A Rising Sun on Tropical Seas (a story from a Battle at Dawn)

And as with the Philippines, ABDA's main goal is now buying time for some resemblance to a coordinated defensive plan. As long as the ABDA manages to atleast blunt the Japanese offensives (and the Americans to tie up IJA divisions at Bataan) they should manage to get something out of it.
 

Driftless

Donor
Why was Percival such as disaster in Malaya, if I may ask?

I assume he did something very wrong with the whole defensive operation.

Others can explain in greater detail than I, but here's my take: Percival was a very capable staff officer and he was the guy who did the military analysis of the defenses of Malaya and it's numerous deficiencies. He apparently was promoted to the top leader role in part because of his staff work and that the top "fighting" generals were needed elsewhere. The defensive deficiencies he identified were not fixed by the time of the invasion, in large part because those resources were committed to the defense of Britain and the Med based on the disasters of 1940. That and Percival lacked the forceful personality to convince both local authority to better prepare - trenches, pill boxes, etc; and to wrangle his own top unit commanders. Percival would have been a great #2 or #3 guy in the chain of command - just not the top dog. Overly simplified, but that's some of the nuggets.

There have been several threads where our usual suspects (myself included) have put forth our better altenatives: everyone from Monty, Alexander, Wilson, etc. Other ideas were to replace the Governor-General with a military man with some diplomatic chops, and then fill the theater command with a fighter.
 
Percival would have been a great #2 or #3 guy in the chain of command - just not the top dog.
So not incompetent, but completely out of his league when it came to battle?

A reasonable explanation, considering the mess that was the entire Pacific War from Dec '41 to Jun '42.
 
So not incompetent, but completely out of his league when it came to battle?

A reasonable explanation, considering the mess that was the entire Pacific War from Dec '41 to Jun '42.

As noted above Percival did not have a sufficiently forceful personality or the willingness to make waves that was required. His plans for increased defensive positions in the north, where the Japanese actually attacked, were opposed by local businesses who objected to troops on their plantations and he did not slap them down (and probably would not have had the backing of the government had he done so). He subordinates (mainly Heath and Bennett) were problematic and difficult and he did not sack them when he had the chance. Wavell interfered and did not have confidence in Percival and Churchill ignored repeated requests for reinforcements and equipment preferring to concentrate on the Middle East. Percival was not the man for the job he found himself in. Given his prescient prewar analysis of the situation he would have been the perfect number 2 for much more forceful commanding general who would not put up with the nonsense from his subordinates and from the locals.
 
The firming of the allied defensive line will still take time. Probably still Jul or Aug of '42. It looks now like it will be north of otl Solomon's and Guadalcanal.

So the real benefit may be to the European theatre. If the defensive line is to the North and Aus is not as threatened to be cut off, US army divisions that otl were placed in the Pacific are free to deploy in the EUR theatre. These were infantry divisions, May be best suited for northern Italy.

Also good chance that Burma road to China will remain open.

I also thought that Wake wad defended, made it through and that Guam was lost.

Good timelines, will see where they end up! Would be awesome to see if the more action early leads to Japanese surrender by Aug 1, '45 , without dropping of atomic bombs.
 
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Driftless

Donor
So pretty much a British version of Friedrich Paulus, right? Solid staff officer that turned out to be very unsuitable for independent command?

I believe that's the case. The remark was made some time back on one of the Malaya threads that Percival was the poster child for the "Peter Principle"; a fellow promoted one notch above his level of competence.
 
View attachment 312923 map courtesy of the US Military Academy
http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/WWII Asian Pacific Theater.aspx

a link to a really awesome detailed map way to big to fit in this forum

http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images2/seasia1901map.jpg

note that the Japanese invasion of Davao has not yet occurred

Awesome resource sharing here, GB. Thanks a lot. This will prove useful for my Korean War spin on a Final Countdown style story.

My only note on the map is with regards to the Lingayen Bay invasion. I believe the 48th Division came in 3 separate convoys: from Mako (Pescadores), from Takao (southern Formosa), and from Kirun (port near Taipei, northern Formosa). Of course a map only has so much space, so no big deal.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
Helfrich was one of the senior Dutch navy commanders in the DEI. OTL he earned the name "Ship a Day Helfrich" for his effective role running the submarine war. In my TL he is serving under Somerville as Commander Submarines Eastern Fleet and Chief of Staff (ashore) to Commander Eastern Fleet.
I'd argue that the Duth submarine service performed so well despite Helfrich, not because of him. This navalist had spend most of The interbellum doing his upmost best to crush The submarine branch in favour of a navalist, cruiser-based approach.
 
Helfrich was one of the senior Dutch navy commanders in the DEI. OTL he earned the name "Ship a Day Helfrich" for his effective role running the submarine war. In my TL he is serving under Somerville as Commander Submarines Eastern Fleet and Chief of Staff (ashore) to Commander Eastern Fleet.

My opinion never liked Helfrich and still don't like him hope he dies in both timeline...
 
As noted above Percival did not have a sufficiently forceful personality or the willingness to make waves that was required. His plans for increased defensive positions in the north, where the Japanese actually attacked, were opposed by local businesses who objected to troops on their plantations and he did not slap them down (and probably would not have had the backing of the government had he done so). He subordinates (mainly Heath and Bennett) were problematic and difficult and he did not sack them when he had the chance. Wavell interfered and did not have confidence in Percival and Churchill ignored repeated requests for reinforcements and equipment preferring to concentrate on the Middle East. Percival was not the man for the job he found himself in. Given his prescient prewar analysis of the situation he would have been the perfect number 2 for much more forceful commanding general who would not put up with the nonsense from his subordinates and from the locals.

Or flip it on its head, keep him #1 but give him a fire breather who can go out and kick the tires as his #2.
 
Allied Forces Pacific and Indian Ocean areas January 1942
Allied Naval Forces available Pacific and Indian Ocean regions January 15, 1942

US Forces Pacific Ocean Area (Nimitz)
Pacific Fleet
Patrol and Escort Force
Mission: clearing Hawaiian Island area of enemy submarines, escorting damaged ships to West Coast, convoy escort, and surface patrols around Hawaii, Midway Island, Johnson Island, and the Line Islands (where a series of airfields are under construction for air route to Australia)

DD (1st line) Craven, Gridley, McCall, Dunlap, Benham, Fanning, Ellet, Drayton, Flusser, Mahan, Cummings, Case, Tucker, MacDonough, Phelps, Patterson, Ralph Talbot, Conyngham, Reid, Tucker, Case, Blue, Helm, Worden, Dewey, Smith, Preston, Shaw,
DD (2nd line)(includes minesweeper and minelayer conversions) Chew, Allen, Henley, Ward, Breese, Wasmuth, Perry, Zane, Trever, Sicard, Chandler, Hovey, Boggs, Lamberton, Ramsey, Montgomery, Pruitt, Tracy

Fleet Train
Oilers are supporting convoys and Task Force 16, the repair ships are assisting repair and salvage at Pearl Harbor, while the other ships are supporting the base
Fleet oilers: Kanawah, Cuyama, Brazos, Neches, Pecos, Trinity, Sepulga, Tippecanoe, Platte, Sabine, Kaskasia, Destroyer tender Whitney, Dixie, Repair ship Argonne, Medusa, Sumner Hospital ship Solace, Stores ship Castor, Rigel, Antares, Seaplane Tender Wright, Tangiers, Curtis, Avocet, Swan, Casco, Macfarland, Munition Ships Pyro, Lassen,

Task Force 16 (Spruance) (ready for operations as of January 15, 1942)
CV Yorktown (36 Wildcat, 36 Dauntless), CV Enterprise (36 Wildcat, 36 Dauntless), CA Northhampton, Portland, Salt Lake City, Minneapolis, CL Helena, Phoenix, DD Jarvis, Mugford, Bagley, Cummings, Farragut, Monaghan, Blach, Maury,

Southwest Pacific (en route San Francisco from Darwin via Pearl Harbor where they switch escorts)
CA Chicago, Indianapolis, Pensacola, CL Marblehead (attached CA Australia, Canberra, DD Stuart, Voyager from Australian Navy, CL Leander, Achilles from New Zealand Navy) seaplane tender Langley, oiler Pecos, Trinity, gunboasts Asheville, Tulsa, Niagara, ocean tug Napa, transports Republic, Chaumont, William Holbrook, Meigs, Halstead, Coast Farmer, Bloemfontain, AT Scott, President Coolidge (embarked is all Navy and Marine Corps personnel from former American Volunteer Group, the 4th Marine Regiment, both bound for California, plus 4,000 American and Filipino dependents, 3,000 USN and Filipino naval base military and civilian personnel who will get off at Pearl Harbor)

ABDA Command (based out of Darwin) (Glassford)
CL Boise, DD John Ford, Paul Jones, Edwards, Alden, Whipple, Pope, Pillsbury, Peary, Edsall, destroyer tender Black Hawk, Seaplane tenders Childs, Preston plus 4 minesweepers, submarine tender Holland, Otus, 22 fleet submarines, 6 S Boats (plus Canopus at Bataan, along seaplane tender Huron, rescue ship Pigeon 3 gunboats, 1 armed yacht, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3 w 6 PT boats) plus PATWING 10 (26 PBY remaining)

The US Navy sent a battle squadron, a cruiser squadron, and a destroyer squadron to the Pacific along with its only escort carrier in late December 1941.

Task Force 1 (Seattle) BB Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, CVE Long Island, plus DESDIV 16 w DD McDougal, Winslow, Moffet, Sampson (forms with Maryland, West Virginia and the Colorado once refitted) (Guard Force for the US West Coast specifically guarding the northern approach from the Arctic Circle route)... Task Force 1 is commanded by Admiral Anderson, Commander Battle Force Pacific Fleet

Task Force 19 (Escort Force West Coast to Hawaii and West Coast to South Pacific)
CL Richmond, Concord, Trenton, Raleigh plus DESDIV 22 w DD Roe, Higgins, Meredith, Grayson, Monssen joins with CV Saratoga, (36 Wildcat, 36 Dauntless) cargo ship Regulas, Sirius, Vega, Procyon, transport Burrows, Crescent City, provision ships Aldebaran, Bridge, Arctic, Boreas, aircraft transport Kitty Hawk, Hammondsport,

Australian Forces ABDA Command (Darwin)
CL Perth, Hobart, DD Vampire, Vendetta,

Royal Navy ABDA Command (includes Force Z) at Batavia
BC Renown, Repulse, CA Dorsetshire, Devonshire, CL Trinidad, Caledon, Mauritius, Glasgow DD Isis, Stronghold, Thanet, Scout, Tenedos, Electra, Encounter, Express, Tenados, Thanet

Eastern Fleet Escort Force (escorting convoys and patrolling for German raiders)
BB Revenge, Royal Sovereign CA Exeter, CL Ceres, Capetown, Colombo, Danae, Dauntless, Durban, Emerald, Enterprise, Hawkins, CVL Hermes,DD Foxhound,


en route
BB Warspite, Ramilies CV Formidable, Indomitable, CA Frobisher CL Gambia DD Foxhound, Grenville, Griffin, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, Norman (last 4 to RAN),

Dutch Fleet (at Batavia)
CL Java, De Ruyter, Tromp, DD Witte de With, Kortenaer, Piet Hien, Banckert, Evertson, Van Nes, plus 15 submarines
Dutch Naval Air Service – 52 flying boats and patrol bombers,

US Army Forces Australia (General Brett)
72nd Field Artillery regiment, 124th Field Artillery regiments (both towed 105 mm guns, 72 guns total), 159th Infantry Regiment (California National Guard), 28th Engineer Regiment (aviation) (reinforced with 2 extra battalions of general engineering troops)
the engineers are at Townsville along with the 72nd Field Artillery, the 159th Infantry and 124th Field Artillery are at Darwin awaiting sufficient shipping to move to Java.

5th Air Force (Chennault)
combat ineffective units: 23rd Fighter Group, 24th Fighter Group, 19th Bomb Group, 27th Bomb Group (Light). All four units have lost all of their aircraft from combat and are at Brisbane with orders to return to the US.

Philippines Air Detachment: 4th Composite Group w 4 LB30, 12 C47, 6 C39, 12 C45 transport aircraft, Bataan Air Detachment w 17th Fighter Squadron w 4 P40E, 4 P40C, 4 A24, 2 T6, 10 Steerman
Java - 35th Pursuit Group (72 P39D), 49th Pursuit Group (72 P40E), 7th Bombardment Group (36 B17E),
en route: 22nd Bombardment Group (B26), 38th Bombardment Group (A20), 3rd Bombardment Group (A20) 43rd Bombardment Group (B25) (groups en route not available until February at the earliest)


Other key points
Darwin – (Australian forces) 23rd AIF Infantry Brigade, 2/2, 2/3 and 2/4 Commando Companies, Darwin mobile force battalion, 19th Infantry Battalion, plus 1 artillery battery (25 pounders), 2 coast defense batteries, 1 light AAA battery, 1 engineer company, 12 Wirraway fighters, 6 Hudson patrol bombers,

Rabaul – (Australian forces) 1st Independent Commando Company, Lark Force (reinforced infantry battalion), 10 Wirraway light bombers, 4 Hudson patrol bombers

Dutch East Indies- Dutch garrison of 3 divisions spread among the various islands, several American and British anti-aircraft, infantry and engineer battalions under Dutch command have arrived or are en route
 
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authors note: The Malayan Campaign is not being covered in this story but is going exactly as it did historically as is the Burma Campaign as of this time. One major exception is that the American Volunteer Group (the Flying Tigers) did not make it to Burma and China as it was in the Philippines training when the war began.

There is mounting pressure to send help to China in Washington and options are being discussed.

Quick summaries here
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Campaign
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_conquest_of_Burma
 
Shame that Malaya and Burma will go as OTL. At least for now. With greater numbers in Darwin and several pilots wanting on planes, when Japan comes for the DEI ABDA may be able to get more Japanese ships and transports. Hopefully this may save some islands and bases.

Thanks for the breakdown on the available forces. I await to see what Japan will have at hand to try their conquests.
 
Japanese Forces East Indies and Philippines Campaign January 15, 1942
Japanese Forces January 15, 1942
Invasion of East Indies and South East Asia

Malaya Campaign (Yamashita)
25th Army w 5th, 18th, and Imperial Guard Infantry Divisions, 3rd Tank Group, plus heavy engineering and artillery support as well as the Army 3rd Air Corps,

As of January 15th the Japanese have the British under heavy pressure and moving rapidly

Luzon Campaign (Homma)
14th Army w 4th, 16th and 48th Infantry Divisions, 65th Infantry brigade, 1st Tank Group, plus heavy engineering and artillery support and the Army 5th Air Division

Burma Campaign (Iida)
15th Army w 33rd, 55th Infantry Divisions, Army 4th Air Division

Available Ground Forces and Army Aviation Dutch East Indies, Southern Philippines and Luzon Campaign
16th Army (Imamura) 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Airborne Brigade, 2nd Air Division, 3rd Air Division,

18th, 38th and 48th Divisions are allotted to this Army, however losses have been heavy in Luzon while the 18th is now allocated to Burma once it is finished in Malaya. To make up for these reassignments (as the 38th Division is now on its way to Luzon) 20th Infantry Division is pulled from Manchuria, while the 1st Division is pulled from its garrison at Tokyo. The 56th Infantry Division, which already has elements assigned to the 16th Army, is reassigned in full to take part as well.

Naval ground forces
1st, 2nd, 3rd Yokosuka SNLF (parachute) battalions, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Kure SNLF (assault) battalions,

Naval Air Support 8th Fleet
21st Air Flotilla (Palau) w 36 Nell, 36 Betty, 24 Mavis, 24 Zero
23rd Air Flotilla (Palau) w 72 Betty, 90 Zero

Naval Air Support 11th Air Fleet
22nd Air Flotilla (Brunei) w 60 Nell, 24 Mavis, 90 Zero,
24th Air Flotilla (Siam) w 48 Nell, 60 Nell, 30 Zero,

In reserve: (in case the Americans come too far west) at Hiroshima
1st Fleet (Takasu) BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, CL Katori, Kashii, Kashima, DD 2 Akigumo class, 15 Kagero class, CVL Hosho (9 Zero, 3 Kate)

Southwest Area Fleet (Kondo)
Western Force - 3rd Fleet (Ozawa)
Covering Force (Takahashi) BB Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro, CL Abukuma, Kinu, DD 10 Asashio class
Scouting Force (Kurita) CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Tone, CL Natori, DD 10 Shiratsuyu class
concerned about the presence of the British battle cruisers and reports that the British may be committing their R Class battleships as well, the 1st and 2nd BatDiv are committed. The more powerful battleships are held back in case of an American sortie into the Western Pacific

Eastern Force - 4th Fleet (Inoue)
Covering Force (Mikawa) BB Kirishima, Haruna, CA Takao, Maya, Chokai, Atago, CL Sendai, Jintsu, Naka, DD 4 Akatsuki class, 6 Hatsuharu class

1st Air Fleet (Yamaguchi)
CV Akagi (18 Zero, 18 Val, 27 Kate), CV Hiryu (18 Zero, 18 Val, 18 Kate), CVL Ryujo (12 Zero, 12 Kate) CVL Shoho (9 Zero, 12 Val, 9 Kate), CVL Zuiho (6 Zero, 9 Claude, 15 Val) CA Chikuma, Myoko, Nachi, Haguro, Ashigara, CL Nagara, Isuzu, DD 20 Fubuki class

each troop convoy has light cruisers, destroyers, subchasers and minesweepers as escorts with strength varying according to size of convoy
 
authors note: the first butterflies from the Hawaiian Island and Luzon battles are reflected in the force allocations. The Divisions above were historically taken from the Manchurian Army and Home forces in late 1942-early 1943 but with heavy losses in Luzon are committed earlier.

To fill out the light carriers with more modern aircraft means stripping the remainder of the Shokaku and Zuikaku airgroups completely, which are now starting from scratch and are effectively out of action until mid 1942 because of that. Heavier than historical losses of Luzon have reduced the land based air flotillas in size as well.
 
Galveston, I assuming that the Luzon campaign is going to gut the 14th army by the end of the campaign. also Shokaku and Zuikaku airgroups mid 1942 return to duty depends on if the Japanese does not need to replace large scale carrier plane losses before the summer. the invasion forces do they have heavy cruiser cover or are the cruisers running as battleline support for the battle divisions. increase of a fleet battle
 
Galveston, I assuming that the Luzon campaign is going to gut the 14th army by the end of the campaign. also Shokaku and Zuikaku airgroups mid 1942 return to duty depends on if the Japanese does not need to replace large scale carrier plane losses before the summer. the invasion forces do they have heavy cruiser cover or are the cruisers running as battleline support for the battle divisions. increase of a fleet battle

yes the Japanese are making some assumptions

as to the actual invasion fleets, they are escorted by light units only, the heavy cruisers and battleships are distant cover

This had mixed results historically but is doctrine at the moment
 
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