A Plethora of Princes - (Thread 2) : A New Europe

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I don't think you should change the TL, I'm just discussing. As I mentioned above, Mehmed Ali had zero interest in declaring independence - the idea was inconceivable, as he had no authority or legitimacy except as a servant of the Sultan.

Plans such as Jomard's were great on paper, and generally totally failed in implementation. If Mehmed Ali had succeeded in gaining Syria, it would have reverted to the Sultan upon his death. The addition of Syria would not have greatly magnified Egyptian power, as the expense of holding it would have balanced the increase in revenue.

There is a tendency to misread the Ottoman Empire as a fragile, crumbling state ruled by a Turkish minority oppressing groaning minorities itching to free themselves. In reality, the Arabs would have viewed it much as the Greeks did the Roman Empire. It simply WAS 'The State'. The Turks had no more a priviledged role in it than did they - quite the opposite, the Turks benefited LEAST from the Ottoman Empire of all its peoples.

In reality, it was a fairly vital polity, and required huge external pushes to separate its territories, and eventually destroy it.

Well, on the one hand I spent about a week deciding where this was going to go and am not making it up on the off-hand. Thus, I am not about to change it now

A chap called Jomard is interesting. In 1839 he was a major advisor to Mohammed Ali and well-trusted. Just before the uprising in Syria and the Ottoman invasion he came up with a 40-page dossier on plans to put in motion - the full integration of the Syrian economy with the Egyptian, the establishment of a forestry school, the improvement of the Naval Academy and its merger with a remodelled Polytechnique to create a sufficient number of sailors to allow Egypt to dispense with its use of Greeks.

Egypt, with Syria, Lebanon and that area of modern Turkey around Alexandretta is a different proposition than just OTL Egypt. As is an Egypt that is victorious and recognised as de facto independent by all the powers, rather than having been defeated, forced out of Syria in 1840 and forced to agree an accord with the Ottoman sultan under threat.

Grey Wolf

 

[Grey Wolf]

John. I'm confused - how did the powers HELP him in 1840 ? It was an Anglo-Austrian naval force which destroyed the fort at Acre, it was mainly British naval power which meant that he could no longer retain contact with Syria, and it was the realisation of what a full-scale blockade of Alexandria would mean that led to him seeling terms...

With Britain not there, with Russia unable to come into play, and with France playing both sides, what is there to stop him ? Ibrahim had defeated the main Ottoman force and fears were of an advance into Asia Minor. Although there was dissension and mutiny among the Ottoman fleet after its defection, the Egyptians were able to keep order, they posted police and they mixed the crews. Ottoman vessels sailed with Egyptian ones on several occasions without mishap. I agree its not a long-term solution, but it is sustainable in the short-term.

In addition, Egypt relied a lot on its overseas contacts. It built its own line of battle ships at Alexandria but bought from foreign powers the smaller frigates. Experts like Jomard were also brought in, and foreign technicians within the fleet and arsenal basically allowed them to operate at a standard much higher than that of the Ottomans, if looking for a comparison

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I would agree, and the growth of Armenian influence was to a large extent a result of the Greek Revolt. Without it, the Greeks would have been a dominant influence in Ottoman commerce and the navy, and even bigger than historical in the Foreign Ministry.

What would happen would depend largely on how long the Ottomans can hold things together. If the empire gets mired in large external wars, you could see a larger and more successful Greek Revolt even a fulfillment of the Megali Idea - if it all holds together to the end of the 19th c, you could perhaps even see a weird Greco-Ottoman state, or a decentralized Ottoman Empire. It's hard to imagine areas with overwhelming Greek majorities like the Morea and Athens remaining in an Ottoman state indefinitely, however, but the northern half of today's Greece was quite a patchwork of faiths and ethnicities.

I find the Greek influence question to be an interesting one. There certainly was a growing influence of Armenians, Jews, and other Christians in Anatolia and "Palestine" during this same time (to the great displeasure of many Muslims). IIRC, by the time of the Young Turks, Jews and the assorted Christians had a great amount of control over commerce throughout the empire and when they left after WWI, that is what allowed the Turks to basically create an industrial build up out of nowhere.

Now with Greece still in the fold, I don't really think there would be too many insurrections from the other nationalities. The other Great Powers might not want it. They saw the failure of Greece, and with a stronger Ottoman Empire, capable of keeping Russia off the Bosphorus on its own, countries like Great Britain and France might not be so willing to attempt to weaken it a second time.

With the growing strength of commercialism within the Ottoman empire, I believe that the Greeks might well become a huge force within the bureaucracy and executive powers, because even with a separate Greek nation in OTL, the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish merchants in Constantinople/Istanbul were highly influential even after the war.

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

John. I'm confused - how did the powers HELP him in 1840 ? It was an Anglo-Austrian naval force which destroyed the fort at Acre, it was mainly British naval power which meant that he could no longer retain contact with Syria, and it was the realisation of what a full-scale blockade of Alexandria would mean that led to him seeling terms...

With Britain not there, with Russia unable to come into play, and with France playing both sides, what is there to stop him ? Ibrahim had defeated the main Ottoman force and fears were of an advance into Asia Minor. Although there was dissension and mutiny among the Ottoman fleet after its defection, the Egyptians were able to keep order, they posted police and they mixed the crews. Ottoman vessels sailed with Egyptian ones on several occasions without mishap. I agree its not a long-term solution, but it is sustainable in the short-term.

In addition, Egypt relied a lot on its overseas contacts. It built its own line of battle ships at Alexandria but bought from foreign powers the smaller frigates. Experts like Jomard were also brought in, and foreign technicians within the fleet and arsenal basically allowed them to operate at a standard much higher than that of the Ottomans, if looking for a comparison

Grey Wolf

No doubt the Egyptians had a great amount of potential. I would say that for a good 2 or 3 decades, the Egyptians were as powerful as the Ottomans. Ali and Ibrahim could do just about whatever they wanted and the Ottomans couldn't do anything about it. The problem is, in my mind, cotton. Ali has introduced cotton.

As cotton grows even more important, Egypt is going to become a natural choice for Britain and industrialized Europe, if not by the ACW, then at least gradually as long-staple cotton becomes valued over the American breeds. This problem is compounded with the relative ignorance of the Egyptian population. They don't know how to make machinery. They can run it, and work with it, but they can't maintain it. Ali and Ibrahim were constantly bringing in foreigners to rebuild broken stuff, or buying parts from abroad. This coupled with the failures of Ali's limited educational reforms signal, to me at least, that Egypt's pre-eminence in the region is short-term unless A)the ACW never happens, or B)the educational reforms of Ali go through with much greater success and scale, and Ali and successors are then able to bargain with the European powers over cotton because Egypt is fully capable of maintaining its own industries without foreign dependence.

 

[Grey Wolf]

No doubt the Egyptians had a great amount of potential. I would say that for a good 2 or 3 decades, the Egyptians were as powerful as the Ottomans. Ali and Ibrahim could do just about whatever they wanted and the Ottomans couldn't do anything about it. The problem is, in my mind, cotton. Ali has introduced cotton.

As cotton grows even more important, Egypt is going to become a natural choice for Britain and industrialized Europe, if not by the ACW, then at least gradually as long-staple cotton becomes valued over the American breeds. This problem is compounded with the relative ignorance of the Egyptian population. They don't know how to make machinery. They can run it, and work with it, but they can't maintain it. Ali and Ibrahim were constantly bringing in foreigners to rebuild broken stuff, or buying parts from abroad. This coupled with the failures of Ali's limited educational reforms signal, to me at least, that Egypt's pre-eminence in the region is short-term unless A)the ACW never happens, or B)the educational reforms of Ali go through with much greater success and scale, and Ali and successors are then able to bargain with the European powers over cotton because Egypt is fully capable of maintaining its own industries without foreign dependence.

The main book I am relying on is a strategic overview

I would definitely be interested in buying one that covers these decades, into the 1850s etc from an Egyptian home front perspective

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

All you say is true, but was not sustainable in the long-term. Mehmed Ali was simply massively overextended. How was he to pay for all this? The revenues of Egypt and Syria were not huge, and the rest of his domains were a large financial drain.

His military strength compared favorably to the Ottomans early on because the latter were in the midst of a total reordering of their polity, which would soon see them eclipse the Egyptians in every conceivable category of military strength. Mehmed Ali was opportunistically taking advantage of this window by making a big power grab.

I'm arguing that the Powers unintentionally helped him by ending his overextension. If they had not, I believe Egypt would have collapsed utterly under the strain of debt and discontent.

Mehmed Ali only got away with what he did due to his successes and the prestige they afforded. Once he ran into inevitable reverses and the crushing taxation he had to levy to support his ambitions took their toll on his subjects' patience, he would have no scope to resist reviving Ottoman power. Remember that he, and all his subordinates, thought of themselves as Ottomans, not Egyptians. It is very easy and convenient, not to mention theoretically a necessity, for a discontent Egyptian official or general to defect from Mehmed Ali to the Sultan.

John. I'm confused - how did the powers HELP him in 1840 ? It was an Anglo-Austrian naval force which destroyed the fort at Acre, it was mainly British naval power which meant that he could no longer retain contact with Syria, and it was the realisation of what a full-scale blockade of Alexandria would mean that led to him seeling terms...

With Britain not there, with Russia unable to come into play, and with France playing both sides, what is there to stop him ? Ibrahim had defeated the main Ottoman force and fears were of an advance into Asia Minor. Although there was dissension and mutiny among the Ottoman fleet after its defection, the Egyptians were able to keep order, they posted police and they mixed the crews. Ottoman vessels sailed with Egyptian ones on several occasions without mishap. I agree its not a long-term solution, but it is sustainable in the short-term.

In addition, Egypt relied a lot on its overseas contacts. It built its own line of battle ships at Alexandria but bought from foreign powers the smaller frigates. Experts like Jomard were also brought in, and foreign technicians within the fleet and arsenal basically allowed them to operate at a standard much higher than that of the Ottomans, if looking for a comparison

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

The main book I am relying on is a strategic overview

I would definitely be interested in buying one that covers these decades, into the 1850s etc from an Egyptian home front perspective

Grey Wolf

I'd recommend:

All the Pasha's Men : Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge Middle East Studies)
by Khaled Fahmy

It's about $30 in paperback.

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

The main book I am relying on is a strategic overview

I would definitely be interested in buying one that covers these decades, into the 1850s etc from an Egyptian home front perspective

Grey Wolf

Hang on, let me see if I can find all those accursed books I used, and have yet to return to the library.....

....shifts through assorted laundry, suitcases.....

Alright, here's a few

For some of the social tensions relations in the Middle East that were developing around 1800 and that era, Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the 18th Century by Abraham Marcus

For a masterpiece and incredibly researched book on Cotton and its path through Egypt, read Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914. E.R.J Owen.

The Egyptian Question Muhammed Kutluoglu

Probably hard to find but The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria by Asad J. Rustum American Press, Beirut 1936

Those are the book I would recommend

 

[Grey Wolf]

All you say is true, but was not sustainable in the long-term. Mehmed Ali was simply massively overextended. How was he to pay for all this? The revenues of Egypt and Syria were not huge, and the rest of his domains were a large financial drain.

His military strength compared favorably to the Ottomans early on because the latter were in the midst of a total reordering of their polity, which would soon see them eclipse the Egyptians in every conceivable category of military strength. Mehmed Ali was opportunistically taking advantage of this window by making a big power grab.

I'm arguing that the Powers unintentionally helped him by ending his overextension. If they had not, I believe Egypt would have collapsed utterly under the strain of debt and discontent.

Mehmed Ali only got away with what he did due to his successes and the prestige they afforded. Once he ran into inevitable reverses and the crushing taxation he had to levy to support his ambitions took their toll on his subjects' patience, he would have no scope to resist reviving Ottoman power. Remember that he, and all his subordinates, thought of themselves as Ottomans, not Egyptians. It is very easy and convenient, not to mention theoretically a necessity, for a discontent Egyptian official or general to defect from Mehmed Ali to the Sultan.

Hmm, how long is long-term - by 1839 this period of his rule had been going on for over 10 years, he had kept his fleet in commission, had continued to build new ships and was well able to go on the offensive.

In addition, the settlement made with the powers in 1840 gave 1/4 of all future revenues to Istanbul, which must not have been an insignificant figure or the percentage would have been higher.

The agreement also forbade Mohammed Ali from building new warships - he attempted to break this almost immediately by laying down new ships of the line. Again implying that financially there was sufficient stability to try to continue as before.

Besides, in the ATL I am theorising a greater role for France, already something of a friend to the Egyptians in some ways.

Grey Wolf

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

If you can avoid the ACW, or get those reforms through then I'll give Egypt till about 1870 before the cotton monoculture really starts to take its toll, and they are no longer able to sustain their armed forces, as Britain finds that cotton does really well in India too, thus cutting Egypt into a smaller slice of their source, hurting the Egyptian economy, as Britain was their biggest buyer.

Oh, and for the military problems, perhaps you should look for The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Disturbances in Palestine, by Rustum.

 

[Grey Wolf]

John, ordered the one you mentioned

Bulgar, I looked for the ones you mentioned on Amazon and the ones which came up came up as unavailable.

Thanks for the names/titles though

Grey Wolf

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

By the Crimean War, the Ottomans held their own one-on-one against Russia and the Egyptian troops were considered worthless by all involved.

Egypt since Mehmed Ali's succession was in a constant state of crisis, two problems of which were never resolved - one was terrible morale, the other, financial. Morale was poor because Mehmed Ali's taxes were crushing and his conscription ruthless. Also, from a military perspective, some peoples simply make better soldiers than others. Egyptian farmers simply due not approach hardy Anatolian peasants in fighting capabilities.

There is nothing wrong with you TL, but upon Mehmed Ali's death, the entire house of cards is going to come tumbling down. The Sultan has merely to neglect to appoint his successor to governorship of Syrian provinces, and that is that.

I cannot emphasize enough that Egypt was NOT independent, nor did anyone in Egypt consider that they were. Mehmed Ali's power was personal, WITHIN the Ottoman Empire. It was only foreign intervention that increasingly made Egypt autonomous. Even as late as the 20th c Ottoman influence in Egypt was much greater than is generally perceived, and until 1882 the Khedive's authority was legally and actually constrained by whatever powers were granted to him by the Sultan.

With regard to fleets, I would remind you that by the 1870s the Ottomans had the THIRD largest fleet in the world, and we're talking ironclads. Ordering them does not imply sufficient financial resources to do so without severe consequences.

Hmm, how long is long-term - by 1839 this period of his rule had been going on for over 10 years, he had kept his fleet in commission, had continued to build new ships and was well able to go on the offensive.

In addition, the settlement made with the powers in 1840 gave 1/4 of all future revenues to Istanbul, which must not have been an insignificant figure or the percentage would have been higher.

The agreement also forbade Mohammed Ali from building new warships - he attempted to break this almost immediately by laying down new ships of the line. Again implying that financially there was sufficient stability to try to continue as before.

Besides, in the ATL I am theorising a greater role for France, already something of a friend to the Egyptians in some ways.

Grey Wolf

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

John, ordered the one you mentioned

Bulgar, I looked for the ones you mentioned on Amazon and the ones which came up came up as unavailable.

Thanks for the names/titles though

Grey Wolf

No problem. I didn't think you'd have much luck. You could try a library. A university library preferably.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

No problem. I didn't think you'd have much luck. You could try a library. A university library preferably.

Those were really interesting looking suggestions - I'll have to run down to the NYC library to find them. Unfortunately, you can't check out books like that but have to read them in the library - but fortunately I'm unemployed at least for another two weeks so I have the luxury... anyway, thanks for the recommendations.

 

[Grey Wolf]

By the Crimean War, the Ottomans held their own one-on-one against Russia and the Egyptian troops were considered worthless by all involved.

Egypt since Mehmed Ali's succession was in a constant state of crisis, two problems of which were never resolved - one was terrible morale, the other, financial. Morale was poor because Mehmed Ali's taxes were crushing and his conscription ruthless. Also, from a military perspective, some peoples simply make better soldiers than others. Egyptian farmers simply due not approach hardy Anatolian peasants in fighting capabilities.

There is nothing wrong with you TL, but upon Mehmed Ali's death, the entire house of cards is going to come tumbling down.

Doesn't this ignore the fact that Ibrahim defeated Hafiz at Nezib, and ina fight of roughly equal force killed 1000 and captured 17000 of the enemy. This reduced the Ottoman to less than parity with which to oppose any Egyptian strike into central Anatolia

Whilst the Syrian revolt was caused by the financial hardships of Mohammed Ali's taxes he effectively crushed the rebellion before the Anglo-Austrian naval attacks on his coast.

Returning to the ATL, I am aware that the OTL successors to Mohammed Ali were not great but they did succeed to a vastly different Egypt than if he had had a constant role of success. Apart from anything else, they would have inherited a good-sized fleet (since he would not have been bound by firman to no longer construct new vessels without permission)

The book I have suggests that Mohammed Ali's manning policies for the fleet worked reasonably well, and that later reforms could well have built upon this, as per Jomard's plan.

Grey Wolf

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

Of course. Just beware of Owen. You'll come out of reading that book knowing more about the export tables of Alexandria during March of 1847 than you would ever need to know. But by far, he is the most informative on the effects of cotton on the Egyptian economy.

 

[Grey Wolf]

Those were really interesting looking suggestions - I'll have to run down to the NYC library to find them. Unfortunately, you can't check out books like that but have to read them in the library - but fortunately I'm unemployed at least for another two weeks so I have the luxury... anyway, thanks for the recommendations.

Unfortunately I cannot access the university library. I tried and was told I needed to have a recognised research project signed off by a member of the faculty. I don't think an idol timeline qualifies !

Grey Wolf

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

Doesn't this ignore the fact that Ibrahim defeated Hafiz at Nezib, and ina fight of roughly equal force killed 1000 and captured 17000 of the enemy. This reduced the Ottoman to less than parity with which to oppose any Egyptian strike into central Anatolia

Whilst the Syrian revolt was caused by the financial hardships of Mohammed Ali's taxes he effectively crushed the rebellion before the Anglo-Austrian naval attacks on his coast.

Returning to the ATL, I am aware that the OTL successors to Mohammed Ali were not great but they did succeed to a vastly different Egypt than if he had had a constant role of success. Apart from anything else, they would have inherited a good-sized fleet (since he would not have been bound by firman to no longer construct new vessels without permission)

The book I have suggests that Mohammed Ali's manning policies for the fleet worked reasonably well, and that later reforms could well have built upon this, as per Jomard's plan.

Grey Wolf

In slight contrast to Abdul, I think Egypt's big problem is going to be economic. The people didn't like Ali, but for the most part, he couldn't be taken down. IIRC, he had secret police, and a pretty firm stranglehold on the whole country. If Ali and his successors can effectively manage to wrangle with Europe over cotton, and manage to run their own economy using native labor and knowledge, then they might have a chance of being able to have Europe obey Egypt during the ACW, rather than Egypt just selling to Europe because Europe wants it. It would be tough, and would require a vast amount of political acumen, but its not outside the realm of possibilty.

The real challenge is getting Egypt to diversify its output VERY quickly. I'm talking Stalinist Russia transformation quickly. If it gets caught with nothing but cotton during the cotton glut of the 1870s, when Egypt, India, and the American South are all producing, then Egypt is probably going down. It needs to be able to able to produce many of its manufactured goods and parts on its own by 1865-1869, or its going to become dependent on Europe.

 

[Grey Wolf]

The real challenge is getting Egypt to diversify its output VERY quickly. I'm talking Stalinist Russia transformation quickly. If it gets caught with nothing but cotton during the cotton glut of the 1870s, when Egypt, India, and the American South are all producing, then Egypt is probably going down. It needs to be able to able to produce many of its manufactured goods and parts on its own by 1865-1869, or its going to become dependent on Europe.

Doesn't this ignore whatever revenues Egypt was getting from Syria ? I freely admit to ignorance here, but the revolt in 1839 was over these, and I don't think the revenues came by way of cotton. Just ordinary taxation ? But Egypt must have valued them sufficiently to continue to impose them at this level.

Also, how set in stone is the cotton economy ? What was Egypt doing before the ACW cut off Southern US supplies ? If these supplies had never been cut off ? I was under the impression that Egypt upped its output massively in order to cover this, gain monies etc...but am not sure this makes sense ? But if the US goes a different way...?

Grey Wolf

 

[Bulgaroktonos]

....breaks out Owen....shudders.....

Alright, Owen give me figures reading like this.

1835-6

Total Revenue from Land tax, agriculture, manufactured goods: 76,607,000 Francs

Long Staple Cotton profits: 90,879,520 piastres (1 Pt=.25 Francs)

Short Staple Cotton profits: 250,000 piastres

Longstaple Francs (1836 conversion, mine): 22,719,880 Francs.

So, roughly 30% of Egypt's revenues were due to Long Staple Cotton in 1836. Cotton remains to be roughly 25-30% all the way to 1861.

Hang on, I need to go back to check your questions, so this post isnt quite finished.