A Roman Empire without Britannia?

Not all of them. The clients along the Rhine and Danube (and later Dacian) frontier are a prime example of this.

Partly because beyond the frontier was always ANOTHER frontier, so you wouldn't gain that much by annexing your clients there, as soon after you would need to subdue your new neightbours and turn THEM into clients, so better to keep the original ones
 
As everyone has said, use the overwhelming military force to punch into and through Germania Magna. Start the very long Romanization process there. In the long term, have a much shorter 'vertical' border than a 'horizontal' border. You also have a safe Danube to transport goods relatively quickly.

Punching into Germania isn't that easy. The Roman legions had a really hard time fighting in the forests (google Battle of Teutoburg Forest, 9 C.E.). And as people already said, it's poor and not that populated and generally not worth it for 1st century Rome.
 
The Roman legions had a really hard time fighting in the forests (google Battle of Teutoburg Forest, 9 C.E.).
This is an awful example. The Romans lost the ambush more because of the mud and bad generalship than the forest. When Germanicus was caught in the forest in a similar situation he completely turned the tables and crushed routed the Germans. As long as the ground was solid and their commander wasn't absolute shit, Roman legionaries were able to fight themselves out of just about any ambush
 
IMHO its not about fighting so much as control, as I said. Where there are tribes behind tribes, then you cannot ever reach a "natural frontier" but always have to consider that the next area you conquer borders a couple more tribes who will likely be more difficult than the one in front of them you are conquering. IMHO what Rome did best was to chase such frontiers down to the oceans (eg Iberia) but where it had never-ending frontiers, Germania or Dacia or the Middle East, it never found a permanent solution
 
Though they kind of were of the Republic, where you could have different commanders winning great victories at different ends of the "empire" at the same time. Of course, that didn't end well - civil war and all that

During the republic, the romans did not waste a second on defense. They simply put almost all of their offensive capacity into one province / front, e.g Hispania in the 1st century BC. Well, I am overexagerating a bit. But these republican romans were that thoughtless. And surprisingly it worked more than often. A lot of luck involved.

During the principate, the romans had a princeps, who had the responsibility to secure ALL the empires borders reliably. Something no roman proconsul of the republic ever had to do or was even willing to take into consideration!

As a result of this increased reponsibilty of the emperors, they had much less units rest for offensive campaigns. Every roman emperor knew, that he can't do a multi-front war. That is why Augustus cut a deal (peace) with the parthians.

The republican commanders just 100 years ago or less knew the same facts. They simply did not care! Because they acted recklessly and only focussed on increasing their own and their families honor. Regardless, if this was beneficial for the republic or not (e.g. Caesar, Pompeius, Crassus, ... and almost all others). This detriemental and subversive nonsense ended with Augustus!

So no! Looking to the big picture most republican commanders were just a piece of selfish shit.

PS: Even if Hollywood and HBO prefers republican commanders over imperial commanders ;)
 
Last edited:
Wasn't a big reason for the high miltary buildup in Roman Britain, less about the occupation and more just as a way to stash armies. The armies can be picked up the navy if needed along the Rhine, and can't cross without naval support if they rebel.
 
I am curious why do say this? As I know Roman forces were fighting in the 450s against the Saxon invaders, and later Nennius in the circa 700-800s would lament the Roman Golden Age. Which is hard to reconcile with Celts not being Romanised. You don't pine for what was not your identity; I never will pine for the Norman Golden Age of 1066-1362.

As far as we can tell, the Britons kept speaking Celtic as their first language, in stark contrast to places like Gaul and Spain, which still speak Romance languages even today. So, that would suggest that the Romanisation process was much less thorough in Britain than it was in the rest of the western Empire.

This is an awful example. The Romans lost the ambush more because of the mud and bad generalship than the forest. When Germanicus was caught in the forest in a similar situation he completely turned the tables and crushed routed the Germans. As long as the ground was solid and their commander wasn't absolute shit, Roman legionaries were able to fight themselves out of just about any ambush

That's quite a contestable reading of the balance of military power:

People have been scapegoating Varus for what was a highly embarrassing defeat ever since the battle itself, so Venning is hardly alone here. But the idea that it was all Varus' fault is actually only found in one of the sources: that of Vellius Paterculus. And Paterculus had a family beef with Varus' family, the Quinctilii, and so we have to tread his blame of Varus with a degree of healthy scepticism. The other sources paint Varus as a noble and courageous heroic figure and put the defeat primarily down to the cunning and military skill of his very wily and able opponent, the Cheruscian war-leader Arminius. Venning seems very sure that "a better general" would not have "allowed himself" to be outfoxed by Arminius, but during Germanicus' later campaign his subordinate general Aulus Cæcina did just that. Cæcina was no amateur, in fact as the commander of the lower Rhine legions and a veteran of forty campaigns, he was about as good a general as the Romans had. Yet, just like Varus, he was led into a trap by Arminius and was on the verge of having the dubious distinction of being the second Roman general in five year to have three legions wiped out under his command when he was saved more by the ill-discipline of Arminius' warriors than any skill of his. Like many Romanophiles, Venning seems to under-estimate Arminius' skill as a general, because that was what defeated Varus...

To begin with, the whole idea that Germanicus was "reined in" by the jealousy of his wicked uncle Tiberius is a great story, but it is one with only one source: Tactius. And in Tacitus' neat moral narrative Germanicus is the golden-haired wunderkind and the lost hope for what might have been, while Tiberius is the envious villain. So while Tacitus paints Germanicus' campaign as a wholesale success with strings of glorious victories cut short by bad old Tiberius, there is evidence even in his account that things were not quite so rosy. Leaving aside the fact that, as noted above, Cæcina narrowly escaped Varian Disaster Mark II, victories that Tacitus depicts as comprehensive do not seem to have been quite as clear cut as his story makes out. Germanicus supposedly inflicts a crippling defeat on Arminius in the Battle of Idistoviso, yet only days later Arminius' supposedly comprehensively beaten army fights another battle at the Angrivarian Walls, which even Tacitus has to admit was something of a draw. So as neat as Tacitus' story might be, there is good reason to believe that Germanicus withdrew because outright victory simply eluded him.

During the republic, the romans did not waste a second on defense. They simply put almost all of their offensive capacity into one province / front, e.g Hispania in the 1st century BC. Well, I am overexagerating a bit. But these republican romans were that thoughtless. And surprisingly it worked more than often. A lot of luck involved.

During the principate, the romans had a princeps, who had the responsibility to secure ALL the empires borders reliably. Something no roman proconsul of the republic ever had to do or was even willing to take into consideration!

As a result of this increased reponsibilty of the emperors, they had much less units rest for offensive campaigns. Every roman emperor knew, that he can't do a multi-front war. That is why Augustus cut a deal (peace) with the parthians.

The republican commanders just 100 years ago or less knew the same facts. They simply did not care! Because they acted recklessly and only focussed on increasing their own and their families honor. Regardless, if this was beneficial for the republic or not (e.g. Caesar, Pompeius, Crassus, ... and almost all others). This detriemental and subversive nonsense ended with Augustus!

So no! Looking to the big picture most republican commanders were just a piece of selfish shit.

PS: Even if Hollywood and HBO prefers republican commanders over imperial commanders ;)

I suspect that war exhaustion might have played a larger role. During the late Republic, Rome was able to raise a seemingly endless supply of legions to fight big wars in various parts of the world; by the time Augustus came along, there were anti-conscription riots after the Emperor tried to raise new legions to replace the ones lost by Varus, and he had to enrol freed slaves and gladiators to make up numbers.[/QUOTE]
 
I don't disagree with that analysis. However, there's something to be said that Germanicus and Caecina managed to escape the trap and Varrus didn't. I'm not saying only Varrus would get into the trap, Roman history probes even their best commanders get duped, but that had they had firm ground to fight on and a more capable commander, they should have been able to extricate themselves (also there's no guarantee Tiberius or Drusus, if both of them were alive at the time of the Illyria revolt, would not believe segestes). Ariminius probably knew this and the choice of muddy terrain right after a rainstorm was probably deliberate.
 
Don't be silly. The 'World Ocean' provides a very nice 'natural frontier'.

Oh. You mean practically. Or with available technology. or available political structures. OK. :p :)

Incidentally, I recall reading an article back in my undergrad days suggesting that Augustan propaganda was actually serious when it talked about world conquest... Apparently the Romans dramatically underestimated the size of Africa and Asia, so you never know, maybe Augustus did want his frontiers to extend to the Ocean...
 
Top