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In the wake of the Franco-Prussian war, Germany was born and France's empire crumbled, it's successor republic being almost relegated to second-rate power for decades. The war created permanent animosity between the two state - many raise the point that this permanent animosity could have been avoided without the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Thats a POD that Ive seen explored here in the past.

However, Bismark had figured this out quite well - and its why he initially argued against this annexation, and then argued for moderation in other terms. The level of the victory however allowed Germany considerable leverage and had future French animosity been accepted as fact - rather than managed through compromises in the peace treaty, its quite obvious that the Germans would have been able to push (occupied) Paris harder.

There are red lines that couldnt be crossed; for example, Britain demanded that the Pas-de-Calais remain French and Berlin profusely promised it. However, France was able to raise 50 billion worth of guarantees to rebuild - showing that the 5 billion reparations that Berlin demanded could have been higher. Territorially, with much of Northern France occupied, it would have been possible to demand more as well. Decades later during the great war, historians regarded the 71 peace as a "gentleman's peace" when describing it's terms compared to what they would be at the end of the Great War.

If we think in terms of maximum German war aims in 1870, a few things come to mind. First of all, given France's historical ease to raise credit, with hindsight, it seems obvious they could have been forced to pay 10 billion reichsmarks rather than 5. (They themselves floated this figure in exchange for keeping Alsace-Lorraine but were turned down). Next, since the Germans can safely say that Paris triggered the crisis that led to this war over the fate of germanic Luxemburg, they have grounds to demand it's inclusion into the second Reich, and finally, since the Longwy-Briey iron fields in "French" Lorraine and the small slice of southern Alsace that had remained French were the territorial objectives of Germany in France during the Great War, it seems quite logical that Berlin could, ultimately, see these territories as desirable to own much earlier if they decided that French animosity was inevitable. In essence, I believe this would mean that all of Alsace, and a much greater portion of Lorraine would become Reichsland.

It would also place the new border much closer to the pre-Westphalia border between France and the HRE. It would also mean a substantially larger French-speaking, hard to assimilate minority on the western borders of the Reich - something that historically was more than offset by the natural riches of Elsass-Lorthigen in the eyes of Berlin.

In terms of German domestic policy, such a change (opposite to the scenario most often explored in alternate history) would likely require Bismark's approval to radically crush the French at the expense of creating a permanent enemy - it would however rally pan-german nationalists to an even higher degree. I believe such strong terms are possible to sell domestically if there is political will.

In terms of French domestic policy, Revanchisme would obviously take greater precedence in the political agenda of the resulting Republique, but there would be a significant loss of power compared to the terms of OTL. The lost regions would give Germany greater preeminence in western Europe and make France a less powerful partner in the eyes of Germany's foes. Lost treasure might even hamper colonization efforts that followed in OTL.

In terms of getting agreements on the terms themselves, its likely that the final peace might take a little longer, and that Britain's view of Berlin would be slightly worse as a result - after all, pushing for this level of gain would destabilize the balance of power a little more, and thus might mean an earlier Franco-British agreement. Immediate opposition is however highly unlikely as these terms would still respect the tacit 1870 agreements which were not to try to destroy France as a state, not to take the Pas-de-Calais or threaten Belgium's territorial integrity.

In terms of longer-term balance of power, however, these German gains might be sufficient to tip the balance of power in a future general war, and would significantly improve the lines of battle in an hypothetical "Schlieffen plan" should the need still arise to invade France again a few decades later.

Benefiting from full hindsight, a pure German nationalist with a belliquose streak might thus argue that Bismark's error was not to antagonize France - but rather than to antagonize it without reaping the full rewards in exchange. The "gentleman's peace" was too harsh to ensure France's amity, and too soft to prevent future conflict - a bit like Versailles is occasionally said to be.

I propose we explore this scenario, where it is made as harsh as possible without provoking immediate British retaliation. How do you believe the next few decades would look like with a second Reich with more French gold, Luxembourg, and more French territory, under its thumb?
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