A Soviet Thermidor

Perhaps nothing was so uniquely upsetting to Russia's traditional place in the European balance-of-power as aftermath of the Russian Civil War (to say the Russian Revolution is somewhat of a misnomer, as the first Russian Revolution did not install the Bolsheviks, but the short-lived provisional government of Alexander Kerensky), which even after the famed "Red October" Revolution of 1917 the survival of the Bolshevik government that had come to power as a result of it was still very much in doubt. It was only after the Russian Civil War in which the Bolsheviks had claimed victory against both the anti-Bolshevik White Movement that the existence of the new government, a radical experiment in Marxist ideals and their implementation for the governance of an agrarian country of over 100 million people.

What the rest of Europe saw was first and foremost a threat: a revolutionary government that had openly devoted itself to the overthrow of world capitalism and those governments that did not align themselves with the Soviet means of thinking. And worst of all, this government had proved capable of defending itself and fighting off not only the White Movement but also substantial contributions of forces from other nations as well. One by one the Bolsheviks had picked off their foes, both foreign and domestic, fighting with that eternal patience and determination that had defined Russia and other peoples of the area since the Kievan Rus, until they at last emerged triumphant, having bested all their foes and having defied the will of those who would have seen their revolution destroyed. Amidst all of this, the Bolshevik government and that of the Second Polish Republic, the first independent Polish state in centuries, had gone to war with each other, a conflict that very nearly resulted in the Bolshevik capture of Warsaw. For the world, this was a sign of a seemingly unbeatable foe, but also one that was committed to spreading its revolution at the end of a bayonet.

What had never been known however, was the extent of damage that had been done to the Soviet regime. Huge swathes of the country had been reduced to rubble by years of conflict from the Great War all the way to the Russian Civil War, millions had been killed, and millions more displaced or violently uprooted. The vital infrastructure that stitched together the largest nation on the face of the Earth was in ruins, and much of what had defined the Russian Empire had been lost in the turmoil and chaos of the revolution and the civil war that had followed it. Such was not an unprecedented event in world history, often it had been the case that once the period of revolutionary turmoil and internal strife had passed, that the foreboding and arduous reality began to set in: the Bolsheviks had won their conflict, but now they were responsible for rebuilding, a minority party that had never commanded the support of a majority of the population of Russia or any other area of the former Russian Empire and had survived through the abilities of talented, if ruthless and often fiercely quarrelsome individuals such as Josef Dzhugashvilli and Lev Davinovich Bronstein, better known as Stalin and Trotsky respectively, was now the government that would be responsible for repairing a broken country.

This is not to say that the Bolsheviks did not contribute their fair share to the mess that the Soviet Union had found for itself, to say that the policy of war communism, implemented by the Lenin government in 1918, was a disaster would be an understatement. Production levels in both manufacturing and agriculture had fallen to pre-1914 levels, peasants in the field grew only enough to sustain themselves, knowing that any extra would be seized by the government, factory workers, in turn, who were malnourished or even facing starvation were too weak from hunger to accomplish anything of use, the Russian people and even the Red Army to which all the resources of the state was devoted, were facing shortages of uniforms because of major deficiencies in the production of cotton and other commodity goods. The fact that many resource-rich areas of Russia and elsewhere were under the control of the Whites, and that the international isolation of the Bolshevik regime prevented them from obtaining any foreign trade was an unpleasant addition to an already dire situation.

The end of the civil war brought an explosion of dissident activity against war communism. The draconian measures imposed by the Lenin government were something that could have been justified by the government during the height of the civil war, but after the war had ended and these same measures remained in place, the Soviet government was soon to the point where it was facing a series of uprisings against its authority by the very same people who had risen up alongside them during the Civil War. In essence, a government of the workers was increasingly beginning to face issues from the very people it claimed to represent.

With the Soviet Union still in poor shape, and an increasingly volatile situation with domestic unrest, the Lenin government, in desperation, turned to the New Economic Policy to change the way things were going in the Soviet Union...

The New Economic Policy was, in effect, a total retreat from the reviled and ultimately unsuccessful policy of War Communism, and according to many within the Communist Party, the New Economic policy was a departure from the socialist ideals upon which the Bolshevik government itself had been founded.

In essence, the NEP boiled down to the idea that introducing elements of a market-driven economy, as opposed to one driven entirely by the dictates of the state and by central planning, was something that could be more effective for the Bolsheviks than War Communism had been. Many would later be perplexed as to how the revolutionary government had ever made such a decision, but in reality the reason for which the NEP was created is quite simple: Revolutions, by their very nature, are organic things, constantly evolving and going through different phases as they progress and eventually the generation of leaders that lead the revolution settles down and sets about to transition from revolutionaries seeking to overthrow the government to revolutionaries seeking to become the government.

The Soviet government was an experiment entirely without precedent, and it too was facing the quandary posed to all revolutionary governments: the issue of reconciling ideology with the necessities of the state. War Communism, which had been derived from Marxism-Leninism, had failed, and failed miserably. The scale to which the policy of War Communism had failed did not simply justify updating the rulebook a little, it demanded throwing the book out entirely and starting from scratch.

The New Economic Policy had immediate, and promising effects for the Soviet economy. It is ultimately unknown what Lenin intended for the New Economic Policy, as is the question with many other unresolved questions about Lenin's plans for the Soviet Union that were interrupted by his untimely death. Whether the NEP was a temporary measure adopted during a particularly desperate phase of Soviet history, or a lasting policy change that would redefine the entire Soviet system. Opinions on it, however, were a divided matter among the Soviet leadership after Lenin's death. The left, particularly Trotsky, denounced it as betrayal of Soviet ideals, others, however, were more supportive of the concept, and for reasons of a political nature, as well as ideological ones.

The NEP was a divisive thing in the already-contentious Soviet political scene of the 1920's, some in the Communist leadership hated it, others wholeheartedly supported it. What no member of the Politburo could do, was ignore it.

(Just a hint for now. Questions? Comments? Concerns?)
 
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Something interesting to consider I think is this, what changed with central planning later?

Specifically, Stalin was successful in that he was able to do what Lenin couldn't, which was use central planning to industrialize the Soviet Union, and in fact turned it into an industrial giant. Now, he starved millions doing so, and numerous other things, no denying it, but he still succeeded in the goal of industrialization.

What was different? Was Stalin a better administrator than Lenin and the like were?

For the NEP, Lenin remarked about things like State Capitalism. My theory is that he intended to just continue State Capitalism until the Soviet Union had finished primitive accumulation, and therefore, the Capitalist phase of economics. After all, Russia wasn't a capitalist society really, still being stuck in the feudal era in more ways than one.

For practical purposes, it means Soviet Union becoming like China today, many decades earlier. How well this would've worked is an interesting question, in of itself.
 
Stalin's approach was brute force and primitive, it worked though. The man achieved results, I never disputed that, nor have I ever believed anything else. I've argued before that Stalinist policies were successful in achieving their goals (albeit ruthlessly) to the point where I've been accused of being an apologist for Stalinism before. But really it's just a matter of looking at the facts for some things. I generally don't look at Stalin in the view of "was he right" because that's a nasty issue to get involved in, I look at his economic policies from the view of "did they accomplish their intended goals" and in many cases, that answer was yes.

The introductory piece wasn't so much meant to be a statement of how central planning doesn't work but more of how War Communism was a particularly bad application of it. I don't think any government in the situation the Bolshevik one was in at the height of the Russian Civil War with several resource-rich areas (oil-producing facilities in Baku and the Ural mines were both occupied by the Whites) could have done well from an economic standpoint but it certainly could have been better than it was.

I also don't think Stalin was per-se "better" (an incredibly subjective thing really) than anyone else in the Soviet leadership (I don't even know how well you can debate the merits of what Lenin did and what others proposed given how little time that Lenin and the NEP had to change the way things worked), I think it just says he did accomplish what he set out to do, and outmaneuvered a series of political opponents to do so, and ultimately he had the time to realize his ambitions, nobody else in that early era really did.
 
I have to admit I read the title as A Soviet Humidor.

That, in turn, sounds like some really weird alternate history where the Soviet Union conquers the Dominican Republic and sets up a communist puppet state.

And in the meantime Soviet leaders take up cigars en masse.
 
Wow wow wow, I'm not accusing you of anything.

With that in mind, the reason I ask is it's important to see why Stalin's brand of central planning was an improvement over War Communism. Perhaps it was having better control over the country? This would make sense, because central planning period, whether it's occurring within a mixed economy, ala Japan, or a command economy, I'd argue only works* when the state actually has enough control over the country in question.

War Communism failed because really, the Soviet Union hardly had any sort of grasp over the country they were in at the time, especially in comparison to Stalin. NKVD didn't have its huge network established, for example, among other things.

Those are my two cents anyway.

*I'm using works in the loosest sense, please keep that in mind for everyone reading this, in the sense that it achieves its state's economic goals.
 
Wow wow wow, I'm not accusing you of anything.

With that in mind, the reason I ask is it's important to see why Stalin's brand of central planning was an improvement over War Communism. Perhaps it was having better control over the country? This would make sense, because central planning period, whether it's occurring within a mixed economy, ala Japan, or a command economy, I'd argue only works* when the state actually has enough control over the country in question.

War Communism failed because really, the Soviet Union hardly had any sort of grasp over the country they were in at the time, especially in comparison to Stalin. NKVD didn't have its huge network established, for example, among other things.

Those are my two cents anyway.

*I'm using works in the loosest sense, please keep that in mind for everyone reading this, in the sense that it achieves its state's economic goals.

Uh, if I came across as being confrontational, that wasn't my intention.
 
Sorry, I misunderstood.:p

Anyway, please judge the rest of my post.

I have, I don't really substantially disagree with any of it, Hell part of what I was saying earlier was that I don't think almost anyone would have done particularly well in the anarchic situation that the Bolshevik government was in.

Though a minor nitpick, back then it was the Cheka, not the NKVD.
 
I have, I don't really substantially disagree with any of it, Hell part of what I was saying earlier was that I don't think almost anyone would have done particularly well in the anarchic situation that the Bolshevik government was in.

Though a minor nitpick, back then it was the Cheka, not the NKVD.

Last, okay, history hiccup on my part, my bad.:p

Point is though, I just wanted to establish that I don't really think War Communism of that time can really be used to judge state heavy economics, which you agreed with, so there's that.

Although honestly? I seriously doubt traditional capitalism would've worked either, as that too needs many centralized institutions which aren't going to be in place, at all, in that situation.

So yes, pretty bad situation regardless there.

Anyway, your thoughts on my prediction with Lenin?
 

Tsao

Banned
Well, this looks interesting. Of course, my lack of constructive commentary probably shows how little I know about this area of history. :p:eek:

I'll be following this anyways.
 
Last, okay, history hiccup on my part, my bad.:p

Point is though, I just wanted to establish that I don't really think War Communism of that time can really be used to judge state heavy economics, which you agreed with, so there's that.

Although honestly? I seriously doubt traditional capitalism would've worked either, as that too needs many centralized institutions which aren't going to be in place, at all, in that situation.

So yes, pretty bad situation regardless there.

Anyway, your thoughts on my prediction with Lenin?

Some of these I can't really answer without giving away parts of the timeline.
 
Hmm, sounds like you actually may be taking a direction similar to one of my few non-ASB timelines recently, but that's another matter.

You're talking about the Red Bear Won't Die I presume?

If that is the case, I wouldn't know, I haven't looked at it in-depth.
 
@HWG
IMO Stalin gets points for being in charge and pushing hard and long enough to get industrialization done.
FWIW Stolypin tried before the Revolutions to get Russian industrialization and infrastructure into the 19th century, much less the 20th but the Russian Tsarist "nobility', bureaucracy, and business culture made tar pits look positively easy to get past. it's part of why Stalin was such a hardass.
Was Stalin's drive to industrialization sane or pleasant? Heck no! IMO it created an albatross of industries focused on defense, not on prosperity or what did the Soviets/Russians any long term good. They definitely needed it from 1930-1950.
Hindsight's nice. As an American, I find it horrific in environmental and human costs but the Nazis justified the paranoia Stalin had about the outside world.

As I posited in Killer300's The Red Bear Won't Die- getting the USSR to industrialize didn't seem to be the problem. It was to making what to what standard for internal or external markets that were the big debates during and after the Revolutions. NEP made some baby steps toward a money economy and maybe trade links with the outside world Stalin shut down hard.

Stalin firehosed the chessboard and said building as much as possible ASAP come what may was what the Soviets'd do during the 1930's. They had plenty of people and resources. Why borrow capital to pay everyone (especially a bunch of foreign investors) when you could just order people to do the labor necessary? No exceptions, no excuses, no questions allowed. If you did, you spent a lot of time counting trees or breaking rocks in the Kolyma for being a "wrecker".

Where I'm going with this is, Stalin wanted a permanent wartime economy.
He had no concept nor interest in a peacetime economy. Things were so fubar in the 1920's as you described that anything was an improvement.

By the time Krushchev tried to put a human face on the runaway train that was the Soviet military-industrial complex, the inertia was nearly impossible to redirect, much less stop.
Gosplan tried several alternative ways to manage the Soviet economy, but since the Soviet economy took public fiat to unprecendented levels it got completely divorced from economic reality.
I.e they got stuck making a lot of @#$% nobody Soviet or otherwise wanted if they weren't giving it away to suit planners to look like they were doing something.

I like where you're going with the NEP does better and gets more of a life of its own. Soviet agriculture and industry grow in more organic ways. With freer exchange with the West and the rest of the world, the Soviets learn what works and apply it rather than succumbing to chauvinism and ideology that made the Soviet era such a blind alley from an economic standpoint.
I'd really love for the Soviets to go social-democratic -Sweden East, only 20X more people and 1000X the space, but that's my Soviet-wank.
 
What's it with you and Russia HWG, you could write whole essays about it in a heartbeat ;)

And some questions:

-Stalin. How much power has he here? You didn't mention him grabbing power like he did OTL, is he still Secretary-General, or he is he just one of the many Politburo members?

-I presume the Russian Civil War went the same?

-Is there any change in how the western nations treat the Soviet Union now?

-With the NEP, will Russia still be able to industrialize like it did under Stalin?
 
@ Super Missile

Your Q:
-Stalin. How much power has he here? You didn't mention him grabbing power like he did OTL, is he still Secretary-General, or he is he just one of the many Politburo members?

My Answer:
IMO Stalin would NOT let the NEP survive, so Stalin never getting near the power he did seems a good bet. I'd have to consult the org chart of the Soviet Politburo ca 1930 as to alternative personalities leading a different charge.

-I presume the Russian Civil War went the same?
The OP AIUI is whom leading which Red factions coming out on top would
do things differently from Stalinism 1930-1950.

The Whites winning the RCW depend on either (A) the SR's and/or Mensheviks defecting from the Bolshevik coalition deprive the Reds of enough manpower and leadership for the Whites to have a window of opportunity AND (B) Kolchak, Wenger, and Yudenich having a joint command, strategy, and political structure all worked out when they all hated the Reds for entirely different reasons and feared/hated each other just as much.

Part A was pretty likely, but for once, IOTL the revolutionary forces agreed to sort it all out after the Whites were defeated. Part B is almost in ASB territory IMO.

-Is there any change in how the western nations treat the Soviet Union ITTL?

There would be if (A) the Soviets abandoned global revolution rhetoric and (B) agreed to some payoff of the Tsarist debts to British and French financiers. The Brits and French were broke as churchmice after WWI and hoped the Russian gold promised would help bail them out while German "reparations" started rolling in to balance their losses and war bond payments to the US. When they got shut down by the Bolsheviks- it helped
prompt Western intervention to get somebody the West "could do business with".

it's HWG's TL, but as I chimed in on Killer's TL, a less hostile Soviet attitude to capitalism would do a lot to dispel the paranoia and isolation that gripped the USSR under Stalin that made Soviet economic policy such a Potemkin village.

-With the NEP, will Russia still be able to industrialize like it did under Stalin?
No.
IMO, you'd have a gentler development path where heavy industry and light industry competitively develop to fit Russian needs and plug into export markets with a lot more capital, emphasizing quality and far more flexibility than the top-down juggernaut Stalin built.
By 1950, they'll be what Stalin wanted to do in one fell swoop without the Holodomor, without the dislocations, forced labor, with a functional thriving civilian economy!
 
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