A more up-front Versailles - would it be better for Germany?

Well, if the French annex the Rhineland and all of Silesia goes to a Polish state Germany is pretty much done for.

No-one for a moment considered giving all of Silesia to Poland.

The Czechs however were pushing for Silesia to be restored to them.

And I really don't think Germany would be done for even after such losses. Even the Rhineland only contains 7 million people. It'd be a heavy hit to Germany's industrial power, but not enough to push her out of the GP ranks, or even enough to push her out of the ranks of the top GPs.

The areas that would be taken would be hardly critical to German war making, leaving her economically able to bulk herself up like crazy industrially if she so chooses, she'd regain basically everything she lost the instant she reoccupies the territory, and would leave her justified in taking it back by force.

Ummm. Silesia and the Rhineland were important industrial areas, so while their loss could be recovered from, they're heavy blows. Also, the Rhineland is extremely important strategically. It's a strong defensive barrier and it's hard for France to invade Germany or Germany invade France across it.

fasquardon
 
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FBKampfer

Banned
Ummm. Silesia and the Rhineland were important industrial areas, so while their loss could be recovered from, they're heavy blows. Also, the Rhineland is extremely important strategically. It's a strong defensive barrier and it's hard for France to invade Germany or Germany invade France across it.

fasquardon

Important, not crucial. And industry was relocated, destroyed and rebuilt, and run up as new construction all the time even IOTL. This Versailles merely gives 5 years of economic hardship, something easily endured at need.

If I'm tasked with leading Germany to victory over the Entente nations by 1950 and I have to pick OTL Versailles or this one, I'll certainly pick this one.

OTL is lost time, this is lost space. Space can be recovered, time cannot.
 
No-one for a moment considered giving all of Silesia to Poland.

Thats incorrect, but besides the point.
The Czechs however were pushing for Silesia to be restored to them.

And I really don't think Germany would be done for even after such losses. Even the Rhineland only contains 7 million people. It'd be a heavy hit to Germany's industrial power, but not enough to push her out of the GP ranks, or even enough to push her out of the ranks of the top GPs.

What does a Great Power mean to you? Germany would have no iron or coal with the loss of these territories. Their entire economy would be destroyed and stuck in a destitute spiral for a very long time without external intervention. How does Germany rebuild its economy if most of its prewar industry has been captured, converted, and liquidated by the victors? How do they acquire the hard currency to import those aforementioned fundamental materials which are required for any industrial economy?
 
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One thing to remember about Brest- litowski is that the initial subject was way more modest and the terretory taken got so large to get the sovjets to stop using the conference as a rhetorical forum and start signing.
Also, ToV and self- determination was applied very one- sided. What's the point of granting terretory of one minority to a victor state in the name of self- determination If that creates huge new minorities of the loosers ethniticy? Sudetenland, transilvania comming to my mind here.
Population exchanges might have been a better idea here.
 
One thing to remember about Brest- litowski is that the initial subject was way more modest and the terretory taken got so large to get the sovjets to stop using the conference as a rhetorical forum and start signing.
Also, ToV and self- determination was applied very one- sided. What's the point of granting terretory of one minority to a victor state in the name of self- determination If that creates huge new minorities of the loosers ethniticy? Sudetenland, transilvania comming to my mind here.

Umm. I'd say the modest initial start and growing demands had more to do with the deteriorating military situation of the Soviets. The Germans gained alot of advantage during the negotiating period, so increased their demands and eventually the Soviets realized that they had to choose either peace or war.

One of the problems is that "national self determination" necessarily involved drawing arbitrary and unfair lines - depending on your exact criteria every state in Europe fell short in some way or another and it would only be the mass murder of WW2 that would mostly "fix" the problem.

Population exchanges might have been a better idea here.

It was considered but it was quickly realized that many millions would die during the exchanges - as they did in OTL after WW2 made the victors desperate enough to actually try them.

The truth is, getting people to move in these sorts of numbers requires force and force (not to mention poor travelling conditions and insufficient facilities to receive the refugees) means death. Population exchange is murder. For it to be considered, WW1 probably needs to get much worse.

Thats incorrect, but besides the point.

Are you thinking of the blue area on this map? That is (Bohemian) Silesia. At no point whatsoever was anyone thinking of giving all that to Poland after WW1! At least not to my knowledge. Am I missing some crazy episode in the peace negotiations?

On the other hand, giving this area to the Czechs was very briefly considered (and quickly discarded). (I'd like to note, I don't think it is likely or desirable that the Czechs would ever gain the area, but I am going for a "maximum plausible territorial losses" scenario that is in keeping, though somewhat tenuously so, with the OTL ideals of the Entente allies.)

What does a Great Power mean to you? Germany would have no iron or coal with the loss of these territories. Their entire economy would be destroyed and stuck in a destitute spiral for a very long time without external intervention. How does Germany rebuild its economy if most of its prewar industry has been captured, converted, and liquidated by the victors? How do they acquire the hard currency to import those aforementioned fundamental materials which are required for any industrial economy?

Um. No. Most of Germany's iron ore and coal are elsewhere.

There's coal in Lusatia and in Middle Germany and iron ore in the Upper Harz and in Lower Saxony.

Heck, most of the Rhineland industrial region is on the east bank of the Rhine, not the West.

Germany would still have more industrial potential that Britain (though of course it also has more vulnerable borders) and would still be leagues ahead of France.

fasquardon
 
Are you thinking of the blue area on this map? That is (Bohemian) Silesia. At no point whatsoever was anyone thinking of giving all that to Poland after WW1! At least not to my knowledge. Am I missing some crazy episode in the peace negotiations?

On the other hand, giving this area to the Czechs was very briefly considered (and quickly discarded). (I'd like to note, I don't think it is likely or desirable that the Czechs would ever gain the area, but I am going for a "maximum plausible territorial losses" scenario that is in keeping, though somewhat tenuously so, with the OTL ideals of the Entente allies.)

You're correct.

Um. No. Most of Germany's iron ore and coal are elsewhere.

There's coal in Lusatia and in Middle Germany and iron ore in the Upper Harz and in Lower Saxony.

Heck, most of the Rhineland industrial region is on the east bank of the Rhine, not the West.

Germany would still have more industrial potential that Britain (though of course it also has more vulnerable borders) and would still be leagues ahead of France.

fasquardon

Germany actually lost most of its iron producing capacity with the French re-acquisition of Moselle, and the Longwy-Briey basin which was located within it.

https://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/0703/report.pdf

If this

So the Danes would get all of Schleswig-Holstein, the Dutch would gain Frisia (while giving up certain lands south of the Rhine to Belgium to make Belgium more defensible and a more functional economic unit), the Poles would gain all of their claims against Germany without plebiscites, the Czechs would gain all of Silesia and France would gain the Saar outright while the Rhineland became an independent state.

happens Germany will loose almost all of its coal. They already lost their iron ore production IOTL, and removing the coke fields of the Rhineland-Westphalia, and Silesia would ruin Germany economically.

If the Sarre coal field is now regarded as French, the Westphalian field contains about 70 per cent of the coal reserves of the German Republic. (See fig. 3.)
 
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Anchises

Banned
I am currently reading André Tardieu's "The Truth About the Treaty", which has some interesting nuggets in it as to how the Entente were actually thinking during the process of negotiating the Versailles treaty. While there was general agreement as to the general shape of the treaty (such as: Germany should be made to pay, Germany should be removed as a threat to international peace and an independent Poland should be created) there was disagreement as to how to achieve the goals. The path followed in OTL was to minimize the amount of territory taken from Germany in the interests of avoiding any encouragement of German Bolshevism, keep Germany as a single economic unit with which the Entente could trade and to minimize the risks Germany wouldn't sign the treaty (a particular anxiety of Lloyd George), instead Germany would be saddled with obligations to be fulfilled over time - a large reparations bill that would be payed out over the course of 30 years or more, the permanent demiliterization of the Rhineland, the removal of Germany to possess certain weapons, to build a large fleet and to maintain a large army. However, early on the Entente powers also considered demanding more territory from Germany, but leaving Germany free to build an army of whatever size she wished and build whatever weapons she wanted.

So what-if Versailles inflicted maximal territorial losses on Germany and reparations up to the limit Germany could pay up-front (estimated by the German delegation as being something like 23 billion gold marks) and had no clauses that required long-term enforcement.

So the Danes would get all of Schleswig-Holstein, the Dutch would gain Frisia (while giving up certain lands south of the Rhine to Belgium to make Belgium more defensible and a more functional economic unit), the Poles would gain all of their claims against Germany without plebiscites, the Czechs would gain all of Silesia and France would gain the Saar outright while the Rhineland became an independent state.

Germany would remain a powerful state with a larger population than France and a larger coal production than Britain. So still a great power.

So... I am curious which Versailles, OTL's or ATL's would lead to the least dangerous Germany during WW2 (let's assume for a moment that Hitler rises to power and is absurdly lucky in the ATL, just as OTL). While the ATL Germany would be smaller, economically weaker and would face a much more challenging invasion of France, it would also have been able to openly develop all types of weapons during the interwar period and would have been able to have a much larger army - which could be very important since the interwar Wehrmacht was severely limited by the lack of trained manpower that resulted from the anaemic Weimar army.

fasquardon

ATLs Germany would be vastly more dangerous. "Avoiding German Bolshevism" is basically dead once you start tearing away majority German areas. The Social Democrats and other Republican parties would be dead in the water from the start, for signing this treaty. Cooperation with the Soviets would be earlier and closer, the Americans would immediately want all of their loans back from France and Great Britain because the treaty kicks everything the Americans fought for in the face.

And angry and pissed of Germans inside another state are a bad idea. It is likely that the ATL Nazis/NatBols can pull of a Czechoslovakia in the countries that are "blessed" with annexing majority German areas. Who would stop them ? Britain that is immediately plunged into a massive financial crisis due to Americans recalling their loans? ITTL the crisis of the Empire that occured after WW1 is going to be more bloody and drawn out. France, who wasn't even able to really occupy the Rhineland IOTL?

Whatever toxic ideology arises from the ashe of Versailles ITTL will be just as toxic and NatSoc but a lot more anti-western. So we might see the horrible crimes of OTLs Eastern Front in France.

Or, hot take I know, the Entente could have enforced the treaty of Versailles. If the treaty of Versailles was properly enforced the German army wouldn't be strong enough to invade anyone.

Hot take, they weren't able to. IOTL they never manged it and if you don't change the American public opinion to ASB levels of indifference, if you don't give France and GB much stronger economies and ASB levels of jingoism, they won't be able to do it in an ATL either.

We can't ignore the massive pressures from America to be lenient with Germany, we can't ignore the fact that Britain was busy with holding together a crumbling Empire and we can't ignore the fact that France lacked the economy or manpower to occupy large parts of Germany for a prolonged time.

With what army? Some people on this forum seem to labor under the delusion that you could simply enforce "Versailles" and then everything would be well. The treaty is defective by design, and it obvious when thinking a bit about it that due to the contrasting agendas and material/political limitations of the Entente members, it was basically only enforcible as long as Germany does not contest it. Of course, violating both convention and precedent by making it a dikat...well, I'll assume you know how OTL played out.

And the more revanchism the treaty includes, the sooner we will see serious German resistance and the nastier the fallout will be. And the Americans will be even less involved, at a certain point they would be so pissed off that they would set off an economic nuke by pressuring the Entente with immediate repayment of their loans.

If anyone in the Entente has the will to occupy Germany for an indefinite, extended period of time, you could dismantle the entire country into a hundred different pieces. It would be a huge economic drain, and potentially horribly gruesome affair which would induce international outrage, but its certainly not impossible. The same type of treaty was imposed on Germany at the end of the Second World War, so it's materially feasible. Given the actors which were involved in the making of Versaille, however, I don't see how anything which is markedly different could be constructed.

In an alternate ASB version where France could afford to mobilize their entire army to occupy areas in Germany for an indefinite period of time, where GB competently stops caring about the Empire and only focuses on Germany, and where the USA is radically indifferent towards human rights it might work. And then the Soviets come in and kick in French and British teeth because the occupying armies are caught in the middle of a massive Pan German revolution while trying to hold back the Soviets (who would be hailed as liberators by the Germans, hey this TL might give you a (Greater German Democratic Republic) that happily does the dirty work for the allies).

Really, where does this persistent myth that Germany winning WW1 would have been better come from? Based on Brest Litovsk, the absolute disaster area that was German politics before and during WW1 and how the Germans treated their occupied territories during ww1, my bet is that the Germans manage to piss off enough countries to form a coalition in under 20 years. These are people who, during the war, were making plans to carve up their own allies once they won.

By not drinking the cool aid about how horrible the Second Empire really was? There were really promising developments happening inside the Kaiserreich and the war only accelerated them.

The Entente meanwhile enacted actually disastrous policies after WW1. A victorious Kaiserreich would have, at the bare minimum, prevented the Soviet take overs of Ukraine etc. We would have, at the bare minimum, seen a more orderly end of A-H. And we would have seen, at the bare minimum, a state that is actually ready to defend the post war order with force if necessary.

And I wonder what coalition do you imagine?

The Eastern States who would be dependent on German protection against the Soviets? Great Britain who would be busy with the colonies?

I can only see a coalition of Italy and France happening and I would argue that this ALT "W"W2 would be a lot less destructive.
 
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Anderman

Donor
No-one for a moment considered giving all of Silesia to Poland.

The Czechs however were pushing for Silesia to be restored to them.


fasquardon

All of it ? If yes that will lead to a interesting demgraphic make up for the Czechoslovak Republic because next to adding 1 million poles to it, there will 4 million
germans added. Which makes germans the single largest ethnic group. Not mayority so.
 
Germany actually lost most of its iron producing capacity with the French re-acquisition of Moselle, and the Longwy-Briey basin which was located within it.

If you look on the map on plate 2, it shows that most of the key Westphalian coal field is on the east side of the Rhine.

As for iron ore, Germany could still import from Sweden, and indeed that would make her production more efficient (indeed, the Lorraine iron ores are extremely low grade, which is why they soon fell out of production - I think in the 1960s in OTL).

As for losing the coal of Silesia (which would end up with Poland as OTL), well... In OTL the Poles were desperate to sell coal to Germany. Germany instead started a trade war as soon as her treaty obligations to trade with Poland elapsed. So, if Germany doesn't start a trade war there she can import plenty of coal (coal which wouldn't be hard to grab early in an alt-WW2).

All of it ? If yes that will lead to a interesting demgraphic make up for the Czechoslovak Republic because next to adding 1 million poles to it, there will 4 million
germans added. Which makes germans the single largest ethnic group. Not mayority so.

Right. I mean, just like I'm not proposing this as a "more fair" Versailles, I'm not saying that Czechoslovakia/Bohemia will be more stable.

But the territorial losses are pretty much the absolute maximum the Entente would ever consider (and to be honest, it's very, very unlikely that the Entente would sign over German Silesia to the Czechs like that).

Whatever toxic ideology arises from the ashe of Versailles ITTL will be just as toxic and NatSoc but a lot more anti-western.

Seriously, is that worse?

A more anti-Western German regime is likely to provoke Western resistance earlier. And if France gets occupied Eastern-Front style, for humanity in general that's going to be worthwhile if it avoids the monstrous disaster that was the German invasion of the Soviet Union and results in a shorter war. It sucks for the French and the Germans sure. But I don't see any reason to play favorites and say that they deserve to be treated any better or worse than any other nation of people.

And angry and pissed of Germans inside another state are a bad idea.

Is that really so much worse for Germany than the anger against reparations and disarmament? From the point of view of the generals, this treaty would actually be better, since while it maims Germany worse territorially, it implicitly recognizes the German right to build an army worthy of a great power and seek redress in future. The OTL treaty really stung the officer class because it stripped Germany of an army worthy of her position (as they saw it) and her right to have an army worthy of her position. It made them afraid that if they didn't do everything they could to undermine Versailles, the proud Prussian military traditions would be lost and the country would fall into the hands of the decadent and the socialists by default.

In an alternate ASB version where France could afford to mobilize their entire army to occupy areas in Germany for an indefinite period of time

France could do this if they kept the income tax after WW1.

What would worry France more is keeping Britain and America happy, which is one of the ways this treaty could go down the dustbin. I could easily see the French deciding in the late 20s or early 30s to get out of the Rhineland since international opinion had shifted against their presence there and the British occupation forces had long ago pulled out. Then down the line a couple years you might see an Anschluss type moment as whatever German regime marched triumphantly over the Rhine to re-unify the region.

And the Americans will be even less involved, at a certain point they would be so pissed off that they would set off an economic nuke by pressuring the Entente with immediate repayment of their loans.

Really? The US would be so angry that they'd torpedo the economies of two of their biggest trading partners and erstwhile allies in the name of one of their biggest trading partners and erstwhile enemy?

I don't see it.

Sure, the US could easily be angry even after their own negotiators had been party to carving Germany up more than OTL - they were generally unhappy about Europe not just getting along in OTL. But angry enough to start a trade/financial war? (And make no mistake - in this era such actions were considered acts of war - indeed, the Treaty of Versailles in OTL had a specific clause that gave the Entente the right to make economic war on Germany should she ever be uncooperative and that the German government could not consider such Entente economic violence as an act of war.)

where the USA is radically indifferent towards human rights

Eh. Let's not white-wash here. The American ideas on human rights in OTL required war and ethnic cleansing to make practical. (Of course, since these ideas were widely shared on both the Entente side and the Central Powers side, it's not really fair to blame the Americans for these ideas - they were widely held.)

If the application of "national self-determination" ended up screwing over Germany as bad as it screwed over the Turks and the Hungarians, would anyone in the former Entente really care? Really? I just don't see it. The Entente found excuses to justify giving Syria to the French, Smyrna to the Italians and Greeks, Transylvania to Romania, all of Vojvodina to Yugoslavia, the lowlands of Slovakia to Slovakia, Lvov to Ukraine, Memmel to Lithuania and Teschen to Poland...

There were really promising developments happening inside the Kaiserreich and the war only accelerated them.

I don't dispute that. What I dispute is that the Germans would be any better at addressing the wounds of a maimed Europe than the Entente were. Europe was seriously messed up by WW1. Seriously, seriously messed up. And whoever wins is going to be left holding the bag. And... I find it hard to imagine that where the French, British and Americans all went "someone else can clean up this mess!" the Germans would decide any different. I mean, it's not like they broke Europe - their allies and enemies in WW1 had done alot of breaking too!

And angry and pissed of Germans inside another state are a bad idea. It is likely that the ATL Nazis/NatBols can pull of a Czechoslovakia in the countries that are "blessed" with annexing majority German areas. Who would stop them ? Britain that is immediately plunged into a massive financial crisis due to Americans recalling their loans? ITTL the crisis of the Empire that occured after WW1 is going to be more bloody and drawn out. France, who wasn't even able to really occupy the Rhineland IOTL?

For sure. And it's one of the reasons why I thought it was interesting to raise this question.

For my own part, here's what I think the possibilities are:

Germany is reduced territorially angry as all heck (but not much more angry due to the lack of the long-term provisions of OTL's treaty). However, she's still able to recover as a great power.

How it goes after that depends very much on whether Germany can regain the lost territories without general war like it did with OTL's Anschluss and taking the Sudetenland and Bohemia. This is especially true with the Rhineland, since if they don't gain that, they basically can't launch a Blitzkreig into France.

How angry the Germans themselves are I don't think matters though. Moral outrage does not win wars.

fasquardon
 

Anchises

Banned
Right. I mean, just like I'm not proposing this as a "more fair" Versailles, I'm not saying that Czechoslovakia/Bohemia will be more stable.

But the territorial losses are pretty much the absolute maximum the Entente would ever consider (and to be honest, it's very, very unlikely that the Entente would sign over German Silesia to the Czechs like that).

Yeah but if Czechoslovakia and all the other states who get a share of Germany are significantly more instable, how is Europe a peacefully/more stable place. I don't assume that Czechoslovakia etc. would start massive ethnic cleansings?

I fail to see how a significantly more instable Europe and a significantly more pissed of Germany can lead to anything that is better than OTL.

The National Socialists were able to utilize German population groups in other states for Propaganda and for intelligence activities. If you have large, pissed off and disenfranchised groups of Germans in the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark and Czechoslovakia the Germans will have ample opportunity for effective propaganda to justify their actions. And, as we see IOTL with Crimea etc., the claim to protect oppressed ethnic brothers and sisters works fairly well. And with a more independent Germany, not hampered by arms control, there are ample ways and opportunities to supply radicalized groups with weapons and training. Every attempt to prevent that, will in turn be useful propaganda to decry the unjust treatment and separation from the Fatherland of the oppressed German minorities.


Seriously, is that worse?

A more anti-Western German regime is likely to provoke Western resistance earlier. And if France gets occupied Eastern-Front style, for humanity in general that's going to be worthwhile if it avoids the monstrous disaster that was the German invasion of the Soviet Union and results in a shorter war. It sucks for the French and the Germans sure. But I don't see any reason to play favorites and say that they deserve to be treated any better or worse than any other nation of people.

Depends on what ideology you get. It think it was Wages of Destruction where the counterfactual of a more "Bolshevik Germany" is discussed. Meaning a Regime that fully shifts its resources to heavy industries and war production, forcibly extracting labor from the agricultural sector and dropping the artisanal character of the German economy.

And in this ATL we might see a more anti-imperialist ideology taking over in Germany, which might allow a real alliance with the Soviets.


Is that really so much worse for Germany than the anger against reparations and disarmament? From the point of view of the generals, this treaty would actually be better, since while it maims Germany worse territorially, it implicitly recognizes the German right to build an army worthy of a great power and seek redress in future. The OTL treaty really stung the officer class because it stripped Germany of an army worthy of her position (as they saw it) and her right to have an army worthy of her position. It made them afraid that if they didn't do everything they could to undermine Versailles, the proud Prussian military traditions would be lost and the country would fall into the hands of the decadent and the socialists by default.

I think losing vast areas of German territory and being torn apart by foreign countries, some of them not even involved in the war, would not be seen as better by the Generals.

And there were serious efforts to build a "Querfront", an alliance of the hard right and the far left. The German communist utilized the Ruhr occupation with nationalist propaganda and there were actual National Socialists/ Bolshevists on the right. There wasn't enough overlap to unite IOTL but in this ATL, with a badly mutilated Germany, there is ample room for understanding. The Generals wouldn't be fine with an internationalist Luxemburgist Germany. A "National Soviet Germany" with a state controlled economy, where the workers control the means of production (*cough,cough*), to reunite Germany and to punish the "Jüdische Hochfinanz" (Jewish Finance Elite) and their lapdogs in Paris and London, that retains a proud German Army that recognizes the tradition of Germans who fought against foreign suppression ? Prussian Generals weren't married to capitalism, a system that uses "worker control" as a fig leaf to justify a rampant military-industrial complex, and that has deeply nationalistic leanings, would be fine for them.


France could do this if they kept the income tax after WW1.

What would worry France more is keeping Britain and America happy, which is one of the ways this treaty could go down the dustbin. I could easily see the French deciding in the late 20s or early 30s to get out of the Rhineland since international opinion had shifted against their presence there and the British occupation forces had long ago pulled out. Then down the line a couple years you might see an Anschluss type moment as whatever German regime marched triumphantly over the Rhine to re-unify the region.

France lacks the manpower or the motivation. The often ridiculed Maginot Line was a direct consequence of the massive manpower losses of WW1. French Industrial Captains were worried about the lack of workers that a large standing army would have brought. A large standing army that would be necessary to occupy unruly Germans.

And if the Germans march triumphantly and France has backed down, what happens then ? France is humiliated and Germany gains momentum in its righteous quest to liberate its oppressed brothers. Pulling out of the Rhineland would be the death sentence for this TLs Versailles. How would Danish or Dutch governments justify holding majority german territories? France their supposed protector just pulled out and gave up.

Really? The US would be so angry that they'd torpedo the economies of two of their biggest trading partners and erstwhile allies in the name of one of their biggest trading partners and erstwhile enemy?

I don't see it.

Sure, the US could easily be angry even after their own negotiators had been party to carving Germany up more than OTL - they were generally unhappy about Europe not just getting along in OTL. But angry enough to start a trade/financial war? (And make no mistake - in this era such actions were considered acts of war - indeed, the Treaty of Versailles in OTL had a specific clause that gave the Entente the right to make economic war on Germany should she ever be uncooperative and that the German government could not consider such Entente economic violence as an act of war.)

Even if the US would not wage "economic war", ITTL I don't think they would help Great Britain and France. How would Britain afford a drawn out war with a truly neutral United States? How would France? This time around there might not even be a blockade, because the USA might not be willing to suspend trade with Germany. This war would be seen as major British and French fuck up. When the news reports about concentration camps and massacres come in it might be far to late for American help, especially if the Soviets side with Germany.

Eh. Let's not white-wash here. The American ideas on human rights in OTL required war and ethnic cleansing to make practical. (Of course, since these ideas were widely shared on both the Entente side and the Central Powers side, it's not really fair to blame the Americans for these ideas - they were widely held.)

If the application of "national self-determination" ended up screwing over Germany as bad as it screwed over the Turks and the Hungarians, would anyone in the former Entente really care? Really? I just don't see it. The Entente found excuses to justify giving Syria to the French, Smyrna to the Italians and Greeks, Transylvania to Romania, all of Vojvodina to Yugoslavia, the lowlands of Slovakia to Slovakia, Lvov to Ukraine, Memmel to Lithuania and Teschen to Poland...

But why was there so much sympathy for the Germans during the Ruhr occupation? I think that comparing Syria or territories on the Balkans to Germany, is not an accurate representation of public opinion in the USA.

I don't dispute that. What I dispute is that the Germans would be any better at addressing the wounds of a maimed Europe than the Entente were. Europe was seriously messed up by WW1. Seriously, seriously messed up. And whoever wins is going to be left holding the bag. And... I find it hard to imagine that where the French, British and Americans all went "someone else can clean up this mess!" the Germans would decide any different. I mean, it's not like they broke Europe - their allies and enemies in WW1 had done alot of breaking too!

The USA were an ocean away, the British had a huge Empire and France was burnt out. All factors that don't apply (or at least to a lesser degree) to a victorious German Reich. The Germans won't allow a Soviet Ukraine, its in their neighborhood! Isolationism isn't an option when you are in the middle of the fucked up continent that the war created.

For sure. And it's one of the reasons why I thought it was interesting to raise this question.

For my own part, here's what I think the possibilities are:

Germany is reduced territorially angry as all heck (but not much more angry due to the lack of the long-term provisions of OTL's treaty). However, she's still able to recover as a great power.

How it goes after that depends very much on whether Germany can regain the lost territories without general war like it did with OTL's Anschluss and taking the Sudetenland and Bohemia. This is especially true with the Rhineland, since if they don't gain that, they basically can't launch a Blitzkreig into France.

How angry the Germans themselves are I don't think matters though. Moral outrage does not win wars.

fasquardon

I don't see a reason why the acquisition of territory without general war wouldn't work ITTL. "Merely walking in their own backyard" would apply to the territories in Denmark or the Netherlands. Great Britain is aware that another war means the end of the Empire, would they really do that for Denmark?

And you said it yourself, the Germans might have fewer territories at the start of the war but their army is better prepared. France is just as burnt out as OTL and Britain also will be hesitant to start this war. I don't see different reactions from the former Entente.
 
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The USA were an ocean away, the British had a huge Empire and France was burnt out. All factors that don't apply (or at least to a lesser degree) to a victorious German Reich.

How would Germany not be burnt out?

Even the US was dizzied by the loss of treasure they endured in WW1.

Good point about the UK and US being far away though.

And you said it yourself, the Germans might have fewer territories at the start of the war but their army is better prepared. France is just as burnt out as OTL and Britain also will be hesitant to start this war. I don't see different reactions from the former Entente.

It's true, this is a possibility. But equally, a different treaty will have effects on the Entente powers. The combination of reparations with an unwillingness to actually enforce the treaty they'd written incentivized some unhealthy behaviour by Britain and France. Getting their pound of flesh up front could well lead to more focus on rebuilding with their own resources (which is basically what had to happen in OTL anyway). I'm not sure what that means for interwar diplomacy and international relations... Maybe not much. Or it may be profound.

But why was there so much sympathy for the Germans during the Ruhr occupation? I think that comparing Syria or territories on the Balkans to Germany, is not an accurate representation of public opinion in the USA.

Oh, so you don't mean the US attitude to human rights at all... You mean their attitude towards German rights... Well, you may be right. But I'm not sure that this would really sway US policy. British actions in Northern Ireland were not looked on well by the US, but ultimately that didn't have much influence on US policy towards Britain. Especially since the PoD requires that the US delegation supports the different approach to the treaty. US public opinion might disagree with what Wilson's team negotiated at Versailles, but the treaty would still be the status quo.

fasquardon
 

Anchises

Banned
How would Germany not be burnt out?

Even the US was dizzied by the loss of treasure they endured in WW1.

Good point about the UK and US being far away though.



It's true, this is a possibility. But equally, a different treaty will have effects on the Entente powers. The combination of reparations with an unwillingness to actually enforce the treaty they'd written incentivized some unhealthy behaviour by Britain and France. Getting their pound of flesh up front could well lead to more focus on rebuilding with their own resources (which is basically what had to happen in OTL anyway). I'm not sure what that means for interwar diplomacy and international relations... Maybe not much. Or it may be profound.



Oh, so you don't mean the US attitude to human rights at all... You mean their attitude towards German rights... Well, you may be right. But I'm not sure that this would really sway US policy. British actions in Northern Ireland were not looked on well by the US, but ultimately that didn't have much influence on US policy towards Britain. Especially since the PoD requires that the US delegation supports the different approach to the treaty. US public opinion might disagree with what Wilson's team negotiated at Versailles, but the treaty would still be the status quo.

fasquardon

1) Sure, financially the Germans were burnt out IOTL. But under the NS-Regime the population was willing to accept a "guns instead of butter" policy that lowered living standards.

In an ATL with a victorious Reich we wouldn't see the sanctions that crippled the economy and we would probably see reparations. So we would probably see a more stable and thriving economy post-war.

The more important factors are demography, geography and national culture though.

America and Britain were far away and had a ton of other geostrategic areas that demanded attention.

France had lower birth rates and simply couldn't afford the losses of WW1. Germany was able to replenish its manpower pool in the "20 year armistice", France wasn't. Imho a major puzzle piece for the weak performance in 1940 was the unwillingness to fight another costly war against Germany. This unwillingness to fight due to the gruesome losses of WW1 caused the archaic military doctrine etc. Money wasn't the issue.

Germany on the other hand had a national culture that heavily favored militarism and military prowess. After a period of rest they would be willing to defend a new pax germanica with military means. France simply was to pacifistic (why die for Danzig indeed...) and Great Britain was focused on India and other colonies. IOTL even after the defeat Freikorps were fighting in the East and in Germany itself.

Also another point: I don't think that Great Britain or France would have spawned an ideology as horrible as National Socialism.

So imho a post-war order with Germany wouldn't have been fair maybe but it would have been stable. Simply because Europe would have been the "price" that a victorious Germany defends and because a victorious Germany would have been willing to kick in teeth to defend that, before it was too late.

2) I still doubt that "getting their pound of flesh" would change much in their ultimate behavior. GB would still be focused on overseas possesions and France would "annex" a restless area full of hostile Germans. The shameful retreat out of the Rhineland that you mentioned would imho just lead to even less willingness to engage in military actions.

3) But U.S. public oppinion could lead to the election of someone that takes a more active approach. And even more crucial: Your intention was to talk about which Germany would be more dangerous.

A Germany that enjoys considerable symphaties in the U.S. prior to WW2 is dangerous. Would we see L and L to Germany? Probably not. Would we see no or not as much support for France and Britain? Not unlikely!

No U.S. support, or "too little too late" would be something that makes Germany more dangerous indirectly. And if the whole conflict is seen as" France and Britain acted like Imperialists and now the Germans reclaim their nation", not much enthusiasm for aiding the old allies is very possible.

When the criminal nature of the German regime becomes publicy known it might be too late...
 
But under the NS-Regime the population was willing to accept a "guns instead of butter" policy that lowered living standards.

Uhhh, no, they weren't. Or at least they weren't willing to until strategic bombing started to really hurt. For most of the war the Nazis did not completely mobilize their economy because they were concerned it would lose them too much popular support.

Money wasn't the issue.

Have you read any histories of the French military in this period, or just pop history overviews? Because I assure you, money was very much an issue that shaped French doctrine.

Germany on the other hand had a national culture that heavily favored militarism and military prowess. After a period of rest they would be willing to defend a new pax germanica with military means. France simply was to pacifistic (why die for Danzig indeed...) and Great Britain was focused on India and other colonies. IOTL even after the defeat Freikorps were fighting in the East and in Germany itself.

It's funny, but before WW2, people considered France to have a culture that favoured militarism and military prowess too. Memories of that Napoleon guy and all. But you fight enough wars and eventually people get tired of them. The Freikorps you are talking about made up less than 1/10th the manpower of the old imperial armies and were mainly motivated by fears of Bolshevism coming into their homes, most German soldiers by 1918 wanted peace so they could just go home and get on with their lives. You really think that something as small as winning WW1 would change that? Change it enough that Germany can mount serious occupations of vast reaches of the east, a big chunk of France and a pile of new colonies? Really?

France had lower birth rates and simply couldn't afford the losses of WW1. Germany was able to replenish its manpower pool in the "20 year armistice", France wasn't.

Germany didn't replenish its manpower pool in the interwar period. They fought WW2 with the generation most decimated by WW1.

3) But U.S. public oppinion could lead to the election of someone that takes a more active approach. And even more crucial: Your intention was to talk about which Germany would be more dangerous.

A Germany that enjoys considerable symphaties in the U.S. prior to WW2 is dangerous. Would we see L and L to Germany? Probably not. Would we see no or not as much support for France and Britain? Not unlikely!

No U.S. support, or "too little too late" would be something that makes Germany more dangerous indirectly. And if the whole conflict is seen as" France and Britain acted like Imperialists and now the Germans reclaim their nation", not much enthusiasm for aiding the old allies is very possible.

When the criminal nature of the German regime becomes publicy known it might be too late...

I think this very much under-estimates the realpolitik that shaped US involvement in WW2. We remember the US involvement as being motivated by goodness and apple pie, but that says more about the American propaganda machine than it does American morality. While individuals like FDR disliked Hitler for moral reasons, he disliked Stalin just as intensely for the same reasons. The difference between the two is that Hitler was kicking the status quo in the teeth and the US profited heavily from that status quo, Stalin wasn't. And even worse, Hitler looked like he might kick the status quo so hard that Germany became a hegemonic power equal to the USA. Which is especially bad when the US imported key resources from the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

If the status quo in an ATL involves a much reduced Germany and political unrest among Germans outside Germany, it effects the US how? Mainly that the German chemical industries may have reduced output and trade less. But there are those in the US who profit from that. It just isn't comparable to losing access to Canadian nickel.

It may generate sympathy for Germany, and that might be enough to see large sections of the US press cheer as Germany dismembers Czechoslovakia and Denmark and annex Austria and the Rhineland. But that happened in OTL anyway. If Germany then went on to annex all of Poland and annihilate France as a great power in a few weeks, I just can't see any US government looking on that benignly.

fasquardon
 

Anchises

Banned
Uhhh, no, they weren't. Or at least they weren't willing to until strategic bombing started to really hurt. For most of the war the Nazis did not completely mobilize their economy because they were concerned it would lose them too much popular support.



Have you read any histories of the French military in this period, or just pop history overviews? Because I assure you, money was very much an issue that shaped French doctrine.



It's funny, but before WW2, people considered France to have a culture that favoured militarism and military prowess too. Memories of that Napoleon guy and all. But you fight enough wars and eventually people get tired of them. The Freikorps you are talking about made up less than 1/10th the manpower of the old imperial armies and were mainly motivated by fears of Bolshevism coming into their homes, most German soldiers by 1918 wanted peace so they could just go home and get on with their lives. You really think that something as small as winning WW1 would change that? Change it enough that Germany can mount serious occupations of vast reaches of the east, a big chunk of France and a pile of new colonies? Really?



Germany didn't replenish its manpower pool in the interwar period. They fought WW2 with the generation most decimated by WW1.



I think this very much under-estimates the realpolitik that shaped US involvement in WW2. We remember the US involvement as being motivated by goodness and apple pie, but that says more about the American propaganda machine than it does American morality. While individuals like FDR disliked Hitler for moral reasons, he disliked Stalin just as intensely for the same reasons. The difference between the two is that Hitler was kicking the status quo in the teeth and the US profited heavily from that status quo, Stalin wasn't. And even worse, Hitler looked like he might kick the status quo so hard that Germany became a hegemonic power equal to the USA. Which is especially bad when the US imported key resources from the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

If the status quo in an ATL involves a much reduced Germany and political unrest among Germans outside Germany, it effects the US how? Mainly that the German chemical industries may have reduced output and trade less. But there are those in the US who profit from that. It just isn't comparable to losing access to Canadian nickel.

It may generate sympathy for Germany, and that might be enough to see large sections of the US press cheer as Germany dismembers Czechoslovakia and Denmark and annex Austria and the Rhineland. But that happened in OTL anyway. If Germany then went on to annex all of Poland and annihilate France as a great power in a few weeks, I just can't see any US government looking on that benignly.

fasquardon

1) Aha, so the National Socialist Regime arguably enacted total economic mobilization to late in war time, and that completely invalidates my argument. Let's see:

a) The whole "total economic mobilization" is muddy water. Several of the measures that are seen as part of it and just took time to take effect. To a certain extent it is certainly true but the Rüstungswunder was at least just as much driven by other factors.

b) If you accuse me of reading pop history I can throw that curveball right back. Living standards dropped under the prewar NS-Regime. I am pretty certain that butter was rationed in 1936 but I need to take a look in my "Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich" (economy in the third reich).

So decreasing living standards for increased armaments production? Seems to me like "guns instead of butter".

2) Money was an issue but the issue that caused the defeat in 1940? I doubt that.

The performance in 1940 seems to be more in line with the experiences of WW1. Sure money limited all participating armies but Germany had far stronger financial constraints.

The whole "Bewegungskrieg and Schwerpunkt" doctrine of the Wehrmacht seems to be the logical development of the Sturmtruppen of WW1. France meanwhile seems to have been still in the defensive mindset of WW1. I really don't see how military mistakes like not conducting the Saar offensive, had their roots in insufficient funding.

3) Why would Germany mount a massive occupation of France or the East ?

Sure we would have seen satellite states in the East. I don't think a massive occupation would have happened. What would have been the reason for massive resistance? Hey we want to get concquered by the Soviets?

And German wargoals quickly focused on the East, so I don't see massive occupations there.

And the 1/10th is not a representative number. Sure many were war weary but the fact that there was forced demilitarization prohibits us from getting a realistic picture.

4) Gemany had higher birthrates than France. So more young men to "burn".

5) I don't see them getting involved in another "European adventure", if the government signed a highly unpopular peace treaty last time. Last time Americans died for imperialist interests of others, now the population is supposed to fund and/or sacrifice boys again, because France and Britain screwed up the peace treaty ?
 
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