A Morning in France

At this point I'm ceasing the 'narrative' such as it is. While I have a lot on my shelves for actions up to around 10:00 to 11:00 6th June my books covering the inland fight are thin. I have a lot less on the decisions or actions of the regiment & division commanders after 11:00. More important is the the knock on effects of the PoD. Those are diverging in a larger way from the historical sequence & I'm wanting to digest the possibilities as it were. That is get some input from the gentle readers, and eventually game out the 6th June battle under the PoD. The last is not going to be easy, for while there are a lot of games on Op Neptune & the assault I've never seen one where the designer considered the effects of complete tactical surprise at the 05:10 sunrise.

A couple years ago while reading 'The Germans in Normandy' by Hargreaves I realized there was actually very little tactical warning of the amphibious fleet approaching & assault. Cross checking a few other sources seems to confirm this. No air reconissance on 4th or 5th June spotted or reported the invasion fleet moving into the channel. Patrol boats were ver thin. There seems to have been one out of Le Hrave & its not clear if it got a coherent report off. There also was a utility boat repairing a navigation bouy, which seems to have failed to warn anyone. The German radar was effectively spoofed according to post campaign intelligence analysis. that is I could not find any warnings of ships spotted at sea from the shore based radar station. The exception would a station north of Calais that was left unjumed and un bombed so that it could 'see' the deception op simulating a fleet approaching Calais area in the early morning of the 6th.

Bottom line is the only warning I've found so far that triggered the alert of the 15th Army was the airborne operation. That operation started at 01:30, or 12:30 by German accounts. By 02:00 the 7th Army had officially ordered the highest alarm level. That sent the soldiers to their anti invasion stations, & started the paratroop chases. Here is where it gets interesting. The soldiers designated for the beach defense did not live or sleep in the bunkers. The bulk of them were billeted in French buildings ranging from 200 to 4000 meters from the beach. Exactly how many would have stood watch in the CP & & guard in the weapons positions I have nothing useful from German sources. Drawing from my own military experience then two men per company of battalion CP bunker, two guards per weapon position, & other scattered sentries would place something like 20% of the total strength at battle positions. The next question is how long did it take for the Germans to stand up the beach defense once alerted after 01:30? The accounts I have indicate the platoons & companies were mostly mustered between 02:00 & 02:30 & on their way. these also suggest it took between 90 & 150 minutes to bring most of the beach positions to full strength. One key indicator is that at near 05:00 the company commanders were starting to rotate small numbers of the soldiers to breakfast.

So, the question that emerged from this is what would happen had there been nothing to alert 7th Army until sunrise & the visual revelation of the invasion fleet at anchor 5000 meters off shore?

Delaying the airborne assault by 4-5 hours to first usable;e light, after 05:15 seems to been the principle PoD. At this point why the delay is for a separate study. Its not ASB, tho there are good arguments for the very early morning start. The point here is what happens if the decision is made for a dawn para op vs a 01:30 start.

So it boils down to the defenders doing their usual morning muster & activities when the first light on the Seine Bay reveals the invasion fleet. Between the movement time to the defense positions, and the interdiction by the naval gunfire on the suspected positions, air attacks, and the shift of the naval fires from the beach to inland targets it would be problematic for the defenders to reach their assigned positions by 06:30/06:35 when the UTAH & OMAHA beach assaults started. Keeping in mind most of the beach defenders were from the low quality static divisions there is the question of how many would push forward when under fire, and what the losses might be. The losses to many being caught by air attacks, including the heavy bomber attack that missed O beach & landed 1-3 kilometers inland, or caught disorganized by the paras dropping from 05:15 or 05:30 are another question.

At this point I placed the relative strength for U & O Beaches at 30% average. While I don't see that degrading defensive fires vs the first assault waves from 06:30 to 07:00 a degradation of the beach dense in the first hour seems very likely. Where only one or two men man a weapon just one casualty effectively puts it out of action. There is are also fatigue & morale factors where the defense is badly undermanned and this level of surprise is had. In this outline I've placed the resistance nests being neutralized within two hours or less from the landing time on a specific beach. In some cases that comes close to the OTL time. In others it is far ahead.

Any way, if the PoD is given then the questions are:

How fast could the Germans alert the defending battalions if the Allied fleet is not spotted until early light?

How fast could the defenders move to the beach & infiltrate through the incoming naval & aircraft attacks. That is if the OTL defense is the 100% mark the how effective is the defense in this condition?

How much easier would it be for the assault in this situation, & how much is the advance during the morning accelerated?
 
It's a very interesting PoD, but slightly unlikely as the Allies expected the minesweepers in advance of the landing fleet to be identified late on D-1.

Delaying the airborne landings has several effects on the Allied side:
- deconflicting the troop carrier aircraft and US heavy bombers needs some thought
- the special missions of the 6th Airborne (Orne and Dives bridges, Merville battery) become more difficult
- aircraft losses might be higher
- US division landings should be far more effective - battalions will be concentrated and ready for action

On the German side the response will be delayed as noted:
- less alert troops at the beaches
- slower ammunition release and distribution
- reserve troops not alerted - IIRC 352nd reserves were concentrated around St Lo and so will be much later to the battle
- however the reserves will not have spent the night running/cycling around Normandy

The German armoured reserves will be slower to respond with a later alert, and will be moving in daylight.

Given the location of 21st Panzer, capturing Caen on D-Day is not feasible. However capturing Bayeux and Carentan might be possible, and depending on beach congestion getting Allied armoured brigades to Evrecy and Villers-Boacge (or at least south of the Caen-Bayeux road) is also possible.

The casualty ratio will also change with fewer Allied losses on the beaches, and higher German casualties from impromptu counter-attacks. During the first few critical days, this should result in the Allied frontline being further inland before defences start to thicken, with a possible D+3 front line close around Caen, along the Odon to Villers-Boacge, Caumont, close around St Lo, Carentan, St Sauvery, with the west coast of the Cotentin peninsula reached within a week, and Cherbourg opened sooner.

After that it's up to the generals on both sides.
 
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It's a very interesting PoD, but slightly unlikely as the Allies expected the minesweepers in advance of the landing fleet to be identified late on D-1.

Thats what has really surprised me, the lack of contact or sighting by the Germans. I need to dig out the descriptions of the two boats that did bump into the fleet during the 5/6 June night. I remember both those as out of Le Havre. I'd have thought there would have been a patrol out of Cherbourg. There may have been a inertia within the German command over recognition of warnings. They had rated the possibility very low due to the storm. Scheduling the map exercise for Army Group G came close to paralyzing the 7th Army on the 6th. Some of the commanders from regiment to army level were already at Rennes & had the alert not been sounded many more would have been on the road to the exercise were there no warning.

Delaying the airborne landings has several effects on the Allied side:
- deconflicting the troop carrier aircraft and US heavy bombers needs some thought

The difference in altitude alone make this a nonproblem in my experience. Also they are over different target areas. Its the brief appearance of the mediums of the 9th Bomber Div over UTAH Beach that is the tricky one. Other early morning missions by the tactical airforces around Caen may be a problem as well.

- the special missions of the 6th Airborne (Orne and Dives bridges, Merville battery) become more difficult
- aircraft losses might be higher

Yes and yes

The airborne plan might be reworked yet again. I was surprised to find major revisions in the airborne op in May, weeks after Monty had 'locked' the amphibious plan in
April.

On the upside for the Germans they may not have lost the commander of the 91st Div to the paras in the first hours.
 
It's a very interesting PoD, but slightly unlikely as the Allies expected the minesweepers in advance of the landing fleet to be identified late on D-1. ....

What I recall is the minesweepers did the actual sweep south from the control point on the north side of the Channel south to the transport anchorages & the bombardment stations during the night. I don't know if that was the scheduled time for sweep of the lanes south across the Channel, or if it had been delayed by the storm. The north half of the Channel was frequently swept for stray mines and new ones. So, the Germans would not have made anything of minesweepers there, even if they observed them.
 
From Montgomery's briefing on Operation Thunderclap on 7th April:

By dusk on D-1 the enemy will be certain that the NEPTUNE area is to be assaulted in strength

I'll need to go through sources to identify the reason given for this, but IIRC it was because it was expected the minesweepers would be seen, either visually or on radar.
 
They did have to plan on a reasonable case. & the Storm that helped conceal the fleet was not in the plan. Neither could they expect the German radar to be degraded as badly as it was.

The initial landing of Op SHINGLE was a complete tactical surprise, but that seems to be uncommon.
 
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