To be fair, the versions of Plan Orange that had the USN racing across the Pacific to the Philippines had largely been abandoned by about 1921, except for a brief revival under one CNO under the influence of some army & political types with skewed views on strategy around 1926 or so.
Certainly, the versions of Plan Orange in effect by the mid-1930s projected a war lasting at least 2 years, dictated largely by the time requirements of mobilization and building all the supporting assets such as transports, fleet auxiliaries, lighter combatants, advanced base 'kits', and the trained personnel necessary to use them. Those versions divided the war into 5 basic phases, the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Marianas, the Philippines, and a blockade of Japan to force submission, with the projected decisive fleet actions occurring in phases 3 or 4. The forces on hand, including reserves and other stuff that would become available upon initial mobilization were only considered adequate to start operations in the Marshalls, with the timetables for those operations projecting a start at least 60-90 days after mobilization.
By about 1930, the USN planners considered aviation to be a vital component of the war, with suitability for airbases for flying boats or land-based planes being a major consideration in targeting and obtaining additional carriers through conversion of suitable merchant ships a big part of mobilization planning.
Proposals to forward base major fleet elements in the Philippines in case of a crisis were generally rejected post-1921 as sticking the fleet too far out on a limb.