A Plethora of Princes - (Thread 2) : A New Europe

Bulgaroktonos said:
....breaks out Owen....shudders.....

Alright, Owen give me figures reading like this.

1835-6

Total Revenue from Land tax, agriculture, manufactured goods: 76,607,000 Francs

Long Staple Cotton profits: 90,879,520 piastres (1 Pt=.25 Francs)

Short Staple Cotton profits: 250,000 piastres

Longstaple Francs (1836 conversion, mine):22719

I guess one assumes that revenues from Syria are included in this ?

One can also see that cotton profits are greater than land tax etc

But this is mid 1830s - why would these revenues go DOWN ? Is it not that the revenues increased massively in the 1860s ?

I am aware of course that industrialisation will require increasing revenues over subsequent decades

Grey Wolf
 
As to Egypt's economy: let's not forget that part of the 1839 treaty limited Egypt's right to set its own customs tariffs, fixing them to less than 5% IIRC. That sort of thing is hell for your ability to build up industry in the face of already-established competition (like Britain's in this age).
 
Okay, basically, cotton dominates Egypts exports. Except for 1848-9 when the cotton prices hit the floor, cotton has an overwhelming dominance on the Egyptian export market. In 1836, cotton is 808,000 pounds leaving Alexandria, out of a total export market of a little over a million.

You are right, these revenues go up incredibly during the 1860s. But everything else stops.

Cotton goes from 1.4 million dollars in export value in 1861, to 15.4 million in 1865. Its huge. They up production significantly to meet the demand, but the thing is, they are the only major supplier of cotton. During this same time, the importation of machinery goes down, and textile exports go down. This signals to me, a decrease in their position as a manufacturer, and a move towards a situation similar to that of a colony. Egypt sells Britain the cotton, Britain sells them the shirts. By the 1870s, the South has come back on the scene, and India has also begun producing cotton, and after 1869, British imports of cotton continue to steadily decrease by roughy 2 million pounds ever 5 years, as Britain becomes less reliant on Egypt.

Before the ACW, the Egyptians had a relatively balanced trade sheet. They sold cotton to Europe, but it was only 45% of their exports and they also sold a large number of manufactured goods. But during and after the ACW, the latter becomes almost non-existent, and they rely almost solely upon cotton as a source of external revenue.

If the ACW never happens, Egypt is going to be in an advantageous position. Long-staple cotton is better than American Middling or short-staple, but the ACW put the Europeans in a place they did not want to be: reliant on Egypt for cotton. So they were willing to compromise after the ACW to get cheaper cotton elsewhere, while also buying enough from Egypt to keep them from changing back to a manufacturing position. If Egypt keeps the price right, then it is very likely Egypt will be able to steadily increase its revenues on cotton because of the better quality of Long-Staple Cotton. It's very hard to go from high quality back to low quality after a long time, and if Egypt keeps sales of cotton to Europe high, European manufacturers might simply be stuck with the better quality Long-Staple after a certain point, ensuring Egyptian control of that market.

If it does happen, than Egypt needs to make sure it continues to manufacture goods to avoid the cotton glut of the 1870s and 1880s, while also managing to be able to produce the machinery on its own. I'd go with a larger education reform under Ali, to try and educated some of the poorer Egyptians on how to work in factories and fix machinery. Revenues in cotton are going to fall after the ACW no matter what, and if Egypt takes the same path, its going to be heavily reliant upon Europeans, who use the 1860s as a chance to increase their presence in the Egyptian cotton monoculture, making policy and such. Furthermore, output is harder to up at this point, as much of the land is under cultivation, and without a home grown industry, all machinery is imported, leaving only the richest farmers able to buy it.

Not sure if it all makes sense, Owen is making my brain hurt. As for the values of cotton exports durin the ACW, if you can find the conversion for Francs to English Pounds during this time, that should be your value.
 
Thank you - this is fascinating

I would say that the major danger is always over-extension, whether in sales or in expenditure

As you show if revenues stay at a sustainable lower level then they are predicatable.

I do not think the ACW was inevitable. I have always been fascinated by how in 1861 the Southern states in an embryonic CSA were able to buy things in from the North, even naval supplies. At this early stage no war, just a developing situation

Grey Wolf
 
Grey Wolf said:
I was thinking that
http://www.realcasadiborbone.it/uk/archiviostorico/cs_071.htm
offers a different way out of the 1840s

Maybe in France, Louis Philippe I abdicates and his son Ferdinand takes over as king. This dampens the chain of events as per OTL

Meanwhile in the Italian peninsular, events do occur as per OTL in Naples, but the bright hopes for a monarchical confederation are realised as revolutions are not sweeping Europe and as Piedmont-Sardinia is not able to have realistic hopes of acquiring territory (eg Lombardy) from Austria.

Democrats and republicans are still a danger to the plan, but Neo-Guelphism gains ground. Perhaps one can postulate that King Ferdinand I's France backs this ?

Grey Wolf

So, January 1848 events in Sicily kick off larger scale events in Italy

In February, Louis Philippe I abdicates in favour of the popular Ferdinand

There is no revolution in Paris, things do not spread across Germany or Austria

In Italy, events proceed partly as per historical, but without the weakness of Austria, and thus with a continued Habsburg influence, Piedmont-Sardinia will act in a very different way

The Pope will emerge as a leader, probably in unison with Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies, and quite likely Ferdinand I of France will prove to be an important ahistorical element

Thoughts ?

Grey Wolf
 
G.Bone said:
Will there be a "council" of some sort between the major rulers of Italy in that period?

I should imagine so

Looking at OTL you had the Pope's leadership for a while, then when things started to go bad, partly because of the actions of Piedmont-Sardinia you had a meeting in the Two Sicilies of the rulers etc.

I would imagine that in the ATL a kind of blend would come about. I've yet to factor Mazzini or even Garibaldi into the equation. But the Pope added to Ferdinand II would be a strong combination in this TL

Grey Wolf
 
Ottoman manpower resources are vastly greater than Egyptian. Also, you don't need equal forces to defend extremely difficult mountainous terrain, especially when it's your heartland and the enemy army is composed of people who drop dead in the cold.

What you are ignoring is the crushing financial burden of Mehmed Ali's campaigns - while the revenues of Syria were small compared to Egypt, he still levied crushing taxes because he needed every penny he could get. He was not motivated by the desire to form a new empire, he wanted riches. Discontent with his rule was universal in ALL the territory he controlled. This means the Sudan, Arabia, Egypt, and the Levant. Keeping just Egypt afloat led to a debt nearly as large as that of the Ottoman Empire by the 1870s. To maintain all of that and finance his reform programs and military efforts would have been impossible in the long run. Maintaining a large fleet is terribly expensive, both in terms of ship and crew costs and maintenance, as non-steam ships were militarily worthless within a couple of decades, and soon iron ships are necessary.

The reason the Egyptians are no match for the Ottomans in the long run is that the morale of the Egyptian army was always very low. It's just that at the beginning, they had more modern training than the Ottomans. His window of superiority was very short - as I mentioned, just a decade later the Ottomans were able to beat the Russians one-on-one. Mehmed Ali's "manning methods" were essentially to drag people kicking and screaming from their farms and chain them to their posts. Egyptians used to mutilate themselves to escape conscription.

Also, if your book was written by a Westerner, it will greatly exaggerate the impact of Western advisors. British histories attribute all Ottoman reforms to the efforts of Stratford Canning, which is absurd.

Grey Wolf said:
Doesn't this ignore the fact that Ibrahim defeated Hafiz at Nezib, and ina fight of roughly equal force killed 1000 and captured 17000 of the enemy. This reduced the Ottoman to less than parity with which to oppose any Egyptian strike into central Anatolia

Whilst the Syrian revolt was caused by the financial hardships of Mohammed Ali's taxes he effectively crushed the rebellion before the Anglo-Austrian naval attacks on his coast.

Returning to the ATL, I am aware that the OTL successors to Mohammed Ali were not great but they did succeed to a vastly different Egypt than if he had had a constant role of success. Apart from anything else, they would have inherited a good-sized fleet (since he would not have been bound by firman to no longer construct new vessels without permission)

The book I have suggests that Mohammed Ali's manning policies for the fleet worked reasonably well, and that later reforms could well have built upon this, as per Jomard's plan.

Grey Wolf
 
JHPier said:
As to Egypt's economy: let's not forget that part of the 1839 treaty limited Egypt's right to set its own customs tariffs, fixing them to less than 5% IIRC. That sort of thing is hell for your ability to build up industry in the face of already-established competition (like Britain's in this age).

That was due to the Capitulations, which Egypt would have been subject to anyway as a legal part of the Ottoman Empire, and even if Egypt somehow managed to achieve independence, it could only do so by being recognized by the powers, which would still subject them to this. Historically, these lasted until WWI.

Mehmed Ali had been evading these restrictions, another reason why he's in deep doo-doo in the long term. The Treaty merely reaffirmed an existing obligation.
 
OK, Bulgaroktonos has done much of this, but let me see if I can sum this up in a brief and coherent way.

Mehmed Ali required 100,000 troops to hold Syria. Huge drain. Sudan also required a large garrison. Conscription was brutal, causing people to mutilate themselves to escape it, and whole villages would flee, requiring them to be resettled by force, all of which are drains on productivity and funds. The revenues of Syria were never able to cover the cost of the occupation, so Syria, as was Sudan and Arabia, were large net DRAINS on the economy. This is why Mehmed Ali had wanted to be granted Syria by the Sultan and why legitimacy was so important.

Economic collapse began BEFORE the powers intervened, while MA was riding high. To bulletize:

- Mehmed Ali overextended economically, setting up all sorts of factories that required a large number of foreign personnel. They required high salaries and generated resentment. The native labor pool did not have the skills necessary to run or administer this array of facilities. As a result, their efficiency, rather than rising over time, actually fell. To have been successful would have required specialist vocational schools, which would have required middle schools, which would have required primary schools, which would have required large numbers of teachers, which would have required teacher-training schools, which would have required... in any case, you get it, a very, very expensive and incredily time-consuming process. The Ottomans, who had a far more realistic and long-term plan, took a century to accomplish this.

- Mehmed Ali increased his revenues by establishing monopolies over everything, including all agricultural production. I'm sure you can see problems with this, but more later...

- The price of cotton fluctuated wildly, making the financial situation very unstable and the government dependent upon loans to make ends meet. In 1836-7 the price of cotton fell suddenly, causing a drastic reduction in revenue, and leading to the bankruptcy of the foreign merchant houses of Alexandria from which MA had been borrowing. The result was that he had to decentralize, handing back agricultural land to notables who had to cover arrears and guarantee revenues, to reduce administrative costs and make up the immediate budget shortfall - but this encouraged the sale of crops illegally to merchants in excess of the fixed government price which led to further decreases in revenue and led to a more or less permanent state of revolt where the people used every method at their disposal to evade taxes. However, the alternative was the total economic and political collapse of Egypt.

In any case, in terms of your TL, I feel the result would be a general collapse of Egypt around 1840 that would likely lead to Ottoman recovery of Syria, and unknown consequences for Egypt. Possibly the Ottomans might try to move in, but this would probably be too soon for them; probably you would end up with a situation much as historical but with a worse-off Egypt, and likely abandonment of the Sudan.

I have also read Owen - you should get it; it appears to be available for 12.70 Pounds. I find it indispensible for my Ottoman TLs.

Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914.
 
I don't know how to respond to this. I'm beginning to find History depressing. One set of facts counters another set of facts. Both sets of facts seem not to allow for the interpretation that is the natural result from reading the other. It begins to make no sense at all.

As to my poor attempts to find a timeline that might survive more than a week, I don't know if you have factored in any butterflies at all, as much as I don't really like that term. The statements that Mohammed Ali's rule was inherently weak seem to ignore, or I suppose push aside, the fact that during the 1830s his rule prospered DESPITE British actions in the early 1830s, and despite being contrained in the later 1830s by a British-led coalition. If instead of malign British influence we replace it with initially mild friendship from the French ?

I honestly haven't a clue about most things. What caused the downturn in cotton prices at the end of the 1830s ? Is this something still in play ? On the other hand, surely one's lenders going bust helps in that you don't have to pay them back !

I don't know any country in this period that had even general primary education, Britain was moving that way with education reform acts but I rather doubt that it was universal primary education that had much to do with the industrial revolution in most countries. Russia, for example, funded its naval expansion and modernisation with scholarships for a couple of DOZEN promising students in imperial establishments.

I do think you have a tendency to have Ottoman resilience, as in survival, turn into Ottoman reclamation of lost glories. They never got Algiers back. They never reclaimed any lands lost to the various European states. Why should they come back to reclaim Egypt and its outlying provinces if they are lost ?

I am also somewhat dubious of the idea that an Islamic vassal of the sultan cannot dream of being an independent monarch. The Sultan although Caliph does not have effective or any rule over a vast number of Islamic nations. He may have a degree of theoretical influence, but he does not have a way to exercise it. I feel that you are colouring the independence argument with implications that are unnecessary to it. Practically, Mohammed Ali could not care less whether the Ottoman sultan remains theoretically his overlord on religious and traditional bases. He is looking for EFFECTIVE and LONG-LASTING independence of action, a hereditary principle for Egypt, freedom to act as he wishes.

How a MORE successful Egypt should collapse in 1840 is complete befuddlement to me. An Egypt hemmed in by Great Power politics, forced out of Syria etc, survived. Why should a more successful one which has crushes the rebellion and beaten off Ottoman forces collapse ?

Grey Wolf
 
Despite being occupied by Britain in 1882, Egypt was still legally part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914, and the Ottomans had more influence there than is generally realized. Why? Why was it necessary to maintain this arrangement, rather than just proclaim Egypt independent and a British protectorate? While there is no reason why a Muslim ruler could aspire to becoming an independent monarch, there are lots of reasons why an Ottoman governor cannot. Egypt was NOT a vassal, it was a PROVINCE. There is a big difference. The relationship between the two was not loose like that between the Ottomans and Tunis, or the Principalities. The evolution of Egyptian autonomy was a process that took 100 years, and didn't really accellerate until the 1870s, due to the crises the Ottomans were facing at the time, primarily financial.

There is a difference between reclaiming Algiers or Tunis, which are far from the Ottoman center, and which had never been under direct rule, to Syria, which is adjacent to the Ottoman core and HAD been an integral part of the empire, moreover had no other potential government, and was still a part of the empire.

I do not at all think MA's rule was weak, quite to the contrary, it was very, very strong. I am saying the ECONOMIC basis for his domain was very fragile, and he was horribly overextended.

I am not suggesting that universal primary education was necessary, but Egypt was beginning with zero - it's hard to expect illiterate peasants to be able to operate an industrial infrastructure suddenly created, and in fact, Mehmed Ali himself conceded his industrial policies were a total failure.

As for the economic troubles of the late 1830s, they were not just due to a fall in cotton prices, it was a general economic collapse. While lenders going bankrupt may very well obviate the need to repay them, it also eliminates your ability to make up budget shortfalls, meaning you can't pay your troops, administrators, and foreign advisors, nor subsidize your factories, buy arms, etc. Also, as they were merchant houses, not just banks, not only are you drying up your only source of capital, but you are losing the outlet for sale of your products, to generate your revenues. Again, the Ottomans are more economically resilient due to a much, much greater economic diversity.

I also said I though Egypt was probably too much for the Ottomans to swallow in the 1840s. I do not think Syria was, however - as it was Syria was largely beyond central control when MA moved in, yet the Ottomans reestablished central power over the entirety of the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Yemen, all within two decades. THAT is resilient. While not strong enough to reclaim territories lost to EUROPEAN powers, they certainly were strong enough to reclaim them from MUSLIM powers, particularly those that were merely autonomous parts of the Ottoman Empire. I think you greatly underestimate the depth, effectiveness, and purpose of 19th c Ottoman reform - from having to devote the entire resources of the empire to defeating one little pasha in Albania in the 1820s they went to being able to hold their own against RUSSIA in the Crimean War and in 1877 (Serbia and Rumania being required to tip the balance). As opposed to Egyptian reform, which was entirely for the personal ambition of Mehmed Ali, not the strengthening of the State.

I am saying that the economic difficulties faced by MA were independent of his military success. He was not occupying economically productive areas; the Hejaz was always a large drain on Ottoman resources, the Sudan did not produce a surplus, ever, even under British rule (until the 1920s), and Syria did not begin to economically develop until after the period in question. British intervention did not just force Mehmed Ali to back away from his gains, it also forced the Sultan to grant Mehmed Ali LEGAL, DYNASTIC control over Egypt, which would not have occurred otherwise, and would have expired upon his death. He was simply expending enormous sums to hold territories that did not even come close to paying for themselves - it is not a stretch to say that this couldn't continue indefinitely! And all contemporary accounts of the condition of Egypt agree that it was miserable.

In any case, none of this invalidates your TL in the slightest - I'm just saying that MA's overextension would eventually have caused his failure. If anything it presents interesting alternatives to what happened in OTL - it could lead to different powers having control of Egypt, greater French control of the Ottoman economy, even French protectorate over Syria. It also gives latitude for the expansion of one of your favorite evil empires, Russia; if Britain is too preoccupied to help, the Sultan will turn to Russia, as he did in 1833. That could lead just about anywhere!

In any TL I have worked on with greater Ottoman success, it is always generated by retention of the Balkan provinces lost in 1878, which immensely increase the revenues of the empire while not materially increasing its expenditures, as the same number of troops were required to garrison the remnant after Berlin as had been the case before. In the case of MA, Egypt was his only productive province, albeit a fairly rich one, at least by Ottoman standards.

Grey Wolf said:
I don't know how to respond to this. I'm beginning to find History depressing. One set of facts counters another set of facts. Both sets of facts seem not to allow for the interpretation that is the natural result from reading the other. It begins to make no sense at all.

As to my poor attempts to find a timeline that might survive more than a week, I don't know if you have factored in any butterflies at all, as much as I don't really like that term. The statements that Mohammed Ali's rule was inherently weak seem to ignore, or I suppose push aside, the fact that during the 1830s his rule prospered DESPITE British actions in the early 1830s, and despite being contrained in the later 1830s by a British-led coalition. If instead of malign British influence we replace it with initially mild friendship from the French ?

I honestly haven't a clue about most things. What caused the downturn in cotton prices at the end of the 1830s ? Is this something still in play ? On the other hand, surely one's lenders going bust helps in that you don't have to pay them back !

I don't know any country in this period that had even general primary education, Britain was moving that way with education reform acts but I rather doubt that it was universal primary education that had much to do with the industrial revolution in most countries. Russia, for example, funded its naval expansion and modernisation with scholarships for a couple of DOZEN promising students in imperial establishments.

I do think you have a tendency to have Ottoman resilience, as in survival, turn into Ottoman reclamation of lost glories. They never got Algiers back. They never reclaimed any lands lost to the various European states. Why should they come back to reclaim Egypt and its outlying provinces if they are lost ?

I am also somewhat dubious of the idea that an Islamic vassal of the sultan cannot dream of being an independent monarch. The Sultan although Caliph does not have effective or any rule over a vast number of Islamic nations. He may have a degree of theoretical influence, but he does not have a way to exercise it. I feel that you are colouring the independence argument with implications that are unnecessary to it. Practically, Mohammed Ali could not care less whether the Ottoman sultan remains theoretically his overlord on religious and traditional bases. He is looking for EFFECTIVE and LONG-LASTING independence of action, a hereditary principle for Egypt, freedom to act as he wishes.

How a MORE successful Egypt should collapse in 1840 is complete befuddlement to me. An Egypt hemmed in by Great Power politics, forced out of Syria etc, survived. Why should a more successful one which has crushes the rebellion and beaten off Ottoman forces collapse ?

Grey Wolf
 
British intervention did not just force Mehmed Ali to back away from his gains, it also forced the Sultan to grant Mehmed Ali LEGAL, DYNASTIC control over Egypt, which would not have occurred otherwise, and would have expired upon his death

I'm not sure about this

On the one hand, the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli (before suppression ?) and Baghdad had all made hereditary statelets

As I read it, the hereditary principle was Mohammed Ali's compensation, his minimum bargaining position when forced back.

I've got 2 new unicorns, one called Snotty and one called Boogie, which is apparently US slang for bogey

Grey Wolf
 
Grey Wolf said:
British intervention did not just force Mehmed Ali to back away from his gains, it also forced the Sultan to grant Mehmed Ali LEGAL, DYNASTIC control over Egypt, which would not have occurred otherwise, and would have expired upon his death

I'm not sure about this

On the one hand, the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli (before suppression ?) and Baghdad had all made hereditary statelets

As I read it, the hereditary principle was Mohammed Ali's compensation, his minimum bargaining position when forced back.

I've got 2 new unicorns, one called Snotty and one called Boogie, which is apparently US slang for bogey

Grey Wolf

True. To clarify, I meant that the personal attachment of Syria to Mehmed Ali would have ended with his death. By 1848 the Ottomans were in a position to back that posistion, but probably not with regard to Egypt. Also, most of those rulers held their positions illegally, a convenient pretext for bringing them back into the fold - on the other hand, dynastic rule over Egypt confirmed by the Powers is a different proposition entirely...

Remember also that Mehmed Ali was an Ottoman, not an Egyptian - he was actually even an ethnic Turk, from Kavalla, now part of Greece. Even in 1914 the language of the Khedival family was Ottoman Turkish, not Arabic. His family spent as much time as they could get away with in Istanbul, not Cairo - there are numerous palaces and villas in Istanbul that belonged to the Khedival family that testify to that.

Mehmed Ali did not aspire to be the dynastic ruler of Egypt, that was merely the consolation prize. His ambitions were much higher and in an Ottoman context.
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
Mehmed Ali did not aspire to be the dynastic ruler of Egypt, that was merely the consolation prize. His ambitions were much higher and in an Ottoman context.

How much do you think Mohammed Ali was actually aiming at the sultanate/to become padishah etc ? Was this a consistent aim/goal in the period or did it raise its head on the back of success ?

If Britain and Austria had not worked to set him back in 1840+, do you think that the defection of the Ottoman fleet and his victory over the Ottoman army sent against him in Syria would have led to an attempt on the imperial throne itself ?

Despite serious distractions in the Caucasus, would Russia have come to the Ottoman Empire's defence under Unkiar Skelessi ?

Grey Wolf
 
Sorry to jump in on this at this late date, but I have a question about the maps of the belgium/netherland border at the beginning of the thread.

I'm surprised that a Belgium that has effectively won a war against the Netherland ( instead of a rebellion ) includes Maastricht but not the South shore of the Schelde and likely, Welcheren. Why is it so?

The south shore of the Schelde allows the dutch to effectively netralise the port of Antwerpen whenever they chose, thereby choking the main port of Belgium of trade and definitely makes it useless as a Navy base. I'm sure the Belgium/french would be much more interested at gaining this shore, and likely Welcheren too, in order to protect both side of this sea access than at gaining Maastricht. Especially as there is bound to be some ennemity leftover from the war, so Belgium will not be able to count on dutch goodwill. Militarily, the shore is wide open, though Welcheren may be more difficult ( then again, it may not). So why is this not part of Belgium in this TL?

Thanks for giving us again a very good timeline, anyhow.
 
Grey Wolf said:
How much do you think Mohammed Ali was actually aiming at the sultanate/to become padishah etc ? Was this a consistent aim/goal in the period or did it raise its head on the back of success ?

If Britain and Austria had not worked to set him back in 1840+, do you think that the defection of the Ottoman fleet and his victory over the Ottoman army sent against him in Syria would have led to an attempt on the imperial throne itself ?

Despite serious distractions in the Caucasus, would Russia have come to the Ottoman Empire's defence under Unkiar Skelessi ?

Grey Wolf

It's hard to tell. With control over the Holy Cities, he may very well have thought he had a shot at the Caliphate, but that would likely have been an opportunistic goal.

I would imagine he would have aimed to become Grand Vizier with a power base sufficient to make it a secure, and perhaps even dynastic, post. I think many of his dynastic hopes died with Ibrahim, however, as the rest of his surviving sons weren't too impressive.

I think you may be overrating the importance of the defection of the Ottoman fleet - besides the immanent obsolescence of the ships themselves, control over the fleet was largely dependent upon the whim of the commander, the personnel could not be retained indefinitely, and he would have to pay them. The impact is that the Ottomans have to build some new ships.

The Ottomans had several armies, not just the provincial one Mahmud sent against Syria. To overthrow the empire he would have to face several more entrenched defensively, fighting in rough terrain, then would have to cross the Straits somehow. An attempt on Constantinople would certainly fail, and probably just bring in the Powers in any case. Even without them the Ottomans will prevail, defensively.

I doubt Mehmed Ali had any delusions that he could accomplish this - more likely he was angling for the best possible position in negotiations. He would never be accepted as Sultan - the best he could achieve is an Imperial marriage to strengthen his posistion (and the title "Damad" for men married to the daughters of Sultans).
 
But how much is one ignoring the role of Britain in this ? They not only had DIRECT influence (bombardment of Acre with the Austrians, threats to blockade Alexandria, show of force etc) but an indirect one in shackling and attempting to direct French interests.

I do think one is ignoring France too much here. Louis Philippe's France evinced an interest even in OTL in an independent Egypt, proving an unreliable ally to Britain and this can be seen in the force which attacked Acre - British and...AUSTRIAN !

Unshackled by Palmerston (one could kill him in the civil war to prevent his influence even), French foreign policy could well have been quite different from OTL. With commitments in Algiers, France is unlikely to bend more to the hostile against Egypt but to look for a wedge against Russia, who are still the protectors of the Ottoman Empire under Unkiar Skelessi.

In the ATL, Britain only sends a squadron to observe in 1840-ish. The civil war and the disagreements between the factions who emerged victorious, plus problems in N America make any active role out of the question and this is going to be obvious to France.

Russia is heavily occupied in the Caucasus. OK, the extent of this is not properly understood in Paris, but is that not more likely to make France suspicious of them, and look for a policy that works against them ? Austria on its own cannot mobilise sufficient naval force or political capital to go after Mohammed Ali without France, and if France does not go that way, then Austria, like Prussia, is more or less an irrelevance when it comes to Egypt.

Grey Wolf
 
fhaessig said:
Sorry to jump in on this at this late date, but I have a question about the maps of the belgium/netherland border at the beginning of the thread.

I'm surprised that a Belgium that has effectively won a war against the Netherland ( instead of a rebellion ) includes Maastricht but not the South shore of the Schelde and likely, Welcheren. Why is it so?

The south shore of the Schelde allows the dutch to effectively netralise the port of Antwerpen whenever they chose, thereby choking the main port of Belgium of trade and definitely makes it useless as a Navy base. I'm sure the Belgium/french would be much more interested at gaining this shore, and likely Welcheren too, in order to protect both side of this sea access than at gaining Maastricht. Especially as there is bound to be some ennemity leftover from the war, so Belgium will not be able to count on dutch goodwill. Militarily, the shore is wide open, though Welcheren may be more difficult ( then again, it may not). So why is this not part of Belgium in this TL?

Thanks for giving us again a very good timeline, anyhow.

I don't see it as being politically feasible for Belgium to aim to be larger than it was legally BEFORE 1830

I don't see an annexation of non-Belgian lands at all

In addition, Louis Philippe is the main benefactor here and in OTL he was not as into Belgian independence as history shows (he would have liked to partition it with Austria)

Thanks for the comments
Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
I'm not ignoring France - that's why I said "without European support". However, it seems to me that France would be looking in this case to rebuild its formally dominant position among the Powers at the Sublime Porte, not alienate it further by backing Egyptian territorial ambitions against the Ottomans. However, I don't see why things couldn't go any number of ways - I'm just saying that a large empire is going to exhaust Egypt in the long run, while time greatly favors the Ottomans, with or without Syria.

Grey Wolf said:
But how much is one ignoring the role of Britain in this ? They not only had DIRECT influence (bombardment of Acre with the Austrians, threats to blockade Alexandria, show of force etc) but an indirect one in shackling and attempting to direct French interests.

I do think one is ignoring France too much here. Louis Philippe's France evinced an interest even in OTL in an independent Egypt, proving an unreliable ally to Britain and this can be seen in the force which attacked Acre - British and...AUSTRIAN !

Unshackled by Palmerston (one could kill him in the civil war to prevent his influence even), French foreign policy could well have been quite different from OTL. With commitments in Algiers, France is unlikely to bend more to the hostile against Egypt but to look for a wedge against Russia, who are still the protectors of the Ottoman Empire under Unkiar Skelessi.

In the ATL, Britain only sends a squadron to observe in 1840-ish. The civil war and the disagreements between the factions who emerged victorious, plus problems in N America make any active role out of the question and this is going to be obvious to France.

Russia is heavily occupied in the Caucasus. OK, the extent of this is not properly understood in Paris, but is that not more likely to make France suspicious of them, and look for a policy that works against them ? Austria on its own cannot mobilise sufficient naval force or political capital to go after Mohammed Ali without France, and if France does not go that way, then Austria, like Prussia, is more or less an irrelevance when it comes to Egypt.

Grey Wolf
 
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