A stronghold in Europe - A von Bethmann Hollweg TL
- Thread starter DerGreif
- Start date
abc123
Banned
WE WANT MAP!!!
Seriously, can you be more specific about that cession of territory?
Just continue with good work.
View attachment 154332So here is a map of the cession of territory from France to Germany, but the slice of Cameroon which went to France is not marked on that map. In contrast to OTL the ceded territory[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] includes the waterhead regions of some rivers flowing towards the Congo, including the Alima and Likouala and the final part of the Sangha as well as all land from there to the Congo and Ubangi, the southern border point being Brazzaville which stayed French, as well as most of the coast up to the western waterhead regions[/FONT] mentioned earlier. The changes to Cameroon are in light green. but again, I am not a great map maker.
I will try another better version later on. For the time being I still work on Chapter 4.
And thanks again for all the nice comments.
Kind regards,
G.
Edit: I changed the map with the one Blomma made for me - thank you very much for that great piece. The small slump which went to France east of Bongor is not shown.
I will try another better version later on. For the time being I still work on Chapter 4.
And thanks again for all the nice comments.
Kind regards,
G.
Edit: I changed the map with the one Blomma made for me - thank you very much for that great piece. The small slump which went to France east of Bongor is not shown.
Last edited:
It took a little bit more time than I wanted to but here comes chapter 4:
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Excerpt from Ann-Kathrin Holloway: "Chancellor, Kaiser, Reichstag and the military[/FONT] -[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] A fight for control", New York [/FONT]2007
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif][…] The Fez Crisis is widely attributed a high significance in affecting the diplomatic landscape of pre-war Europe, often called the turning point of German-British relations. There has been an endless stream of studies concentrating only on the obvious, the impact on foreign affairs. But there is perhaps a dimension of even bigger importance to the Fez Crisis: its subtle but none the less huge impact on domestic German policy. After Eisendecher delivered his sharp protest note to France and Spain started occupying northern ports in Morocco tensions were rising. As one German foreign office official suggested to send a gunboat to Agadir war became a real option. Although Eisendecher and Bethmann refused to take military action and Eisendecher was rather successful in the following diplomatic exchange turning the British to a neutral stance, Bethmann was concerned with Germany’s military situation after war seemed no longer impossible.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]So Bethmann invited the military leadership to a conference to discuss Germany’s defensive options. The famous War Council met secretly in Bethmann's manor of Hohemfinow on June 3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]rd[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] 1911. The participants included all of the important decision makers: from the civilian government Bethmann and Eisendecher and from the military side the Prussian minister of war Josias von Heeringen, his brother [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]August von Heeringen, who was Chief of Staff of the Naval High Command, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]the head of the German Imperial Naval office Admiral Tirpitz, Chief of the Naval Cabinet Georg Alexander von Müller, Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger and the Chief of the Military Cabinet Moriz von Lyncker. Most notably the Kaiser was not invited. Bethmann explained to the assembly that the Kaiser should not waste his precious time on what were preliminary talks considering the options at hand. The aim of this meeting should be to develop a sound strategy which then could be presented to the emperor. Main subject of the discussion were the German war plans in case the Fez Crisis grew hot. As Bethmann learned there existed two plans, Moltke's Plan West and Plan East, but only the first was considered to be a viable option for a short victory. The Plan West was based on earlier plans developed by then Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen, which envisioned a deep strike through Belgium into France, bypassing the heavily enforced eastern border forts. In the east a small contingent should use Russia’s inability to mobilise fast and fight a defensive action until France would be defeated quickly.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]1[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] The shortcomings of this plan became rapidly aware to Bethmann and Eisendecher. First of all, marching through Belgium required either a right to military passage or the violation of Belgium’s neutrality. The probability of Belgium allowing free passage was considered to be practically nil by Eisendecher. And the chief diplomat emphasized that in case of an invasion of Belgium the entry of Britain into the war on the side of the entente would be a certainty. Secondly Moltke had to admit that his plan was everything else than a sure way to victory. The problems were manifold: It would require more divisions than the German army was fielding right now.2 And Moltke concurred that any unforeseen stalling of the advancing armies would cause the plan to break down and end up in a prolonged war which would be disastrous with a belligerent Britain blockading Germany successfully. Actually the 3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]rd[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] department of the Chief of Staff had presented a study based on information gathered by the secret service and French military publications in May 1910 which had shown that French counter measures to the Moltke Plan West would have most certainly stopped an even initially successful advance and would have led to failure of its most important aim: a quick victory in France.3 Moltke explained further that the amount of ammunition stored now would only suffice to the 40[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]th[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] day of mobilisation. Finally Moltke admitted to the grim conclusions he already had come by in January 19054, that any war fought in the future will become a “Volkskrieg”, a war of the people, and be neither short nor victorious since even the winner of such a war would be utterly exhausted.5 Although there were differences concerning the estimated length of a war in the end the consensus of most of the assembled military advisers was quiet depressing since most of them considered a prolonged war even with an attack through Belgium the most probable outcome.6[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Which led to the next important question: Would the Imperial Navy be able to break a British blockade? Tirpitz was emphatic about the ability to win a decisive battle against the Grand Fleet as soon as the Kiel channel and the fortification of Helgoland were ready in 1914 but had to concede that for now the fleet was not in a position to gain the upper hand.7 August von Heeringen gave a similar opinion in his judgement saying that the fleet had not the ability to engage the Grand Fleet in a decisive battle.8 Moltke on the other hand was even more sceptical. The strength relations had never reached the “2:3 standard” which would have been necessary for the German Navy to be even considered a risk.9 Would Germany go to war with the British Empire now, a blockade could be devastating in the long run. Moltke assumed that even in two years from then the Imperial Navy would not be ready for war.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]10[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] It was clear that the war had to be either short or with at least a neutral British Empire. Since the expansion of the army had been neglected in favour of the navy the divisions for a quick victory in the west were [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]missing even if one would consider such a quick victory possible.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] As [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]August von Heeringen pointed out: “What an ironic constellation that the expansion of the fleet would now be the hindrance to victory.” It was also von Heeringen who acknowledged that should the British Empire evade a decisive battle and establish a far blockade the Imperial Navy would be rather useless.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]11[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] The consequences of these insights everybody had gained in the long discussions were astonishingly different considering that the assessments of Germany's defensive position were rather similar. Whereas Moltke still sought the saving of Germany in a short war against France, the earlier the better, Tirpitz clung to his idea of a High Seas Fleet which could break a British blockade in some undefined future. In the end it was blatantly obvious at least for Bethmann and Eisendecher that any war would be rather long than short and that any such war with Britain as an enemy now and in the near future would end with a ruinous defeat for the German Empire.12 [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]As a consequence Bethmann invited Moltke, Lyncker, Josias von Heeringen and the secretary of finance Adolf Wehrmut two days later again into his home. In a lengthy discussion Bethmann made it clear that the established war plans could not cope with reality and that especially Moltke's Plan West would interfere with his and Eisendecher's envisioned foreign policy towards Britain. So Bethmann supported by Wehrmut for all different reasons offered Moltke a bargain as he later telegraphed to Eisendecher. If Moltke would join Bethmann to topple Tirpitz and his fleet plans Bethmann would support Moltke for a huge enlargement of the army budget. But Bethmann wanted something else: That Moltke would concentrate on his alternate plan which [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]would not rely on the invasion of a neutral country. Although Moltke resisted the suggestion first, Bethmann insisted that Moltke had to take diplomatic changes into account. Bethmann added that an offensive in the east might even need more men and therefore would make it much easier to get the budgetary rise. Finally Moltke agreed to focus on the alternate Plan East and to support Bethmann against Tirpitz. Lyncker was already very open to Bethmanns suggestions,13 and Josias von Heeringen always had accepted the primacy of the civil government and the chancellor.14 Bethmann got a preliminary draft of the revised Plan East one month later. It existed in two variants, one with France as the aggressor and Russia’s position uncertain, the second with Russia as the aggressor and France’s position not declared. Both plans had a strong defensive line of forts at the western and eastern borders in common and both needed a lot of additional troops and money. Considering that the last army law passed in February 1911 saw only an almost negligible increase in troops and even a lower yearly budget than the years before15 the importance of a revision of that law would be immediately clear. Furthermore the finances of the German Reich were in a bad condition. Any budgetary rise for the army would have to be subtracted from other armaments. Bethmann wanted to use this against the naval building program.16 It was then that Bethmann and Moltke confronted the Kaiser with the findings of the War Council and with Moltke's alternate plan. Their suggestion was simple. The Kaiser should exercise his authority and stop the fleet building after Great Britan would accept a naval détente with Germany. Eisendecher should receive a free hand to strike a bargain with the British Empire. It was not an easy task. But Wehrmut, not afraid of speaking his opinion as well as Lyncker, who had a great deal of influence on the emperor, weighed in, as well as Eisendecher and Josias von Heeringen. In addition to that Werner von Rheinbaben, since Januaray 1911 naval attaché to Britain, reported that the British fleet building program will match the German pace and there was no indication that this would change in the foreseeable future.17 At last the negotiations with France in the Fez Crisis were coming to a for Germany very favourable end as well as simultaneously furthering rapprochement with France and Britain which gave Eisendecher and Bethmann much needed clout. After weeks of lengthy discussions and heavy fights the combined threat of resignation by Bethmann, Wehrmut and Eisendecher opposed by the same threat from Tirpitz the emperor caved in. Wilhelm II. later wrote into his diary on August 31[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]st[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], 1911: “I had almost forgotten why I decided that a cruiser fleet was in the best interests of the German Empire and its colonies.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]18[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]” [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Tirpitz resigned two days later. The first confrontation with the military ended in favour of the civilian leadership. […][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]OTL cited sources:[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Burchardt, Lothar, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, Harald Boldt Verlag Boppard am Rhein 1968.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Cecil, Lamar, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Wilhelm II. – Vol. 2 – Emperor and exile, 1900 – 1941[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 1996.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Förster,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] Stig[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusionen des kurzen Krieges, 1871 – 1914, Metakritik eines Mythos,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] in: Burkhardt/Becker/Förster/Kronenbitter, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], pp. 115 – 158, Verlag Ernst Vögel München 1996.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Guth[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Ekkehart P., [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Lyncker, Moriz Freiherr von,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]in: [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Neue Deutsche Biographie[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Vol. 15, Duncker & Humblodt Berlin 1987.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Holborn, Hajo, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Vol. 3 – Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1871 bis 1945)[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], R. Oldenbourg München und Wien 1971.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Massie, Robert K., [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Die Schalen des Zorns – Großbritannien, Deutschland und das Heraufziehen des Ersten Weltkrieges[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], S. Fischer Verlag GmbH Frankfurt am Main 1993; translated by Walter Brumm from the original [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Dreadnought. Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Random House New York 1991.[/FONT]
Michaelis, William, Tirpitz' strategisches Wirken vor und während des Weltkrieges., in: Werner Rahn (Editor): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit. Oldenbourg, München 2005
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Ritter, Gerhard, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk – Die Hauptmächte Europas und das wilhelminische Reich (1890 – 1914)[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], R. Oldenbourg Verlag München 1973.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Röhl[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Wilhelm II., Vol. 2, pp. 1118, 1128 ff.[/FONT][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Scheck, Raffael, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Alfred von Tirpitz and German right-wing politics, 1914-1930[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Humanities Press Atlantic Highlands New Jersey 1998.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Stein, Oliver, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik 1890 – 1914[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Ferdinand Schöningh Paderborn 2007.[/FONT]
1 This is in a gist what in OTL became known as the “Schlieffen plan”.
2 As in OTL Moltke had written to the secretary of war, see Förster, Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusionen des kurzen Krieges, 1871 – 1914, Metakritik eines Mythos, in Burkhardt/Becker/Förster/Kronenbitter, Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 115 – 158, pp. 14g.
3 As in OTL, see Förster, ibid., p. 145 f.
4 As in OTL, see Förster, ibid., p. 144.
5 „Es wird ein Volkskrieg werden, der nicht mit einer entscheidenden Schlacht abzumachen sein wird, sondern ein langes, mühevolles Ringen mit einem Land sein wird, das sich nicht eher überwunden geben wird, als bis seine ganze Volkskraft gebrochen ist, und der auch unser Volk, selbst wenn wir Sieger sein sollten, bis aufs äußerste erschöpfen wird.“ Moltke, in January 1905, see Förster, ibid., p. 144.
Translation by me: „It will be a war of the people, which will not be brought to an end by one decisive battle, but will become a long, agonizing struggle with a nation, that will not acknowledge defeat until all of its people's power is broken, and which will leave our own people utterly exhausted even if we can stay victorious.”
6 In OTL Tirpitz informed the secretary of the interior as early as in 1907 that Germany should prepare for a long war, meaning at least 18 months, see Förster, ibid., p. 147; Burchardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, pp. 19 f. Lyncker was also described as a serious and calm man who pleaded for a negotiated peace and criticised the 3rd OHL, since he was able to give a rational analysis of the rather bad situation in the war in OTL, see Guth, Lyncker, Moriz Freiherr von, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 15, p. 587. For Moltkes insights that a long war is the probable outcome of any war in the future see the citations above. Josias von Heeringen's position is not so easy to predict: there is a small marginalia in one of Moltkes memorandums which indicated he thought of the war in 1870/71 as a lengthy war and feared another war against France might be of similar or greater length, see Burchardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, p. 24, note 54; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik 1890 – 1914, p. 102. But Stein also mentions that the ministry of war based its deliberations on a short war, see Stein, ibd., pp. 102 ff.; Burchardt, ibd. p. 17 f. Other military experts – not present in this ATL war council – as von der Goltz, von Blume and von Caprivi as well as the late Moltke the Elder had also thought of the next war as a prolonged, inexorable and horrible war, see Stein, ibd., pp. 103 ff.; Burchardt, ibd., pp. 21 ff.
7 As in OTL, see Michaelis, Tirpitz' strategisches Wirken vor und während des Weltkrieges., in: Werner Rahn (Editor): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit. Oldenbourg, München 2005, pp. 397 – 426, p. 412.
8 As in OTL, see Michaelis, ibd., p. 412.
9 Although British politicians seemed to be content with a “2:3 standard” in spring 1911 this referred solely to those dreadnoughts to be built until 1914, neither to other dreadnoughts built later on nor to the fleet as a whole. In OTL Widenmann was responsible for the misrepresentation of these facts, see Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, Vol. 2, pp. 213 ff. and note 99 to chapter 8 (p. 369). Since Widenmann was no longer naval attaché after January 1911 any misrepresentation of these facts will not happen in this TL. Rheinbaben will rather give an accurate description of the situation which will show the German inability to overcome the British naval armament even in the long run.
10 As he pointed out in OTL on the War Council 12/8/1912. See the entry from the diary of Georg Alexander von Müller (December 8, 1912). Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg [BArch N 159/4 Fol. 169-171]. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=799.
11 As he pointed out in OTL on the War Council 12/8/1912. See Michaelis, ibd., p. 412.
12 While in OTL Bethmann was content with whatever the military considered necessary because he thought of himself not as a military expert, see Stein, ibd., p. 331, although his assessment of a coming war was spot on, see Stein, ibd., pp. 328 ff. In this TL Bethmann has gathered enough confidence to rely on his own and rather obvious conclusions that if any war will be probably long and horrible British entry had to be avoided at all costs.
13 This is based on the few rather positive evaluations of Lyncker as a calm and rational man who was critical of a dictatorial 3rd OHL and their strategy, see Guth, ibd., Vol. 15, p. 587.
14 Josias von Heeringen did so in OTL as well, see Stein, ibd., pp. 269, 296 ff.
15 As in OTL, see Stein, ibd., pp. 268 ff.
16 As in OTL, see Stein, ibd., pp. 291 ff.
17 In contrast to OTL where Widenmann gave a serious misrepresentation of the facts, especially reporting falsely that the British had been given up their two-power-standard due to the fast pace of the German naval program and would be willing to accept further German armament, see Ritter, ibd., pp. 213 ff., [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]216 f., and who supported all naval laws vehemently, see [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Ritter[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], ibd., pp. 232 ff.[/FONT] and note 99 to chapter 8 (p. 369).
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]18 In OTL the emperor was unsure which naval strategy he should follow. He seemed to favour cruisers before battleships at first, but was later swayed by Tirpitz. See Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German right-wing politics, 1914-1930, p. 2; Stein, ibd., p. 210; Röhl, Wilhelm II., Vol. 2, pp. 1118, 1128 ff.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Chapter 4: The Taming of the s[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]ea lions[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Alfred Kubin, The power (Die Macht) 1903, page 6 (Blatt 6) of the Hans-von-Weber Mappe[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Excerpt from Ann-Kathrin Holloway: "Chancellor, Kaiser, Reichstag and the military[/FONT] -[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] A fight for control", New York [/FONT]2007
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif][…] The Fez Crisis is widely attributed a high significance in affecting the diplomatic landscape of pre-war Europe, often called the turning point of German-British relations. There has been an endless stream of studies concentrating only on the obvious, the impact on foreign affairs. But there is perhaps a dimension of even bigger importance to the Fez Crisis: its subtle but none the less huge impact on domestic German policy. After Eisendecher delivered his sharp protest note to France and Spain started occupying northern ports in Morocco tensions were rising. As one German foreign office official suggested to send a gunboat to Agadir war became a real option. Although Eisendecher and Bethmann refused to take military action and Eisendecher was rather successful in the following diplomatic exchange turning the British to a neutral stance, Bethmann was concerned with Germany’s military situation after war seemed no longer impossible.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]So Bethmann invited the military leadership to a conference to discuss Germany’s defensive options. The famous War Council met secretly in Bethmann's manor of Hohemfinow on June 3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]rd[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] 1911. The participants included all of the important decision makers: from the civilian government Bethmann and Eisendecher and from the military side the Prussian minister of war Josias von Heeringen, his brother [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]August von Heeringen, who was Chief of Staff of the Naval High Command, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]the head of the German Imperial Naval office Admiral Tirpitz, Chief of the Naval Cabinet Georg Alexander von Müller, Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger and the Chief of the Military Cabinet Moriz von Lyncker. Most notably the Kaiser was not invited. Bethmann explained to the assembly that the Kaiser should not waste his precious time on what were preliminary talks considering the options at hand. The aim of this meeting should be to develop a sound strategy which then could be presented to the emperor. Main subject of the discussion were the German war plans in case the Fez Crisis grew hot. As Bethmann learned there existed two plans, Moltke's Plan West and Plan East, but only the first was considered to be a viable option for a short victory. The Plan West was based on earlier plans developed by then Chief of Staff Alfred von Schlieffen, which envisioned a deep strike through Belgium into France, bypassing the heavily enforced eastern border forts. In the east a small contingent should use Russia’s inability to mobilise fast and fight a defensive action until France would be defeated quickly.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]1[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] The shortcomings of this plan became rapidly aware to Bethmann and Eisendecher. First of all, marching through Belgium required either a right to military passage or the violation of Belgium’s neutrality. The probability of Belgium allowing free passage was considered to be practically nil by Eisendecher. And the chief diplomat emphasized that in case of an invasion of Belgium the entry of Britain into the war on the side of the entente would be a certainty. Secondly Moltke had to admit that his plan was everything else than a sure way to victory. The problems were manifold: It would require more divisions than the German army was fielding right now.2 And Moltke concurred that any unforeseen stalling of the advancing armies would cause the plan to break down and end up in a prolonged war which would be disastrous with a belligerent Britain blockading Germany successfully. Actually the 3[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]rd[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] department of the Chief of Staff had presented a study based on information gathered by the secret service and French military publications in May 1910 which had shown that French counter measures to the Moltke Plan West would have most certainly stopped an even initially successful advance and would have led to failure of its most important aim: a quick victory in France.3 Moltke explained further that the amount of ammunition stored now would only suffice to the 40[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]th[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] day of mobilisation. Finally Moltke admitted to the grim conclusions he already had come by in January 19054, that any war fought in the future will become a “Volkskrieg”, a war of the people, and be neither short nor victorious since even the winner of such a war would be utterly exhausted.5 Although there were differences concerning the estimated length of a war in the end the consensus of most of the assembled military advisers was quiet depressing since most of them considered a prolonged war even with an attack through Belgium the most probable outcome.6[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Which led to the next important question: Would the Imperial Navy be able to break a British blockade? Tirpitz was emphatic about the ability to win a decisive battle against the Grand Fleet as soon as the Kiel channel and the fortification of Helgoland were ready in 1914 but had to concede that for now the fleet was not in a position to gain the upper hand.7 August von Heeringen gave a similar opinion in his judgement saying that the fleet had not the ability to engage the Grand Fleet in a decisive battle.8 Moltke on the other hand was even more sceptical. The strength relations had never reached the “2:3 standard” which would have been necessary for the German Navy to be even considered a risk.9 Would Germany go to war with the British Empire now, a blockade could be devastating in the long run. Moltke assumed that even in two years from then the Imperial Navy would not be ready for war.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]10[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] It was clear that the war had to be either short or with at least a neutral British Empire. Since the expansion of the army had been neglected in favour of the navy the divisions for a quick victory in the west were [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]missing even if one would consider such a quick victory possible.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] As [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]August von Heeringen pointed out: “What an ironic constellation that the expansion of the fleet would now be the hindrance to victory.” It was also von Heeringen who acknowledged that should the British Empire evade a decisive battle and establish a far blockade the Imperial Navy would be rather useless.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]11[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] The consequences of these insights everybody had gained in the long discussions were astonishingly different considering that the assessments of Germany's defensive position were rather similar. Whereas Moltke still sought the saving of Germany in a short war against France, the earlier the better, Tirpitz clung to his idea of a High Seas Fleet which could break a British blockade in some undefined future. In the end it was blatantly obvious at least for Bethmann and Eisendecher that any war would be rather long than short and that any such war with Britain as an enemy now and in the near future would end with a ruinous defeat for the German Empire.12 [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]As a consequence Bethmann invited Moltke, Lyncker, Josias von Heeringen and the secretary of finance Adolf Wehrmut two days later again into his home. In a lengthy discussion Bethmann made it clear that the established war plans could not cope with reality and that especially Moltke's Plan West would interfere with his and Eisendecher's envisioned foreign policy towards Britain. So Bethmann supported by Wehrmut for all different reasons offered Moltke a bargain as he later telegraphed to Eisendecher. If Moltke would join Bethmann to topple Tirpitz and his fleet plans Bethmann would support Moltke for a huge enlargement of the army budget. But Bethmann wanted something else: That Moltke would concentrate on his alternate plan which [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]would not rely on the invasion of a neutral country. Although Moltke resisted the suggestion first, Bethmann insisted that Moltke had to take diplomatic changes into account. Bethmann added that an offensive in the east might even need more men and therefore would make it much easier to get the budgetary rise. Finally Moltke agreed to focus on the alternate Plan East and to support Bethmann against Tirpitz. Lyncker was already very open to Bethmanns suggestions,13 and Josias von Heeringen always had accepted the primacy of the civil government and the chancellor.14 Bethmann got a preliminary draft of the revised Plan East one month later. It existed in two variants, one with France as the aggressor and Russia’s position uncertain, the second with Russia as the aggressor and France’s position not declared. Both plans had a strong defensive line of forts at the western and eastern borders in common and both needed a lot of additional troops and money. Considering that the last army law passed in February 1911 saw only an almost negligible increase in troops and even a lower yearly budget than the years before15 the importance of a revision of that law would be immediately clear. Furthermore the finances of the German Reich were in a bad condition. Any budgetary rise for the army would have to be subtracted from other armaments. Bethmann wanted to use this against the naval building program.16 It was then that Bethmann and Moltke confronted the Kaiser with the findings of the War Council and with Moltke's alternate plan. Their suggestion was simple. The Kaiser should exercise his authority and stop the fleet building after Great Britan would accept a naval détente with Germany. Eisendecher should receive a free hand to strike a bargain with the British Empire. It was not an easy task. But Wehrmut, not afraid of speaking his opinion as well as Lyncker, who had a great deal of influence on the emperor, weighed in, as well as Eisendecher and Josias von Heeringen. In addition to that Werner von Rheinbaben, since Januaray 1911 naval attaché to Britain, reported that the British fleet building program will match the German pace and there was no indication that this would change in the foreseeable future.17 At last the negotiations with France in the Fez Crisis were coming to a for Germany very favourable end as well as simultaneously furthering rapprochement with France and Britain which gave Eisendecher and Bethmann much needed clout. After weeks of lengthy discussions and heavy fights the combined threat of resignation by Bethmann, Wehrmut and Eisendecher opposed by the same threat from Tirpitz the emperor caved in. Wilhelm II. later wrote into his diary on August 31[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]st[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], 1911: “I had almost forgotten why I decided that a cruiser fleet was in the best interests of the German Empire and its colonies.[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]18[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]” [/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Tirpitz resigned two days later. The first confrontation with the military ended in favour of the civilian leadership. […][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]OTL cited sources:[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Burchardt, Lothar, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, Harald Boldt Verlag Boppard am Rhein 1968.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Cecil, Lamar, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Wilhelm II. – Vol. 2 – Emperor and exile, 1900 – 1941[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 1996.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Förster,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] Stig[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusionen des kurzen Krieges, 1871 – 1914, Metakritik eines Mythos,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif] in: Burkhardt/Becker/Förster/Kronenbitter, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], pp. 115 – 158, Verlag Ernst Vögel München 1996.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Guth[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Ekkehart P., [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Lyncker, Moriz Freiherr von,[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]in: [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Neue Deutsche Biographie[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Vol. 15, Duncker & Humblodt Berlin 1987.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Holborn, Hajo, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Deutsche Geschichte in der Neuzeit, Vol. 3 – Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1871 bis 1945)[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], R. Oldenbourg München und Wien 1971.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Massie, Robert K., [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Die Schalen des Zorns – Großbritannien, Deutschland und das Heraufziehen des Ersten Weltkrieges[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], S. Fischer Verlag GmbH Frankfurt am Main 1993; translated by Walter Brumm from the original [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Dreadnought. Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Random House New York 1991.[/FONT]
Michaelis, William, Tirpitz' strategisches Wirken vor und während des Weltkrieges., in: Werner Rahn (Editor): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit. Oldenbourg, München 2005
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Ritter, Gerhard, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk – Die Hauptmächte Europas und das wilhelminische Reich (1890 – 1914)[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], R. Oldenbourg Verlag München 1973.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Röhl[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Wilhelm II., Vol. 2, pp. 1118, 1128 ff.[/FONT][/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Scheck, Raffael, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Alfred von Tirpitz and German right-wing politics, 1914-1930[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Humanities Press Atlantic Highlands New Jersey 1998.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Stein, Oliver, [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik 1890 – 1914[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], Ferdinand Schöningh Paderborn 2007.[/FONT]
1 This is in a gist what in OTL became known as the “Schlieffen plan”.
2 As in OTL Moltke had written to the secretary of war, see Förster, Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusionen des kurzen Krieges, 1871 – 1914, Metakritik eines Mythos, in Burkhardt/Becker/Förster/Kronenbitter, Lange und kurze Wege in den Ersten Weltkrieg, pp. 115 – 158, pp. 14g.
3 As in OTL, see Förster, ibid., p. 145 f.
4 As in OTL, see Förster, ibid., p. 144.
5 „Es wird ein Volkskrieg werden, der nicht mit einer entscheidenden Schlacht abzumachen sein wird, sondern ein langes, mühevolles Ringen mit einem Land sein wird, das sich nicht eher überwunden geben wird, als bis seine ganze Volkskraft gebrochen ist, und der auch unser Volk, selbst wenn wir Sieger sein sollten, bis aufs äußerste erschöpfen wird.“ Moltke, in January 1905, see Förster, ibid., p. 144.
Translation by me: „It will be a war of the people, which will not be brought to an end by one decisive battle, but will become a long, agonizing struggle with a nation, that will not acknowledge defeat until all of its people's power is broken, and which will leave our own people utterly exhausted even if we can stay victorious.”
6 In OTL Tirpitz informed the secretary of the interior as early as in 1907 that Germany should prepare for a long war, meaning at least 18 months, see Förster, ibid., p. 147; Burchardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, pp. 19 f. Lyncker was also described as a serious and calm man who pleaded for a negotiated peace and criticised the 3rd OHL, since he was able to give a rational analysis of the rather bad situation in the war in OTL, see Guth, Lyncker, Moriz Freiherr von, in: Neue Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 15, p. 587. For Moltkes insights that a long war is the probable outcome of any war in the future see the citations above. Josias von Heeringen's position is not so easy to predict: there is a small marginalia in one of Moltkes memorandums which indicated he thought of the war in 1870/71 as a lengthy war and feared another war against France might be of similar or greater length, see Burchardt, Friedenswirtschaft und Kriegsvorsorge, p. 24, note 54; Stein, Die deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik 1890 – 1914, p. 102. But Stein also mentions that the ministry of war based its deliberations on a short war, see Stein, ibd., pp. 102 ff.; Burchardt, ibd. p. 17 f. Other military experts – not present in this ATL war council – as von der Goltz, von Blume and von Caprivi as well as the late Moltke the Elder had also thought of the next war as a prolonged, inexorable and horrible war, see Stein, ibd., pp. 103 ff.; Burchardt, ibd., pp. 21 ff.
7 As in OTL, see Michaelis, Tirpitz' strategisches Wirken vor und während des Weltkrieges., in: Werner Rahn (Editor): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit. Oldenbourg, München 2005, pp. 397 – 426, p. 412.
8 As in OTL, see Michaelis, ibd., p. 412.
9 Although British politicians seemed to be content with a “2:3 standard” in spring 1911 this referred solely to those dreadnoughts to be built until 1914, neither to other dreadnoughts built later on nor to the fleet as a whole. In OTL Widenmann was responsible for the misrepresentation of these facts, see Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, Vol. 2, pp. 213 ff. and note 99 to chapter 8 (p. 369). Since Widenmann was no longer naval attaché after January 1911 any misrepresentation of these facts will not happen in this TL. Rheinbaben will rather give an accurate description of the situation which will show the German inability to overcome the British naval armament even in the long run.
10 As he pointed out in OTL on the War Council 12/8/1912. See the entry from the diary of Georg Alexander von Müller (December 8, 1912). Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg [BArch N 159/4 Fol. 169-171]. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=799.
11 As he pointed out in OTL on the War Council 12/8/1912. See Michaelis, ibd., p. 412.
12 While in OTL Bethmann was content with whatever the military considered necessary because he thought of himself not as a military expert, see Stein, ibd., p. 331, although his assessment of a coming war was spot on, see Stein, ibd., pp. 328 ff. In this TL Bethmann has gathered enough confidence to rely on his own and rather obvious conclusions that if any war will be probably long and horrible British entry had to be avoided at all costs.
13 This is based on the few rather positive evaluations of Lyncker as a calm and rational man who was critical of a dictatorial 3rd OHL and their strategy, see Guth, ibd., Vol. 15, p. 587.
14 Josias von Heeringen did so in OTL as well, see Stein, ibd., pp. 269, 296 ff.
15 As in OTL, see Stein, ibd., pp. 268 ff.
16 As in OTL, see Stein, ibd., pp. 291 ff.
17 In contrast to OTL where Widenmann gave a serious misrepresentation of the facts, especially reporting falsely that the British had been given up their two-power-standard due to the fast pace of the German naval program and would be willing to accept further German armament, see Ritter, ibd., pp. 213 ff., [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]216 f., and who supported all naval laws vehemently, see [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Ritter[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif], ibd., pp. 232 ff.[/FONT] and note 99 to chapter 8 (p. 369).
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]18 In OTL the emperor was unsure which naval strategy he should follow. He seemed to favour cruisers before battleships at first, but was later swayed by Tirpitz. See Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German right-wing politics, 1914-1930, p. 2; Stein, ibd., p. 210; Röhl, Wilhelm II., Vol. 2, pp. 1118, 1128 ff.[/FONT]
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Mh, not so sure about this happening.
1. The only internationally recognised kind of blockade was the close one, effectively blocking access to certain ports. - By 1911, the German Navy would have been capable of wearing down the Royal Navy in any attempt to execute this. - That in the war the RN/Great Britain would be able to switch to distant blockade was not entirely foreseeable at that point in time. And it only happened because the USA did not act neutral and fought for the rights of the neutral nations but clearly favoured the Entente and reacted benevolently to British impertinence.
2. Any concentation of the army at the eastern front was suicide. Even the existing pre-war Ostaufmärsche left half of the army in the west, under the assumption that France remained neutral (at least initially).
Against a hostile France, the bulk of the army always would go west, in all deployment plans. - There was nothing to gain from shifting the bulk of the forces to the east, except a quick French advance to Rhine and Ruhr.
1. The only internationally recognised kind of blockade was the close one, effectively blocking access to certain ports. - By 1911, the German Navy would have been capable of wearing down the Royal Navy in any attempt to execute this. - That in the war the RN/Great Britain would be able to switch to distant blockade was not entirely foreseeable at that point in time. And it only happened because the USA did not act neutral and fought for the rights of the neutral nations but clearly favoured the Entente and reacted benevolently to British impertinence.
2. Any concentation of the army at the eastern front was suicide. Even the existing pre-war Ostaufmärsche left half of the army in the west, under the assumption that France remained neutral (at least initially).
Against a hostile France, the bulk of the army always would go west, in all deployment plans. - There was nothing to gain from shifting the bulk of the forces to the east, except a quick French advance to Rhine and Ruhr.
First of all, thank you for your input. It is greatly appreciated!
On topic: In August 1911 according to Michaelis as cited in Footnote 7 in chapter 4 during the 2nd Morocco crisis, Tirpitz as well as August von Heeringen both told the emperor that the fleet was not ready for war. Whereas Tirpitz gave a positive outlook (in 1914 after the fortification of Helgoland and building of the Kiel channel he thought the chances to be better). V. Heeringen let that open. So at least that would still be the same as in OTL.
If a far blockade was already foreseeable in June 1911 without the Kaisermanöver of 1912 might be indeeed not that clear. But at least in 1912 August von Heeringen feared exactly that, see again the same source. You can find the book in google books and read it up yourself (it is in German though).
Heeringen said: "Wenn der Engländer sich wirklich auf Fernblockade mit konsequenter Zurückhaltung seiner Schlachtflotte verlegt, kann die Rolle unserer schönen Hochseeflotte im Kriege eine sehr traurige werden. Dann werden die U-Boote es schaffen müssen."
Translation by me: "If the British will really switch to a far blockade while consistently holding their battle fleet back the part of our beautiful High Seas Fleet in the war will indeed become a sad one. Then the U-boats will have to make up for it."
Although that was after a specific manouever which showed the shortcomings of gambling on a decisive battle, I still found it not that inconcievable that von Heeringen would come up with that problem in an intensive discussion of war planning a year earlier. But I will read further up on that matter. It is at least only one point of a whole other bunch of points, especially that many of the military advisers considered the fleet not even ready for a decisive battle near the coast. If not Widenmann gave his misrepresentation of British armament that should have been clear to much more people in Germany.
I am not amilitary expert so I cannot say much on this. But considering that in OTL there were (relatively speaking) a rather small amount of troops defending the western front, which is 1st of all short, 2ndly was already fortified in OTL and could have been even more so in this ATL I think that more troops operating in the east will not open up the west. I do not see the French rush in there. Maybe if they ignore Belgium neutrality and it is of course a contingency Germany will have to prepare for.
But what I wanted to enforce is that the new development will no longer base all their operations onto the infringement of Belgium neutrality and focus therefore on the Ostaufmarschplan. That does not mean, that the west will be left undefendend. I actually did not write anything about the exact deployments yet, because I was not sure about what is military sound, but I wanted to be based on the OTL Ostaufmarschpläne. I will consider your input then, but that is all for a later installment.
I have to go to a wedding now, so I will come to this back later. Perhaps you can give me some good sources on the matter at hand. What could be done to enforce the east, how much has to be left in the west? In this TL there will be more troops available because of a shift to the army in armaments.
Thanks again for the input. I greatly appreciate it!
Kind regards,
G.
It wasn't foreseeable because at that time the British admirals and politicians themselves were still struggling about what to do in case of war with Germany. - It was, nevertheless, an option also seen by Tirpitz; but it was an option that was illegal under the then relevant rules of international law.
That the British might be able to modify international law was a remote prospect not really considered by the Germans, although it should have been clear to them that American sympathies would not ly with Germany and the most influential neutral nation thus might allow the Brits to bend the rules.
That the fleet wasn't ready was a standard pretext of Tirpitz' - as Moltke observed in 1912: "The fleet never will be ready for war." Wearing down a close blockade was a matter of using torpedoes and sea mines - requiring rather a Galster navy instead of Tirpitz' battle fleet.
No problem at all. Take what you need.Once again well-researched update. I might blatantly steal parts of this timeline for my mod with due credits
I will research that topic more deeply. Maybe you can point to some good sources in German or English?
For the time being it seems that at least von Heeringen thought of this option as a real possibility as early as in 1912. But it is not the founding stone of this update. What is more important is that Bethmann comes to the realisation that a short war is improbable and that in case of a long war Germany may very well be cut off from external trade. Both realisations were rather common as early as in 1890. That the fleet will not be able to break a far blockade is just one building block in this argument because many thought that the fleet would not be able to guarantee access to the world market even in case of a near blockade.
Thanks again for the feedback.
Kind regards,
G.
- Lambert, Nicholas A. "Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution" University of South Carolina Press, 1999
- Schröder, Joachim "Die U-Boote des Kaisers" Bonn (Bernh.&Graefe), 2003
- Hobson, Rolf "Maritimer Imperialismus" München (Oldenbourg), 2004
- Besteck, Eva "Die trügerische >First Line of Defence<" Freiburg (Rombach), 2006
Bethmann's victory comes far too quick.
First question is: would he at all risk to alienate the Kaiser? - From what I gather he was rather anxious not to do this; after all, Wilhelm could fire him whenever he wanted. And Bethmann took great care that this didn't happen. And the fleet was Wilhelm's darling...
Second question: Can Tirpitz resign? He'd rather propose/request his resignation to/from the Kaiser; but would Wilhelm accept it in 1911? I think not...
(Because otherwise there would be no change from OTL) I buy your points that Bethmann realises
a) that a short war is not in the books.
b) that the German Navy will not be able to prevent a distant blockade.
(Although IOTL the military would never admit such things opposite 'a civilian'.)
But even if he get's the military to admit this, any change of strategy will require a lot of pression - and the Kaiser to side with Bethmann.
Moltke did not regard Bethmann his superior, they both were of equal standing as highest military and civil advisors to the emperor - and only the Kaiser could adjust their opinions into one policy.
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Wouldn't Moltke support anything that limits naval buildup in favour of a buildup of the Heer? Once that decision is made, avoiding tensions with Britain is just a consequence, right?
a long war needs preparations to the Heer, and given that Germany still is a land power these would be more important than the navy. Furthermore, IMHO the easiest countermeasure to a naval blockade is to win quickly on land - or, if that is not possible, to occupy territories which can provide the necessary supplies and raw materials. It would fit the East-first strategy if Germany aims at controlling large parts of Ukraine for the food supplies there.
Moltke didn't think in the category 'territory gained' but rather in 'enemy forces annihilated'.
An eastern strategy would find the Russians quickly retreating to the interior, and the vast distances of Russia could not be mastered with the supply apparatus of 1914. Occupation of the Ukraine opposite an intact Russian army won't work...
The reason for the western strategy was that France couldn't retreat like the Russians could, so, there was hope for a quick decisive battle.
What old Count Schlieffen was propagating wasn't what is written in his famous/infamous memorandum. It was a very prosaic approach: Beat the French by getting into their flank and/or rear, then shift a part of the forces to the east, beat the Russians, who will attack opposite weak German forces; then shift the forces back west, beat the recovering French again; then go east again, etc. Just utilising the advantage of the inner line by bouncing the troops from west to east and back again, until the enemy gives up, hopefully...
It's not entirely clear what Moltke and Ludendorff made of this with their 1908/09 changes, which appear to aim at double envelopment - thus trying to completely beat the French in the first round, which perhaps was a little bit overambitious... But looking who got the super heavy guns in August 1914 - 2nd Army and 6th Army - this obviously seems to have been the idea.
I don't know, the 1909 plans also looked fairly desperate, no? I feel like I remember reading that the plan recognized Germany might have to withdraw to the Oder! while France was finished off.
Not quite, the planners were pretty sure that the Russians couldn't advance beyond the Weichsel/Vistula.
But surrendering almost all of East Prussia would already have been seen as a catastrophe, something the pre-war military planners tended to disregard.
Wow, my hero is here! Still following your great TL, my personal favourite!
Thanks for the source list: Hobson I can get from our university library, Besteck should be there, too, but is lent out, I have to figure out who has that book, than I can make some copies. The other two I have to see if I can get them trough other means or "Fernleihe". I hope I find time tomorrow after work to have a look into them.
As for Bethmann: his final goal in this TL is to get rid of at least further Naval Laws and strengthen the army. This was his goal in OTL after the Moroccon crisis ever since and he threatened the Kaiser with resignation to gain a partial victory in 1912 over Tirpitz. But he was fighting rather alone in OTL and in this ATL he struck a bargain with Moltke - something he never did that explicitly in OTL although after 1913 he got much help from Moltke in this regard. But then it was too late. The whole premise of my TL is a slightly different Bethmann who gained more confidence during schooltime/whatever and therefore will fight stronger for his principles and ideas.
You are absolutely right in that if Bethmann would be the only one threatening resignation the Kaiser might have gone with Tirpitz in the end. But we have already many differences to OTL: Since January 1911 Widenmann who sent false reports to the Kaiser is no longer naval attachè in London but was replaced by the moderate Rheinbaben. Furthermore there is the assistance of Moltke - who did not receive an order from Bethmann but rather reached a bargain - Bethmann will support a Great Army Law and Moltke will support Bethmann's ideas of defence planning, especially against Tirpitz (as he did in OTL although way too late). According to Stein, Moltke and the General Staff were also rather conztent with their roles as military advisers and did not overstep their boundaries before the July crisis. Wehrmut was also eager to get rid of the Naval armament and supported an army law. Last point: in this TL Bethmann and Eisendecher havee gathered some clout with their resolve of the Fez Crisis, which ended quiet favourably for Germany: rapprochement with Britain and France, gains in the Congo (in contrast to OTL their were no gains in MOrocco advertised and both made clear they were going after compensation in French Congo). I think that, although it will not be an easy fight, they can gain the upper hand of Tirpitz in this TL. But I will sleep over it and see what the additional material brings to my mind.
rast;5074703[... said:
Although it seemed to be a rather desperate hope. Recent military historians come to think that the Genereal Staff was not convinced of an easy and quick victory over France. See the study from 1910 of the Genereal Staff I mentioned in chapter 4 which gave a rather bleak outlook even in case the initial advances and attacks would be successful.
You comments on Schlieffen's strategy are spot on!
Thanks again for all your interest and all your input! I will see, if I can manage a revised edition of chapter 4 and maybe a chapter 5 tomorrow.
Kind regards,
G.
Wasn't it Bethmann who said when he thought of war with Russia, he thanked God for the Russian revolutionaries?