A successful Bay of Pigs

Anchises

Banned
I have discovered this great forum recently. After reading a few of the great timelines created here I decided to start my own timeline at some point in the future (despite my insufficient english).

My favorite period of history is the Cold War and I really like the idea of creating "my" Cold War.

I decided to use the preparations for the Bay of Pigs as POD. In OTL the whole operation was a disaster. Personally I tend to follow the interpretation that the CIA tried to lure the Kennedy Adminisration into a trap. The whole plan was supposed to fail so that Kennedy was forced to launch a conventional invasion of Cuba.

Interestingly some close advisors had strong objections. Historically they never talked about their concerns. My POD starts with them actually voicing their concerns. This leads to a thorough review of the plan that reveals the flaws to Kennedy.

My knowledge about the Cold War is solid but I am not a Kennedy expert so take my thoughts with a grain of salt:

-This serves as an early lesson for Kennedy to not "blindly" trust the intelligence agencies or the military. OTL he learned that after the Bay of Pigs operation turned into an embarassing disaster.

-Kennedy was a fierce anti-communist and promised determined action against Castro. So I think its reasonable to assume that the plan wouldn't have been scrapped altogether.

So now I have room to come up with a "Bay of Pigs" plan that might actually work. My impression is that a popular insurrection/guerilla campaign against Castros regime won't work. Cubas population supported him for the most part.

The Brigade 2506 was far to small to pull of a successful invasion without US intervention.

So there are essentially 2 ways for the anti-Castro forces to win. A substantial build up of the Brigade 2506 turning it into a force capable of defeating the Cuban military or a US invasion.

I don't know if Kennedy would have allowed a US invasion of Cuba under this circumstances. He seemed very interested in plausible deniability of US involvment OTL. I would use a US invasion in my timeline if its within Kennedys character to allow it. Maybe someone with more expertise could provide me with some insights into Kennedy's character/beliefs.

A build up of the Brigade 2506 is tricky aswell. The Soviets and the Cubans were aware of the small force OTL.

So if the USA actually attempts to create a force strong enough to defeat the FAR conventionally plausible deniability is out of the question.

Also I am not sure about the size of the exile Cuban community but I doubt it could provide enough recruits. Mercenaries or international anti-communist volunteers are probably needed.

On top of that I assume that a large scale naval invasion would require substantial US-Navy support. The same is true for the airforce probably.

I am leaning towards the following scenario:

The USA delays the Bay of Pigs operation and instead starts a large scale build up of the Brigade 2506 into a strong force of anti Communists from around the globe (ironically Francos Spain could provide recruits for this "International Brigades").

These forces are successful in overthrowing Castro due to better equipment and substantial naval and air support from the USA.

Casualties are much higher than expected due to the determined resistance of the Cuban military though. The weakened force isn't able to handle the unfolding guerilla war that the pro-Castro forces start with heavy support from the population.

The USA is forced to send troops to stabilize the new regime and gets a taste of asymetrical warfare much sooner... (in a smaller and more controlled way than in Vietnam though).

Now I have the following questions:

a) Is a military Invasion or my scenario within the suspension of disbelief for a Kennedy adminstration? Or do I need another more hawkish president ?

b) I assume that the Soviets would know about the US plans just like they did OTL. How do I prevent an earlier Cuban Missile Crisis where the Soviets send troops and nuclear weapons to protect Cuba? Or is that unlikely without a failed Bay of Pigs?

c) How many "volunteers" are needed for a successful Invasion that defeats the Castro government?

What forces would the USA use for a invasion of Cuba?

d) Would the Soviets "retaliate" with a new Berlin blockade? What other places are likely for Soviet retaliation?

I hope the Bay of Pig topic hasn't been discussed too often and my questions are interesting enough to create a good discussion.
 
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Geon

Donor
First Anchises welcome to AH!

I am not the authority I would like to be on Bay of Pigs but I can answer at least one of your questions regarding Soviet involvement. The Soviets would not have dared to risk sending troops or nuclear weapons to Cuba at this point. Assuming as you say a successful Bay of Pigs invasion I believe they would have made threatening noises and possibly even a few provocative actions around the globe (like a second Berlin blockade) but no troops or nuclear weapons would have been sent to Cuba. The Soviet Union would not risk World War III over Cuba.

In OTL the Cuban Missile Crisis developed as a direct result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs. Castro allowed the Soviets to bring in nuclear weapons as insurance for his regime that there would not be a second attempt, this time with U.S. Marines!

Lack of naval and air support was a key reason for the failure of the invasion. For a successful invasion you need to have the U.S. bombing the heck out of Cuban forces before they even reach the beaches.

I could see Castro and company going back into the hills to conduct guerilla warfare here. If it is sufficiently bad you could see the U.S. willing to forget Vietnam and the 60's see Cuba as the major quagmire.
 

Anchises

Banned
First Anchises welcome to AH!

Thank you !

I am not the authority I would like to be on Bay of Pigs but I can answer at least one of your questions regarding Soviet involvement. The Soviets would not have dared to risk sending troops or nuclear weapons to Cuba at this point. Assuming as you say a successful Bay of Pigs invasion I believe they would have made threatening noises and possibly even a few provocative actions around the globe (like a second Berlin blockade) but no troops or nuclear weapons would have been sent to Cuba. The Soviet Union would not risk World War III over Cuba.

In OTL the Cuban Missile Crisis developed as a direct result of the failure of the Bay of Pigs. Castro allowed the Soviets to bring in nuclear weapons as insurance for his regime that there would not be a second attempt, this time with U.S. Marines!

I suspected that. Cuba is deep in the U.S. sphere of influence and is of vital strategic interest. The failed Bay of Pigs and Khruschev's impression that Kennedy is weak allowed for the unique situation of the Cuban missile crisis. I wasn't sure if Khruschev wouldn't use the time between the actual invasion and the KGB knowing about the U.S. efforts to prop up the Cuban military with Soviet troops though. Thanks for the answer!

Lack of naval and air support was a key reason for the failure of the invasion. For a successful invasion you need to have the U.S. bombing the heck out of Cuban forces before they even reach the beaches.

Yeah. The United States would be deeply involved even if a force of anti communist "volunteers" would start the actual invasion. A massive aerial campaign before and during the invasion, coastal bombardments, a naval blockade and logistical help would make it pretty obvious that the whole operation is controlled by the United States.

Thats the reason I am unsure if Kennedy would allow such a hawkish operation. Sure there are no U.S. ground troops involved but apart from that its very similiar to an outright invasion.

I could see Castro and company going back into the hills to conduct guerilla warfare here. If it is sufficiently bad you could see the U.S. willing to forget Vietnam and the 60's see Cuba as the major quagmire.

My thoughts about a post invasion Cuba move along similiar lines.

Castro would probably take precautions for a prolonged guerilla campaign once the U.S. aerial campaign shows a substantial invasion is imminent. With guerilla experience and massive support from the population the United States would be forced to quickly send ground troops to prevent a collapse of the anti-communist forces.

Ultimately Cuba isn't Vietnam. The United States can prevent Soviet/Chinese aid from coming in easily. Supply lines are much shorter and there is no "North Vietnam". The USA would be able to "win" but Cuban resistance might be fierce enough to prevent Vietnam (high casualties, drawn out resistance etc.). Especially because Cuba is so close to U.S. soil that media "spin doctors" wouldn't be able to sanitize the war as effeciently in Vietnam. The cruel reality of a counterinsurgency campaign would be more present in the media than in the first years of the Vietnam war.

Also there would less pressure on Kennedy (assuming Dallas is butterflied away) to send grounds troops to Vietnam. With Cuba back in the "capitalist camp" its hard to make the case that the Democrats are weak on Communism and a drawn out quagmire in Cuba might generate enough support in the population to stay out of Vietnam.

This has wideranging consequences of course. No Vietnam trauma (because Cuba is a less costly and horrible quagmire) being one of them.
 
Lack of naval and air support was a key reason for the failure of the invasion. For a successful invasion you need to have the U.S. bombing the heck out of Cuban forces before they even reach the beaches.

IMO rather too much attention has been given to the air support question--at least in terms of its military effects. [1] I agree with Jeffrey Record, *The Wrong War, Why We Lost in Vietnam* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 171:

"It was clear at the time that the invasion could not possibly have succeeded without American air support. But it was no less clear to many at the time, as has been the judgment of almost every retrospective analysis, that the invasion would have failed even with that support. The argument over Kennedy's decision is irrelevant because the premises and planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion were so faulty that no amount of air support would have made a decisive difference. Aside from the invasion's fatal lack of secrecy and violation of every principle of amphibious assault, it was ludicrous to expect a force of fourteen hundred to hold its own against the twenty thousand Cuban army regulars and local militia that Castro could--and did--assemble to lock the invaders down on their beachhead. But an invasion of ten times as many exiles would also have been doomed from the start because of the CIA's disastrous assumption that Operation Zapata would spark a mass popular uprising against the Castro government; the CIA apparently assumed that Castro was as unpopular at home as he was in the Cuban exile community in the United States. In fact, in 1961 the Cuban Revolution and Castro were still immensely popular on the island. Cuban communism's appeal...rested first and foremost on its nationalist credentials, and Castro was swift to exploit the Bay of Pigs as yet another Yankee bid to reenslave Cuba to American capitalism. In the final analysis, it made no difference in April 1961 what the USS *Essex* did not do off Cuba's shores."

(Even if one thinks that Record is exaggerating Castro's support in Cuba in 1961 and instead attributes the lack of a popular rebellion to the efficiency of Castro's security police, the result is the same.)

[1] That it had important *political* effects, especially in engendering a feeling of betrayal in the Cuban exile community in the United States against JFK (and against his party for decades after his death) is undoubtedly true.
 

Anchises

Banned
IMO rather too much attention has been given to the air support question--at least in terms of its military effects. [1] I agree with Jeffrey Record, *The Wrong War, Why We Lost in Vietnam* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 171:

"It was clear at the time that the invasion could not possibly have succeeded without American air support. But it was no less clear to many at the time, as has been the judgment of almost every retrospective analysis, that the invasion would have failed even with that support. The argument over Kennedy's decision is irrelevant because the premises and planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion were so faulty that no amount of air support would have made a decisive difference. Aside from the invasion's fatal lack of secrecy and violation of every principle of amphibious assault, it was ludicrous to expect a force of fourteen hundred to hold its own against the twenty thousand Cuban army regulars and local militia that Castro could--and did--assemble to lock the invaders down on their beachhead. But an invasion of ten times as many exiles would also have been doomed from the start because of the CIA's disastrous assumption that Operation Zapata would spark a mass popular uprising against the Castro government; the CIA apparently assumed that Castro was as unpopular at home as he was in the Cuban exile community in the United States. In fact, in 1961 the Cuban Revolution and Castro were still immensely popular on the island. Cuban communism's appeal...rested first and foremost on its nationalist credentials, and Castro was swift to exploit the Bay of Pigs as yet another Yankee bid to reenslave Cuba to American capitalism. In the final analysis, it made no difference in April 1961 what the USS *Essex* did not do off Cuba's shores."

(Even if one thinks that Record is exaggerating Castro's support in Cuba in 1961 and instead attributes the lack of a popular rebellion to the efficiency of Castro's security police, the result is the same.)

[1] That it had important *political* effects, especially in engendering a feeling of betrayal in the Cuban exile community in the United States against JFK (and against his party for decades after his death) is undoubtedly true.


Thanks that's a very useful quote from a useful source!

I would very much agree to the conclusion presented in the source.

I mentioned earlier that any idea of starting a popular uprising is doomed to fail from my point of view. The CIA failed in creating a reliable intelligence network on Cuba so the provided information was mostly "wishful thinking". A critical outsider with presidential authority behind him would have quickly realized that (the scenario in my timeline).

Apart from the Escambray rebellion there was very little actual resistance to Castro and even mediocre intelligence would have supported no other conclusion IMHO. So any plan with a chance of success would be forced to acknowledge that a sustained conventional invasion is necessary.

Your quote mentions that even an invasion of 14000 exile cubans would have likely failed. That's a number I can work with.

So lets assume that there are around 250.000 exile cubans in the extended time frame of "my" Bay of Pigs operation (the best number I was able to come up with after a few minutes of google). I am just going to assume that around 20% of them have the necessary age and fitness to participate in an invasion. So we have 50000 potential recruits.

Of course its ASB territory to assume that the CIA would have been able to just draft these 50000 men. Lets assume that the CIA is able to draft 6000 men (12% of the able bodied Cubans on American soil). That's stretching it but it should be within the suspension of disbelief if we consider that the exile community was highly politicized against Castro and that the CIA has a presidential carte blanche to draft able bodied cubans ( a high budget and not strictly legal methods might help to).

These 6000 recruits are supplemented with "volunteers" from south america and spain and U.S. military personnel so that we have a force of around 10000 men.

Their objective is to capture Havana in a quick push, "installing" a new government that then calls for U.S. help to pacify the whole island (the whole thing is a farce of course). Then Marines start flooding in doing the actual work of conquering the whole island , disarming and disbanding the militias etc.

We have 20000 Cuban regulars, 300000 militiamen and 9000 police men trying to prevent that.

My idea for a convincing scenario was:

In late 1961/early 1962 CIA and U.S. military have trained and equipped the invasion force. The Escambray rebels have received more help than OTL (advisors and weapons).

The actual invasion starts with a massive aerial campaign of a week (?) that completely destroys the Cuban air force and massively disrupts the capabilities of the regular Cuban army.
Once this aerial campaign succeeded in securing absolute U.S. air supremacy the Escambray rebels are supported by special forces parachuting in and by supply drops. Their objective is to tie up some Cuban troops and to spread chaos behind enemy lines.

The actual landings happen on three different landing zones close to Havana with a few diversionary landings to spread the Cuban forces thin. They should succeed in establishing beach heads with reliable supply lines.

Then the attack towards Havana starts.

As in OTL the militias have neither the training nor the equipment to stop tanks/mechanized elements of the invasion force. Gruesome casualties are the consequence.

The regular army is severely weakened by the U.S. campaign of aerial bombardments. They mount a valiant defense of their capital and the few remaining tanks cause a lot of trouble but eventually they are unable to continue defending the capital against overwhelming pressure. With heavy casualties the invasion succeeds in capturing Havana.

Then a "press conference" where the "new and democratic" government of Cuba seeks U.S. help leads to the actual invasion. U.S. troops start flooding to capture the island.

Then a vietnamesque quagmire starts unfolding once the Americans realize the grim reality of a guerilla war ...

Is that a convincing scenario ? I am no expert in military history so help would be really appreciated.
 
I have discovered this great forum recently. After reading a few of the great timelines created here I decided to start my own timeline at some point in the future (despite my insufficient english).

I hope the Bay of Pig topic hasn't been discussed too often and my questions are interesting enough to create a good discussion.

Welcome to the forums! I think you will find that the only topic that elicits groans of exasperation and "Haven't we done this already?" are Nazi plans to invade Britain in WW2. Fair warning there.

I decided to use the preparations for the Bay of Pigs as POD. In OTL the whole operation was a disaster. Personally I tend to follow the interpretation that the CIA tried to lure the Kennedy Adminisration into a trap. The whole plan was supposed to fail so that Kennedy was forced to launch a conventional invasion of Cuba.

Myself, I wouldn't give the CIA too much credit as this kind of conspiracy theory would. Nothing I have read tells me that this was about more than bureaucratic incompetence beginning long before Kennedy was sworn in. However I read an internal history of the op, since declassified, which basically suggested that CIA officials involved did believe the U.S. military would have to invade eventually, one way or another. I think it's fair to say that if Kennedy had suggested doing a conventional military invasion instead, the CIA would have gone along happily.

So now I have room to come up with a "Bay of Pigs" plan that might actually work. My impression is that a popular insurrection/guerilla campaign against Castros regime won't work. Cubas population supported him for the most part.

Agreed. Outside the fever dreams of some bureaucrats in Langley, the basic premise of the operation was nuts. Even if he didn't have popular support, it was nuts. This was certainly the consensus of the diplomatic community. Incidentally note the catastrophically poor operational security involved since they aren't supposed to know about it -- e.g. one of the diplomats from the embassy that got shut down wrote in his memoirs that he decided to fly over to Miami for a day and see if there was any truth to all the rumors he was hearing, and man aged to confirm the basic details within a few hours by talking to exiles there. For a research project 10 years ago or so I read the Canadian embassy's correspondence in Havana and a few days before the invasion their ambassador also wrote home that he suspected an invasion was coming and that if it was as described it would certainly fail.

Now I have the following questions:

a) Is a military Invasion or my scenario within the suspension of disbelief for a Kennedy adminstration? Or do I need another more hawkish president?

Historically the Kennedy administration was obsessed with Castro, especially after the Bay of Pigs. Hence the increasingly bizarre schemes to assassinate Castro.

However, to replace the Eisenhower-approved guerrilla scheme with a full military invasion might require some event to intervene, some sort of crisis, provocation, etc. I don't know what that would be off the top of my head, but I don't think it's necessarily crazy to think about.

The change in administrations did as much as anything to screw up serious oversight of this operation. I wonder if there's a way to get the Eisenhower administration to authorize a more substantial op in the first place. If so, Kennedy probably would have gone along with it and played his part, just as he did here.

b) I assume that the Soviets would know about the US plans just like they did OTL. How do I prevent an earlier Cuban Missile Crisis where the Soviets send troops and nuclear weapons to protect Cuba? Or is that unlikely without a failed Bay of Pigs?

Historically the Cuban government always feared an invasion but did not think seriously beef up its intelligence and military services with major Soviet aid until after the Bay of Pigs. It's very possible Khrushchev would decide this is a good idea regardless, but even in our timeline, the Soviet government didn't decide to deploy missiles until May 1962, so that should give you plenty of time to play with here.

c) How many "volunteers" are needed for a successful Invasion that defeats the Castro government?

What forces would the USA use for a invasion of Cuba?

I'm not sure how to answer this question. Given the premise in Langley that the population was ready to revolt on its own but just needed a spark, I suppose the existing force only needed to be moderately larger, enough to establish a beachhead. But I think we all know this idea was in retrospect phenomenally misguided. Otherwise the alternative is a conventional military force, and honestly, once you're going that route, it probably makes more sense to hand it to the Marines than to build up this entirely separate force of international "freedom fighters," sort of a U.S. Foreign Legion.

d) Would the Soviets "retaliate" with a new Berlin blockade? What other places are likely for Soviet retaliation?

For something happening in early 1961 I have to think the Soviets would reluctant accept it as a fait accompli. Khrushchev isn't insane. Risking war in Europe for the sake of a Caribbean island you've only just won and don't have forces stationed on is probably a bridge too far, so to speak.
 
A lot of people have mentioned the Miama Cubans won't switch due to lack of feeling of betrayal, is there anyway to get them to make loud noises earlier to convince both or either Eisenhower to order a more substantive operation to try to gain their support for the party that freed Cuba or for Kennedy to feel the need to be more hawkish and to expand the op or to authorise more resources to try to keep them on side?

Obviously these would need to be very loud noises, but we seem to have agreed that this betrayal made Florida a more "purple" state and so would this be a possible catalyst to influence future elections and either party?
 
The situation Anchises described in post # 6 above is actually how the US currently does "regime change". People learned a thing or two from the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
 

Anchises

Banned
A lot of people have mentioned the Miama Cubans won't switch due to lack of feeling of betrayal, is there anyway to get them to make loud noises earlier to convince both or either Eisenhower to order a more substantive operation to try to gain their support for the party that freed Cuba or for Kennedy to feel the need to be more hawkish and to expand the op or to authorise more resources to try to keep them on side?

Obviously these would need to be very loud noises, but we seem to have agreed that this betrayal made Florida a more "purple" state and so would this be a possible catalyst to influence future elections and either party?

The exile Cuban population would be much smaller than OTL. The later waves of Cuban immigration would probably never happen and a lot of Cubans would probably go back. I could see a new elite of former exilants on Cuba.

The situation Anchises described in post # 6 above is actually how the US currently does "regime change". People learned a thing or two from the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

So it's somewhat believable?
 

Anchises

Banned
I wonder how a successful Bay of Pigs would have effected US policy in Central America during the 70's and 80's.

That really depends on a lot of factors.

Is the Invasion a long term success?

If it's a quagmire we might see a less interventionist U.S. approach in the 70s.

If it's a success South America would probably viewed as a U.S. interest zones even more than OTL.

And it really depends on the political developments that happens after the POD. If Cuba doesn't cause a national trauma on the scale of Vietnam I could see a more hawkish democratic party for example.
 
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