A Short Analysis of the Zanj State and Internal Factors 871-883.

In 869, the Zanj revolt began as a regional conflict and minor slave revolt led by a mysterious figure named Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj in the region of al-Sawad (far southern Iraq). Beginning with a small group of supporters from Eastern Arabia and another small group from his days in Baghdad and Basra, Ali ibn Muhammad, placed in an old Sassanid/Umayyad fortress (abandoned, presumably Sassanid or at the least, very early Arab [thus Umayyad]) called al-Quryashi, began sending agents forth into the various work sites that held slaves. These agents would promise these slaves loot and other precious items in exchange for rebelling against their masters. Such was the vase, before hundreds of Zanj slaves had joined the revolt. Soon after, a series of conflicts erupt between the local administrative districts and the landlords against the slaves/Zanj under Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj and his clients and supporters. Soon into this conflict of less than 4 months, the Zanj under the surprisingly efficient rule of Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj, the Zanj had utterly defeated the local landlords and emirs in open conflict and forced the local authorities into their fortresses and cities across the southern section of the Sawad.

By late 870, the Zanj had became acutely aware that the new conflict was against the Abbasid authorities, instead of the landlords and that the Abbasid powers in Samarra had begun to pay attention to them. This occurred ultimately with the arrival of the Caliphal regent, Abu Ahmad al-Muwaffaq in 871, who after a large scale campaign including many noted generals of the Abbasid army, such as Julun al-Turki and Muhammad al-Muwallad. However, after Abu Ahmad al-Muwaffaq suffered a severe defeat at the battle of the Abu Khasib against Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj (directly outside the main camp of the Zanj, who were taken by surprise,, it was precisely the fact that the Zanj took an initiative and a series of night attacks and a bold frontal strike, that they won and pushed Abu Ahmad back into the swamp where his army suffered incalculable casualties from mosquito born illness) and the failure of the Abbasid offensive to quickly gain victory and more clearly, the rise of the Saffarid threat, Abu Ahmad al-Muwaffaq retreated from the Sawad to see to the defense of Baghdad against the possible Saffarid foe to the east. As Popovic states, the rebellion entered a completely new state and the rebels became aware sincerely of their prowess and pursued from then on the creation of a counter state in the South of Iraq.

From 872-879, the Zanj experienced more or less continual victories in the larger scale of the war. While the Zanj failed to hold Basra after sacking the city, the Zanj had effective control over the largest cities of the region. Further, the Zanj had made inroads and connections across the region, creating the synthesis of the Zanj state. It seemingly becomes clear that the Zanj held the dominant role in the region in this 7 year period.

Further, in this 7 year period, the Zanj coinage appears and the famed Zanj-Bedouin alliance takes form. Zanj coinage depicted on one side, the name of the leader of the Zanj, Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Zayd ibn Husayn ibn Ali ibn abi Talib (shortened version of his name, claiming to be from amongst the Ahl ul-Bayt or the family of Ali ibn Talib) and the other a quotation, "Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their properties (in exchange) for that they will attain paradise."

(-- A side note, this coin gives us an insight into the internal contradictions within the Zanj state and of Ali ibn Muhammad al-Dibaj himself. On one side, he claims ancestry to Ali ibn abi Talib/Ahl ul Bayt, placing great levels of respect and authority in the area of ancestry and of placing the Ahl ul-Bayt upon a pedestal. Further, Ali ibn Muhammad with his name, places the title of Imam al-Mahdi, thus claiming to be the awaited Imam/Mahdi with whom the world will be saved. More than once, Ali ibn Muhammad claims to directly be a certain Alid (descendant of Ali ibn abi Muhammad) who had earlier died or disappeared; such as the mysterious character of Yahya ibn Umar, a famous Alid rebel who was executed in 866; or when Ali ibn Muhammad claimed to the reincarnated Yahya ibn Abi l'Shumayt, who was the Imam and Mahdi of the Shumaytiyya Ghulat sect in al-Ahsa during the 830s, in fact, the term Ali referred to himself as, al-Dibaj, was the nickname of this Yahya ibn Abi l'Shumayt. Now, despite obvious Shi'i leanings of Ali ibn Muhammad, his quotation from the other side of the Zanj coin, was a direct call to the Khawarij or as he would have termed, al-Shurha. The quote specifically, is a quotation from the Quran (9:111), and despite being a fair quote, was considered the rallying call for the Khawarij of the Azaraq sect who rebelled against al-Hajjaj ibn Yusf in the days of the Umayyad Caliphate. In fact, the Khawarij term Shurha or 'those who sell/whom have sold' derives directly from this quotation.

---In addition to Ali ibn Muhammad, his commanders exhibited clear division on this topic. For instance, Ali ibn Muhammad claims to be the Imam al-Mahdi and thus the successor to Ali ibn abi talib, Husayn ibn Ali ibn abi Tlaib and so forth, yet, in Basra, after the capture of the city by Zanj forces, one of the most principle of Ali's supporters, al-Muhallabi, is recorded first leading the prayers int he conquered city by omitting the names of Uthman ibn Affan and Ali ibn abi Talib, whilst mentioning Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Khattab. This being a clear reference to the Khawarij/Shurha concept that the frist two Caliphs had been just and correct, whereas the succeeding two, Utham ibn Affan and Ali ibn abi Talib are deviant and apostates. Al-Muhallabi continues with his supporters in insisting to not reference these two caliphs at prayer and then begins to even curse the two caliphs. Leading to sectional conflict within the city against the Zanj, that sees al-Muhallabi and the Zanj garrison fleeing the city and allowing the Abbasid to resume control over the smoldering pile of rubble of Basra. Regardless, to imagine the aspect of one of the most trusted and devout of Ali ibn Muhammad's supporters as being completely opposed to the idea that Ali ibn abi Talib was even Muslim and yet he served a master who claimed to be the direct successor of Ali ibn abi Talib, it is extraordinary to say the least.---)

Regardless, the construction of al-Mukhtara also occurred in this period and would serve as the capital of the Zanj state from that time forward. The city itself, was likely a conglomeration of its supporters, displaced peoples and those who reluctantly sided with the Zanj out of economic necessity, especially in the case of local merchants and Hajj travelers. Al-Mukhtara itself was certainly a fantastic city, especially for a force of rebels. In Tarikh al-Tabari, it is cited that the city is defended by more than 300,000 warriors. Whilst this number is probably incorrect, it may be the case that this city exceeded any city in the area outside Baghdad and Samarra. It should also be noted that Abu Ahmad al-Muwaffaq when arriving at al-Mukhtara in 881, pondered the city and claimed that such a city and defenses was something he had never observed in a rebellion. Indeed, the city would put forth one of the most protracted and bloody sieges of the IX century, lasting nearly over 2 years of constant battle over the city between the Zanj and the Abbasid.

With the mention of al-Mukhatara, we see the situation of the Zanj command chain. The Zanj command chain, while not ever defined, we can gain insights on its workings from the accounts. Zanj forces and government was centered almost entirely around al-Mukhtara and specifically, Ali ibn Muhammad. All orders were issued from him to his generals and most decisions of his generals were sent to Ali ibn Muhammad for review and decision by him and his advisors. Despite this, his generals had relative autonomy and they were the vocals for much of the Zanj state. Generals of the greatest status were Ali ibn Aban al-Muhallabi, Sulayman ibn Jami, Sulayman ibn Musa al-Sha'rani, Anqalay ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al-Zayd ( first son of the Zanj leader and was in command of the defense of the capital city [al-Tabari notes that Ali ibn Muhammad by the end of the revolt, had sired over 100 children amongst his many wives by 883]). It should be noted, that none of the listed generals were Zanj or former slaves. All of them were close supporters of Ali ibn Muhammad, who had surrounded himself from the onset of the rebellion with extremely loyal clients and allies, who had toiled with him in the desert and or whom he wallowed in prison with.

These generals often seem to have created their own smaller cities in their territories that they operated in. Ali ibn Aban al-Muhallabi held one of the largest such permanent city in Ahwaz near the canals connecting the Karun and Tigris rivers. Sulayman ibn Jami held another such city, as his base, which was outside Tahitha, called al-Mansura. Sulayman al-Sha'rani held another on the Suq al-Khamis, called al-Manii'a. These generals operated over a series of innumerable commanders, who were appointed by heir generals and led companies of soldiers on raids and other forays. These generals, thus held the second link in command, whilst Ali ibn Muhammad remained in al-Mukhtara, seeing to the various issues of the states and issuing major orders, the individual generals dealt with the local populace and with the logistical war against the Abbasid, especially the acquisition of resources.

Not much information comes to us on the state of judicial proceedings in the Zanj state. The most we know, is that the Zanj possessed a many jurists in their employment, who seemed to be distributed to the areas under Zanj control or Zanj jurists were sent to Abbasid controlled regions, to cause dissention. Most of these jurists would surrender at the end of the siege of al-Mukhtara in 883 under the policy of safe conduct issued by Abu Ahmad al-Muwaffaq. Advisors to Ali ibn Muhammad are certainly robust, from the accounts. Ali ibn Muhammad himself is recorded as always measuring his opinions with that of his various advisors who included supporters from amongst his entourage before the revolt, but interestingly, made up of scholars of the region who would claim after the revolt, to have been forced into such roles. This is perhaps doubtful, the scholars in question likely joined in order to gain a living from the pensions of the Zanj, and only claimed to have been forced, once the Abbasid won, so as to not receive ostracism.

Merchants and trade continued under the Zanj rule, however only for those whom the Zanj had peace deals with. Thus, raiding continued on those whom the Zanj were not aligned with. Darmawayh al-Zanji, a famed commander of the Zanj who operated in the deepest sections of the Batihah (swamplands of Iraq), exhibit this mentality of raiding unless the merchants can produce that they have allegiance with that of the Zanj. Regardless, the cities of al-Mukhtara clearly had many markets and in the account of the siege, the Abbasid forces burn and destroy over 8 different markets in the city. Thus, it can be easily argued that the rebellion was not a revolt of class warfare and or against proto capitalism as argued by many orientalists of the XIX century and Marxist thinkers, as the destruction of the landlords and the class of the exact same class with different masters, seems to be the result. Further, the ideal of slave revolt in the Haitian sense of ending the practice, was wholly incorrect. Slaves were given to newly freed slaves and Zanj; especially those women captured from amongst the areas under Abbasid control who did not submit to the Zanj. As well, Abbasid accounts recall the freeing of slaves at each turn in the siege of al-Mukhtara, as well as the amount of slaves present in markets in the Zanj city in 882.

Villages often are cited as supporting the Zanj as well. Various villages offer support to the Zanj, certainly as scouting the area and by direct conflict against the Abbasid authorities. thus, it can be argued that the villagers were more or less neutral, because it is also cited cases wherein the villagers assist the Abbasid. The allegiance seemed to flow toward the one who could do the most harm to the village at that moment in terms of looting. Bedouin in the area and to the south, seemed to be staunch or at least, opportunistic supporters of the Zanj. Seeing an opportunity for loot, especially slaves, the Arab tribes in the Sawad aligned with the Zanj. Beginning in 873, these Arab tribes and Bedouin seem to me one of the most lucrative if not most, supporters of the Zanj state. Tabari notes that much of the blockade running occurring between 881-883 to the Zanj capital was done by Bedouin and Arab merchants, as opposed to actual Zanj soldiery. Also, Arab support for the Zanj was high even in Makkah, where Bedouin loyal to the Zanj took virtual control over Makkah in 873-878 and made prayers in favor of the Zanj at the site of the Kaaba.

After writing, this, I am deciding to cut it short and perhaps ask any questions someone might have. I also am willing to answer questions regarding the war and the course of it, including the final siege of al-Mukhtara (881-883). Thanks in advance.
 
Excellent analysis.

Thank you, the area is not well developed. The ideas of many writers of the past was tainted by some sort of ideology, which I would identify as something related to Marxism or at least the ideas of dialectical materialism. These writers would for reasons, I am not fully aware of, would depict the Zanj state as one where currency or cash was abolished and or the equity of the state was that of proto socialism. These such claims are odd and are refuted entirely and is clear cut.

Regardless of the scant information, I do believe some rough framework can be made in regards to the Zanj state.
 
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