A Plethora of Princes - (Thread 5) : The Rushing of the Wind

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

After searching a rather extensive library all morning, I can find not one reference to uprisings in Epirus and Thessaly in 1853. This to me indicates that they are of so minor a character as to have no historical significance. What source are you using for this?

In any case, without significant foreign support, in manpower, weaponry, and serious finance, Greece will make no significant contribution to a war against the Ottomans. You are talking about an army that felt comfortable about launching a one-on-one OFFENSIVE war against Russia in that very year, and which achieved a string of succeses - and fought both in the Principalities and the Caucasus. On the other hand, the total population of Greece is only about 1 million in 1853, so its not going to be able to field more than perhaps 20,000 troops.

The Ottomans have plenty of bandwidth to deal with Greece and Syria simultaneously if the Russians are on their side.

I don't necessarily agree with your first point. Seeing the Ottomans AND the Russians focussing on Syria, it might be seen as a good time to try to do something about the unsatisfactory Northern border in Greece. Its only a year or so since two disputed villages on the border were awarded to the Ottomans, and this will remain in the memory.

If you look at the OTL 1853 uprisings in Epirus and Thessaly, neither was the result of outside interference. They were a mixture of spontaneity and Greek support (King Otto provided men and money). In the ATL the potential is certainly there for something similar to occur.

In addition, the presence of a French line of battle squadron in the Aegean will have a galvanising effect.

Furthermore, if France is determined to push the issue with Russia, then the dangers of war would certainly be ameliorated somewhat by opening a second flank against the Ottomans.

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

The use of this map is to show that one's perceptions about the Indian sub-continent can be confusing. Even in OTL, the Khan of Kalat remained outside the British system until the 1850s and outside British sovereignty until the 1870s. In the ATL, Baluchistan added to what just about shows on the map as Punjab (Ranjit Singh's state) effectively hem in British India, and provide a different buffer zone than historically with the advances of Russian interests.

In addition, if we look at the alternative outcome of the First Afghan War, then Russian interests would be stronger in Herat, and also in Afghanistan over the years ahead.

I foresee a series of clashes with Persia, conquest of some of the abutting provinces etc, before the OTL sequence of events in Khiva and Bokhara is set in motion.

OTL Russia was able to maintain its Central Asian AND Far Eastern advances despite the Crimean War (in China, actually HELPED by the Crimean War). I am proposing for the ATL not to throw OTL in Central Asia off to any great degree.

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

I'd like to move this on, but one has to conclude that we are stuck at the 1854 conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean

WHAT is going to happen ?

I have to say I once again find Jelavich's books on the Balkans to be pretty useless in this - they don't even MENTION the Epirus and Thessaly uprisings in 1853. They tell a linear STORY of history, so if it doesn't fit, its excluded.

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

After searching a rather extensive library all morning, I can find not one reference to uprisings in Epirus and Thessaly in 1853. This to me indicates that they are of so minor a character as to have no historical significance. What source are you using for this?

Its in Baumgart's "The Crimean War 1853-1856" but is also referenced at this website

http://www.neoskosmos.com.au/030106/nkew/feature/feature_index.shtml

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I'd like to move this on, but one has to conclude that we are stuck at the 1854 conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean

WHAT is going to happen ?

I have to say I once again find Jelavich's books on the Balkans to be pretty useless in this - they don't even MENTION the Epirus and Thessaly uprisings in 1853. They tell a linear STORY of history, so if it doesn't fit, its excluded.

Grey Wolf

These must have been really insignificant uprisings - I can't even find them in Balkan histories. If they had had any significance, they would be all over the place. I think the issue is that in this period the Greeks were in the habit of thinking of Constantinople as their capital, and didn't really have that sense of nation-statehood. That's why outside of Crete there were no real revolts in Ottoman territory until the Macedonian Question began to heat up at the turn of the century.

In any case, your big problem is the East Med, where you're going to have to take a huge turn of events! Unless France and Russia can come to an arrangement, I don't see how France has a hope of prevailing against Russia. And would Britain remain aloof with such critical interests at stake? It seems to me that in this case, Britain is not likely to sympathize much with France, but would not want the Russians to increase their hold over the Ottoman Empire - not a good situation for them. Perhaps an effort would be made to broker a settlement?

 

[Grey Wolf]

These must have been really insignificant uprisings - I can't even find them in Balkan histories. If they had had any significance, they would be all over the place. I think the issue is that in this period the Greeks were in the habit of thinking of Constantinople as their capital, and didn't really have that sense of nation-statehood. That's why outside of Crete there were no real revolts in Ottoman territory until the Macedonian Question began to heat up at the turn of the century.

Perhaps it depends on who determines the significance ? Napoleon has something to say about history, on this subject.

Winfried Baumgart
"The Crimean War 1853-1856"
(1999)

p52

The tension between Greece and Constantinople did not die down. It was fanned by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in October 1853. In January 1854 open revolts broke out first in Epirus, then in Thessaly and both attracted a great deal of assistance, in men and money, from Greece. King Otho and his government did not conceal their efforts to encourage the Greeks beyond the frontiers. Officers and soldiers left the army and went as volunteers to the areas in revolt. Soon, Yanina, the administrative centre in Epirus, was in danger of being take by the rebels. The Turks despatched reinforcements and launched a counteroffensive. This development was obviously what the rebel leaders and the government in Athens expected: that Russian troops would soon cross the Danube and the Balkan Mountains and would finally join hands with the Greeks for the final onslaught on Constantinople. In this, however, they were mistaken"

These revolts and Greek support for them were the main reason for French action in occupying Piraeus and forcing King Otto to yield

p53

In June the insurrection in Epirus and Thessaly, deprived of support from Greece, was quashed.

In any case, your big problem is the East Med, where you're going to have to take a huge turn of events! Unless France and Russia can come to an arrangement, I don't see how France has a hope of prevailing against Russia. And would Britain remain aloof with such critical interests at stake? It seems to me that in this case, Britain is not likely to sympathize much with France, but would not want the Russians to increase their hold over the Ottoman Empire - not a good situation for them. Perhaps an effort would be made to broker a settlement?

I see France as trying not to end up in a full-blown war on the one hand, but also determined to not allow their Egyptian ally to be rolled over on the other. My thoughts are that the hope in Paris is that Said's army defeats the Ottomans and holds off the Russians, and that the Russian-Ottoman navy do not progress beyond the Dardanelles, or at least not beyong Smyrna in the face of the French force in the Aegean. Crete is still Egyptian in this period, and a good place for a Franco-Egyptian force to base itself.

These hopes may well not be realistic. I do not, however, see an Ottoman-Russian union of armies as very likely. It seems more likely that they will try to operate in concert but in separate commands.

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

Further to this, how would people see the following :-

--- If a combined Franco-Egyptian fleet engages and defeats the Russo-Ottoman fleet, perhaps off Rhodes ?

--- If the Egyptian army in Syria holds off the Ottomans but is defeated by the Russians ?

If these events happen in sequence ?

What would be the effect of Egyptian defeat upon their position in Palestine ?

Could the Franco-Egyptian navy ensure the retention of the Lebanon littoral even if interior Syria is lost ?

Could a negotiated peace be made at this juncture ?

What effect would this have upon Russia's position within/towards the Ottoman Empire ?

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Further to this, how would people see the following :-

--- If a combined Franco-Egyptian fleet engages and defeats the Russo-Ottoman fleet, perhaps off Rhodes ?

--- If the Egyptian army in Syria holds off the Ottomans but is defeated by the Russians ?

If these events happen in sequence ?

What would be the effect of Egyptian defeat upon their position in Palestine ?

Could the Franco-Egyptian navy ensure the retention of the Lebanon littoral even if interior Syria is lost ?

Could a negotiated peace be made at this juncture ?

What effect would this have upon Russia's position within/towards the Ottoman Empire ?

Grey Wolf

It doesn't seem too likely that in this period you will see too many really decisive naval battles - but I doubt the Ottomans will display too much confidence at see in this period after any defeat is incurred.

On land, I think you are seriously underestimating the Ottomans. I don't see how your TL would really change the path to reform taken historically, except that you have shorn them of expensive to maintain and primitive provinces, so if anything you'll have a leaner and meaner empire. I just don't see how, barring a miracle, the Egyptians are going to have any chance of victory on land. Besides a much superior manpower base, both in terms of quality and quantity, the Egyptians are hobbled by a difficult communications route (across the Sinai) whereas the Ottomans have a direct connection to their center of power - and naval superiority is not going to counterbalance that.

Anyway, I'm done defending them - you seem to have adopted the position of 19th c historians that the Ottomman Empire was just a supine mess sitting around declining and having things done to it, so I'll just address your sequence of events. Just keep in mind that the Ottomans had three times the revenues of Egypt, Syria being a tiny portion (all of the Arab portion of the empire produced less revenue than any one province in the Balkans), and the basic building block of their army was the Turkish soldier, significantly better fighters than unwilling Egyptian peasant conscripts.

If the Russian army comes in to save their pathetic allies, I'm not sure how France can avoid war. The Russians would back down if the Powers are united in forcing a settlement, but your TL does not seem to support this possibilty. Britain is aloof, Austria can't really do much to influence events in Syria, nor have an interest in trying, and Prussia is probably thrilled to see France and Russia at odds over something far away.

If the Russians defeat Egypt, they are not going to be interested in annexing Syria and Palestine - they would likely return it to Ottoman control, as they have almost certainly attained the role of protector of Ottoman Christians, and yet another rescue would likely see the empire as more or less a Russian protectorate.

If the Powers intervene to save the day, Russia will likely accept a face-saving arrangement that accords the Tsar some special symbolic role in the holy land, but a serious victory over Egyptian forces is going to have to involve a transfer of territory. Loss of the Lebanon would involve a serious blow to French interests and prestige in the area.

The Lebanon littoral is mountainous, and its retention unlikely given the loss of the interior. The region is not self-sufficient, and a power that controls the interior would control the coast - particularly if there alternative ports to which trade can be diverted - and Mersin and Iskenderun are both good options.

Historically, the Lebanon littoral ports prospered by exporting goods from the interior wheat growing areas of Syria (the Hauran) and trade from Aleppo and Damascus, and importing European goods in return. All of this can easily be diverted to Iskenderun.

If you have a pressing need for the littoral to remain under Egypt, while possible it will quickly decline into an economically depressed backwater.

 

[Grey Wolf]

OK, addressing your concerns

I cannot see the Ottoman Empire in its historical position a la OTL, when history for the last 20+ years has divereged to its detriment. Most especially :-

- Russia did not replace Unkiar Skelessi with the Straits Convention in 1841

- The Egyptian victory in that period is a serious loss of face for the Ottoman Empire, and as you yourself referred to practical independence for Egypt will sunder the idea of one Muslim realm under the Sultan/Caliph

- I would expect that the rest of Mahmoud's reign would be plagued by conservative pressures on the one hand, and Russian impositions on the other. Britain is not around to object, France has hitched itself to Egypt, and Austria does not have sufficient naval power to dispute this. In fact, oddly, all this may in fact act as a spur to Austrian naval construction.

- Egypt does not have to adopt the unfavourable conditions of the early 1840s treaty of OTL. Not only do they remain territorially unviolated, but the navy, the arsenal, the army, and the state finances are completely independent of Istanbul, and the Ottoman loss of face is counter-poised by an Egyptian gain of face.

You also appear to posit no particular action on behalf of the Egyptians in the rest of the 1840s in this ATL. I would expect them to adopt the plan to bring Syria wholly into the Egyptian sphere, and to reform the training and provision for the armed forces.

Whilst Mohammed Ali and Ibrahim are doing this, Mahmoud is struggling to make reforms. The conservative forces, in relative retreat since the destruction of the Jannisaries were definitely not cowed in this period - the plots with regard to the Giray are an example. With his position weaker, the freedom of action is less, and I would see it as something of a success for Mahmoud to die a natural death having not suffered uprising or conservative rebellion. I do not see his OTL strength as inevitable; on several occasions even in OTL the empire teetered on the brink. Here it would be regarded as a success to keep it together, even if as a virtual Russian protectorate.

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

The Lebanese littoral ? Are we talking about all of Lebanon, or all only the coast ? I would think we are talking here of roughly OTL Lebanon, the area that in OTL actions by the Western powers got the Ottoman sultan to grant a sort of self-government to.

It seems quite possible that France would wangle the concession, mainly in their own interests rather than those of the Egytpians. But Egypt would retain the Lebanese forests for their timber which is not insubstantial. Lebanon may well not wither completely if France takes over as virtual protector of it

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

I also think the idea that a decisive naval battle being a-historical is a bit misleading - Navarino was historical, Sinop was historical, how many actual battles occurred in this period here ? I'm not really aware of any.

In order to be of any use, the Russo-Ottoman naval force has to advance beyond the Aegean. If it simply skulks about it might not have bothered in the first place. I could see Russian hubris as being responsible for the defeat.

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Both Sinop and Navarino occurred against more or less stationary fleets. The ability to detect and being to battle an enemy fleet in this period is not great. However your point about the Russians is a good one.

An inferior Ottoman fleet, or one getting the worst of a fight, can just flee, into any number of ports - as they invariably did.

All parties, including conservatives, were in agreement that the military needed reforming. That's why Mahmud was successful in defeating the Janissaries - he even had the entire religious establishment on his side. Where conservatives differed with the Mahmud and the Tanzimat was in wholesale adoption of Western institutions, whereas conservatives wanted to adapt them to the existing culture. Conservatives also had issues with expanding the priveledges of Christians, and local notables tended to resist centralization.

None of this particually effects the efficacy of the Ottoman military. Mahmud's prestige did not exactly benefit from having his fat pulled out of the fire by the West, and in this case he can blame his defeats on Infidel powers. Historically the Ottoman Empire suffered continuous setbacks in this period yet managed to continue to recover strength. The loss of Syria is not going to magically undo all this and leave them helpless.

I believe you are overestimating the effect of the restrictions placed upon Egypt. Nothing prevented Egypt from maintaining a moden army, albeit smaller, or the means to equip it. And as I pointed out, Egypt's economic development was enormously enhanced by not having to maintain a huge military establishment. The horrendous level of taxation that Mehmed Ali levied to support his ambitions laid the Egyptian economy to waste. As I said, Syria did not come close to paying for itself, and the Sudan and Arabia were very large drains. There are only so many people in Egypt, and so many people to pay taxes.

In our TL Egypt concentrated on economic development; in yours they will necessarily divert far more attention to military matters. Conversely, the Ottomans face much lesser outside threats in your TL, and it's reasonable to assume there are more resources available for reform and development.

 

[Grey Wolf]

Both Sinop and Navarino occurred against more or less stationary fleets. The ability to detect and being to battle an enemy fleet in this period is not great. However your point about the Russians is a good one.

An inferior Ottoman fleet, or one getting the worst of a fight, can just flee, into any number of ports - as they invariably did.

Well, some of it might run away and if this were against the Egyptians only then quite possibly, but the Western observations of these fleets OTL said that even the best was below Western standards. I could well imagine the French being the deciding factor there.

All parties, including conservatives, were in agreement that the military needed reforming. That's why Mahmud was successful in defeating the Janissaries - he even had the entire religious establishment on his side. Where conservatives differed with the Mahmud and the Tanzimat was in wholesale adoption of Western institutions, whereas conservatives wanted to adapt them to the existing culture. Conservatives also had issues with expanding the priveledges of Christians, and local notables tended to resist centralization.

None of this particually effects the efficacy of the Ottoman military. Mahmud's prestige did not exactly benefit from having his fat pulled out of the fire by the West, and in this case he can blame his defeats on Infidel powers. Historically the Ottoman Empire suffered continuous setbacks in this period yet managed to continue to recover strength. The loss of Syria is not going to magically undo all this and leave them helpless.

If Unkiar Skelessi continues to be in force, then what would the conservatives have to say about effective Ottoman subjugation to the Russians ???

I believe you are overestimating the effect of the restrictions placed upon Egypt. Nothing prevented Egypt from maintaining a moden army, albeit smaller, or the means to equip it. And as I pointed out, Egypt's economic development was enormously enhanced by not having to maintain a huge military establishment. The horrendous level of taxation that Mehmed Ali levied to support his ambitions laid the Egyptian economy to waste. As I said, Syria did not come close to paying for itself, and the Sudan and Arabia were very large drains. There are only so many people in Egypt, and so many people to pay taxes. In our TL Egypt concentrated on economic development; in yours they will necessarily divert far more attention to military matters.

Well, this could well be a reason why Syria revolts a second time when circumstances seem ripe.

Conversely, the Ottomans face much lesser outside threats in your TL, and it's reasonable to assume there are more resources available for reform and development.

Unless they face greater interior threats...

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I don't think we're going to agree on this subject. Let me know when you've read "All the Pasha's Men" - I'd be interested to see what you think.

Regarding internal threats, in OTL they were insignificant except as far as they brought in foreign intervention, and what revolts there were were nearly entirely due to Russian intrigue, which is presumably LESS of a problem in this TL.

Russian predominance won't be any more odious to conservatives as historical British or French predominance was - if anything less so as the Russians are far less hypocritical and have a predisposition towards autocracy.

On the other hand, your Egypt is far more dependent on foreign protection and lacks the legitimacy of being Ottoman - and Egyptian resentment in OTL against foreigners was quite explosive.

Its interesting that so much is made of revolts in the Ottoman Empire in a moral sense, yet so little in places like France, which in the 19th c had so many of such a high level of bloodshed, and yet the legitimacy of France is never questioned, yet that of the Ottoman Empire is - many people even consider modern Turkey illegitimate.

Well, some of it might run away and if this were against the Egyptians only then quite possibly, but the Western observations of these fleets OTL said that even the best was below Western standards. I could well imagine the French being the deciding factor there.



If Unkiar Skelessi continues to be in force, then what would the conservatives have to say about effective Ottoman subjugation to the Russians ???



Well, this could well be a reason why Syria revolts a second time when circumstances seem ripe.



Unless they face greater interior threats...

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

I'll let you know whenever it arrives. At the moment I'm reading two very good books on Russia in Asia :-

IMPERIAL RIVALS - Russia, China and Their Disputed Frontier
by S.C.M. Paine
(1996)

EASTERN DESTINY - Russia in Asia and the North Pacific
by G. Patrick March
(1996)

As well as dipping into Ian Heath's Wargames Foundry book on China for the Taiping stuff, and also having Baumgart open

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

I don't think we're going to agree on this subject.

Well, I guess I would say that you like to see the best case scenario and extrapolate it as a trend, whilst I like to play with the possibilities.

In history, the POSSIBLE often happens more often than the apparently PROBABLE

I certainly don't see it as an unlikely chain of events. I guess it might not be the MOST LIKELY, but that's not really the point.

After all, how likely were some of the other things in this ATL ? The British Civil War if Ernest Augustus became king was certainly a POSSIBILITY and one which Wellington was worried about. Personally, I think that Britain would probably have got over it, and muddled through like we usually do. That to me is the MOST PROBABLE. But its a bit boring, and the ATL plays with the POSSIBILITIES here

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I'm discussing what I think is most likely, not "best case", which in my opinion would have been the collapse of Egypt's empire, which I also think is most likely. I'm trying to work with your TL, in which I think you are making the Ottomans unreasonably useless and the Egyptians overly dynamic. You are forgetting that Mehmed Ali, besides being an ethnic Turk, as well as the rest of his ruling class, were Ottomans, not Egyptians. Even in the 20th c the Khedival family spoke Ottoman, not Arabic, and spent most of their time in Istanbul, not Cairo. Modern historiography tends to find nationalism in everything - Mehmed Ali had no concept of nationality nor did his subjects, who viewed him as a particularly oppressive foreign invader.

Reform in Egypt got a faster start than in the Ottoman Empire because Napoleon had essentially cleaned house, and Mehmed Ali used particularly brutal methods to increase revenues, which was his goal. The Ottomans on the other hand had as a goal the strengthening of the state, and had vastly greater intellectual, historical, and material resources upon which to draw, as the Balkans were far, far, more developed in every way than Egypt. Whereas the Egyptians had to hire Western administrators to run their new institutions, the Ottomans were able to use their own corps of modernist bureaucrats. Plus, their institutions were developed organically over time and with input from local peoples rather than just sweeping away everything that existed and imposing an alien structure on an unwilling population - the former route creating a more stable and long-term trajectory of development.

I'm not saying that Egypt could not have done better than they did historically, I'm just saying that the successes you give them are not going to bring down the Ottoman Empire, and time greatly favors the Ottomans, barring a huge war against them from a great power, the only one of which really available, Russia, has no interest in launching one in your TL.

A matchup of France/Egypt vs. Russia/Ottomans in Syria is so hopeless in my view for F/E that I can't come up with a way to save the day for them barring Prussia and Austria gang-piling Russia. While I'll grant the naval situation could go in their favor, Russia and the Ottomans have no need of naval support to wipe out the Egyptians in Syria, which has the misfortune of being adjacent to the core of Ottoman power - particularly with a revolt in progress.

So in terms of your TL, accepting everything you've done so far, IMO you are going to have to avoid a full-scale war in the Levant or see a substantial Russian/Ottoman victory.

As a final note, I think even the most virulently anti-Ottoman people (what ever DID happen to Rafi, anyway?) would acknowledge the unusual fighting spirit of the Turkish soldier, as well as that of the Russian - the Egyptians have never been particularly lauded - even in the campaigns against the Mahdists, the Egyptian troops were considered notably inferior to the Sudanese troops in the Egyptian army. That is certainly a factor.

If the Ottoman reform effort were the work of a single individual or even a small group, I would be more confortable with a way weaker Ottoman Empire, but that was not the case - the majority of the ruling class were behind it - after the destruction of the Jannissaries, it would be very difficult to halt it. On the other hand, Mehmed Ali's efforts were more superficial and dependent upon his will - and unless you can give him better successors or make him less senile in his later years, you do not have a strong hand at the tiller.

Well, I guess I would say that you like to see the best case scenario and extrapolate it as a trend, whilst I like to play with the possibilities.

In history, the POSSIBLE often happens more often than the apparently PROBABLE

I certainly don't see it as an unlikely chain of events. I guess it might not be the MOST LIKELY, but that's not really the point.

After all, how likely were some of the other things in this ATL ? The British Civil War if Ernest Augustus became king was certainly a POSSIBILITY and one which Wellington was worried about. Personally, I think that Britain would probably have got over it, and muddled through like we usually do. That to me is the MOST PROBABLE. But its a bit boring, and the ATL plays with the POSSIBILITIES here

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

Well, this could go on forever but if I don't advance it on this basis then it won't be advancing at all.

Besides, there are many intangibles in an ATL - what effect has had support had on the army infrastructure ? How has Egyptian credit been enhanced by the ATL's many changes ? Perhaps the Egyptian army is much better outfitted than OTL.

Perhaps Said has been to France, has got a good grounding of modern ways, is a ruler prepared to take over after the aberation of Abbas' period

They are all questions and one does not really need answers. I'll continue this in a new thread, I think

Grey Wolf