You can only analyse the data you have. Be strategic about what to gather and how to store it.
(Marie Curie)
Assessing the data acquired on Mars was a gargantuan task. RRA had engaged all major German universities to process samples. DELAG had been asked to scrutinise the “Wolpertinger” crash. Johannes Kreutzer was the team leader. He had been involved in design and construction of the landing craft for the Hammer in managerial capacity. Now, he was the master of fifteen subgroups that were looking into the different aspects of the accident.
Obviously, “Lohengrin” and “Melusine” had not suffered any problems; they had worked as they should. The two pilots were not reporting difficulties in steering them. But Karl Gmeinwieser had lost control of “Wolpertinger”. Why? That was the overarching question.
The crash itself was unspectacular: fast moving lander had met planet. Braking down hadn’t worked. But Max Steinle had begun crying even before the braking manoeuvre had been due. His utterances had been transcribed and analysed. Evidently, the hitch had been obvious to him. He hadn’t said Karl was disabled, but that he had lost control of the boat.
Failure of the control stand, was it possible? Not normally… One element might fail, but redundancy was integral. If the cyclic stick failed, you could override it. It was awkward, but it worked. If braking failed, you still could fire the braking rockets manually. It might affect accuracy, but it should take away the velocity – and allow you to ride down to the surface.
Sabotage? The notion imposed itself. The photographs taken by the “Melusine” crew weren’t helpful though. – Kreutzer had been present when “Wolpertinger” had been put through the final tests at Friedrichshafen. Everything had been in order. What had happened must have happened later – after the practice rounds in orbit, which had also revealed no hitches. Had there been a saboteur on board the Hammer?
(Marie Curie)
Assessing the data acquired on Mars was a gargantuan task. RRA had engaged all major German universities to process samples. DELAG had been asked to scrutinise the “Wolpertinger” crash. Johannes Kreutzer was the team leader. He had been involved in design and construction of the landing craft for the Hammer in managerial capacity. Now, he was the master of fifteen subgroups that were looking into the different aspects of the accident.
Obviously, “Lohengrin” and “Melusine” had not suffered any problems; they had worked as they should. The two pilots were not reporting difficulties in steering them. But Karl Gmeinwieser had lost control of “Wolpertinger”. Why? That was the overarching question.
The crash itself was unspectacular: fast moving lander had met planet. Braking down hadn’t worked. But Max Steinle had begun crying even before the braking manoeuvre had been due. His utterances had been transcribed and analysed. Evidently, the hitch had been obvious to him. He hadn’t said Karl was disabled, but that he had lost control of the boat.
Failure of the control stand, was it possible? Not normally… One element might fail, but redundancy was integral. If the cyclic stick failed, you could override it. It was awkward, but it worked. If braking failed, you still could fire the braking rockets manually. It might affect accuracy, but it should take away the velocity – and allow you to ride down to the surface.
Sabotage? The notion imposed itself. The photographs taken by the “Melusine” crew weren’t helpful though. – Kreutzer had been present when “Wolpertinger” had been put through the final tests at Friedrichshafen. Everything had been in order. What had happened must have happened later – after the practice rounds in orbit, which had also revealed no hitches. Had there been a saboteur on board the Hammer?