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A few introductory words:

It may be that I am going to write a scenario that has been done to death. Probably. I’m not very familiar with the alternate history forum and community.

My POD is the Battle of Tannenberg, which in TTL ends up being a Russian victory. It has to be kept in mind that Ludendorff’s maneuver was extremely daring, and rested in no small part on a gamble about the sheer incompetence of the Russian commanders (it seems now that the catastrophe of Tannenberg was no so much Rennenkampf’s fault as Zhilinsky’s, who proved to be a really bad commander of the Northwestern front). But it could have turned out differently, had the Russians been a little more better at coordinating.

I’m not so much interested in POD’s and butterflies and whatnot, as in the outcome, that is an Europe without the WW1 as we know it. I’m also more interested about diplomacy than warfare. So I’m going to use an extremely unoriginal method: I will simply replace Zhilinsky with a better, far-sighted commander, let say Yudenich, himself being put there by a Polivanov who has not been disgraced in 1912.

The influence of the POD could also be discussed: it could be argued that the Germans would have been able to defeat the Russians later on anyway, that Samsonov and/or Rennenkampf would have blundered at some point, or that the belligerents would not have agreed to peace so quickly, etc., etc.

It may be so, but I believe that what I’m going to propose is at least plausible, and the point is that it offers the opportunity to explore an alternate Europe where:
  • There has been no “world” war, no total conflict, no industrial slaughter for four years, only a relatively short European war, ended through negotiation.
  • The US of A have not been embroiled on the old continent.
  • Wilsonian principles have not triumphed: Europe remains quite conservative and monarchic.
  • Leninism, fascism, etc. will develop differently, if at all. Traditional political structures are still largely in place.
  • There is no special emphasis put on “war guilt”: Austria is considered as the main culprit, but the stigma is nothing like the one experienced by Germany OTL.
  • Germany’s power has been curtailed, but not destroyed.
  • Russia is perceived as the main victor – thus, russophobia gains traction in Western Europe, even among erstwhile allies (= Brits). Intellectual and political elites in Russia and Germany tend to think more and more in terms of struggle between pan-germanism and pan-slavism.

It may become an Imperial Russia wank, but I will try to keep it balanced and realistic. English is not my mother tongue, so I apologize in advance for that.


August 1914


Flashback: in the early 1910s, General Alexey Andreyevich Polivanov is considered as one of the most promising officers of the staff. As assistant to the Minister of War, he has shown himself to be an eager reformer, determined to modernize Russia’s military forces in order that a catastrophe like the defeat of 1905 never happen again. Naturally, such a dedicated man draws the attention of the civil reformers, that is, liberal politicians who, like Miliukov or Gutchkov, want to see the Russian State thoroughly reformed. In 1912, Polivanov is approached by such men, who want to ally with like-minded officers in order to bring about change in Russia. Polivanov is tempted to mingle with these people, particularly Gutchkov who, as liberals goes, seems thoroughly level-headed and dedicated to all things military. But (unlike OTL), Alexey Andreyevich finally decides to stay away from the politicking of the Duma, as he recognizes that it would hurt his career and prevent him from carrying the reforms that the Army so desperately needs.


August 1914: When the war begins, the reforms promoted by Polivanov and like-minded officers have slowly and gradually improved the training, structure, supply and communication systems of the Russian armed forces (which is thus in a slightly better shape than OTL).

Nevertheless, there is still much to be done, and Polivanov is painfully aware that Russia is not yet ready for the war that has just started. He has done much to further the career of dynamic officers, but the structure of command is still full of incompetent courtiers in the mold of his own boss, Minister of War Sukhomlinov. The supreme commander himself, Grand-duke Nikolaï Nikolaïevitch, is nothing more than an amicable nonentity.

Nevertheless, when he learns that the command of the Northwestern front (the one facing the all-powerful might of Germany!) has been entrusted to such a feckless courtier, Polivanov goes out of his way: bypassing Sukhomlinov, he is able to use all of his influence as assistant minister to sway Grand-duke Nikolaï Nikolaïevitch, and convince him to appoint general Yudenich instead of Iakov Zhilinski. Yudenich, who has been sent to the Caucasus, is recalled in a hurry.

A few days later, the East Prussia campaign starts. Polivanov reminds Yudenich that communication is of paramount importance, and convinces him to move his headquarters as close as possible to the front-lines.

***

Following their defeat at Gumbinnen in the early days of the war, and desperate to prevent the fall of such a symbolic city as Konigsberg, the German commanders went for an extremely risky gambit: they decided to try to encircle Samsonov’s Second Army, in the hope of destroying it before Rennenkampf’s First Army could realize what’s happening.

At the same time, on the Russian side, Samsonov’s request to push further west was denied by Yudenich, who ordered that Samsonov wait for Rennenkampf before pursuing the advance westwards. This communication was the first between Samsonov and Yudenich to be encrypted under the new ciphers, whose codebooks had been rushed by Polivanov and Yudenich to the field commanders once it had become clear that the Germans had broken the old ones.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided to press on with their gamble, and attacked Samsonov with all their might. What happened next is known by every schoolboy across Russia.

The battle of Allenstein took place from 26 August to 1 September 1914, in the woods of Eastern Prussia. It would prove a decisive Russian victory: the German forces, who had successfully flanked and encircled the Second Army, would find themselves attacked in the rear by the full might of Rennenkampf’s army: the battle would end up a complete and utter disaster for the German forces. Only a small portion of German troops managed to retreat westwards under Mackensen and François. The decision of Hindenburg and Ludendorff would go down in History as a fatal mix of desperation and Germanic arrogance. They had expected Russians to be too slow to react, and it could have been true a few years earlier, or in other circumstances, but in this case, the energy of Yudenich, the attention of Polivanov to good communication, and the sheer numbers of the Russian army, had won the day.

Interestingly enough, this fateful victory took place a few thirty kilometers away from Tannenberg, the site of another famous battle who had seen Slavic forces halting the tide of Germanic expansion.

***

(to be continued)
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