replaced by the Van Spejik class of in the mid 1970’s. The Van Spejik purchase was complemented by the acquisition of the three Oberon class submarines in 1972.
The Riverine Force initially comprised smaller patrol vessels and the landing vessels modeled on the French dinnasault convoys from the first Indochinese war. The popularity of attaining command at an early stage meant that the riverine force was a popular choice for junior officers of the RVN.
The Marine Corps
The Vietnamese Marine Corps (“VNMC”) were descended from the French organised commando companies and river patrol units. Two battalions of troops, which comprised of commando companies from the North and South were transferred to the control of Royal Vietnamese Navy on January 1 1954.
On October 1, 1954 the VNMC included one landing battalion, six riverine companies, five light infantry companies, one raiding party, headquarter detachment and training units. The light infantry companies were rotated through duties ashore and serving as boarding party detachments for the Royal Vietnamese Navy.
The Force Reconnaissance Marines were created as a way to launch seaborne infiltration missions on the North Vietnamese coastline and infiltrating riverine missions. The Marines also had the longest basic training lasting for six month prior to commencing their specialist training.
Navy Divers
With an exposed coastline and with a majority of foreign trade coming through their ports the ability to be able to protect their shipping from mining operations assumed importance. One of the first roles of the Navy was to be able to conduct minesweeping and mine clearance operations. It was the second role that the Navy formed its first of four clearance diving teams. Their role was orientated towards removing explosive ordinance from the hulls of ships and clearance of wharves. A point that was understated was that they were also capable of planting explosives on the hulls of ships and wharves as well. These capabilities were enhanced with combined training conducted with divers from the Navy of the Republic of China.
Below: RVNS Chi Lang I in USN service.
La Rouge Beret
Donor
The General Staff
Hanoi, D 67
A large building sat inside a brick yard, shaded by the large mangrove trees jutting on either side. To enter the building one would climb nine steps, guarded by ornate stone dragons flanking either side. After having your identity card confirmed for the third time to gain entrance, you would be admitted to the inner sanctum of the Vietnamese People’s Army General Staff headquarters.
Inside a windowless room a large map was pinned to the table, a closer inspection revealed that the map extended west to Thailand, and if one moved anti clockwise it covered Cambodia, Laos, Southern Vietnam and the southern provinces of the People’s Republic of China. Despite the stifling atmosphere, an air of anticipation gripped the room as the Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese People’s Army General Nguyen Giap prepared to outline the latest direction from the Politburo.
‘Comrades,’ General Giap smiled, ‘It is the belief in the Politburo that after the failure of the ‘land to the tillers’ program, that we need to strengthen the state. This means that we will continue to train and improve the professionalism of our forces, with the help of our fraternal allies,’ as he tapped the illustration of China and the Soviet Union on the map. ‘Our junior and intermediate officers will continue their technical training at staff colleges in China and the Soviet Union.’
‘Consequently we will not immediately liberate the oppressed masses of the South. Minister Truong Chinh has spoken of the need to secure our Western borders by supporting the efforts of the Pathet Lao. This presents an opportunity to strengthen our rapport with them and to maintain our combat experience.’ His eyes briefly sparkled, ‘Our support also offers the perfect pretext to develop the supply routes and caches that we will ultimately need when we launch our eventual campaign of reunification.’
‘General, has there been a policy shift from our Chinese allies with the ascension of Mao Anying to the General Staff and Politburo?’
‘There is a more militant stance against the Nationalist hold outs on Formosa. Marshall Peng De Hui still leads the General Staff and he is focused on improving the People’s Liberation Army. However their stance has led them to increase their advisory inside Laos and we would be wise to balance that influence.’
Hanoi, D 67
A large building sat inside a brick yard, shaded by the large mangrove trees jutting on either side. To enter the building one would climb nine steps, guarded by ornate stone dragons flanking either side. After having your identity card confirmed for the third time to gain entrance, you would be admitted to the inner sanctum of the Vietnamese People’s Army General Staff headquarters.
Inside a windowless room a large map was pinned to the table, a closer inspection revealed that the map extended west to Thailand, and if one moved anti clockwise it covered Cambodia, Laos, Southern Vietnam and the southern provinces of the People’s Republic of China. Despite the stifling atmosphere, an air of anticipation gripped the room as the Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese People’s Army General Nguyen Giap prepared to outline the latest direction from the Politburo.
‘Comrades,’ General Giap smiled, ‘It is the belief in the Politburo that after the failure of the ‘land to the tillers’ program, that we need to strengthen the state. This means that we will continue to train and improve the professionalism of our forces, with the help of our fraternal allies,’ as he tapped the illustration of China and the Soviet Union on the map. ‘Our junior and intermediate officers will continue their technical training at staff colleges in China and the Soviet Union.’
‘Consequently we will not immediately liberate the oppressed masses of the South. Minister Truong Chinh has spoken of the need to secure our Western borders by supporting the efforts of the Pathet Lao. This presents an opportunity to strengthen our rapport with them and to maintain our combat experience.’ His eyes briefly sparkled, ‘Our support also offers the perfect pretext to develop the supply routes and caches that we will ultimately need when we launch our eventual campaign of reunification.’
‘General, has there been a policy shift from our Chinese allies with the ascension of Mao Anying to the General Staff and Politburo?’
‘There is a more militant stance against the Nationalist hold outs on Formosa. Marshall Peng De Hui still leads the General Staff and he is focused on improving the People’s Liberation Army. However their stance has led them to increase their advisory inside Laos and we would be wise to balance that influence.’
I was thinking that's quite similar to what the KMT did in Taiwan. Could Vietnam have used Taiwan (or for that matter, South Korea) as a model for development?
And speaking of the KMT, do these guys play a role at all in this alt-South Vietnam?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viet_Nam_Quoc_Dan_Dang
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dai_Viet_Quoc_Dan_Dang
La Rouge Beret
Donor
The inspiration for land reform is derived from the Japanese model conducted post WWII, so the impact of the land reform by the South Vietnamese inspire the reforms by the Taiwanese and the South Koreans. Also in TTL the South Vietnamese have observed some of the causes that contributed to the success of the Chinese Communist Party and have sought to address those concerns.
Both political parties will be integrated into the government, I am trying to work out an umbrella organisation to integrate the various parties. Something akin to UMNO is what I am envisioning... However if I reboot this timeline, and I am considering a radical departure then a combination of the two parties will come into being. I am currently ironing out the ideas and talking with a former member of the board on plausibility etc. For those that are interested, PM and I will give you a rough idea of what I am considering.
Yes I meant Peng De Huai, in TTL he loses the political battle again within the PLA General Staff. But is presented with an opportunity to wage war against the external enemies of the state, as a sop for his removal. They originally consider him for a commandant role at a military academy, but rethink his possible effect on impressionable young minds.
Both political parties will be integrated into the government, I am trying to work out an umbrella organisation to integrate the various parties. Something akin to UMNO is what I am envisioning... However if I reboot this timeline, and I am considering a radical departure then a combination of the two parties will come into being. I am currently ironing out the ideas and talking with a former member of the board on plausibility etc. For those that are interested, PM and I will give you a rough idea of what I am considering.
Yes I meant Peng De Huai, in TTL he loses the political battle again within the PLA General Staff. But is presented with an opportunity to wage war against the external enemies of the state, as a sop for his removal. They originally consider him for a commandant role at a military academy, but rethink his possible effect on impressionable young minds.
La Rouge Beret
Donor
I am thinking about resurrecting this thread.
Would anyone be interested if I did so?
Would anyone be interested if I did so?