A rather different Congress of Vienna

Eurofed

Banned
This is a PoD that I've proposed earlier in another thread, it was criticized as unlikely, but now I think I've stumbled into a decent way to make it plausible as part of another TL.

Background: Quebec and Nova Scotia colonies join the American revolution. As a result, the USA get Canadian colonies and territories in 1781, have Federalist Administrations up to 1808, then expansionist Democratic ones, build a rather good military, kick French butt in the French-American War, get French Caribbean colonies in 1800, buy Lousiana territory and Hispaniola in 1803, and they kick British butt in the War of 1812 (US Army and militias defeat the British armies in the northern territories and landing attempts again and again and US Navy makes a decent performance in the Caribbean). Moreover, Britain gets busy trying to rebuild an American colonial empire in southern South America.

As a result, Britain is kinda more overstretched and less military successful in the tailend of Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon still goes down in 1813-14 as the result of the failed invasion of Russia. However, when a deadlock takes shape in the Congress of Vienna as a result of the Polish-Saxon Crisis, Prussia and Russia don't back down when Britain, France, and Austria refuse their plan, and Britain and Austria declare war. Talleyrand persuades Louis XVIII to make France join Britain and Austria, even as this war and the restored Bourbon monarchy grow more and more unpopular within France.

Making advantage of the overwhelming unpopularity of the Bourbon regime, Napoleon returns to France from his banishment on Elba. The French Army, already making a lackluster performance fighting for an unpopular regime, and the French populace quickly switch their allegiance to him and Napoleon enters Paris after escaping from Elba, beginning his "Two Hundred Days" rule. The resurgence of Napoleon turns the European conflict in a three-way war, as Britain and Austria fight Prussia and Russia, and both sides fight Napoleonic France.

Joachim Murat, King of Naples, makes an alliance with the Russo-Prussians (even if after Napoleon’s return he wavers between an alliance with Napoleonic France or with the Russo-Prussians) and declares war on Austria, in an attempt to save his throne, sparking the Neapolitan War.

Prussian Army makes a good performance thanks to its recent reforms, Russian Army deploys overwhelming numbers, this and the effective lack of French support doom Austria. Prussians decisively defeat Austria someplace in Bohemia, Russians decisively defeat Austria someplace in Hungary. The Kingdom of Naples defeats the Austrians someplace in northern-central Italy. Vienna and Buda-Pest are occupied by the Russo-Prussians and Austria is forced to beg for peace. Russo-Prussian forces defeats British-Hanoverian troops someplace in Hanover and occupy it.

Britain is war-weary and kinda overstretched to fight two and later three wars at once, plus the ongoing colonial war in southern South America. Without the presence of the Prussians ITTL, at the Battle of Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, Napoleon inflicts a decisive defeat to the British and their Dutch-Belgian allies and occupies Belgium.

Mounting defeats in Europe and the Americas and economic hardship trigger widespread Luddite riots in Britain that are barely suppressed and bring down the pro-war Tory government. A Whig government takes over, promises economic and political reforms, and makes a bid for peace. Napoleon skillfully maneuvers against Russo-Prussian armies for several months and inflicts them several indecisive defeats but is eventually crushed by overwhelming numbers someplace in northeastern France. The Crown Prince of Prussia, Frederick William, takes part in the last decisive battle and gains an enduring sense of Romantic loyalty to the cause of German unification. Napoleon abdicates again and spends his last years of life as a prisoner of Russia.

The Peace of Ghent between Britain and America concedes North America to the USA, which annex Rupert’s Land, North-Western Territory, Labrador, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and British Guiana.

The Congress of Vienna reconvenes, with the balance of power in Europe having substantially tilted towards victorious Russia and Prussia as the dominant parties.

Russia annexes Finland, the Duchy of Warsaw, the Grand Duchy of Posen, Galicia, Bukovina, Moldavia (Bessarabia had been already annexed in 1812) and Wallachia (the latter two nominally Ottoman vassal states, but the Russians shall proceed to evict the Ottomans with the assent of the other powers in no time).

Prussia keeps West Prussia and annexes Rhineland-Westphalia, Hannover, Saxony, and Bohemia-Moravia.

The Russo-Prussians are initially at a loss about what to do with France, which has shown itself to be politically unstable and hostile under the Bourbon and Napoleon alike. They have got rather disllusioned with the Bourbon restoration but certainly they don't want to keep Napoleon in charge, either. Eventully they decide to make the senior line of the Bourbon renounce the throne and put the Orleans line on it with a reaffirmation of the Charter of 1814, in the hope the new dynasty may be more stable and popular. Alternatively, they decide to keep young Napoleon II on the throne.

Since France sided against the victors, and Napoleon was more successful, France gets an harsher peace. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine are carved out to re-create the Kingdom of Burgundy which is given to the former King of Saxony. French Flanders go to Netherlands, Corsica goes to Sardinia-Piedmont.

A strong Kingdom of Netherlands is set up under the House of Orange and includes the Seven United Netherlands, Austrian Netherlands, French Flanders, and Limburg. Since the Duchy of Luxemburg is deemed to be a German land, it is set up under the joint rule of Netherlands and Prussia.

The victorious powers are equally initially at a loss about to do with Italy, but certainly they don't want it to be an Austrian or French playground. Eventually they decide to build some strong Italian states, as a bulwalk against France and Austria, diminishing the political fragmentation, and since Murat proved to be a good ally against Austria (not that much trustworthy against Napoleon, but he didn't anything really substantial to help him, either), they make his kingdom one of the main Italian states.

Joachim Murat keeps the throne of Naples (although Sicily remains a separate kingdom under the Bourbon dynasty) and gains Lombardy and Veneto. Tuscany, Parma, and Modena are united as the Kingdom of Etruria under the Bourbon-Parma dynasty. Savoy-Piedmont includes Nice, Savoy, Piedmont, Corsica, and Sardinia as the Kingdom of Sardinia. Since Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia don't care as much about the territorial integrity of the Papal States, Ferrara and Bologna are given to Etruria and Ravenna, Romagna and Marche are given to Murat to build a land connection between his northern and southern possessions. The Pope keeps Umbria and Latium.

Austria is made to renounce its Imperial title and becomes the Kingdom of Austria and Hungary. It loses Bohemia-Moravia, Galicia, Bukovina, and all Italian possessions, but keeps the rest.

What do think of this settlement, about the future evolution of Europe ? What does it think more likely, a Louis Phillipe or Napoleon II France ? How much would the unifications of Germany and Italy be accelerated, with these strong Prussia and strong liberal Naples (I take as the most likely butterfly that Murattian Naples becomes the leader of Italian unification ITTL) ? I expect that with Prussia on the rise and Austria diminished, the German Confederation would get to resemble something more of a working confederal political unity, but I dunno how much. I expect this Russia to go on a rampage against Turkey immediately afterwards, but how many Russian gains are plausible, before defeated and war-weary Britain is roused to a rematch ? Surely Russian Moldavia and Wallachia, and an independent Greece as a Russian vassal, but how large ? Is this Austria, diminished and effectively kicked out of Germany and Italy, and with Russia rampant in the Balkans, effectively doomed (Hungary goes its way and German Austria is sweeped in German unification), or it has some future, perhaps as a Habsburg Greater Hungary being a Russian proxy in the Western Balkans ? How early would Britain, France, and Austria seek a rematch against the Russia-Prussia-Naples alliance and who would side with them (Netherlands ? Spain ? Denmark and/or Sweden ?) and aganst them ? Is it possible that this PoD would butterfly Russia and Prussia into becoming more liberal (e.g. Alexander I does implement a constitution and serf emancipation, prussia grants an early constitution followig his example) ? How would this TL affect the liberal-national revolutions of the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s ? What's the likely future of Netherlands and Belgium ITTL ?
 
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Well for a little while after the war, Europe has just become very imbalanced, so traditional politics are going to go to pot for a few years while Prussia and Russia enjoy the spoils of a very one-sided peace. Turkey doesn't stand a chance, if we are to believe what you are suggesting about the state of the UK and Austria after the war, then Russia will be unstoppable. Once Russia has taken what it wants - which will pretty much be the western Black Sea coast and the Balkans all the way to Constantinople's doorstep, the city itself becoming little more than a free city under Russian guidance given its importance to Russia, then Russia's power becomes far greater. Furthermore, if Prussia fully capitalises in Germany then Austria is going to be in real trouble politically as its just lost its entire sphere of influence. In one fell swoop the policy of Balance of Power has been fatally undermined, and only Prussia and Russia turning on each other - and causing massive wanton destruction in order to mutilate their economies - can really revert this.

Of course, there are a number of issues with your original idea which make this scenario a little implausible anyway.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Well for a little while after the war, Europe has just become very imbalanced, so traditional politics are going to go to pot for a few years while Prussia and Russia enjoy the spoils of a very one-sided peace.

Reasonable.

Turkey doesn't stand a chance, if we are to believe what you are suggesting about the state of the UK and Austria after the war, then Russia will be unstoppable.

Well, the tea-sippers empire is still pretty much what we know and love (minus British North America, which didn't amount to much in 1815, & part of the British West Indies, and their personal union with Hanover, plus British Argentina). It's just that on top of their Napoleonic Wars weariness, they got a bad one-two punch at Waterloo and in America and their enthusiasm for war to the bitter end cracked. Simmering social troubles in the 1810s and the military defeats exploded in a bad civil unrest mix (not successful revolution by any measn, but something that would give them pause) that was the feather that cracked the back of the British war effort and brought down the reactionary pro-war Tories dominant since the start of the French Revolutionary Wars. In a little time they shall recover, the basis of their strength (British population and industry, naval hegemony, India) is still wholly there, they just need to put their house in order (the political and economic reforms of the late 1820s and 1830s get anticipated), then they can return to project power abroad, but first and foremost in the colonies (southern South America a bit, but mostly India, China, Indonesia) rather than the upturned balance of power in Europe, even if I expect they make a strong alliance with France and maybe Spain or the Scandinavian countries to contain the Prussian-Russian behemoth and their Neapolitan client. But in the immediate post-war, yep Russia has a window to rampage against Turkey while Britain and France cast off defeat shock.

As for Austria, yep, they badly got cut down to size. For them it's an early 1866, only worse. They miscalculated and got themselves into a bad two-fronts war expecting a French help that never came, and they pay the price for it. They still exist but they have become a kinda second-rate great power, with no Bohemia-Moravia, Galicia, or northern Italy. At the moment they are rather shellshocked, and in the future they are likely wavering between eagerness to contain the Russo-Prussians and sensible fear that another defeat might mean the end of the Habsburg state.

Once Russia has taken what it wants - which will pretty much be the western Black Sea coast and the Balkans all the way to Constantinople's doorstep, the city itself becoming little more than a free city under Russian guidance given its importance to Russia, then Russia's power becomes far greater.

A reasonable perspective. What would they annex and what they would set up as vassal states ?

Furthermore, if Prussia fully capitalises in Germany then Austria is going to be in real trouble politically as its just lost its entire sphere of influence.

Well, I do expect Prussia to take the lead of German unification sooner rather than later, even if the details are fuzzy, and Austria has indeed lost its enire sphere of influence, yes, Germany, Italy, and most of the Balkans as well. But what are you suggesting here ? Hungarian and/or Croat separatism taking off ? German Austrians feeling the irresistible lure of German unification ? Both ?

In one fell swoop the policy of Balance of Power has been fatally undermined,

That's the whole point of the PoD. Destabilizing the European Balance of Power and Pax Britannica. It does not just make 19th century things more interesting, but in the larger picture, it makes the British Empire too busy to mind about trying again and cripple the swelling Ameriwank Empire in the bud (say, intervention in the ACW), despite the potential rivalry, before it's too late.

Of course, there are a number of issues with your original idea which make this scenario a little implausible anyway.

*frustration* I thought I had managed to hammer all the unplausibility away this time around. What are you referring about ?
 
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Well OK then. Let's see.

In a little time they shall recover, the basis of their strength (British population and industry, naval hegemony, India) is still wholly there, they just need to put their house in order (the political and economic reforms of the late 1820s and 1830s get anticipated), then they can return to project power abroad, but first and foremost in the colonies (southern South America a bit, but mostly India, China, Indonesia) rather than the upturned balance of power in Europe, even if I expect they make a strong alliance with France and maybe Spain or the Scandinavian countries to contain the Prussian-Russian behemoth and their Neapolitan client. But in the immediate post-war, yep Russia has a window to rampage against Turkey while Britain and France cast off defeat shock.

Well, yes the UK will recover, but UK/France/Spain/Scandinavia wouldn't be enough to put down Prussia/Russia. Spain and Scandinavia wouldn't be much help, if you substituted Austria in instead then the fight is fairer but the damage could have already been done over the previous war. You'd need Europe largely to turn wholesale on them after their ascendancy, or more likely after a few years they will decide that their alliance is unnecessary and turn on each other - their politics in 1815 may be pretty much along the same lines but eventually being so close to each other they are going to clash and forsake their alliance. I have a general notion that the Balance of Power always evens out - frankly dominant powers are just far too big targets. It's just a question of what happens before the Balance is restored.

A reasonable perspective. What would they annex and what they would set up as vassal states ?

Well I'd say Moldavia and Wallachia would move into Russian orbit swiftly, while the Black Sea coast to their east would be directly annexed to Russia. It's perhaps a bit early for this but they might try to split off a Greek state to be a Russian satellite - it would be handy for them as a buffer state to guard the Aegean side of the Dardenelles. As I say I doubt Constantinople would be directly annexed. It would probably be made into a Free City decidedly under Russian control, to hold the Dardenelles open for Russia. Russia would probably also move down to swallow up the area which is now Georgia, though I don't think they'd push further. They wanted to dismember the Ottoman Empire completely, but one war is too quick, it risks reprisals. Better to gain all the strategic goals they wanted to gain in this war and then just wait for Europe to turn its back again to complete the job a couple of decades later. For this reason, I don't see any Slavic states in the Balkans being carved out, yet. However, Russia's grip on this area, especially with Austria holding its tail between its legs, is now going to be near-unchallengeable when the next war rolls around.

Well, I do expect Prussia to take the lead of German unification sooner rather than later, even if the details are fuzzy, and Austria has indeed lost its enire sphere of influence, yes, Germany, Italy, and most of the Balkans as well. But what are you suggesting here ? Hungarian and/or Croat separatism taking off ? German Austrians feeling the irresistible lure of German unification ? Both ?

I don't think the Austrian Empire would dissolve just like that, but it would be in trouble. With its sphere of influence gone in Germany, Prussia will form a pan-German Zollverein which makes it near impossible for Austria to exert any influence there without having to ask Prussia's permission first. I don't think we're heading for Grossdeutschland but Austria is shot. When the 1830 and 1848 (or equivalent) revolutions role around, Austria is going to be unable to use its power to keep the rest of Europe ticking, Metternich is just going to be seen as a quaint little fellow who has laughable ideas - if he hasn't retired in ignominy already - and the resulting upheavals will probably shatter his conservative politics and likely bring about a federal constitutional Austria - I don't see Russia allowing for Austria to be turned into a republic. In this situation it will be stronger internally for the more cooperation that ethnic groups who suddenly have more power are willing to give, but it will find military exertions harder as the Empire will likely be unwilling to agree on involvement in conflicts as the separate regions withdraw their involvement if they protest it. This will lead Austria to being somewhat like Spain - powerful on the face of it, given territory controlled and such, but totally unable to face up to opponents of equal stature. Given enough time this could quite feasibly lead to large chunks of the eastern parts of the Empire being taken by Prussia and Russia but let's not get too far ahead of ourselves.

That's the whole point of the PoD. Destabilizing the European Balance of Power and Pax Britannica. It does not just make 19th century things more interesting, but in the larger picture, it makes the British Empire too busy to mind about trying again and cripple the swelling Ameriwank Empire in the bud (say, intervention in the ACW), despite the potential rivalry, before it's too late.

Hahaha. Well, yes I identified the Ameriwank early on and I have half a mind to say that if you start an Ameriwank early enough then short of an early proto-European Union forming as a counter, you can always twist events to make the Americans overcome opposition, there's just too much they can exploit to provide a colossal rise to glory. A crippled UK is a non-issue, if you start the wheels of Ameriwank rolling, particularly by having the UK lose all of North America, then even as the world's predominant power then you can still make the Americans "win". ;)

*frustration* I thought I had managed to hammer all the unplausibility away this time around. What are you referring about ?

Well, I'll ignore the whole "making the US army strong enough to defeat the British army time and time again by 1812" thing because both you've tried to explain it and ultimately it makes little difference to the TL - you achieve the exact same things if you have the British win the set piece battles but fail to exert the strength to actually take anything important (which is probably the approach I would think more likely). But yes, this is a side-issue as it makes no difference after the war. I'll give you the Napoleonic thing as well, though I think you overestimate just how much commitment the UK put in there - if the UK needed to they could have raised several more battalions and solved some of the issues but it's plausible enough to have them ultimately lose a few important battles (much though it hurts my British pride ;))

My first real issue is the bit about the USN doing better in the Caribbean and Britain becoming involved in South America. Now, you've been vague on the second issue so it's possible that there are some ways it could happen but after the failures in Buenos Aires of 1806 (and 08?) the British largely lost interest in South America, politically anyway. When it started to rebel it was largely in favour as suddenly a whole continent of untapped trading potential was opened up and it was a huge opportunity, one which they exploited in RL, but they had no desire to conquer parts of South America for their empire, especially after the Monroe Doctrine. The British Empire was a trading empire and they acted as best served profits. Frankly, trying to get involved in South America would be a terrific drain in resources, and it would entirely defeat the purpose of making profitable colonies. Far better to just step in and monopolise trade with the emerging Latin states. The only place they might get involved is Patagonia, so as to control the Cape, but history shows they made no effort to do so, and in all probability they would continue to refuse to do so unless Argentina and Chile very publicly spectacularly failed to show any interest in going there. Either way, it's unlikely to cause any colonial wars, which somewhat weakens your "Britain deflated by constant colonial war" thing.

As for the USN, there's no doubt that pound on pound the USN showed itself very able to square up to the British. However, note that the USN never tried a fleet battle against the RN. There's a very good reason for this - the British were content to let individual frigates pester shipping as they had their own frigate hunters sailing around. However, an American fleet is an entirely different thing. The British were concerned about the USN meeting up and determined to annihilate any American fleets that formed. In this principle they were so successful that they never had any victories. The Americans found themselves unable to launch any fleets against the British because of the pressure the RN exerted, and I don't think this is going to change ITTL. In fact IIRC the successes of the USS Constitution came about after the Americans tried once to send a fleet out to attack British shipping lanes. After sailing about 10 miles, the Americans were suddenly being chased by an overwhelming force. Scared of what would happen, two ships turned back to port and the USS Constitution and its one remaining companion agreed to disperse, whereupon the Constitution escaped and proceeded to do well attacking British ships sailing on their own. Essentially the Americans were scared of forming fleets because they knew it would result in that fleet getting destroyed. This means that I have reason to doubt your conclusions about the US capturing most of the British American colonies, including Guiana. I just can't see the Americans being able to launch enough men without being mercilessly hunted and destroyed. There are plenty of times the Americans can be strong enough to take the Caribbean, but 1812-15 isn't one of them.

After that my main truck is with the Europeans totally falling out to the point of war during the Congress of Vienna. I know tensions were high, but frankly the need to resolve the Napoleonic Wars was too pressing, and diplomatic courtesy had to be observed. A total falling out could happen, but the worst it would do is polarise Europe. The two factions would still come to a treaty on the France issue. If Napoleon returns during the talks, as in RL, it only makes their cooperation more essential. A war can still happen, but it would require a period of detente first. This period of detente might be small - three, maybe five years - but it gives time for countries to sort themselves out after the Napoleonic Wars. Also, Europe was extremely tired after the Napoleonic Wars, and had no interest in another colossal Battle Royale, so if the Congress did lead to war, it won't be a full-scale one. Maybe Prussia and Russia could strike fast enough to disable Austria but at that point they'd seek a peace on their terms and try to avoid fighting France and the UK. France and the UK, also very tired, might be happy enough to oblige. It depends what state Austria is in during the war, and how things pan out. If you want a big war to decidedly bring about your objectives, you're best waiting a good 15-20 years, because frankly Europe doesn't have the fight left in them still.

Just a few things to ponder. Notably you can still largely achieve the state that you want the world to be in, but not in the same way - I think you're just trying a bit too much too fast, and pushing the boundaries to accomplish it.
 
Well OK then. Let's see.
As for the USN, there's no doubt that pound on pound the USN showed itself very able to square up to the British. However, note that the USN never tried a fleet battle against the RN. There's a very good reason for this - the British were content to let individual frigates pester shipping as they had their own frigate hunters sailing around. However, an American fleet is an entirely different thing. The British were concerned about the USN meeting up and determined to annihilate any American fleets that formed. In this principle they were so successful that they never had any victories. The Americans found themselves unable to launch any fleets against the British because of the pressure the RN exerted, and I don't think this is going to change ITTL.

Indeed.

Pound for pound, the USN was a capable force, but their biggest problem in the Napoleonic Era was best summed up by an excerpt from the manual of an excellent (for it's time) naval strategy game called Broadsides:

"The United States Navy of this period had the most diciplined and well trained officers, sailors and marines of the era along with the best built ships in the world. Unfortunately, they just didn't have very many of them."

That's the biggest reason the USN couldn't engage in fleet actions (and what absolutely killed the U.S. during the War of 1812) was that Thomas Jefferson and the Republican party of the era absolutely gutted the fledgling USN when they came to power in the early years of the 19th century, reducing a navy of close to 100 ships to about 25 with no ship larger than the legendary "Yankee Frigates" which were kind of a class of ship in and of themselves but were by no means ships of the line and they only had SIX of them!

[This is generally the part where I pause and reflect on the utter stupidity of the Jeffersonians when it came to protecting the United States]

Without ships of the line, fleet action is impossible, and that's where the USN had it's worst problems during the Wo1812: tiny navy with nothing that could stand up to a British SoTL or even RN squadrons.

The point of departure for the USN therefore needs to be a strong Federalist succession, starting with Washington, that can control both the executive and legislative branches of government from the outset of the Republic once it began opperating under the Constitution in 1789 and sustaining at least through 1812; a sort of "dynasty" that keeps the US prepared for war and capable of actually fighting one.

The Presidency would probably have to look something like this:

Washington (in office 1789-1797)
Adams (1797-1805)
Charles Pinckney (1805-1813)
Alexander Hamilton (1813-1821)

Along with a corresponding period of congressional power (strong majorities in either or both houses for the duration)

The Federalists (Washington wasn't a party man, but the bulk of his administration were Federalists, which made him, to some extent, a de facto Federalist President) would have built up the USN. They'd have built a capable army (not neccessarily an army much larger than OTL but somewhat larger and probably one that is much better funded and prepared).

The POD here has to come during the Quasi-War with France. If Adams and the Federalists could have curbed the Alien and Sedition Acts, that is, kept them within reason (there are some things you have to do in times of war, but the A&S Acts went too far and pretty much killed Adams chances of re-election, Pinckney's chances of ever getting elected PoTUS and the Federalist party on the whole) especially the Sedition Act itself, with what I see as the "silver bullet": It made it a crime to publish "false, scandalous, and malicious writing" against the government or its officials.

People can say "Yeah, but they had their reasons..." but the Sedition Act takes a crap all over the 1st Ammendment. Nobody's going to stand for that.

POD: The Federalists don't pursue the A&S Acts, rather, they prosecute the Quasi-War to it's successful conclusion and instead pass even bigger Naval Acts (which build SoTLs and increase the number of frigates and enlarge the standing USN to a specified number of ships for preparedness in the event of conflict) and a Preparedness Act that enlarges the Army (but not too much) but also mandates proper training, funding and equipment of both the Army and Navy.

When the first Barbary War opens in 1801, they can use it to pass another Naval Act and and another Preparedness Act.

Basically, the Federalists have to live up to their bold words "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute!"

If they do that during the Quasi-War (1798-1800) and the first Barbary War (1801-1805) and use those two back-to-back naval wars as the proof of the imperative of a large, strong USN "For the security of the American people, in their persons, their property and their commerce!" then I think they'll be able to fight a much better Wo1812.

Especially after they pass yet another Naval Act and Preparedness Act in 1807 and 1809 rather than Jefferson's sub-moronic Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts in response to French and British interference with American commercial shipping during the period of the British Blockade and Napoleone's "Continental System".

Of course, then it becomes a matter of which one of the two still wants to violate U.S. neutrality.

One of the things I always wondered was what sort of SoTLs the USN would have developed in this period.

The Yankee Frigate was graded by the British Admiralty as somewhere between a frigate and a 4th or 5th rate SoTL, and during the Wo1812, they were not to be engaged by British frigates unless the British held a ratio of 2:1 or better.

I wonder if they would have produced a sort of "Pocket Battleship" of the age of sail; smaller than European SoTLs but fast and manuverable with sufficiant fire power to face opposing SoTLs and hold their own, perhaps even building enough of them to enage in fleet actions.

At any rate, that's where the folly and fix is required to make the U.S. formidable in the Napolenonic Era.

The Jeffersonians were simply incapable of doing it, so it's up to the Federalists and the only way they can do it is to survive the Quasi-War. To survive the Quasi-War, they've got to come up with something that doesn't alienate the public like the Alien and Sedition Acts.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Well, yes the UK will recover, but UK/France/Spain/Scandinavia wouldn't be enough to put down Prussia/Russia. Spain and Scandinavia wouldn't be much help, if you substituted Austria in instead then the fight is fairer but the damage could have already been done over the previous war.

Well, my impression here is that Austria would certainly be a part of any anti-Russian-Prussian/German coalition anyway but become just as cautious to challenge them directly again as they were with late Napoleon. Especially after Germany and Italy form, they would know that a new defeat would mean the dismantling of the Empire: Austria claimed by Germany, Italy swallowing their usual claims, the Habsburg state cut down to Hungary-Croatia and made a satellite. So they would be a part of that coalition, but a cautious and opportunistic one, likely drawn into a new war by British or French belligerance. Of course, that may easily happen.

So yes, most of the damage has been already made, that's another big point of the PoD, to maneuver butterflies so the effects of 1859-1866 (only greater) are essentially anticipated to 1815 in Germany and Italy. Basically, that means to paralyze or defeat France temporarily and to cripple the Habsburg. With Russian support (which means them getting a free ride in Eastern Europe) it can be done.

You'd need Europe largely to turn wholesale on them after their ascendancy,

Well, it cannot be the whole of Europe, someone is going to take their side, e.g. I see budding Neapolitan Italy ever staying a Prussian/German ally. Potentially Netherlands has good reasons to swing towards either coalition.

or more likely after a few years they will decide that their alliance is unnecessary and turn on each other - their politics in 1815 may be pretty much along the same lines but eventually being so close to each other they are going to clash and forsake their alliance.

Well, this might or might not happen, frankly IMO a German-Russian clash was absolutely not an inevitable outcome without Hitler & Stalin (and even them could have made an effective alliance of convenience until the British Empire was gutted), they had potentially quite compatible strategic objectives throughout the 19th century, it was Bismarck's one big unexcusable blunder to prefer Austria to Russia as main ally (besides the latter was definitely stronger, ditching Austria would have made Italy loyal to Germany for the ages). But anyway I do not see them turning on each other after such a successful partnership until they have achieved their basic objectives, Prussia forming Germany and potentially dismantling Austria to form Grossdeutchsland and make Italy and Hungary loyal satellites, Russia gobbling the Balkans and potentialy dismantling the Ottomans. And UK & France are still going to be hostile, a rather good reason to stay together. An estrangement may happen for political reasons, e.g. Germany and Italy form and evolve towards liberalism, Russia returns to absolutism under the next tsar. But even that does not mandate a breakup if UK/France remain hostile.

I have a general notion that the Balance of Power always evens out - frankly dominant powers are just far too big targets. It's just a question of what happens before the Balance is restored.

Well, I might theoretically agree on a global scale, but I'm not absolutely convinced that Europe is such a big and diverse place that this always need happen. There are plenty of ways a European hegemony may turn essentially stable if it provides a competent and non-harmful rule. And ITTL, on a global scale, when Ameriwank gets to cover all of North America, Australia, and South America, it shall be essentially unstoppable by anything less than EU or maybe EU + China or Russia.

Well I'd say Moldavia and Wallachia would move into Russian orbit swiftly, while the Black Sea coast to their east would be directly annexed to Russia. It's perhaps a bit early for this but they might try to split off a Greek state to be a Russian satellite - it would be handy for them as a buffer state to guard the Aegean side of the Dardenelles. As I say I doubt Constantinople would be directly annexed. It would probably be made into a Free City decidedly under Russian control, to hold the Dardenelles open for Russia. Russia would probably also move down to swallow up the area which is now Georgia, though I don't think they'd push further. They wanted to dismember the Ottoman Empire completely, but one war is too quick, it risks reprisals. Better to gain all the strategic goals they wanted to gain in this war and then just wait for Europe to turn its back again to complete the job a couple of decades later. For this reason, I don't see any Slavic states in the Balkans being carved out, yet. However, Russia's grip on this area, especially with Austria holding its tail between its legs, is now going to be near-unchallengeable when the next war rolls around.

Well, since Russia historically had little concern about annexing Finland and Poland, I've assumed they would not mind annexing Moldavia and Wallachia, too. But otherwise, you have given me a good reckoning for the results of the next Russo-Turkish war: Russian annexation of Old Romania, Greater Greece (not just the feeble rump that emerged from the OTL Greek War of Independence, but all Greek majority areas) becomes a Russian satellite, Constantinople a free city. But I'd reckon that once this happens, the complete dismantling of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans becomes necessary anyway, as they would have lost any decent strategic connection with the Anatolian core of the Empire. So say 1878-like Greater Bulgaria is annexed or satellitized by Russia, Bosnia is thrown to Austria as a consolation prize, Serbia could go either way. Maybe if Serbia goes to Austria, too, Europe would find the settlement less unbalanced.

I don't think the Austrian Empire would dissolve just like that, but it would be in trouble. With its sphere of influence gone in Germany, Prussia will form a pan-German Zollverein which makes it near impossible for Austria to exert any influence there without having to ask Prussia's permission first. I don't think we're heading for Grossdeutschland but Austria is shot.

Well, I would not absolutely rule out Grossdeutschland in the medium term, quite the contrary I see it as the most likely outcome, either as the result of the anti-Russian-Prussian/German coalition failing a rematch, or the 1830/1848 Revolutions happening. Once Prussian-led Germany forms, and it already includes Bohemia-Moravia, its nationalist pull on German Austrians is going to be mighty. The Habsburg state, for the concerns of filling a power niche in the northern/western Balkans, can easily survive as a Greater Hungary-Croatia. The Magyars would be happy to be put in exclusive charge of such a show (although they may find the chore keeping most or all of Yugoslavia in line more than a bit tiresome).

When the 1830 and 1848 (or equivalent) revolutions role around, Austria is going to be unable to use its power to keep the rest of Europe ticking, Metternich is just going to be seen as a quaint little fellow who has laughable ideas - if he hasn't retired in ignominy already - and the resulting upheavals will probably shatter his conservative politics and likely bring about a federal constitutional Austria - I don't see Russia allowing for Austria to be turned into a republic.

Well, I assume that ITTL Metternich has surely already retired in ignominy when his foreign politics led Austria to be humiliated by the Russo-Prussians. I expect that from now on, the Habsburg state simply tries to chug along under whatever obscure bureaucrat ministers the dynasty may scrounge, implementing a more isolationist version of his policies (centralist-absolutist ay home, trying to appease and cautiously oppose the European hegemons, as under late Napoleon), forsaking power projection in Germany & Italy, until the liberal-national revolutions hit them. Then Austria goes Grossdeutchsland under whatever Habsburg scion accepts to swear loyalty to a constitution and to the Prussian German Emperor and Neapolitan Italy swallows Trento (but not Sudtirol), Istria, and Dalmatia. I agree that Russia would try to keep the Magyar-Croat rump a monarchy, but I expect that an Habsburg scion willing to swear loyalty to a constitution and rule on a German/Russian satellite can always be found. If not, there's plenty of German and Russian princes.

I agree that in this situation, a federal structure and ethnic equality would make the state stronger, but I do not see the Magyrar ruling class being all that willing to try it. I expect they at most concede federal autonomy to Croatia/Bosnia and a satellite status to Serbia. Anything more would require another big crisis.

In this situation it will be stronger internally for the more cooperation that ethnic groups who suddenly have more power are willing to give, but it will find military exertions harder as the Empire will likely be unwilling to agree on involvement in conflicts as the separate regions withdraw their involvement if they protest it. This will lead Austria to being somewhat like Spain - powerful on the face of it, given territory controlled and such, but totally unable to face up to opponents of equal stature. Given enough time this could quite feasibly lead to large chunks of the eastern parts of the Empire being taken by Prussia and Russia but let's not get too far ahead of ourselves.

With the caveats above, I essentially agree.

Hahaha. Well, yes I identified the Ameriwank early on and I have half a mind to say that if you start an Ameriwank early enough then short of an early proto-European Union forming as a counter, you can always twist events to make the Americans overcome opposition, there's just too much they can exploit to provide a colossal rise to glory.

Very true, but Ameriwank needs to cross a rather dangerous point when they go ACW (while theoretically it could be avoided, I think in the longer term and larger picture it is greately beneficial and almost necessary if America has to swallow multi-continental, e.g. to allow the complete integration of Latin Americans) and Britain needs to be kept distracted at that moment. Of course, colonial wars in India and/or China can easily play that role, too. However, the big plan is to have Ameriwank swallow southern South America and Australia by WWI. While surely an America with Canada, Mexico, and northern South America can potentially outbuild everything the British Empire has by 1880-1900, having a worthwhile partner for the British-Empire-dismantling venture, either Grossdeutchsland or uber-Russia would be quite useful (esp. if uber-Russia or Grossdeutchsland would switch sides towards UK and France, then alliance with Greater Germany or uber-Russia becomes rather worthwhile to win the World War(s) without bleeding too much).

then even as the world's predominant power then you can still make the Americans "win". ;)

Well, the big long-term aim is to make the USA resemble 1984's Oceania, without Britain, southern Africa optional.

Well, I'll ignore the whole "making the US army strong enough to defeat the British army time and time again by 1812" thing because both you've tried to explain it

Indeed. It is actually rather realistic to have a much more competent US military in 1812 if you make the Federalists remain in power rather longer and butterfly away the disastrous Jefferson Presidency.

and ultimately it makes little difference to the TL - you achieve the exact same things if you have the British win the set piece battles but fail to exert the strength to actually take anything important (which is probably the approach I would think more likely).

Well, Americans actually winning most of the battles makes it more realistic they can make actual substantial territorial gains from Britain in the War of 1812. Rupert's Land, Northwestern territory, Jamaica, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana. While some of them could have been won in 1781, I assume it is a bit more realistic if British North America gets totally dismantled in two rounds instead of one.

But yes, this is a side-issue as it makes no difference after the war. I'll give you the Napoleonic thing as well, though I think you overestimate just how much commitment the UK put in there - if the UK needed to they could have raised several more battalions and solved some of the issues

Theoretically true but I take it as a gvien that without Prussia support for Britain, a total Napoleonic victory at Waterloo becomes very likely and that easily could have had pretty big political effects in Britain, and that an efficient US military can win the War of 1812 without too much effort if they start controlling Lower & Upper Canada.

but it's plausible enough to have them ultimately lose a few important battles (much though it hurts my British pride ;))

Well, about British pride, you may be partially in the TL of the wrong guy since I find two AH British clichès terribly annoying and I'm going to defy them in TLs as much as I can: one, they have a Divine blessing to enforce the bloody European balance of power and post-ARW imperial integrity successfully against everyone, France, Germany, Russia, EU, America, Japan, or whatever; two, even if they get their butts kicked all the way to the Moon and the Ten Plagues hit the British Isles, they never give up fighting for the bloody balance of power or a major colony, ever. I do not buy Churchill-like braggadocio and I find it irritating if taken as fact (the man was making a biiiggg bluff on the expectation that Axis stupidity would bring America in the war before Britain collapsed); at worst Britain is certainly entitled to make a competent if doomed show in any major war like Germany in the World Wars or Russia in the Cold War, but when they lose a war badly, their morale needs to break like the one of any other people in the same situation. Only the Japanese are (partially) entitled to that kind of suicidal stubborness. ;)

My first real issue is the bit about the USN doing better in the Caribbean and Britain becoming involved in South America. Now, you've been vague on the second issue so it's possible that there are some ways it could happen but after the failures in Buenos Aires of 1806 (and 08?) the British largely lost interest in South America, politically anyway.

Well, I apply two big butterflies for South America. First, Britain gets butterflied into successes in Rio de la Plata in the 1800s and as a result, their interest in empire-building in the region does not diminish. Second, some key Spanish-American pro-independence revolutionary leaders (first and foremost Simon Bolivar) get strong political connections with the USA and a lot of American support, so they come to regard political union with the "American experiment" as a natural fulfillment of their struggle.

When it started to rebel it was largely in favour as suddenly a whole continent of untapped trading potential was opened up and it was a huge opportunity, one which they exploited in RL, but they had no desire to conquer parts of South America for their empire, especially after the Monroe Doctrine.

ITTL, South America gets basically split in three: northern Spanish colonies (Gran Colombia and Peru-Bolivia) become US states, southern Spanish ones (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) and southern Brazil become British colonies, Brazil loses chunks to either side and makes an uneasy balancing act. And yes, this grates with Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny a lot. That's one big reason why in the next big US-UK clash (say *WWI), the USA are going to side against Britain and swallow British South America and Oceania.

The British Empire was a trading empire and they acted as best served profits. Frankly, trying to get involved in South America would be a terrific drain in resources, and it would entirely defeat the purpose of making profitable colonies. Far better to just step in and monopolise trade with the emerging Latin states. The only place they might get involved is Patagonia, so as to control the Cape, but history shows they made no effort to do so, and in all probability they would continue to refuse to do so unless Argentina and Chile very publicly spectacularly failed to show any interest in going there. Either way, it's unlikely to cause any colonial wars, which somewhat weakens your "Britain deflated by constant colonial war" thing.

The logic I apply here is that when it becomes clear that the USA are going to expand a lot in South America, too, Britain may be more motivated to directly expand in Argentina and Chile, to save some of those markets from Yankee clutches, with the push of some lucky military butterflies.

As for the USN, there's no doubt that pound on pound the USN showed itself very able to square up to the British. However, note that the USN never tried a fleet battle against the RN. There's a very good reason for this - the British were content to let individual frigates pester shipping as they had their own frigate hunters sailing around. However, an American fleet is an entirely different thing. The British were concerned about the USN meeting up and determined to annihilate any American fleets that formed. In this principle they were so successful that they never had any victories. The Americans found themselves unable to launch any fleets against the British because of the pressure the RN exerted, and I don't think this is going to change ITTL. In fact IIRC the successes of the USS Constitution came about after the Americans tried once to send a fleet out to attack British shipping lanes. After sailing about 10 miles, the Americans were suddenly being chased by an overwhelming force. Scared of what would happen, two ships turned back to port and the USS Constitution and its one remaining companion agreed to disperse, whereupon the Constitution escaped and proceeded to do well attacking British ships sailing on their own. Essentially the Americans were scared of forming fleets because they knew it would result in that fleet getting destroyed. This means that I have reason to doubt your conclusions about the US capturing most of the British American colonies, including Guiana. I just can't see the Americans being able to launch enough men without being mercilessly hunted and destroyed. There are plenty of times the Americans can be strong enough to take the Caribbean, but 1812-15 isn't one of them.

Well, your analysis has much of merit, but please take note that ITTL 1812 America already has worthwhile Caribbean bases in whole Hispaniola, French Caribbean, and Dutch/French Guiana that it previously won or bought from France. Combine this with a more developed than OTL US Navy, and I assumed that with some luck, the Americans may pull out enough success to keep the supply lines open with their bases and pull successful landings or offensives in *some* British colonies, such as Jamaica and British Guiana. As a matter of fact, the RN kicks their butt when they try landing in other places (e.g. Cuba, Trinidad & Tobago), and this is one reason why they only get part of their Caribbean aims at the peace table (e.g. Cuba, the eastern British West Indies are not won and are left for the rematch). Basically, I took as a given that once they have settled Canada, their ultimate victory on land is a given, barring an abysmally bad army. Getting something in the Caribbean is luck and the appropriate butteflies.

After that my main truck is with the Europeans totally falling out to the point of war during the Congress of Vienna. I know tensions were high, but frankly the need to resolve the Napoleonic Wars was too pressing, and diplomatic courtesy had to be observed. A total falling out could happen, but the worst it would do is polarise Europe. The two factions would still come to a treaty on the France issue. If Napoleon returns during the talks, as in RL, it only makes their cooperation more essential. A war can still happen, but it would require a period of detente first. This period of detente might be small - three, maybe five years - but it gives time for countries to sort themselves out after the Napoleonic Wars. Also, Europe was extremely tired after the Napoleonic Wars, and had no interest in another colossal Battle Royale, so if the Congress did lead to war, it won't be a full-scale one. Maybe Prussia and Russia could strike fast enough to disable Austria but at that point they'd seek a peace on their terms and try to avoid fighting France and the UK. France and the UK, also very tired, might be happy enough to oblige. It depends what state Austria is in during the war, and how things pan out. If you want a big war to decidedly bring about your objectives, you're best waiting a good 15-20 years, because frankly Europe doesn't have the fight left in them still.

Well, I rather prefer most of the settlement (Prussian and Russian territorial gains, Italy less fragmented, Austria nerfed and kicked out of Germany & Italy) implemented after the Napoleonic Wars since it builds a better precedent for future development, but can certainly see a couple butterflies switched to give France a more lenient peace. What do you think if the rest stays but France only loses Alsace and keeps young Nappy II on the throne, do you find it more plausible ? I find a bit unrealistic that a Napoleon-relapsing France gets a much more lenient peace (i.e. OTL status quo ante bellum) than Austria. And the Austria/Hanover/Poland/Turkey-gutting is the key here, it absolutely needs to stay, in principle I have nothing against France getting the lenient OTL deal (what they keep here, they are going to lose in the next big war, Alsace-Lorraine and Corsica don't really belong in France anyway ;)).
 
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Eurofed

Banned
Sigma7, actually the Federalist butterfly you suggest is the one I was using all the way. ITTL, a different ARW that gains Quebec and Nova Scotia butterflies Washington into reluctant stay for a third term (which nicely creates a different precedent by the way) and America fighting a full-fledged victorious French-American War. President Washington wisely persuades Federalist Congress against the Alien and Sedition Acts. This and victory in the FAW butterflies away Jefferson's victory in 1800 and 1804. The Federalists stay into power and enforce their plans to develop American infrastructure, finance, manufacturing, Army, and the Navy (using the justifications you quote for the military building, as well as resurfacing tensions with Britain in the North, and budding Manifest Destiny republican/anticolonial expansionism in Spanish America). As a matter of fact, I had assumed that it was a bit more politically realistic if incumbent fatigue made the Democratics win the Presidency in 1808, even if the Federalists kept control of Congress. The disastrous Jefferson steps aside as candidate after two defeats, and would let the more moderate (and warlike) Madison become the Democratic candidate. Madison, being more amenable to many of the Federalist ideas in the first place, and faced with a Federalst Congress, and the more warlike and less decentralization-extremist younger faction geeting influence among the Democrats, would keep most of their program in place, and this would be sufficient to fulfill the scenario of keeping the US military efficient for 1812. What do you think more plausible, this scenario, or a Federalist Presidency and Congress all the way to 1812 (and beyond, after they win the war with Britain), in order to fulfill the scenario ? I think that theoretically there is enough plausible political justification to keep the Federalists much longer in power than if they avoid the A&S A, and provide one or two substantial military successes, but I was mindful that the US political balance eventually always swings back. Anyway, if we use the all-Federalist scenario, I would use this sequence:

Washington (1789-1801)
Adams (1801-1809) or (1801-1813)
Alexander Hamilton (1809-1821) or (1813-1821) or (1813-1825).

The three-terms limit gets entrenched, and the Democrats get a chance into power when the rallying effect of war and decisive victory in 1815 wears down a term or two later and incumbent fatigue eventually sets in. I honestly dunno what's more likley, Adams going for three terms too or settling for two. But I think that with continued Federalist success, Adams and Hamilton would remain the main candidates. I'm not convinced that with the Federalists' ongoing success, Adams and Hamilton should step aside for the less influential Pinckney.
 
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