A slightly different 1940 scenario

CaliGuy

Banned
Here is a slightly different 1940 scenario in comparison to our TL:

Let's say that, rather than sending his strategic reserve to the Low Countries, French General Maurice Gamelin initially keeps his strategic reserve at Rheims (as per the original plan). However, let's also say that the Nazis realize that the location of the French strategic reserve is a serious danger for them and thus decide to invade Switzerland in order to get Gamelin to move the French strategic reserve over there and away from the Ardennes (for the record, I think that Joseph Goebbels actually proposed something like this in May 1940 in our TL). Gamelin falls for this trap and begins moving his strategic reserve to Switzerland while the main German assault still occurs through the Ardennes.

Anyway, what happens in this TL is that the French and British forces in the Low Countries still get cut off by the Germans as per the Manstein Plan. However, what is different in this TL is that France still has a strategic reserve which has been moving towards the Swiss border (since Gamelin didn't know where exactly the main German attack would be and thus decided to send his strategic reserve to Switzerland to help the Swiss fight the Nazis there).

Basically, my questions here are these:

1. Can the French strategic reserve get back north in time and successfully break the German encirclement of the French and British forces in the Low Countries?

2. How does the Battle of France progress from this point onward?
 
This is based on the canard that the French 7th Army comprised the strategic reserve. This is not true. There were at least sixteen divisions, including the three Division Char Reserve, and some motorized infantry divisions, plus non divisional units, that fell under the label "Reserve Strategic". I've seen others count eighteen or twenty. These were unassigned to any specific Army and under the control of Georges NW Front HQ. There were a assortment of contingent plans for assignment of these divisions, independent battalions and regiments of artillery and tanks, Corps HQ, & support units. Those plans included a German invasion of Switzerland (Seize the passes in the Jura Mountains among other things).

Perhaps the confusion concerning the 7th Army derives from its variable roles. Had the Netherlands not been invaded, it would have reverted to reserve for the Allied left wing in Belgium.

2. How does the Battle of France progress from this point onward?

Different, but no different. The core French problem was the operational command levels, Georges, and the key army group and army commanders decisions were consistently running 24 to 48 hours behind events. This was fatal in view of how fast Kleists three armored corps were attacking and advancing. In your scenario the battles would be at different times and locations, but the overall result similar.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
This is based on the canard that the French 7th Army comprised the strategic reserve. This is not true. There were at least sixteen divisions, including the three Division Char Reserve, and some motorized infantry divisions, plus non divisional units, that fell under the label "Reserve Strategic". I've seen others count eighteen or twenty. These were unassigned to any specific Army and under the control of Georges NW Front HQ. There were a assortment of contingent plans for assignment of these divisions, independent battalions and regiments of artillery and tanks, Corps HQ, & support units. Those plans included a German invasion of Switzerland (Seize the passes in the Jura Mountains among other things).

Perhaps the confusion concerning the 7th Army derives from its variable roles. Had the Netherlands not been invaded, it would have reverted to reserve for the Allied left wing in Belgium.

Thanks for all of this information, Carl! :) Basically, my confusion stems from various books which mention the 7th Army as consisting of either the entire French strategic reserve or the main part of the French strategic reserve:

https://www.google.com/search?q=gam...+reserve&source=lnms&tbm=bks&biw=1920&bih=950

Different, but no different. The core French problem was the operational command levels, Georges, and the key army group and army commanders decisions were consistently running 24 to 48 hours behind events. This was fatal in view of how fast Kleists three armored corps were attacking and advancing. In your scenario the battles would be at different times and locations, but the overall result similar.

So, a quick German victory?

Also, what about if Gamelin doesn't take the German bait in this TL and doesn't send the Seventh Army over to either the Low Countries or Switzerland? (Instead, he keeps it at Rheims.) Would the result still be a quick German victory? Or would having the Seventh Army stationed at Rheims at least allow France to hold out for several additional months?
 
I have paper copies of the French OB & locations of May 1940. Ought to get them scanned and loaded on my machine here.

...
Also, what about if Gamelin doesn't take the German bait in this TL and doesn't send the Seventh Army over to either the Low Countries or Switzerland? (Instead, he keeps it at Rheims.) Would the result still be a quick German victory? Or would having the Seventh Army stationed at Rheims at least allow France to hold out for several additional months?

Really could not say. But here is a important point. The Sickle Cut plan as we know it was not set in stone. Kleists armored group was not locked into the thrust to the coast. There was a alternate plan to attack south to envelop eastern France. Guderian refered to this as the Paris option & stated in his memiors that as late as the 14th or 15th May he sought firm guidance from Kleist on which it was to be, Paris or the Channel.

Minor points...

The French 7th Army was assembled along the Channel coast. This was the most direct route to its expected objective in the 'Breda Variant' of the Dyle plan. It allowed at least one corps to reach the Scheldt area by boat thus avoiding the problems or rail or road transport across Belgium. Several divisions of the 'Reserve Statigic' were near Reims, the three DCR, the 3d Mot ID, 21st Corps HQ among others.

Georges probablly would have been making the decisions about deployment of the 7th Army. He was the operating commander of the North West Front & made the bulk of the major decisions between 10 May and Gamelins dismissal late in the month. As far as I know Gamelin gave two orders during the campaign. The first was to execute the Dyle plan, given the morning of 10 May. The second was for the attack on the corridor, which led to the battles around Arras. That was given very shortly before Gamelin was relieved, 19 May IIRC.
 
This is an interesting idea.

Firstly, where are the German forces for the invasion of Switzerland coming from? As this would effect the course of the campaign. I assume that the original plan for the matadors cloak in the north continues in this scenario although with perhaps fewer divisions.

Secondly as noted above the French strategic reserve was rather scattered. What effect does it have on the Germans plans (if any) when they see large amounts of French forces streaming south/south west.

Thirdly, what do the French do when they realise it's a trap and the Panzers are streaming through northern France? My guess is that the forces heading towards Switzerland about turn and at the very least take up positions along the Somme and dependant on how much time this manouver takes possibly start counter attacking. Certainly in this scenario they haven't been trapped, distroyed, disinertgrated or waiting on a beach for the Royal Navy to save them.

Whatever outcome of the French having more combat capable forces to the south of the pocket based on Dunkirk has on the battle would likely depend not on their fighting ability but on what Hitler preceaves to be their fighting ability. OTL he was concerned about the flank, here he's going to be bat shit crazy about it. I suspect forces that OTL where used to the north would be diverted south to this real or imagined threat. Further these forces would reduce the pressure in the pocket. I think that at the very least the evacuation would be more successful than OTL especially with regards to reduced shipping losses and higher amounts of heavy equipment saved. Further still it gives the tantalising possibility of then BEF and trapped French formations holding the perimeter in expectation of a relief operation from the south!
 
... Firstly, where are the German forces for the invasion of Switzerland coming from? As this would effect the course of the campaign. I assume that the original plan for the matadors cloak in the north continues in this scenario although with perhaps fewer divisions.

OTL the Germans did run a deception op concerning a attack thru Switzerlnad. They dropped some false infer for French spies, and alluded to it in a propaganda radio broadcast around 14 May. Some historians claim this slowed the deployment of a couple infantry divisions from the Stratigic Reserve.

Secondly as noted above the French strategic reserve was rather scattered. What effect does it have on the Germans plans (if any) when they see large amounts of French forces streaming south/south west.

OTL their reactions were all over the place. Guderian and Kleist shouted for speed and a deep thrust, Rundsteadt was skeptical of the entire operation, Halder saw it as the only hope of success but also saw the risks, Hitler acted like Hitler and waffled by the latest report.

Thirdly, what do the French do when they realise it's a trap and the Panzers are streaming through northern France? My guess is that the forces heading towards Switzerland about turn and at the very least take up positions along the Somme and dependant on how much time this manouver takes possibly start counter attacking. Certainly in this scenario they haven't been trapped, distroyed, disinertgrated or waiting on a beach for the Royal Navy to save them.

OTL the reaction was poor, Corap ordered 9th Army to retreat in the face of a armored breakthrough of three tank corps, apparently thinking foot infantry could outrun a large mechanized force. Huntzinger allowed a critical counter attack to be canceled by a corps commander contrary to repeated direct orders, & ordered 2d Army over to the defense. Georges broke down and became increasingly ineffectual in just a few days. A few like Piroux did well, but most of the key decision makers failed in the critical six days from the 10th to 16th May.

Whatever outcome of the French having more combat capable forces to the south of the pocket based on Dunkirk has on the battle would likely depend not on their fighting ability but on what Hitler preceaves to be their fighting ability. OTL he was concerned about the flank, here he's going to be bat shit crazy about it. I suspect forces that OTL where used to the north would be diverted south to this real or imagined threat. Further these forces would reduce the pressure in the pocket. I think that at the very least the evacuation would be more successful than OTL especially with regards to reduced shipping losses and higher amounts of heavy equipment saved. Further still it gives the tantalising possibility of then BEF and trapped French formations holding the perimeter in expectation of a relief operation from the south!

Perhaps. Gamelins dismissal was inevitable as Renaud had been working on that for months & it had little to do with the events of May. A extra week of time might give Weygand something to work with. There was still the problem of badly trained Series B units, and command staff that were not trained for high speed warfare. but, then the German army was operating at their maximum limits in capability, luck, and morale. It might not take much of a tactical reversal to create a even larger 'Halt order' problem.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
It might not take much of a tactical reversal to create a even larger 'Halt order' problem.

Whatever outcome of the French having more combat capable forces to the south of the pocket based on Dunkirk has on the battle would likely depend not on their fighting ability but on what Hitler preceaves to be their fighting ability. OTL he was concerned about the flank, here he's going to be bat shit crazy about it. I suspect forces that OTL where used to the north would be diverted south to this real or imagined threat. Further these forces would reduce the pressure in the pocket. I think that at the very least the evacuation would be more successful than OTL especially with regards to reduced shipping losses and higher amounts of heavy equipment saved. Further still it gives the tantalising possibility of then BEF and trapped French formations holding the perimeter in expectation of a relief operation from the south!

What do you think that the end-game of the Battle of France would have liked like in such a scenario?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Really could not say. But here is a important point. The Sickle Cut plan as we know it was not set in stone. Kleists armored group was not locked into the thrust to the coast. There was a alternate plan to attack south to envelop eastern France. Guderian refered to this as the Paris option & stated in his memiors that as late as the 14th or 15th May he sought firm guidance from Kleist on which it was to be, Paris or the Channel.
Do you know why he decided on the Channel?
 
Not a clue. I don't even know who actually made the decision. Only that Kliest directed his corps commanders to head west to the coast. I'd have look up if that were on the 14th or 15th.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Not a clue. I don't even know who actually made the decision. Only that Kliest directed his corps commanders to head west to the coast. I'd have look up if that were on the 14th or 15th.
OK.

Also, what do you think that the 1940 campaign would have looked like with a much larger Halt Order problem (as in the scenario above)?
 
For some reason I'm unable to load the maps onto the forum today.

OK.

Also, what do you think that the 1940 campaign would have looked like with a much larger Halt Order problem (as in the scenario above)?

Any halt order gives the French & Allied armies in general precious time to react to the German manuver. Kleist & Guderian saw speed as everything. Liss the intelligence officer for Enemy Forces West seems to have agreed with them as the March 1940 war game where he slowed the French reaction by 48 hours was the only stratigicaly sucessfull test of all those made from October 39 through March 40.

Even if it does not change the stratigic outcome delay is liable to cost to Germans more in losses. Each week of campaign means another 10,000 dead, another 150 aircraft permanently lost, another dozen of the important MkIII & MkIV tanks destroyed.
 
The above is what I'd expect, Germans were so much better than the French at reacting that its probably a longer but eventually successful campaign with much higher German losses and more of the BEF/FR escaping due to being forced back rather than pocketed. However then the butterflies hit hard. No credible invasion threat due to losses means the British don't panic and redirect everything into emergency measures , so new British equipment types might be 6 months earlier. Less disruption due to the Luftwaffe rebuilding means more production ( and remember the Brits were outproducing the Germans to start with ).
Then there is a hostile Switzerland which requires a largish garrison ( not somewhere you want to be fighting the natives ) and therefore, including the losses , no great reserve of troops to reinforce the Italians with in Africa/Balkans ( assuming AH still sees the USSR as enemy number 1 ).
With the USSR getting tougher every day ( Germans will know the effects of the great purge are wearing off to a degree ) , its a toss up on what AH does. It will be Barbarossa or Africa/Balkans as I doubt both are possible as in OTL. Either way its probably a shorter war with either more of Europe under the Iron Curtain ( Barbarossa delayed a year ) or Italy folding earlier ( losing in Africa/Balkans )
 
Ok heres one of the maps I was refering to.
 

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Invading Switzerland is something the Germans do not want to do. The Swiss made it clear that, in addition to the "redoubt" in the Alps they were perfectly ready to blow the railway tunnels under the Alps. This was something the Germans did not want to have to deal with. Additionally they were prepared to destroy much of the key industrial plants. For these, and other reasons, the Germans (correctly) felt that the advantages of leaving Switzerland alone were much greater than bringing them in as an enemy. Going through the low countries, as opposed to Switzerland, had the advantage that should France not surrender and some remnant remain unoccupied, all or most of the Channel coast is held by Germany which is a plus.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
For some reason I'm unable to load the maps onto the forum today.



Any halt order gives the French & Allied armies in general precious time to react to the German manuver. Kleist & Guderian saw speed as everything. Liss the intelligence officer for Enemy Forces West seems to have agreed with them as the March 1940 war game where he slowed the French reaction by 48 hours was the only stratigicaly sucessfull test of all those made from October 39 through March 40.

Even if it does not change the stratigic outcome delay is liable to cost to Germans more in losses. Each week of campaign means another 10,000 dead, another 150 aircraft permanently lost, another dozen of the important MkIII & MkIV tanks destroyed.
How long do you think that France would hold out if it avoided falling into the Sickle-Cut trap? Also, if the Nazis still win in France in this TL, how much worse do they perform in their upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union?

Invading Switzerland is something the Germans do not want to do. The Swiss made it clear that, in addition to the "redoubt" in the Alps they were perfectly ready to blow the railway tunnels under the Alps. This was something the Germans did not want to have to deal with. Additionally they were prepared to destroy much of the key industrial plants. For these, and other reasons, the Germans (correctly) felt that the advantages of leaving Switzerland alone were much greater than bringing them in as an enemy. Going through the low countries, as opposed to Switzerland, had the advantage that should France not surrender and some remnant remain unoccupied, all or most of the Channel coast is held by Germany which is a plus.

Good points. That said, though, I was thinking of invading Switzerland purely in terms of distracting France and getting it to send some of its troops there. That way, France will (hopefully--for the Germans) be more vulnerable for the German Sickle-Cut attack.
 
... they were perfectly ready to blow the railway tunnels under the Alps. This was something the Germans did not want to have to deal with. Additionally they were prepared to destroy much of the key industrial plants. ...

The key industrial plants include hydroelectric generation. Germany had little reserve capacity & losing the 10-15% they purchased from the Swiss would not be economically enhancing.
 
How long do you think that France would hold out if it avoided falling into the Sickle-Cut trap?

My gut instinct is Germany is screwed. But there are a lot of details to examine. Two items that jump to mind are Allied vs German ammunition reserves, particularly artillery, second would be pilot & aircraft replacement for the next 90-180 days. Just French imports from the US challenges German production. Add in British production & their full on pilot training program & weighs in. French aircraft production had been reformed, the plants not overrun are going to be adding in on the Brit and US contributions.

Also, if the Nazis still win in France in this TL, how much worse do they perform in their upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union?

Lots of intervening variables & decisions. With multiple forks and twists.
 
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