A multipolar 1940s Europe

[Eurofed]

Recently I stumbled upon a mod for a WWII grand strategy game that included plenty of alt-historical 1930s-1940s event paths for various nations and great powers. I was inspired to try and fit as many of them in the same scenario, as much as they could be made somewhat compatible and plausible.

Without further ado, let's assume that:

In the early 1930s USSR, Stalin gets assassinated and the succession power struggle results in the takeover of a faction (I suppose we may assume it is the Zinovevite one) that pursues a policy more focused on ambitious (but not reckless) foreign expansion (mixing the ideological committment to export Communism and the neo-Russian realpolitick drive to restore Tsarist Russia's sphere of influence) and less so on extreme totalitarian control & repression than OTL Stalin. They pursue industrialization, collectivization, and rearmament much like OTL but shun very-large-scale purges of Soviet society (apart from rooting out Stalinists, of course).

In 1933 political instability in Germany results in a takeover by vanilla right-wing nationalist-militarist groups backed by the army, that ruthlessly purge out the Nazis and the Communists. The German political system is reformed to a semi-authoritarian neo-Kaiserreich monarchy with a constitution that reinforces the powers of the executive, curbs parliamentary instability, and bans "extremist" parties. In the domestic policy field, they pursue an economic policy of recovery fueled by public works and rearmament broadly similar to the Nazis but they avoid pushing the rearmament to financially-unsustainable levels. In the foreign policy field, they end reparations, start rearmament, and seek to fulfill the irredentist claims of Germany by supporting Pan-German activities in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.

Italy starts the invasion of Ethiopia a couple years earlier than OTL, which causes it to turn antagonistic to the Entente powers and grow close to Germany much like OTL. As a result, the Anschluss (driven by a Pan-German uprising in Austria) takes place in 1935.

In France, political instability leads to an authoritarian right-wing regime change in 1936. The new French leadership shifts to an expansionist neo-Napoleonic foreign policy in Western Europe. They support pro-French right-wing groups in the Low Countries and Spain. As a result, the Spanish Civil War largely takes the character of a proxy war between pro-French nationalists and pro-Soviet republicans, which the nationalists win. Spain subsequently picks a fight with Portugal leading to the latter's annexation after a quick war, setting up Iberia as a client state of France. Pan-French Wallonian separatism plungs Belgium in serious civil disorder which gives France an excuse to intervene. The Netherlands, which is experiencing a rise of Pan-Dutch right-wing nationalism, also intervenes in the Belgian conflict to stop pro-French irredentism and affirm its own but suffers a decisive defeat. The final outcome is the French annexation of Wallonia and the establishment of a "Greater Netherlands" Dutch-Flemish client state of France.

The French expansionism alienates Britain and drives it to sever the Entente alliance. The UK shifts to a foreign policy that opportunistically plays France and Germany off each other, trying to prevent both from becoming sole hegemon of Europe, while they strive to contain Communism.

In Eastern Europe, Germany covertly supports the separatism of Sudetenland Germans, Slovaks, and Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, while Italy does the same with various non-Serb nationalities in Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia collapses in a multi-faction civil war which gives Germany an excuse to intervene and "protect Germans". The crisis results in Germany annexing the Sudetenland, Czechia and Slovakia being set up as client states of Germany, and Hungary getting southern Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia.

On its turn, Italy starts a war with Yugoslavia over the pretext of separatist unrest. The conflict reveals some serious flaws of the Italian military (which Rome subsequently strives to eliminate) but for various reasons (no major Italian involvement in the SCW, long-standing preparation for this war, favorable logistic situation, etc.) Italy eventually wins it. Hungary and Bulgaria later join the conflict when Yugoslavia starts to lose. Italy annexes most of Dalmatia and bits of Slovenia, Hungary gets Backa, Bulgaria annexes most of Vardar Macedonia, Albania (a client state of Italy) gets Kosovo and northwestern Vardar Macedonia, while Slovenia, Croatia-Bosnia, and Montenegro are set up as client states of Italy.

Although France and Germany-Italy get antagonised by their reciprocal expansionism in Western and Central-Eastern Europe, as a rule they stay too much focused on their own interventionist activites for a long while to take direct action and stop the ones of the other side.

The USSR makes a secret agreement with Germany much like the OTL M-R Pact (which Italy later joins) to divide Eastern Europe in spheres of influence. Despite ideological antagonism, those powers share a common interest to get the region wholly rid of the hostile states spawned by the Versailles settlement. Soviet agents fuel Communist and Byelorussian/Ukrainian irredentist unrest in Poland, which gives the USSR a pretext to invade the country. Germany later intervenes to backstab Poland and "protect" its own nationals. Soviet Russia annexes the Kresy; Germany gets Danzig, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia; Poland (with Posen and Podlachia) is turned in a client state of Germany. German-Soviet political pressure on the Baltic states results in Soviet annexation of Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania (with the Vilnius region) is turned into a client state of Germany. Berlin sponsors the creation of a Polish-Lithuanian confederation.

Hungary starts a conflict with Romania over its irredentist claims on Transylvania, which Bulgaria and the USSR later join to backstab Bucharest. The peace settlement gives northern-western Transylvania to Hungary, southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and Bessarabia to the USSR. Soon thereafter, pro-Soviet coups/uprisings in Bulgaria and Serbia turn them into client states of the USSR. Romania turns to Berlin for protection and becomes a client state of Germany.

The last major feat of Soviet expansionism in Europe involves a Winter War-like attack on Finland, which results in the Red Army reaping a decisive victory (despite a Swedish intervention) and the transformation of Finland (with East Karelia) in a SSR. Berlin vetoes enlargement of the conflict to Swedish territory. Soviet expansionism scares Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to form the Confederation of Scandinavia which turns to Berlin for protection (it is deemed a more valid anti-Soviet bastion than Paris) and becomes a German client. With the German-Soviet pact fulfilled and Eastern Europe neatly divided into spheres of influence, Germany shifts back to anti-Communist containment and warns Moscow against further expansionism in the region.

In East Asia, Japan invades China much like OTL, but the Soviets are active to prop up the CCP and Germany-Italy to support Nationalist China. The result is a roughly-balanced three-way Sino-Japanese War & Chinese Civil War mix quagmire/stalemate, which makes Japan align with France and Nationalist China with Germany and Italy. Pro-Soviet coups and uprisings turn Xinjiang and Persia into Soviet client states.

By the early-mid 1940s, Eurasia gets split in a three-way Cold War between the French bloc (with Iberia and Greater Netherlands), the German bloc (with Scandinavia, Czechia, Slovakia, the Polish-Lithuanian Confederation, Hungary, and Romania) that has the Italian sub-bloc as main junior partner/ally (with Slovenia, Croatia-Bosnia, Montenegro, and Albania-Kosovo), and the Soviet bloc (with Serbia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Persia).

Britain plays France and Germany-Italy against each other to keep a power balance in Europe while trying to muster both and contain Soviet expansionism in the Middle East and Central Asia. In East Asia, Paris, the Berlin-Rome 'axis', and Moscow are involved in a three-way proxy war where they side with Japan, Nationalist China, and the CCP respectively.

In the USA, FDR's assassination in 1933 results in populist Huey Long grabbing control of the Democratic party and winning the Presidency in 1936 and re-election in 1940. He implements an extensive public works and wealth redistribution populist program which broadly works as a more extreme version of the New Deal. A staunch "no US partecipation in European alliances and quarrels" Washingtonian isolationist, Long strives to keep America free from involvement in European conflicts, and its foreign policy focused on keeping and expanding its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Further ideas from source material which I did not include in the scenario since I'm uncertain about their compatibility, include a Habsburg restoration in Hungary (would neo-Kaiserreich Greater Germany support it or oppose it ?), Mussolini overthrowing the Italian king (not sure if it vibes any well with his main ally being a monarchy), and the USA turning to some more extreme political regime than populism.

I would have fancied the latter as a way to make America suitably expansionist in its home turf (can't really be a TL/scenario of mine if it lacks either a Greater Germany or a US Canada ) but it might be too clichè and destabilize the global power balance (an Anglo-American antagonism would be interesting to have in this scenario, however). I am also a little uncertain whether Romania would better fit in the German or the Soviet sphere of influence from a geopolitical point of view. I'm not sure which side Greece and Turkey would align with ITTL. The Soviets certainly itch to grab Turkey, but it may be a step too many.

 

[Dunois]

If ny authoritarian right wing regime in France you mean the Croix de Feu of Colonel LaRocque, then they were far from being expansionist and certainly won't launch schemes aimed annexing Wallonia.

 

[Eurofed]

If by authoritarian right wing regime in France you mean the Croix de Feu of Colonel LaRocque, then they were far from being expansionist and certainly won't launch schemes aimed annexing Wallonia.

Nope, this would defeat the purpose of the scenario in several ways. We have to assume that political butterflies within interwar French far right result in a more Bonapartist-expansionist faction getting on top.

 

[Dunois]

Nope, this would defeat the purpose of the scenario. We have to assume that political butterflies within interwar French far right result in a more Bonapartist-expansionist faction getting on top.

The problem is that it is hard for me to see an openly expansionist faction getting on the top in France during the interwar period. While there were expansionist voices in France pre war and post war, they were very much in the minority. I doubt that even Charles Maurras and Action Française were expansionist, as after all they mainly cared about putting the clocks back to what they were in 1789 and not about European or overseas expansion.

 

[Enigmajones]

Ummm hate to advertise, but my TL's 1940's Europe is pretty multi-polar.

 

[Eurofed]

The problem is that it is hard for me to see an openly expansionist faction getting on the top in France during the interwar period. While there were expansionist voices in France pre war and post war, they were very much in the minority. I doubt that even Charles Maurras and Action Française were expansionist, as after all they mainly cared about putting the clocks back to what they were in 1789 and not about European or overseas expansion.

A charismatic ATL leader with a neo-Napoleonic expansionist streak that eventually hegemonizes the French far right may easily emerge in the postwar/interwar political turmoil.

 

[Kelenas]

Mh... lets see. Regarding the Netherlands, I think it would make more sense for them to be a German ally/client state, rather than French. German-Dutch relations were generally closer, plus a Dutch nationalist extremist party would likely claim all of Belgium, rather than just the Dutch-speaking Flemish parts, meaning the French just annexed a lot of "their" territory.
The Scandinavians in turn might be more likely to align with the French, due to Danish fear of German irredentism (even if minor).

Either French or Germans/Italians might also be able to draw in the Irish - since it's apparently irredentist/expansionist free-for-all and that bit of British northern Ireland looks ugly on maps.

The British, though, seem rather screwed. The only major ally (other than their Dominions) is on the opposite side of the world and of somewhat questionable worth.

- Kelenas

 

[Dunois]

A charismatic ATL leader with a neo-Napoleonic expansionist streak that eventually hegemonizes the French far right may easily emerge in the postwar/interwar political turmoil.

If you want to look at things under the angle "that person may have died in the trenches OTL" then yes it is definitely possible. But you still have to be careful about using this kind of things as one man can't do anything by himself.

Using Italy and Germany, fascism and nazism where likely to happen regardless on whether or not Hitler or Mussolini would have survived the war. The ideologies may have been different though but not by much.

 

[Eurofed]

Mh... lets see. Regarding the Netherlands, I think it would make more sense for them to be a German ally/client state, rather than French. German-Dutch relations were generally closer, plus a Dutch nationalist extremist party would likely claim all of Belgium, rather than just the Dutch-speaking Flemish parts, meaning the French just annexed a lot of "their" territory.

Hmm, what about the Netherlands (either before or after a nationalist takeover) initially intervenes in the Belgian conflict against France, but they suffer a decisive defeat and get turned in a client of France as a result. Paris prefers to mollify the Dutch by letting them keep their own state and getting the Flanders.

The Scandinavians in turn might be more likely to align with the French, due to Danish fear of German irredentism (even if minor).

Scandinavia may align with Germany b/c the latter looks like better protection against the Soviets, and/or the pro-German Swedes get their way on this within the union, and/or German irredentism on Danish territory is deemed an unimportant issue by all (it was so fringe that even Hitler did not bother to fulfill it).

Either French or Germans/Italians might also be able to draw in the Irish - since it's apparently irredentist/expansionist free-for-all and that bit of British northern Ireland looks ugly on maps.

Err, ITTL Britain has more or less reversed back to 19th century "splendid isolation" neutrality in the French vs German/Italian feud (or more accurately, they play off the two sides to keep them balanced and use them to contain the Soviets). This suits the ambitions of both sides fine unless and until they decide they need British stuff or UK as an ally in the endgame with each other or Russia. Otherwise, why piss off London major way to gain Ireland which is quite small potatoes and peripheral as an ally/client ?

It is an expansionist/irredentist free-for-all precisely b/c several great powers take that path at once, which keeps things roughly balanced, as long as no one makes a bid for ultimate power (ITTL most likely the Soviets if they eventually get victory disease) or intrudes on someone else's home turf.

The British, though, seem rather screwed.

They are maintaining a balance of power in Europe, however, and they have lost nothing important from a status quo which hugely benefits them except influence in Persia.

The only major ally (other than their Dominions) is on the opposite side of the world and of somewhat questionable worth.

Meaning ??

 

[Eurofed]

If you want to look at things under the angle "that person may have died in the trenches OTL" then yes it is definitely possible. But you still have to be careful about using this kind of things as one man can't do anything by himself.

Using Italy and Germany, fascism and nazism where likely to happen regardless on whether or not Hitler or Mussolini would have survived the war. The ideologies may have been different though but not by much.

The point goes way beyond the purpose of this thread, but I strongly disagree in that without Hitler and Mussolini we still would most likely and quite easily have got far-right (semi-)authoritarian and revisionist interwar Italy and Germany, but their domestic and foreign policies would quite easily have gotten rather different in several major ways with different leaders.

 

[Astrodragon]

Just how is America supposed to increase its influence and power in the Western Hem while remaining virulently isolationist???

 

[Eurofed]

Just how is America supposed to increase its influence and power in the Western Hem while remaining virulently isolationist???

"Isolationist" may have different shades of meaning. As it concerns pre-WWII 20th century America, its typical mainstream sense was "keep the USA off European powers' quarrels", not "keep the USA's paws off Latin America".

 

[I Blame Communism]

I wish people wouldn't assume that far-right = expansionist, always and forever. The British and French right-wings were committed to maintaining their empires against outside powers and subversion. That Italy and Germany's regimes were expansionist was a product of their particular circumstances: both wanted to assert great-power status through empire-building of their own.

Lots of questions here. There seems to be an assumption that 'pretext' is something that just solves any diplomatic problems with waging aggressive war, which as the Nazis showed us over Poland is just not true.

What is the nature of the conveniently timed civil-war in the most stable democracy in central Europe? It can't be ethnic. The Nazis tried to start a terror-action among the Sudeten-Germans, and the Czechoslovak government just sent in the police and kept order.

Why does Italy invade Ethiopia earlier? Why does Hungary pick a fight with a much bigger country? Why woul anything like the m-R pact be signed if Germany wasn't intending to make war on the Entente? Why Poland-Lithuania?

 

[lukedalton]

Why does Italy invade Ethiopia earlier?

This is very simple, Benny want demonstrate that the PFI is better the liberal democracy who replaced, and what's better than conquer Ethiopia, avenge Adua and win when your predecessor failed and at the same time demonstrate to the world how powefull Italy is now (that was basically the main motivation of the Abyssian war), so with a little tweaking, some better management of resource and even a little incident at the border to spin as a casus belli it's not unrealistic that war begin earlier.
Oh Eurofed, i don't think is good for Benny try to eliminate the monarchy without a very very very good reason, the army can have a different opinion and this can cause a severe case of lead poisoning on the dictator, it's more propable that can try to put on the trone someone who can control but he must wait for the death of VEIII. Greece will probably stay on the British side for historycal, political and economic reason, probably some economic treaty with Italy but just that. Romania will probably go for neutrality trying to play both side against the other and a soviet coup in Serbia open a can of worm as is right in the middle of the italian sphere of influence and despite joining the M-R like pact it will not sit very well with Rome, except that maybe a communist serbia is 'accepted' in exchange of stop support communist (or any other guerrillas) in the former Yugoslavia and accept the division and for that Italy entere the M-R pact

 

[Dunois]

IBC is really spot on about rightist regimes not necessarily being expansionists.

There is no equivalent in France of Italian irrendentism for example and even less of German pangermanism. No political party in France openly clamoured for annexing Belgium or the left bank of the Rhine during the interwar period. Even ultranationalists like Déroulède did not want France to annex parts of Belgium, according to some research I did yesterday they even wanted to partition the left bank of the Rhine with the Belgians!

The areas which an irrendist/expansionist/Greater French movement could plausibly claim would be the following by order of likelyhood:
-Saarland and parts of the left bank of the Rhine. This is by far the most likely scenario both in order to gain more coal deposits and to obtain a more defensible border againsyt Germany.
-Luxembourg. There was apparently some pro French agitation in 1918 and 1919 but unlike Belgium, France did not actively try to annex the Great Duchy.
-The entire left bank of the Rhine. Only extremists which were very much in the minority asked for this post war. France would have been equally happy with a Rhenish puppet state.
-Wallonia/Belgium. This was not even on the agenda of most nationalists, modern rattachism was far far far from being on the horizon at the time. France resigned herself that she could not annex Belgium after its failed "secret" attempt in 1866.
-Romandy/French speaking Switzerland. The region was not even part of France during the Napoleonic wars. There has moreover never been any pro French movement or pro French feelings in the area, Swiss nationalism is a very solid creature.
-Aosta Valley+Occitan speaking Italian valleys of Piedmont. France made a semi serious attempt at annexing these after world war two, chiefly because the fascist regime had persecuted and forcibly Italianised the inhabitants of these areas (it has been a very successful cultural genocide by the way since almost no one speaks French in Aosta nowadays). Before world war two however, no one cared about these areas at all, most nationalist movement saw Italy as a "Latin sister" and ally.
-Catalonia. This has never been on the radar, an argument could be made for it but a very tenous and iffy on.

The only way I could see a very expansionist movement gaining traction in France would be if France is defeated during the war or of the war ends in a draw (but then the Entente will be maintained and strengthened). The main concern of most French nationalists until world war two was not gaining more territory. It rather was ensuring that the French population would grow as fast as the German one. The "demographic gap" between France and Germany was a huge concern at the time and instead of wasting money on foreign ventures, spending money on pro-natalist and pro family ventures is far more likely in my opinion. But then the socialists or radicaux are equally likely to do this ...

Eurofed if you want a more multipolar Europe during the 1940s and 1950s you have several alternative options at your disposal:
-A Fascism-Democracy-Neutrals-Communism post WW2 division. Kind of what Dr Strangelove timeline will look like actually.
-A disunited Democratic western Europe after WW2. This is what will happen to a degree in my TL, a Franco-British bloc on one side, a Germano-Italian one on the other, with the rest of free Europe divided between them.

 

[Kelenas]

Hmm, what about the Netherlands (either before or after a nationalist takeover) initially intervenes in the Belgian conflict against France, but they suffer a decisive defeat and get turned in a client of France as a result. Paris prefers to mollify the Dutch by letting them keep their own state and getting the Flanders.

Certainly possible, but then their puppet regime in the Netherlands isn't going to enjoy much popularity, if any at all. No doubt Germany's going to try its best to exploit the situation by sponsoring agitators and resistance groups within the country.

Scandinavia may align with Germany b/c the latter looks like better protection against the Soviets, and/or the pro-German Swedes get their way on this within the union, and/or German irredentism on Danish territory is deemed an unimportant issue by all (it was so fringe that even Hitler did not bother to fulfill it).

Could work if whatever treaty they sign includes Germany abandoning/forfeiting their claims on northern Sleswig-Holstein. That might satisfy the Danes.

- Kelenas

 

[Eurofed]

Certainly possible, but then their puppet regime in the Netherlands isn't going to enjoy much popularity, if any at all. No doubt Germany's going to try its best to exploit the situation by sponsoring agitators and resistance groups within the country.

Certainly so to some degree, but in all likelihood neither France nor Germany are going to press the issue to the extreme consequences until and unless they decide the time for their endgame has come.

Could work if whatever treaty they sign includes Germany abandoning/forfeiting their claims on northern Sleswig-Holstein. That might satisfy the Danes.

I see no difficulty whatsoever for Germany to provide that kind of guarantee to Scandinavia. Potential German irredentism on Schleswig had so little following that even Nazi Germany did not bother to enforce it after they defeated and occupied Denmark (differently from A-L, Luxemburg, and South Tyrol).

 

[Eurofed]

I wish people wouldn't assume that far-right = expansionist, always and forever. The British and French right-wings were committed to maintaining their empires against outside powers and subversion. That Italy and Germany's regimes were expansionist was a product of their particular circumstances: both wanted to assert great-power status through empire-building of their own.

This assertion is quite true as it concerns British far-right, potentially not much so as it concerns the French one. Or better, it depends on which faction of the tripartite French far right gets dominant. There was one, the populist-militarist "Bonapartists", that had a sizable imperialist-expansionist streak.

Lots of questions here. There seems to be an assumption that 'pretext' is something that just solves any diplomatic problems with waging aggressive war, which as the Nazis showed us over Poland is just not true.

Well, pretexts are just that, but they are certainly not the real reason ITTL several great powers and their regional proxies/clients get away with repeated aggressive expansionism.

Rather, political butterflies make it so that a free-for-all occurs where the vast majority of the great powers (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan) shift to regional expansionism against minor states in a way that by more or less unspoken agreement does not drive any of them to a direct collision course with each other. Since most of them are busy doing their own thing, they do not bother too much to stop the actions of their peers. The other gp are either isolationist and far away from the focus of the storm (USA), or too isolated in their theoretical committment to uphold the status quo to do anything important (UK).

What is the nature of the conveniently timed civil-war in the most stable democracy in central Europe? It can't be ethnic. The Nazis tried to start a terror-action among the Sudeten-Germans, and the Czechoslovak government just sent in the police and kept order.

One must not be a slave to OTL butterflies. The Nazis never were any good in setting up these kinds of proxy destabilization operations (or false flag ones for that matter) with any serious effectiveness. An ATL Germany may potentially do much better at stirring up the unrest of Sudetenfolk, Slovaks, and CZS Hungarians, and throwing plenty of covert support to CZS separatists. Czechoslovakia potentially had plenty of vulnerability to ethnic strife, since the dominant nationality just made up 50% of the population, and the other nationalities did not share any serious active loyalty to the state.

Why does Italy invade Ethiopia earlier?

What Lukedalton said. In addition, I point out that Italy and Ethiopia had a serious border incident in 1934. Rome might easily decide to pick it up as a casus belli then and there (and if necessary, butterflies might cause it to occur a bit earlier).

Why does Hungary pick a fight with a much bigger country?

They have a quite sizable and dearly felt irredentist score to settle. They have support from their German-Italian patrons, and to some degree may be aware that the strategic situation is gearing up to trap Romania into a pincer (i.e. other countries are likely to intervene and backstab Bucharest).

Why woul anything like the m-R pact be signed if Germany wasn't intending to make war on the Entente?

Poland delenda est. Both the Germans and the Soviets (and the Italians in their own niche) come to realize that despite ideological differences, they may share a potential interest to dismantle the Versailles settlement in Eastern Europe and replace it with their own preferred order and spheres of influence, and they can do it in relative safety if they establish temporary, opportunistic cooperation.

Why Poland-Lithuania?

Storywise, a fanciful butterfly. In the TL's internal logic, a bone thrown to the defeated Poles to make them a bit less bitter towards their new German overlords about their fate.

 

[Eurofed]

This is very simple, Benny want demonstrate that the PFI is better the liberal democracy who replaced, and what's better than conquer Ethiopia, avenge Adua and win when your predecessor failed and at the same time demonstrate to the world how powefull Italy is now (that was basically the main motivation of the Abyssian war), so with a little tweaking, some better management of resource and even a little incident at the border to spin as a casus belli it's not unrealistic that war begin earlier.

Yep, very much so.

Oh Eurofed, i don't think is good for Benny try to eliminate the monarchy without a very very very good reason, the army can have a different opinion and this can cause a severe case of lead poisoning on the dictator, it's more propable that can try to put on the trone someone who can control but he must wait for the death of VEIII.

Good point. As I said, I was so uncertain about the compatibility of this butterfly with the overall vibe of the scenario that I did not include it in the original version.

Greece will probably stay on the British side for historycal, political and economic reason, probably some economic treaty with Italy but just that.

Uhm, I was thinking that Greece may fairly easily decide to join the German-Italian bloc, and the Italian sphere of influence, when Bulgaria becomes a Soviet client. It just looks so neat from a geopolitical PoV. Your argument for them staying a UK client has merit, but IMO is not necessarily an inevitable outcome. Greece may join the 'Axis' bloc while keeping sizable economic and political ties with Britain. As long as Britain keeps a neutral stance towards the European blocs, such double ties are nto necessarily incompatible.

Romania will probably go for neutrality trying to play both side against the other

Theoretically speaking, it is a quite possible, but I doubt that much of an advisable, course. They have just been screwed badly from the Axis-Comintern pincer, and TTL looks like quite a dangerous and instable place for neutral minor states not strongly tied to a great power patron. Romania may quite easily and even rather likely look far too valuable to be accepted as a neutral buffer state.

and a soviet coup in Serbia open a can of worm as is right in the middle of the italian sphere of influence and despite joining the M-R like pact it will not sit very well with Rome, except that maybe a communist serbia is 'accepted' in exchange of stop support communist (or any other guerrillas) in the former Yugoslavia and accept the division and for that Italy entere the M-R pact

You are right on both points. On one hand, the 'M-R' spheres of influence in the Balkans might have beeen defined so that the Soviet one includes Serbia and Bulgaria, while the Italian one includes the rest of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. In order to make this settlement any really stable and balanced, in addition to the agreement you mention the scenario should also entrench the butterfly of Greece joining the Italian sphere of influence. Alternatively, I can expunge the butterfly of Serbia joining the Soviet sphere of influence and keep it in the Italian one (although the Serbs would be kinda unruly clients for the Italians, like the Dutch for the French and the Poles for the Germans). I welcome suggestions on this.

 

[Eurofed]

@Dunois (and IBC): I do not make any assumption about the various butterflies that make up this scenario necessarily being high-probability ones, but neither any of them look like extremely implausible ones. OTOH, France taking the described course, broadly speaking, is an integral and necessary part of the scenario as conceived.

Yes, a French nationalist regime would care to implement various natalist policies to try and lessen the "demographic gap" with Germany (and Russia). This in no way necessarily precludes setting up a number of expansionist schemes in Western Europe, especially if they do not involve any major war. That French nationalism did not take this course in our 20th century does not necessarily mean there is a butterfly net making it impossible, since it did happen to some degree in the 19th century, there is a component of the French far right which is potentially liable to go this way, and interwar European politics were quite volatile anyway.

In the list of potential irredentist-expansionist targets you made, the Saar and the Rhineland have obvious and very very serious problems in the face of a resurgent strong German military power. To a lesser degree, this is also true as it concerns Aosta in the face of a TTL not-so-crappy Italian military power allied with a resurgent Germany. For whatever butterfly reason, TTL assumes that the various revisionist great powers make an unspoken agreement to not go to the throat of their peers in their expansionist cycle (at least for a good while) if it can be avoided, and instead feed on the flesh of minor states instead.

In comparison Belgium was very valuable (its coal mines can prop up French economy just as good as Rhenish ones), half of it is ethnically-linguistically compatible, its national consciousness potentially not so ironclad. I admit that Luxemburg was kinda off my radar as I wrote the OP scenario, but I glady admit it may easily be a secondary expansionist target of this France, and potentially grabbed in the course of the Belgian conflict. Just like French seizure of the Netherlands, it would piss off the Germans to some extent, but provided they are busy crushing CZS and Poland at the time, Paris can get away with it (and the reverse is also true, obviously).

As it concerns French-speaking Switzerland, it is another potential target, but for the reasons you quote, rather more far off the road, if any, than the Low Countries. Catalonia I agree is tenous enough that I did not include France grabbing pieces of it from Spain as its compensation for the help in the SCW (although a potential case might be made for it since the Spaniards are helped to get Portugal as a reward anyway).