[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]And here is the revised edition of chapter 4. Parts are cleared up or rewritten and a new paragraph included. Additional sources and footnotes were added to address all grievances rast put forth. Most important difference: I decided that Tirpitz resignation was not necessary to stop the naval law of 1912 since in this TL Tirpitz would never press for it and the shift in priorities to the army[/FONT] was already undergoing. This will only be cemented by the developments outlined herein and pave the way for the naval agreement.
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Chapter 4: The Taming of the s[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
ea lions[/FONT]
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Alfred Kubin, The power (Die Macht) 1903, page 6 (Blatt 6) of the Hans-von-Weber Mappe[/FONT]
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Chancellor, Kaiser, Reichstag and the military[/FONT]
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A fight for control[/FONT]
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[…] The Fez Crisis is widely attributed a high significance in affecting the diplomatic landscape of pre-war Europe, often called the turning point of German-British relations. There has been an endless stream of studies concentrating only on the obvious, the impact on foreign affairs. But there is perhaps a dimension of even bigger importance to the Fez Crisis: its subtle but none the less huge impact on domestic German policy. After Eisendecher delivered his sharp protest note to France and Spain started occupying northern ports in Morocco tensions were rising. As one German foreign office official suggested to send a gunboat to Agadir war became a real option. Although Eisendecher and Bethmann refused to take military action and Eisendecher was rather successful in the following diplomatic exchange turning the British to a neutral stance, Bethmann was concerned with Germany’s military situation after war seemed no longer impossible.[/FONT]
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So Bethmann invited the military leadership to a conference to discuss Germany’s defensive options. The famous War Council met secretly in Bethmann's manor of Hohemfinow on June 3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
rd[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
1911. The participants included all of the important decision makers: from the civilian government Bethmann and Eisendecher and from the military side the Prussian minister of war Josias von Heeringen, his brother [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
August von Heeringen, who was Chief of Staff of the Naval High Command, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
the head of the German Imperial Naval office Admiral Tirpitz, Chief of the Naval Cabinet Georg Alexander von Müller, Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger and the Chief of the Military Cabinet Moriz von Lyncker. Most notably the Kaiser was not invited. Bethmann explained to the assembly that the Kaiser should not waste his precious time on what were preliminary talks considering the options at hand. The aim of this meeting should be to develop a sound strategy which then could be presented to the emperor. Main subject of the discussion were the German war plans in case the Fez Crisis grew hot. As Bethmann learned there existed two plans, Moltke's Plan West and Plan East, but only the first was considered to be a viable option for a short victory. The Plan West was based on earlier plans developed by then Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen, which envisioned a deep strike through Belgium into France, bypassing the heavily enforced eastern border forts. In the east a small contingent should use Russia’s inability to mobilise fast and fight a defensive action until France would be defeated quickly.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
1[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
The shortcomings of this plan became rapidly aware to Bethmann and Eisendecher. First of all, marching through Belgium required either a right to military passage or the violation of Belgium’s neutrality. The probability of Belgium allowing free passage was considered to be practically nil by Eisendecher. And the chief diplomat emphasized that in case of an invasion of Belgium the entry of Britain into the war on the side of the entente would be a certainty. Secondly Moltke had to admit that his plan was everything else than a sure way to victory. The problems were manifold: It would require more divisions than the German army was fielding right now.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
2[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
And Moltke concurred that any unforeseen stalling of the advancing armies would cause the plan to break down and end up in a prolonged war which would be disastrous with a belligerent Britain blockading Germany successfully. Actually the 3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
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department of the Chief of Staff had presented a study based on information gathered by the secret service and French military publications in May 1910 which had shown that French counter measures to the Moltke Plan West would have most certainly stopped an even initially successful advance and would have led to failure of its most important aim: a quick victory in France.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Moltke explained further that the amount of ammunition stored now would only suffice to the 40[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
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day of mobilisation. Finally Moltke admitted to the grim conclusions he already had come by in January 1905[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
4[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, that any war fought in the future will become a “Volkskrieg”, a war of the people, and be neither short nor victorious since even the winner of such a war would be utterly exhausted.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
5[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Although there were differences concerning the estimated length of a war in the end the consensus of most of the assembled military advisers was quiet depressing since most of them considered a prolonged war even with an attack through Belgium the most probable outcome.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
6[/FONT]
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Which led to the next important question: Would the Imperial Navy be able to break a British blockade? Tirpitz was emphatic about the ability to win a decisive battle against the Grand Fleet as soon as the Kiel Canal and the fortification of Helgoland were ready in 1914 but had to concede that for now the fleet was not in a position to gain the upper hand.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
7[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Müller's assessment was essentially the same.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
8[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
August von Heeringen gave a similar opinion in his judgement saying that the fleet had not the ability to engage the Grand Fleet in a decisive battle.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
9[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Moltke on the other hand was even more sceptical. The strength relations had never reached the “2:3 standard” which would have been necessary for the German Navy to be even considered a risk.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
10[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Would Germany go to war with the British Empire now, a blockade could be devastating in the long run. Moltke assumed that even in two years from then the Imperial Navy would not be ready for war.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
11[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
It was clear that the war had to be either short or with at least a neutral British Empire. Since the expansion of the army had been neglected in favour of the navy the divisions for a quick victory in the west were [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
missing even if one would consider such a quick victory possible.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
As [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
August von Heeringen pointed out: “What an ironic constellation that the expansion of the fleet would now be the hindrance to victory.” It was also von Heeringen who acknowledged that should the British Empire evade a decisive battle and establish a far blockade the Imperial Navy would be rather useless.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
12[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
The consequences of these insights everybody had gained in the long discussions were astonishingly different and at times even paradoxical considering that the assessments of Germany's defensive position were rather similar. Moltke still sought the saving of Germany in a short war against France, the earlier the better, although he was not convinced that Germany could stay victorious in such a war. Tirpitz clung to his idea of a High Seas Fleet as a deterrent against a British blockade in some undefined future, although his deterrence theory made a close blockade ever more unlikely.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
13[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
In the end it was blatantly obvious at least for Bethmann and Eisendecher that any war would be rather long than short and that any such war with Britain as an enemy now and in the near future would end with a ruinous defeat for the German Empire.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
14[/FONT]
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As a consequence Bethmann invited Moltke, Lyncker, Josias von Heeringen and the secretary of finance Adolf Wehrmut two days later again into his home. In a lengthy discussion Bethmann made it clear that the established war plans could not cope with reality and that especially Moltke's Plan West would interfere with his and Eisendecher's envisioned foreign policy towards Britain. So Bethmann supported by Wehrmut for all different reasons[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
15[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
offered Moltke a bargain as he later telegraphed to Eisendecher. If Moltke would join Bethmann to topple Tirpitz and his fleet plans Bethmann would support Moltke for a huge enlargement of the army budget. But Bethmann wanted something else: That Moltke would concentrate on his alternate plan which [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
would not rely on the invasion of a neutral country. Although Moltke resisted the suggestion first, Bethmann insisted that Moltke had to take diplomatic constraints into account. Bethmann added that an offensive in the east might even need more men and therefore would make it much easier to get the budgetary rise. Finally Moltke agreed to focus on the alternate Plan East and to support Bethmann against Tirpitz. Lyncker was already very open to Bethmanns suggestions,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
16[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
and Josias von Heeringen always had accepted the primacy of the civil government and the chancellor.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
17[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Bethmann got a preliminary draft of the revised Plan East one month later. It existed in two variants, one with France as the aggressor and Russia’s position uncertain, the second with Russia as the aggressor and France’s position not declared. Both plans had a strong defensive line of forts at the western and eastern borders in common and both needed a lot of additional troops and money. Considering that the last army law passed in February 1911 saw only an almost negligible increase in troops and even a lower yearly budget than the years before[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
18[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
the importance of a revision of that law would be immediately clear. Furthermore the finances of the German Reich were in a bad condition. Any budgetary rise for the army would have to be subtracted from other armaments. Bethmann wanted to use this against the naval building program.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
19[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
It was then that Bethmann and Moltke confronted the Kaiser with the findings of the War Council and with Moltke's alternate plan. Their suggestion was simple. The Kaiser should exercise his authority and stop Tirpitz from introducing further naval laws. Eisendecher should receive a free hand to strike a bargain with the British Empire to reach a naval détente. It was not an easy task. But Wehrmut, not afraid of speaking his opinion as well as Lyncker, who had a great deal of influence on the emperor, weighed in, as well as Eisendecher and Josias von Heeringen. In addition to that Werner von Rheinbaben, since January 1911 naval attaché to Britain, reported that the British fleet building program will match the German pace and there was no indication that this would change in the foreseeable future.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
20[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Furthermore public as well as parliamentary opinion was increasingly in favour of a serious army expansion since the Bosnian crisis in 1908 had brought back the possibility of a continental war to the public mind.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
21[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
At last the negotiations with France in the Fez Crisis were coming to a for Germany very beneficial end as well as simultaneously furthering rapprochement with France and Britain which gave Eisendecher and Bethmann much needed clout.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
22[/FONT]
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After the almost peaceful resolution of the Fez crisis Tirpitz saw only small chances for a new naval law to gain public and parliamentary support, although the Navy League tried to push for faster battlecruiser building.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
23[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Therefore Tirpitz gave grudgingly support to Moltke's suggestion of a new greatly expanded army bill for 1912. The emperor permitted the proposition of an army law in early September 1911. But Tirpitz stood still opposed to any reduction in the naval building pace, whereas Bethmann, Wehrmut and Eisendecher wanted to use the dwindling support for the navy to cut expenditure there and to open up a wider range of possibilities in upcoming negotiations with Britain. Metternich's reports which were corroborated by Rheinbaben gave the impression that chances for a naval détente were never better than now. Weeks of lengthy discussions and heavy fights followed. Tirpitz lost some ground due to the fact that since the war council Müller had been convinced that indeed a naval détente would be desirable and naval construction should not be accelerated.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
24[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Even more damaging was Holtzendorff's view that the focus should move to readiness than to building ever more ships which lacked able personal to command and sail them.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
25[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Then there were the logical arguments which showed the paradoxical circular logic of Tipitz' theories and the danger of further deterioration of the German-British relations. In the end it was the combined pressure of perhaps the only concerted effort of Imperial government and military officials that let the emperor cave in. Wilhelm II. later wrote into his diary on January 31[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
st[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, 1912: “I had almost forgotten why I decided that a cruiser fleet was in the best interests of the German Empire and its colonies.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
26[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
” With a free hand for Eisendecher in further negotiations with Britain, the way was paved for a naval agreement.[/FONT]
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Although Tirpitz offered his resignation, the emperor would not have it. Tirpitz remained in office, but his power had waned and would never regain its decade long hold on naval policies. The first confrontation with the military ended in favour of the civilian leadership. […][/FONT]
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OTL cited sources:[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Afflerbach, Holger, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Kaiser Wilhelm II. als Oberster Kriegsherr im Ersten Weltkrieg[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, R. Oldenbourg Verlag München 2005.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Burchardt[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, Lothar, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, Harald Boldt Verlag Boppard am Rhein 1968.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Cecil, Lamar, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Wilhelm II. – Vol. 2 – Emperor and exile, 1900 – 1941[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 1996.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Fischer, Jörg-Uwe, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Admiral des Kaisers[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, Verlag Peter Lang Frankfurt am Main 1992.[/FONT]
Förster, Stig, Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusionen des kurzen Krieges, 1871 – 1914, Metakritik eines Mythos, in: Burkhardt/Becker/Förster/Kronenbitter, Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 115 – 158, Verlag Ernst Vögel München 1996.
Giessler, Klaus-Volker, Die Institution des Marineattachés im Kaiserreich, Harald Boldt Verlag Boppard am Rhein, 1976.
Guth, Ekkehart P., Lyncker, Moriz Freiherr von,in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 15, Duncker & Humblodt Berlin 1987.
Hobson, Rolf, Imperialism at sea, Brill Academic publishers, Inc. Boston, Leiden 2002.
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Holborn, Hajo, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Vol. 3 – Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1871 bis 1945)[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, R. Oldenbourg München und Wien 1971.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Lambert, Nicholas A., [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, University of South Carolina 1999.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Mi[/FONT]
chaelis, William, Tirpitz' strategisches Wirken vor und während des Weltkrieges., in: Werner Rahn (Editor): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit. Oldenbourg, München 2005
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Ritter, Gerhard, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk – Die Hauptmächte Europas und das wilhelminische Reich (1890 – 1914)[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, R. Oldenbourg Verlag München 1973.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Röhl[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], John, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Wilhelm II.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Vol. 2, pp. 1118, 1128 ff.[/FONT][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Scheck, Raffael, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Alfred von Tirpitz and German right-wing politics, 1914-1930[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, Humanities Press Atlantic Highlands New Jersey 1998.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Stein, Oliver, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik 1890 – 1914[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, Ferdinand Schöningh Paderborn 2007.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Stevenson, David, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Armaments and the Coming of War in Europe[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, Clarendon Press Oxford 1996.
_____________________________________________________
[/FONT]
1 This is in a gist what in OTL became known as the “Schlieffen plan”.
2 As in OTL Moltke had written to the secretary of war, see
Förster, Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusionen des kurzen Krieges, 1871 – 1914, Metakritik eines Mythos, in Burkhardt/Becker/Förster/Kronenbitter, Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 115 – 158, pp. 14g.
3 As in OTL, see
Förster, ibid., p. 145 f.
4 As in OTL, see
Förster, ibid., p. 144.
5 „Es wird ein Volkskrieg werden, der nicht mit einer entscheidenden Schlacht abzumachen sein wird, sondern ein langes, mühevolles Ringen mit einem Land sein wird, das sich nicht eher überwunden geben wird, als bis seine ganze Volkskraft gebrochen ist, und der auch unser Volk, selbst wenn wir Sieger sein sollten, bis aufs äußerste erschöpfen wird.“ Moltke, in January 1905, see
Förster, ibid., p. 144.
Translation by me: „It will be a war of the people, which will not be brought to an end by one decisive battle, but will become a long, agonizing struggle with a nation, that will not acknowledge defeat until all of its people's power is broken, and which will leave our own people utterly exhausted even if we can stay victorious.”
6 In OTL
Tirpitz informed the secretary of the interior as early as in 1907 that Germany should prepare for a long war, meaning at least 18 months, see
Förster, ibid., p. 147;
Burchardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, pp. 19 f. For
Moltkes insights that a long war is the probable outcome of any war in the future see the citations above.
Lyncker is difficult to predict, but he was also described as a serious and calm man with rather pessimistic views on the ability of the German army to win a two front war, since he was able to give a rational analysis of the rather bad situation in the war in OTL, see
Guth, Lyncker, Moriz Freiherr von, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 15, p. 587;
Afflerbach, [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Kaiser Wilhelm II. als Oberster Kriegsherr im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 74 ff. [/FONT]
Josias von Heeringen's position is also not so easy to predict: there is a small marginalia in one of Moltkes memorandums which indicated he thought of the war in 1870/71 as a lengthy war and feared another war against France might be of similar or greater length, see
Burchardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, p. 24, note 54;
Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik 1890 – 1914, p. 102. But
Stein also mentions that the ministry of war based its deliberations on a short war, see
Stein, ibd., pp. 102 ff;
Burchardt, ibd. p. 17 f. Other military experts – not present in this ATL war council – as
von der Goltz, von Blume and
von Caprivi as well as the late Moltke the Elder had also thought of the next war as a prolonged, inexorable and horrible war, see
Stein, ibd., pp. 103 ff.;
Burchardt, ibd., pp. 21 ff.
7As in OTL, see
Michaelis, Tirpitz' strategisches Wirken vor und während des Weltkrieges., in: Werner Rahn (Editor): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit. Oldenbourg, München 2005, pp. 397 – 426, p. 412.
8 As he admitted both towards the emperor and the chancellor in OTL in September 1911, see
Fischer, Admiral des Kaisers, pp. 115 f.
9 As in OTL, see
Michaelis, ibd., p. 412.
10 Although British politicians seemed to be content with a “2:3 standard” in spring 1911 this referred solely to those dreadnoughts to be built until 1914, neither to other dreadnoughts built later on nor to the fleet as a whole. In OTL Widenmann was responsible for the misrepresentation of these facts, see
Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, Vol. 2, pp. 213 ff. and note 99 to chapter 8 (p. 369). Since Widenmann was no longer naval attaché after January 1911 any misrepresentation of these facts will not happen in this TL. Rheinbaben will rather give an accurate description of the situation which will show the German inability to overcome the British naval armament even in the long run.
11 As he pointed out in OTL on the War Council 12/8/1912. See the entry from the diary of
Georg Alexander von Müller (December 8, 1912). Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv [BArch N 159/4 Fol. 169-171].
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=799.
12 As he pointed out in OTL on the War Council 12/8/1912. See
Michaelis, ibd., p. 412. This problem was at least known in OTL and therefore this TL since 1907 when Vice Admiral Karl Galster published a pamphlet outlining these problems of the naval policy campaigning for a navy of cruisers and U-boats, see
Hobson, Imperialism at sea, pp. 261 ff., 271. The danger of a wide blockade was also seen by many others, including Tirpitz see
Hobson, ibd., pp. 270 f. The British had dismissed a close blockade at the same time, see
Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, pp. 205 ff. In this TL the anachronistic strategy of Admiral Wilson will never be put in the open, since the OTL war scare of August 1911 will not happen.
13 In regard to this paradox in OTL, see
Hobson, ibd., pp. 270 f.
14 While in OTL Bethmann was content with whatever the military considered necessary because he thought of himself not as a military expert, see
Stein, ibd., p. 331, although his assessment of a coming war as a horrible catastrophe for all nations involved was spot on, see
Stein, ibd., pp. 328 ff. In this TL Bethmann has gathered enough confidence to rely on his own and rather obvious conclusions that if any war will be probably long and horrible British entry had to be avoided at all costs.
15 As in OTL, see
Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War in Europe, p. 178.
16 Although Lyncker was a follower of the “inevitable-war-thesis” and pledged on several occasions for a pre-emptive strike Lyncker was also described as a calm and rational man who was critical of the chances of the German army to win a war and later criticised the dictatorial 3rd OHL and their strategy, see
Guth, ibd., Vol. 15, p. 587;
Afflerbach, [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Kaiser Wilhelm II. als Oberster Kriegsherr im Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 74 ff. Furthermore Lyncker accepted the primacy of politics over the military, see [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Afflerbach[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, ibid., pp. 74, 87 ff.[/FONT]
17 Josias von Heeringen did so in OTL as well, see
Stein, ibd., pp. 269, 296 ff.
18 As in OTL, see
Stein, ibd., pp. 268 ff.
19 As in OTL, see
Stein, ibd., pp. 291 ff.
20 In contrast to OTL where Widenmann gave a serious misrepresentation of the facts, especially reporting falsely that the British had been given up their two-power-standard due to the fast pace of the German naval program and would be willing to accept further German armament, see
Ritter, ibd., pp. 213 ff., [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
216 f., and who supported all naval laws vehemently, see [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
Ritter[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
, ibd., pp. 232 ff.[/FONT] and note 99 to chapter 8 (p. 369). In OTL Rheinbaben supported a naval agreement strongly, see
Giessler, Die Institution des Marineattachés im Kaiserreich, pp. 176 f. On Widenmann's destructive behaviour see also,
Giessler, ibd., pp. 150 ff.
21 As in OTL, see
Stevenson, ibd., p. 180.
22 The rapprochement and the much lower level of nationalist propaganda will also diminish the war scare slightly, so that a naval bill will be even more out of the question than it was in OTL, see
Stevenson, ibd., pp. 195 f.
23 As in OTL, see
Stevenson, ibd., pp. 195 f.
24 In OTL Müller was not convinced that a naval law right after the Agadir crisis would be a good idea, since he saw the weakness of the German fleet until the Kiel channel was built, see
Fischer, ibd., pp. 115 f. Only Tirpitz was able to sway him later. What is even more important is the fact, that in OTL Müller supported Bethmann as chancellor especially against the 3rd OHL and accepted the constitutionally given primacy of politics over military matters, see
Fischer, ibd., pp. 146, 152 ff., especially 156 ff., 164 ff., 172 ff.
25 As in OTL, see
Stevenson, ibd., pp. 196, 200.
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
26 In OTL the emperor was unsure which naval strategy he should follow. He seemed to favour cruisers before battleships at first, but was later swayed by Tirpitz. See Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German right-wing politics, 1914-1930, p. 2; Stein, ibd., p. 210; Röhl, Wilhelm II., Vol. 2, pp. 1118, 1128 ff.[/FONT]
